MEMORANDUM**

Robert and Shirley Camboni appeal pro se the district court's (1) dismissal of Arizona Governor Symington, Pinal County, the Pinal County Prosecutor and members of the Pinal County Board of Supervisors, and (2) summary judgment for the City of Apache Junction, several city officials and employees, and several private defendants in the Cambonis' 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action alleging that the defendants violation their constitutional rights by enforcing the City's litter and sign ordinances and the state public nuisance law. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. We review de novo, see Jesinger v. Nevada Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir.1994) (summary judgment); Everest & Jennings v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir.1994) (dismissal for failure to state a claim), and affirm.1

* Dismissal

The Cambonis contend that the district court erred by dismissing Arizona Governor Symington, Pinal County, the Pinal County Prosecutor, and members of the Pinal County Board of Supervisors. This contention lacks merit.

The district court properly dismissed Governor Symington because state officials are not subject to liability under section 1983 unless they play an affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir.1987) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976)).

The district court properly dismissed Pinal County and the members of the Board of Supervisors because a local government and its officials are not subject to liability under section 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior. See Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978). The district court also properly dismissed the Pinal County Prosecutor because he is entitled to absolute immunity for his actions "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). In addition, the district court properly dismissed the Cambonis' conspiracy claims against the county defendants because mere conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1982).

We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deeming timely the county defendants' motion to dismiss.

The Cambonis contend that the district court erred by granting summary judgment for the private party defendants and the City of Apache Junction defendants. This contention lacks merit.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for the private party defendants because mere conclusory allegations of a conspiracy without more, are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. See id.; Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 525 (9th Cir.1988).

The district court properly granted summary judgment for the City, City Manager Lee, Assistant City Manager Hoffman, Director Nakagawa, Zoning Administrator Issacs, and the City Council Members because a local government and its officials are not subject to liability under section 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-94. The district court properly granted summary judgment for City Attorney Gimbut because he is entitled to absolute immunity for his actions "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. The district court's summary judgment for Mayor Perkins, and Committee Members Kennemur and Verley because the Cambonis have failed to establish that their First Amendment rights were violated at the city council meeting. See Thomas v. Douglas, 877 F.2d 1428, 1433-34 (9th Cir.1989).

The district court also properly granted summary judgment for the City defendants on the Cambonis' conspiracy and First Amendment claims because the Cambonis failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to establish a conspiracy, see Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.1989), and because the district court properly concluded that the ordinances in question are reasonable, content neutral and serve a substantial government interest, see Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46 (1986).

We have considered the Cambonis' contentions that the district court improperly held them to the same standards as attorneys and displayed bias and prejudice toward them and find them to be without merit.

AFFIRMED.