Pell, Circuit Judge, concurred in part and dissented in part and filed an opinion.

Neal B. Goodfriend, Chicago, Ill., for respondents-appellants-cross-appellees.

Sam Adam, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner-appellant-cross-appellant.

Before PELL and FAIRCHILD, Circuit Judges, and GORDON,* District Judge.

MYRON L. GORDON, District Judge.

This is a habeas corpus action in which both the petitioner and the respondents cross appeal from the judgment of the district court. The petitioner appeals from the district court's findings that the petitioner was not deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel at trial and that the petitioner was not entitled to a hearing on his allegation of prejudice on the part of the trial judge. The respondents appeal from the finding of the district court that the petitioner's sixth amendment right to counsel was violated at sentencing.

* The petitioner was arrested on August 12, 1972, and charged with possession of cocaine. After several continuances at his request, he was indicted on May 20, 1973, in the circuit court for Cook County, Illinois, for possession of cocaine. From June 6, 1973, to January 25, 1975, the trial of his case was continued 37 times, 21 times at the request of the petitioner. As will be noted in this opinion, many more adjournments of the trial date subsequently occurred. In addition, the petitioner twice moved for the substitution of judges; both motions were granted.

On January 23, 1975, the petitioner's case came before Judge Saul A. Epton, who set the matter for trial on February 26, 1975. The trial was subsequently rescheduled several more times to accommodate the petitioner's counsel, Mr. R. Eugene Pincham. Finally, on October 8, 1976, over a year and a half from the February trial date, Judge Epton admonished an associate of Mr. Pincham that the trial would begin on October 13, 1976, and counsel should be ready for trial. Trial did not begin on October 13; it was instead rescheduled several more times to accommodate Mr. Pincham. On November 5, 1976, when the case was called for trial, Mr. Pincham appeared before Judge Epton to inform the judge that he was engaged in another trial and could not proceed until the following week. Judge Epton directed Mr. Pincham to report directly to him when the other trial was completed so that the petitioner's trial could commence promptly.

The petitioner's case was called daily the following week, but the petitioner's counsel was unavailable. On Monday, November 15, an associate of Mr. Pincham appeared before Judge Epton and informed the judge that although Mr. Pincham had completed his other trial, he was unavailable to try the petitioner's case because he had instead commenced yet another trial in federal court. Judge Epton refused to grant another continuance and asked the associate to handle the defense. The associate refused to proceed, however, and left the courtroom.

The following day, two associates of Mr. Pincham presented a request for leave to file the appearance of a colleague of Mr. Pincham, Mr. Sam Adam, on behalf of the petitioner. Mr. Adam was not present, nor was he ready to proceed with the petitioner's case. Instead, he conditioned his appearance on the judge granting a thirty day continuance. Judge Epton refused Mr. Adam leave to appear and continued the case to the following day.

On November 17, two associates of Mr. Adam appeared; neither was ready to proceed with trial. Judge Epton then presented Mr. Spurlark with a choice:

'You can represent yourself in this case, or you can have a lawyer of your own choosing, or I am going to appoint Mr. Cornelius Toole to represent you.' R. 118-119.

The petitioner replied that he chose as his attorney either Mr. Pincham or Mr. Adam. Judge Epton rejected these choices since neither attorney was available to proceed with the trial. Since the petitioner was unwilling to represent himself, the judge appointed Mr. Toole and set the case for trial on that Friday, November 19, 1976. On that day, Mr. Toole requested a continuance until the following Monday so that he could further review the file. The motion for a continuance was denied, but once the jury was selected, the proceedings were suspended for the day.

Prior to the start of trial on Monday, November 22, attorneys Pincham and Adam appeared before Judge Epton and filed a motion for substitution of judges. The motion alleged actual prejudice on the part of Judge Epton. He denied the motion, terming it a dilatory tactic and untimely. At the conference, the petitioner again asked to be represented by either Mr. Pincham or Mr. Adam. The request was denied, and the case proceeded to trial.

At trial, five Chicago police officers testified. Relying on an informant's tip, they had obtained a search warrant for an apartment. Four of the officers then went to the apartment building and observed the petitioner entering the building. When the officers gained entry to the apartment in question, they found the petitioner in a bedroom next to a table piled with drug paraphernalia and with what later proved to be cocaine having a street value of $250,000. The jury found the petitioner guilty of possession of cocaine.

The petitioner appeared before Judge Epton for sentencing on December 13, 1976. At sentencing, Mr. Adam was present and sought leave to appear on behalf of the petitioner and to participate in the proceedings. Mr. Toole was also present. Judge Epton denied Mr. Adam leave to appear and sentenced the petitioner to imprisonment for a term of fifteen to thirty years. The petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal. People v. Spurlark, 67 Ill.App.3d 186, 23 Ill. Dec. 860, 384 N.E.2d 767 (1st Dist. 1978).

II

The petitioner concedes that 'this case has a sordid history of continuances and delays at the trial level.' However, the petitioner contends that the fault did not lie with him, for on every occasion when the case was called, he was present. He argues that Judge Epton punished him because of irritation with the petitioner's counsel, even though the petitioner was not responsible for his attorneys' actions. The petitioner concludes that instead of forcing him to trial with an attorney he did not want, the judge should have permitted him additional time to hire another attorney.

The sixth amendment guarantees an accused the right 'to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.' The appointment of counsel to represent the accused is not a mere formality; the appointed counsel must be given an opportunity to prepare a defense. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446, 60 S. Ct. 321, 322, 84 L. Ed. 377 (1940); see United States v. Miller, 508 F.2d 444, 451-52 (7th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1215 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946, 90 S. Ct. 964, 25 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1970). The court must also afford an accused a reasonable time for the selection of counsel. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 75 S. Ct. 1, 99 L. Ed. 4 (1954); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932).

We do not believe these general principles were offended in this action. The petitioner's case had been delayed for years, yet his chosen counsel was not ready to proceed to trial. The petitioner obtained over forty continuances; another twenty were granted by the court, usually because the petitioner's counsel failed to appear. The trial of the petitioner's case had been delayed over three years. The petitioner's sixth amendment rights are not unlimited. While he has an absolute right to counsel, he does not have an absolute right to counsel of his choice. See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 565 F.2d 881, 887 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955, 98 S. Ct. 1587, 55 L. Ed. 2d 807 (1978); United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1210 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Santoro v. United States, 409 U.S. 1063, 93 S. Ct. 554, 34 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1972). Judge Epton had a duty to bring this case to trial so as to vindicate the public's 'strong interest in the prompt, effective, and efficient administration of justice.' United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069, 99 S. Ct. 837, 59 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1979).

Even so, the petitioner argues that he was not given a meaningful opportunity to choose a new attorney because when he chose Mr. Adam, the judge refused to allow Mr. Adam's appearance. At that point, the petitioner must have been aware of the judge's intent to proceed to trial without further delay. The judge had already denied Mr. Adam's conditional appearance--the condition being another delay of thirty days. Nevertheless, the petitioner insisted that he be represented by either Mr. Pincham or Mr. Adam.

The petitioner's right to be represented by the attorney of his choice cannot be insisted upon to such a degree that it obstructs the reasonable and orderly procedures of the court. United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986, 98 S. Ct. 613, 54 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1977); Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Bragan, 499 F.2d 1376, 1378-80 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hampton, 457 F.2d 299, 301-02 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 856, 93 S. Ct. 136, 34 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972); Carey, supra, at 1214-15; United States v. Cozzi, 354 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 911, 86 S. Ct. 896, 15 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1966). The sixth amendment does not give an accused the power to manipulate his choice of counsel to delay the orderly progress of his case. United States ex rel. Martinez v. Thomas, 526 F.2d 750, 754 n. 6 (2nd Cir. 1975).

Under the circumstances of this case, Judge Epton was entirely justified in rejecting a request of counsel that would have done nothing more than delay an oftdelayed matter. See McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1981); United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 166-67 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012, 101 S. Ct. 568, 66 L. Ed. 2d 470 (1980); United States v. Silva, 611 F.2d 78, 79 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1973). Instead, he appointed a competent attorney and granted that attorney a brief period to prepare for trial. We find no fault with Judge Epton's conduct. Judge Epton gave the petitioner a choice of how the trial would proceed in a manner consistent with the orderly administration of justice. That the petitioner did not like this choice does not make it constitutionally offensive. McKee, supra, at 931; Wilks v. Israel, 627 F.2d 32, 36 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1086, 101 S. Ct. 874, 66 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1981). We find no problem of constitutional magnitude in the choice presented the petitioner; the petitioner's sixth amendment right to counsel was not infringed at his trial.

III

The petitioner also argues that Judge Epton's failure to hold a hearing on the petitioner's motion for substitution of judges denied him his fourteenth amendment right to due process of law. The petitioner contends that his moving papers demonstrated the judge's actual prejudice toward him, primarily because of comments by the judge to the media regarding the delays in the case. The petitioner further contends that such a hearing is required under Illinois law. See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, Sec. 114-5(c). Similarly, federal law contemplates that an allegation of prejudice against a judge must be heard by another judge. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144.

The possible prejudice of the judge is a matter that is collateral to the guilt or innocence of the accused. See Chromiak v. Field, 406 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017, 90 S. Ct. 581, 24 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1970). The petitioner must demonstrate that the judge's bias denied him a fair trial. Wilks, supra, 627 F.2d at 36-37; Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 852-53 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047, 100 S. Ct. 737, 62 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1980).

The petitioner did not meet this burden. Review of the trial record reveals that whatever Judge Epton's personal attitudes were toward the petitioner and his counsel, he took great pains to keep those matters from the jury. He also repeatedly ensured that the media attention to the trial had not tainted the jury. The petitioner does not indicate any part of the record that suggests anything to the contrary. We find no violation of the petitioner's due process rights stemming from any alleged prejudice on the part of Judge Epton.

IV

The district court granted Mr. Spurlark's petition insofar as it alleged a deprivation of his sixth amendment rights at sentencing. In an order dated June 5, 1981, the district judge granted the state a 120 day period to resentence the petitioner. See respondents' brief, App. C.

At his sentencing before Judge Epton, the petitioner was represented by Mr. Toole, his court-appointed counsel. Mr. Adam was also present, and Mr. Toole informed the judge that Mr. Adam wished to appear on behalf of the petitioner.

'MR. TOOLE: * * *

'Your Honor, I have been advised by Mr. Spurlock [sic] that he has hired Mr. Adam for purposes of filing an appearance and proceeding as the attorney of record, or as co-attorney.

'Is that correct?

'THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

'MR. TOOLE: Mr. Adam is here, and it is my understanding that Mr. Adam wishes to file his appearance and participate in these proceedings.

'THE COURT: Motion denied. Motion denied. Mr. Adam, most respectfully a very fine lawyer associated with Mr. Pincham, at an earlier date requested to file an appearance on behalf of Mr. Spurlock. That motion was denied once. I don't know how many times I have to deny that motion. I will deny it again. Proceed.' R. 485-86 (emphasis added).

As is evident from the above, Judge Epton stated no explanation for his summary denial of Mr. Adam's appearance. However, when this matter was before the district court, Judge Epton submitted an affidavit in which he stated that because of the earlier delays in the trial he believed that the appearance of Mr. Adam 'was designed merely to further delay the proceedings.' See respondents' brief, App. D.

The respondents argue that the history of the petitioner's case fully supported Judge Epton's belief and justified his refusal to permit Mr. Adam's appearance. They contend that the same principles which applied to the situation before the trial, as discussed in part II, supra, also apply at the sentencing.

We disagree. The right to the assistance of the attorney of one's choice should not be interfered with unnecessarily. While the right to be represented by an attorney of one's choice is not absolute, it is significant.

Preservation of this right has found expression in the courts. In United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52 (3rd Cir. 1979), the court of appeals for the third circuit held that the arbitrary dismissal of the defendant's local counsel was a violation of her sixth amendment right to representation of her choice, even though the defendant was represented by other competent counsel. Similarly, the court of appeals for the fourth circuit has held that it is a violation of due process for a court to interfere with the efforts of an accused to secure representation of his choice, thereby forcing him to be represented by an undesired court-appointed attorney. Reickauer v. Cunningham, 299 F.2d 170, 172 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 866, 83 S. Ct. 127, 9 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1962).

This court has also recognized the right of an accused to be represented by counsel of his choice. In United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972), the appellant was one of several defendants at trial. In the preliminary stages of the trial proceedings he was purportedly represented by counsel for some of the other defendants, but he then stated that he did not want their representation. He instead preferred to be represented by an attorney not present. Nevertheless, the trial judge continued to consider the other attorneys as his counsel. This court concluded:

'In sum, the right to counsel of choice could not be denied by exclusive recourse to appearances on record where Seale did not actually agree to the trial representation of the appearing attorneys or where he was not shown to be engaging in unwarranted dilatory tactics.' Id. at 358.

The respondents argue that a showing of delay has been made here--that an appearance by Mr. Adam would have delayed the proceedings. However, there is no support for that position in the record. It is undeniable that Judge Epton had experienced massive difficulty bringing the petitioner's case to trial, but that battle was over at the time of sentencing. Judge Epton made no inquiry into the matter of delay at the time of sentencing. He was not confronted with any motions or requests for a continuance. In contrast to his earlier effort to appear, Mr. Adam did not condition his appearance at sentencing with a request for an adjournment. So far as the record discloses, the state court's interest in the orderly administration of justice could have been fully preserved without denying Mr. Adam's appearance.