The district court's refusal to entertain Leano's present motion for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 can be sustained only if at least one of Leano's two prior motions was determined against him 'on the merits' as that term is explicated in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16, 83 S. Ct. 1068, 10 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1963).1

Because neither denial rested upon an evidentiary hearing, the inquiry must be directed to the files and records of the case to ascertain whether or not they 'conclusively show' that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. 28 U.S.C. 2255. Sanders, supra.

In his several applications Leano has charged, in substance, that the sentencing judge enhanced punishment on the basis of a conviction void because he had not been afforded his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S. Ct. 589, 30 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1972).

The initial motion was denied by the sentencing judge, who observed in passing that he had not considered Leano's prior conviction when fixing punishment. Such informal disclaimers have indeed been given controlling weight in instances where a petitioner's allegations were essentially all that appeared in the record. United States v. Eidum, 474 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1973); Dukes v. United States, 492 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1974).2 But Leano's allegations do not stand alone. To the contrary, they are fully corroborated; the transcript of the proceedings on Leano's arraignment for sentence makes evident the 'reasonable probability' (Tucker v. United States, 431 F.2d 1292, 1294 (9th Cir. 1972) that the prior conviction played a vital role in the fixing of the questioned sentences.3 We conclude that denial of the first motion was not 'on the merits.'

Leano's second motion was denied by an order which contains the recital that 'there is nothing in the petition to indicate that petitioner did other than make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel.'

We fail to understand the import of this statement. True, the allegations appearing in Leano's second application are imprecise, but, as noted above, they are sufficient to charge an unconstitutional denial of counsel and were so regarded both by the court and the district attorney. But even if we construe the statement to mean that the records, etc., affirmatively show a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel-- for such a waiver cannot be presumed (Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969))-- the court's factual conclusion is simply in error. The sole mention of waiver appears in the commitment wherein it is stated that when Leano was arraigned for sentence, 'he appeared in person and without counsel; (that) the court advised the defendant of his right to counsel and asked him whether he desired to have counsel appointed by the court and the defendant thereupon stated that he waived the right to the assistance of counsel.' If relevant at all, this recital suggests that when Leano was earlier arraigned for plea, he was then 'without counsel.'

It follows that the denial of the second motion, like the first, was not 'on the merits.' Accordingly, and as in Tucker, supra, 431 F.2d at 1294, the order is vacated and 'the cause is remanded to the district court for resentencing without consideration of any prior convictions which is invalid under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963).'