The two principal issues raised in this case are (1) whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the award of erroneously withheld Social Security Act benefits in an action under the judicial review provisions of the Act and (2) whether the district court's order is so ambiguous as to require remand for clarification. We answer both questions in the negative and affirm the district court's judgment granting relief to the plaintiff class.

On September 1, 1972, plaintiff Roland Wright applied for husband's insurance benefits under § 202(c) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(c).1 The Secretary denied Wright's initial application for failure to satisfy the one-half support requirements of § 202(c)(1)(C). That decision was affirmed in subsequent administrative appeals; Wright received the last administrative decision denying his claim on August 21, 1975. He and his wife filed this action on October 8, 1975 challenging the constitutionality of § 202(c)(1)(C) and seeking to represent two classes:

(1) All applicants for husbands' insurance benefits under § 202(c) of the Social Security Act . . . whose applications, requests for reconsideration, hearings, or Appeals Council reviews have been denied solely because of the statutory requirement in 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C) that husbands must have received more than half of their support from their wives in order to be entitled to benefits and . . . such denials have occurred since the 60th day prior to October 5, 1973, . . .; and (2) the insured, married women wage-earners eligible for Social Security benefits whose husbands would be eligible to receive husbands' benefits were it not for the requirement in 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C) that husbands have been receiving more than half their support from their wives in order to qualify for benefits.

The Secretary did not file an answer until March 1, 1976. Plaintiffs submitted interrogatories to the Secretary designed at least in part to elicit information necessary to establish the class action allegations in the complaint. The Secretary moved to stay the proceedings; after the parties had briefed the issue, the district court denied the motion on September 24, 1976. Finally, on November 15, 1976 the Secretary filed initial responses to plaintiffs' interrogatories. Plaintiffs moved to certify the classes on February 22, 1977.

Before the Secretary's response was due, however, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 97 S. Ct. 1021, 51 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1977),2 holding that the provisions of § 202(f)(1)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 402(f) (1)(D), which required a widower seeking benefits under the Act to establish that at the time of his wife's death he "was receiving at least one-half of his support" from her, violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment since no similar proof was required of widows. Less than three weeks later, the Court summarily affirmed three district court decisions, holding that the similar requirements of § 202(c)(1)(C) offended the Fifth Amendment.3 We are informed by the Secretary that "pursuant to" these decisions he "paid, from the effective date of their applications, benefits to all individuals who had obtained a 'final decision' of the Secretary denying them benefits (solely on the basis of § 202(c)(1)(C)), who had instituted suit pursuant to section 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(g)." Accordingly, Roland Wright received husband's insurance benefits "effective from September, 1971."4 After paying him retroactive benefits and apparently certifying him for prospective benefits as well, See 42 U.S.C. § 405(i), the Secretary moved to dismiss the action as moot.

The district court denied the motion and certified the two classes,5 ruling that the certification related back to the date the complaint was filed.6 The court found that class action allegations covering the members of the class plaintiffs sought to represent were pending in other cases between the time of the Secretary's final denial of the Wright claim and the date the Wrights filed their complaint.7 The 60-day limitation for filing complaints under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) was therefore tolled until after this action was commenced.8 Finally, since the husband class was limited to those who had received denials based Solely on 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C), the district court concluded that each member of the husband class had received a "final decision of the Secretary" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Califano v. Goldfarb, supra, 430 U.S. at 203 n. 3, 97 S. Ct. 1021; Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764-767, 95 S. Ct. 2457, 45 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1975).9 Having found that it had jurisdiction to review the Secretary's decision as to each member of the husband class, the court, relying on Goldfarb, Silbowitz, Jablon, and Abbott, supra note 3, entered summary judgment on the merits for plaintiffs, reversing the Secretary's eligibility determination in each case and ordering him,

to pay each class member all the benefits he would have received had his application for husband's insurance benefits been granted originally without regard to the support requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C).

Before turning to the Secretary's sovereign immunity contention, we must deal with two contentions concerning our jurisdiction.

The Secretary contends that the district court had no jurisdiction over the claims of the absent class members because the judicial review provisions of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), only permit individual actions. The Supreme Court rejected this contention in Califano v. Yamasaki, --- U.S. ----, 99 S. Ct. 2545, 61 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1979), decided after the oral argument in the case at bar:10

where the district court has jurisdiction over the claims of the members of the class in accordance with the requirements set out in § 205(g) (42 U.S.C. § 405(g)), it also has the discretion under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23 to certify a class action for the litigation of those claims.

Id. 99 S.Ct. at 2558. Since each member of the husband class met the requirements of § 205(g), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), as construed in Weinberger v. Salfi, supra,11 the court had jurisdiction over each of their claims. The certification of the wife class is academic since no relief was granted as to them. See note 5, Supra.

Next, the Secretary contends that after Roland Wright had been paid the case was moot and therefore the district court should have dismissed the action. Plaintiffs respond that the case was not moot even as to Wright because the Secretary's erroneous denial of benefits had not been formally reversed. In the alternative, plaintiffs contend that even if Wright's claim was moot, the claims of the other members of the class were not, and therefore the court properly entered judgment on the merits for them. Of course, plaintiffs' alternative contention depends on the validity of the proposition that the court's certification of the class could relate back to the time the complaint was filed. For until the class was certified, the claims of the class members were technically not before the court and the vitality of their claims could not save an otherwise moot case.

Wright sought a judicial determination that the Secretary's finding that he was ineligible for benefits was erroneous as well as the money he claimed he was entitled to. The Secretary's unilateral decision to give him part of the relief he sought was not sufficient to moot the case. But even if it had been, this court's decision in Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 350 (7th Cir. 1978), following the Second Circuit's decision in White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 856-857 (2d Cir. 1977), Cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908, 98 S. Ct. 1458, 55 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1978), on this point, requires the conclusion that the district court properly found that certification of the class should relate back.12 The conceptual difficulties inherent in such a holding13 did not deter the Supreme Court from suggesting in Sosna v. Iowa, supra, 419 U.S. at 402 n. 11, 95 S. Ct. 553, that class certification may relate back or from giving "speedy effect," Frost v. Weinberger, supra, 515 F.2d at 64, to that suggestion in Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U.S. at 110-111 n. 11, 95 S. Ct. 854.

The Secretary contends that the district court's award of "retroactive" relief is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.14 In Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689, 702 (7th Cir. 1975), Cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912, 96 S. Ct. 3200, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1204 (1976), we rejected an identical argument. According to the Secretary, however, United States v. Testan, supra, requires reconsideration of the point. Although Testan discusses the doctrine of sovereign immunity, it is of little relevance in this case, and we adhere to our decision in Jimenez, decided only four years ago.

In Testan v. United States, 499 F.2d 690, 205 Ct. Cl. 330 (1974), the Court of Claims held that the Classification Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5101, Et seq., "gives rise to a claim for money damages (against the United States) for pay lost by reason of . . . allegedly wrongful classifications (of federal employees)." United States v. Testan, supra, 424 U.S. at 399, 96 S. Ct. at 953. Any such claim necessarily required a waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. Plaintiffs argued that the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, constituted a general waiver of sovereign immunity "with respect to any claim invoking a constitutional provision or a federal statute . . . ." Id. at 400, 96 S.Ct. at 954. The Court found the argument unpersuasive, explaining that

the Tucker Act is merely jurisdictional and (the) grant of a right of action (against the United States) must be made with specificity. . . . (T)he asserted entitlement to money damages depends upon whether any federal statute "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.

Id. (Citation omitted.) Finding no such mandate in either the Classification Act or the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, Et seq., the Court held that the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction of plaintiffs' claims for reclassification and back pay.

Unlike the plaintiffs in Testan, plaintiffs here are not asserting an independent right of action for money damages against the United States. Rather, they seek a judicial determination reversing the Secretary's decision that they were ineligible for benefits under the Social Security Act at the time of their applications. Section 205(g) of the Act unequivocally authorizes the district court to entertain such an action and expressly authorizes a district court "to enter, . . . a judgment . . . reversing the decision of the Secretary . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

The Secretary's decision denying an applicant benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(j)(1) solely on the basis of 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C) is no less erroneous or subject to correction in a proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) than a decision under 42 U.S.C. § 402(c) generally. Reversal of the Secretary's decision as to eligibility necessarily requires the award of "retroactive" relief. It is the date on which the application is filed, and not the date on which the claimant is ultimately determined to be eligible, that triggers his entitlement to benefits under the Act. See, e. g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(c), (j) (1). Subject to certain exceptions that are irrelevant here, the language of § 202(j)(1) is mandatory, See note 4, Supra; a claimant is entitled to "retroactive" benefits for a period of up to twelve months preceding his application.15 Furthermore, § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 404, directs the Secretary to make proper adjustments "(w)henever (he) finds that . . . less than the correct amount of payment has been made to any person . . . ." Congress has thus unequivocally expressed its intention that a claimant receive the benefits to which he is entitled under the Act, including "retroactive" benefits. The doctrine of sovereign immunity does not require more.16

The district court reversed the Secretary's eligibility decision as to each member of the husband class and ordered him "to pay each class member all the benefits he would have received had his application . . . been granted originally . . .. " The Secretary has taken the position that until Abbott was decided in March, 1977, the one half support requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 402(c) (1)(C) were valid and enforceable. Therefore, although any person applying for husband's benefits after March, 1977 would be entitled to benefits without regard to § 402(c)(1)(C) for each month thereafter, he would not be entitled to any "retroactive" benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(j)(1) because in any month prior to March, 1977 he would not have been entitled to benefits "had he filed application therefor. . . ." Id.17 According to the Secretary, the district court's order is unclear as to whether it includes only those applicants who were denied benefits altogether before March, 1977 or whether it also includes applicants who were only denied retroactive payments under § 402(j)(1) after March, 1977.

The district court's order seems both plain and unambiguous. We can find nothing in the order to support the suggestion that it includes only those who had been denied benefits at the time Abbott was decided. Nor can the Secretary; to support the contention that the order is ambiguous, he relies on a single sentence from the district court's decision granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The class certified includes all applicants for husband's benefits "whose applications, requests for reconsideration, hearings or Appeals Council reviews have been denied solely because of the statutory requirement(s) in 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C) . . . and (whose) notices of such denials were mailed . . . on or after the 60th day prior to October 5, 1973; . . . ." This language is not limited to applicants who were denied benefits prior to Abbott and there is no reason to read such a limitation into the order.

The Secretary argues that even if the order is not ambiguous, the most "plausible" interpretation is that it is limited to those who applied before March, 1977. We disagree. The most "plausible" interpretation of the language is that which is fairly expressed in the language itself.

We conclude, therefore, that the district court's order requires the Secretary to pay complete retroactive benefits to all applicants for husband's benefits whose notices of denial based solely on 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C) were mailed on or after the 60th day prior to October 5, 1973 and before entry of the district court's judgment on October 5, 1977. We see no reason for the further delay which would result from a remand on this point.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.