PER CURIAM:*

Juan Manuel Cerda, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which upheld an order of an Immigration Judge (IJ) denying his application for cancellation of removal and ordering him removed from the United States. The IJ found that Cerda was deportable and that he was not eligible for cancellation of removal because his prior assault conviction under Texas Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1) was for a crime involving moral turpitude that made him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Because § 22.01(a)(1) proscribes some forms of assault that are not morally turpitudinous, the denial of Cerda's cancellation of removal application rested on the modified categorical approach, which the IJ and BIA used to narrow his prior conviction by reference to state court documents in accordance with Esparza-Rodriguez v. Holder, 699 F.3d 821, 824-26 (5th Cir. 2012).

In Gomez-Perez v. Lynch, 829 F.3d 323, 328 n.5 (5th Cir. 2016), we recently held that to the extent Esparza-Rodriguez treated § 22.01(a)(1) as divisible and thus amenable to the modified categorical analysis, it has been overruled by Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016). The parties now agree that remand is warranted. Accordingly, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the decision of the BIA, and REMAND the case for further consideration of whether Cerda meets the other requirements to be considered for cancellation of removal, and if so, whether he is entitled to that relief as an exercise of the immigration court's discretion.