Plaintiffs Ben Allen and Aaron Rutlin, along with 13 other black members of the Amalgamated Transit Union Local 788 (Union), brought suit against the Union alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983 and 2000e et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that the Union failed to grant them seniority and other incidental rights guaranteed to them under various collective bargaining agreements. A second count alleged that the Union had breached its duty of fair representation under 29 U.S.C. § 185.1

The district court, the Honorable H. Kenneth Wangelin, found the defendant guilty of racial discrimination against the plaintiffs in violation of §§ 1981 and 2000e et seq., and ordered, inter alia : (1) that each plaintiff be awarded $1,000 punitive damages; (2) that defendant reimburse each plaintiff his $100 initiation fee plus interest thereon from the date of its payment; (3) that plaintiffs be awarded back pay as limited by a five-year statute of limitations, pending a report by special master; (4) that defendant grant Ben Allen and Aaron Rutlin seniority dating from the date of their employment with the Consolidated Service Car Company (CSC); (5) that all other plaintiffs were barred from any relief (including seniority rights) prior to five years from the date of the filing of the complaint (July 5, 1974) under Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120 (1969), and that their seniority date should be determined by supplemental order, pending a report from a special master concerning back pay; (6) that defendant pay plaintiffs' attorney a $300 fee; and (7) that defendant be permanently enjoined from any further racial discrimination against plaintiffs.

The Union has appealed the grant of injunctive relief, urging that the trial court erred in finding racial discrimination and in granting any relief to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have cross-appealed asserting that the district court erred in limiting remedial relief under the five-year statute of limitations, and in awarding an inadequate attorney fee. This court has jurisdiction to review the grant of the injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We affirm in part, and reverse in part.

Facts.

Prior to 1963 several independent companies, including CSC, operated transit facilities in the metropolitan St. Louis area. In 1959 a report prepared for the City of St. Louis and the County of St. Louis (Gilman Report) recommended that all of the companies involved in transit operations be consolidated in three phases: (1) establishment of an area-wide integrated transit system; (2) examination of rapid transit possibilities; and (3) completion of the plan by acquiring the CSC operation and replacing it with bus service. In 1963 fifteen transit companies (excluding CSC) merged into one corporation, Bi-State Development Agency (Bi-State). Bi-State was managed by Transit Services Corporation (TSC) which handled personnel matters, including negotiating collective bargaining agreements.

Most of the employees of the 15 merged companies belonged to various unions. The defendant, which represented about 75 per cent of the merged employees, campaigned so that all the merged employees became members of Local 788. Bi-State, through TSC, recognized the Union without a labor election.

To attract employees in this "organizational drive" the Union agreed to waive the $100 initiation fee for the merged employees. Since it was the policy of the Union to dovetail seniority for the years of prior employment of individuals who brought their work and equipment with them, it was agreed that the seniority of the merged employees would be dovetailed into the two Union seniority rosters (one for maintenance employees and one for drivers). In addition a section in the bargaining agreement provided:

Seniority of each of the full-time operators covered by this Agreement shall be on a system basis. The years of service of each of the full-time operators with each of their predecessor transit companies shall be counted from date of last employment and given full credit in the seniority roster.

There is no evidence that either the waiver of the initiation fee or the dovetailing provision was presented to the Union "rank and file" membership for approval.

Two years later, in 1965, Bi-State purchased the certificates of convenience issued to CSC, and in November of that year it had the certificates revoked by the city. CSC was then liquidated. Bi-State, through TSC, gave priority in hiring to former CSC employees by waiving any age limitation, any written test and pre-employment investigation. CSC employees only had to appear at the Bi-State employment office, fill out a job application, and pass a physical exam to be employed, and Bi-State hired a total of 34 CSC employees (33 black drivers and 1 white maintenance man) in this manner. The drivers received approximately 30 days of training in areas of routes, transfers, making change and actual bus driving. Following a probationary period all CSC employees joined the Union. Each paid a $100 initiation fee and none was given seniority credit for his prior employment, i. e., seniority was "end-tailed."

The former CSC employees did not complain to Bi-State or the Union about alleged racial discrimination in their treatment as "new employees" in 1965 until at least three years later. They then filed complaints against both the Union and Bi-State with the NAACP and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights. Two, Ben Allen and Aaron Rutlin, eventually filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in March of 1971.

Between 1969 and 1974 Bi-State agreed to grant former CSC employees full seniority credit2 for their employment with CSC, and paid them back vacation pay as if they had originally been credited for their years with CSC. The Union continued in its refusal to grant former CSC employees full Union seniority.3 The Union president told the former CSC members that the matter of their seniority would have to be put to a vote before the "rank and file" Union membership. However, he refused to place the matter before the "rank and file," because such action might cost him his office at the next election.

In 1971, a motion was made at a Union meeting for full seniority rights for the former CSC employees. It was seconded, but not entertained by the Union president because of the charges filed by those employees still pending before the city, state and federal commissions.

On August 21, 1972, the EEOC issued a reasonable cause determination that the Union had engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII by denying the charging parties (Ben Allen and Aaron Rutlin) their full seniority rights and by charging them the $100 initiation fee. The EEOC decision also stated that the Union made no valid attempt to set into motion the proper processes to obtain the seniority rights demanded by the charging parties.

On June 13, 1974, Ben Allen and Aaron Rutlin were issued notices of right to sue within 90 days. Joined by 13 other former CSC employees they filed this action against the Union on July 5, 1974.

Discrimination.

On appeal the Union challenges the district court's finding that it discriminated against plaintiffs in violation of §§ 1981 and 2000e et seq. It contends that it had legitimate business reasons for the differences in treatment of the employees involved in the 1963 merger and the plaintiff-employees involved in the purchase of CSC. It urges that CSC was not a transit company and therefore the provision of the bargaining agreements dealing with the grant of full seniority rights of the operators of predecessor transit companies was not applicable; that special training periods were necessary for the service car drivers; and that plaintiffs did not "bring their work and equipment with them" since CSC vehicles were not used by Bi-State. The Union also asserts that prior to the 1963 merger it represented approximately 75 per cent of the employees of the 15 merging transit companies and there existed a substantial continuity of interest to maintain that representation. In contrast it asserts there was no legal obligation for TSC to employ CSC drivers and no continuity of operations entitling the service car drivers to continuous service credit or Union seniority.

The district court, in rejecting these arguments, found they did not rebut the prima facie case of discrimination.4 We find this decision not clearly erroneous.

The Gilman Report recommendations clearly indicate that CSC was considered an integral part of the then existing transit system. Furthermore, although Bi-State did not continue to operate the CSC vehicles, after the 1965 purchase it added 172 daily round trip bus routes to its system and bought new buses. The district court found this was the equivalent of plaintiffs bringing their work and equipment with them. In addition, there is testimony that some of the smaller front engine and horizontally opposed engine buses used by other merged companies were not used by Bi-State, but that did not affect the treatment of drivers of those buses. Finally, there was evidence that the drivers involved in the 1963 merger also received 30 days of training.

As to the § 1981 claim, the evidence supports a finding that the black plaintiffs were unable to enforce a provision in the collective bargaining agreement which their white counterparts were able to enforce. We accordingly affirm the district court's finding of racial discrimination.

Statute of Limitation.

We agree with the district court that the applicable statute of limitation governing plaintiffs' action under § 1981 is the five-year statute provided in Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.120 (1969), for breach of written contracts, which is most analogous to the claim asserted here. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 95 S. Ct. 1716, 44 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1975); and Butler v. Teamsters Local 823, 514 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1975). The Union urges that since the denial of seniority rights and the payment of the initiation fee took place in 1965, the statute bars plaintiffs' claims. However, the district court found that the denial of seniority rights was a continuing discrimination and that the statute had not run. We think this proposition too well-settled to require further discussion. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S. Ct. 1251, 47 L. Ed. 2d 444 (1976); Williams v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 530 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1975); and United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom., United Transp. Union v. United States,409 U.S. 1107, 93 S. Ct. 900, 34 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1973).5

The Union also contends that the payments of initiation fees were single, isolated acts and that the statute of limitations should bar any claim for repayment. Although we agree that the requirement of the fees is not a continuing wrong since it was not repeated, it was an integral part of the disparate treatment. We find restitution of the initiation fees to be harmonious with the spirit of remedial equitable relief sanctioned by Congress and approved by the Supreme Court in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., supra.

Back Pay and Seniority.

After finding that the statute of limitations did not bar the claims, the district court found that it did become relevant in the granting of retroactive relief. The trial court limited the award of back pay to five years and granted full seniority rights only to Ben Allen and Aaron Rutlin. We have no difficulty with the court's application of the statute to back pay, but find the court erred in limiting the retroactive seniority rights of the other 13 named plaintiffs.6

The injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs is essentially equitable in nature. It seeks to restore to plaintiffs the contractual rights discriminatorily denied to them.7 Under the circumstances it is settled that a statute of limitations is not applicable and the Union has not pleaded laches. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 66 S. Ct. 582, 90 L. Ed. 743 (1946).8

In Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., supra, Mr. Justice Brennan observed:

(O)ne of the central purposes of Title VII is "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination." To effectuate this "make-whole" objective, Congress in § 706(g) vested broad equitable discretion in the federal courts to "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without backpay . . ., or any other relief as the court deems appropriate." . . . "The provisions of (Section 706(g)) are intended to give the courts wide discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible. . . . (T)he Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful employment discrimination whole and . . . the attainment of this objective . . . requires that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination." This is emphatic confirmation that federal courts are empowered to fashion such relief as the particular circumstances of a case may require to effect restitution, making whole insofar as possible the victims of racial discrimination in hiring.

424 U.S. at 763-64, 96 S. Ct. at 1264 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

Thus we find the court erred in not granting full restitution of seniority to all plaintiffs under § 1981.

We reach the same conclusion under § 2000e et seq. The district court denied Title VII relief to all plaintiffs except Ben Allen and Aaron Rutlin, since only they had filed charges with the EEOC and the complaint did not allege a class action or seek class relief. It is settled that a suit by a named member of a class in a class action may seek relief for the entire class without the necessity of other class members pursuing their administrative remedy with the EEOC. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n. 8, 95 S. Ct. 2362 (1975); Romasanta v. United Airlines, Inc., 537 F.2d 915, 918 (7th Cir. 1976); Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 156 U.S.App.D.C. 69, 478 F.2d 979, 985 n. 11 (1973); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 718-20 (7th Cir. 1969); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968). In the instant case, although no class action was filed, 13 additional plaintiffs alleged facts demonstrating they were similarly situated and had received the same discriminatory treatment as Ben Allen and Aaron Rutlin. Under such circumstances, particularly where the discrimination is continuing it would be nonsensical to require each of the plaintiffs to individually file administrative charges with the EEOC.9 Defendants have in no way been placed in jeopardy.

In Local 179, United Textile Wkrs. v. Federal Paper Stock Co., 461 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1972), this court held that the filing of an EEOC complaint by a union on behalf of its members satisfied the exhaustion requirement. We allowed the employees themselves to file suit. The court concluded that there had been no attempt to bypass the EEOC, and that it was, therefore, insignificant that the Union had filed the administrative charges rather than the employees themselves. This reasoning is also applicable here.

Punitive Damages.

The district court awarded each plaintiff $1,000 punitive damages. On appeal the Union urges that punitive damages do not lie under § 1981. We disagree. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., supra ; and Claiborne v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 401 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D.La.1975). See also Comment, Implying Punitive Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 9 Harv.Civ.Lib. Civ.Rights L.Rev. 325, 345-51 (1974).

The Supreme Court, in Johnson, recognized that some district courts have denied both compensatory and punitive damages in title VII suits. However, contrary to the Union's argument here, the Supreme Court expressly observed that Title VII remedies are coextensive with the individual rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and are separate, distinct and independent. Mr. Justice Blackmun observed:

An individual who establishes a cause of action under § 1981 is entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages. See, e. g., Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799 (CA 1), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940, 89 S. Ct. 299, 21 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1968); Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F.2d 573 (CA 5 1967).

421 U.S. at 460, 95 S. Ct. at 1720.

The Union now urges that Caperci and Mansell were § 1983 suits, not § 1981 suits, and that the above language of Johnson is dictum and need not be followed. The Union further urges that no other appellate decision has allowed a punitive award in a § 1981 suit.

Section 1981 does not expressly provide a remedy for interference with the right to make and enforce contracts. In this deficiency it is like 42 U.S.C. § 1982. However, it has been determined that equitable relief and compensatory damages are available under § 1982 through 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 90 S. Ct. 400, 24 L. Ed. 2d 386 (1969); and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S. Ct. 2186, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1189 (1968). Furthermore, punitive damages have been awarded under § 1982. See, e. g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974). Under the circumstances we see no reason for denying a punitive award under § 1981.

The Union contends that if punitive damages are allowable in a § 1981 suit, this is not an appropriate case for such an award. Again we must disagree.

In the instant case there is substantial evidence that the Union consistently obstructed plaintiffs' efforts regarding their proper seniority rights. Plaintiffs registered numerous complaints as to their disparate treatment with the defendant Union, Bi-State and various state and federal agencies. In 1969 the Union president refused to present plaintiffs' demand for seniority to the membership, although the plaintiffs requested such action. In 1971, a motion made at a Union meeting for seniority rights for plaintiffs was seconded, but not entertained because of race charges pending before city, state and federal commissions. Bi-State eventually agreed to grant plaintiffs full seniority credit for their years of work for CSC for purposes of vacation benefits, pension benefits and other future employment benefits. The Union continued its refusal to consider the seniority rights of the plaintiffs. These facts are sufficient to sustain the district court's award of punitive damages. See, e. g., Gill v. Manuel, 488 F.2d 799, 801 (9th Cir. 1973).10

Attorney Fees.

The district court held that since 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., was alleged as a jurisdictional base and the plaintiffs prevailed, it would award plaintiffs' attorney a fee of $300 as compensation.11 The plaintiffs challenge the amount of the award on cross-appeal. We find the amount grossly inadequate.

The guidelines for attorney's fees set forth by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), have been approved by this court. See Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541, 548 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 428 U.S. 909, 96 S. Ct. 3220, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1216 (1976). See also Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, supra. The Senate found that those guidelines were correctly applied in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 66 F.R.D. 483 (W.D.N.C.1975) ($65 per hour); Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D.Cal.1974) ($50 per hour); and Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl.Prac.Dec. P 9444 (C.D.Cal.1974) ($84 per hour). S.Rep.No.94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 5908. The $4.54 per hour awarded here is obviously short of those standards.

The plaintiff also asks for attorney fees for this appeal. We have allowed such fees in Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. St. Louis, supra ; and Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., Inc., 476 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854, 94 S. Ct. 153, 38 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1973).

On remand the district court should reconsider the attorney fee award for the time spent prior to the filing of the notice of appeal. Additionally, we direct counsel to file an affidavit in this court as to time spent in processing the appeal in order that an allowance of reasonable attorney fees can be made for the appeal.

Conclusion.

We affirm the district court's finding of racial discrimination, the awards of punitive damages and back pay,12 and restitution of the initiation fees. We remand to the district court and direct that defendants grant plaintiffs full seniority on the Union seniority roster based upon their date of employment with CSC; that the court reconsider and award a reasonable attorney fee, and grant any other relief the court finds not inconsistent with this opinion.