This case presents the question whether the Executive Branch may hold uncharged citizens of foreign nations in indefinite detention in territory under the "complete jurisdiction and control" of the United States while effectively denying them the right to challenge their detention in any tribunal anywhere, including the courts of the U.S. The issues we are required to confront are new, important, and difficult.

In the wake of the devastating terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress authorized the President to

use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.

Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub.L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). Pursuant to that authorization, the President sent U.S. forces to Afghanistan to wage a military operation that has been commonly termed — but never formally declared — a "war" against the Taliban government and the terrorist network known as Al Queda.

Starting in early January 2002, the Armed Forces began transferring to Guantanamo, a United States naval base located on territory physically situated on the island of Cuba,1 scores of individuals who were captured by the American military during its operations in Afghanistan. The captured individuals were labeled "enemy combatants." Now, for almost two years, the United States has subjected over six hundred of these captives to indefinite detention,2 yet has failed to afford them any means to challenge their confinement, to object to the failure to recognize them as prisoners of war, to consult with legal counsel, or even to advance claims of mistaken capture or identity. Despite U.S. officials' recent stated intention to move to begin a sorting of the detainees, electing which to release and which to try before military tribunals on criminal charges, and the administration's designation several months ago of six detainees (including two Britons and one Australian) deemed eligible for military trials, see Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Criticizes Indefinite Detention in Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at A1, no military tribunal has actually been convened. Nor has a single Guantanamo detainee been given the opportunity to consult an attorney, had formal charges filed against him, or been permitted to contest the basis of his detention in any way. Moreover, top U.S. officials, including Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, have made it clear that the detainees may be held in their present circumstances until this country's campaign against terrorism ends. Id. The administration has, understandably, given no indication whether that event will take place in a matter of months, years, or decades, if ever.3

On January 20, 2002, a group of journalists, lawyers, professors, and members of the clergy filed a petition for habeas relief before the United States District Court for the Central District of California on behalf of the class of unidentified individuals detained involuntarily at Guantanamo. The petition named as respondents President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, and a number of military personnel. See Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D.Cal.2002). After the district court dismissed the petition for lack of "next-friend" standing, or, alternatively, for lack of jurisdiction under Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 70 S. Ct. 936, 94 L. Ed. 1255 (1950), this court affirmed on the ground that petitioners lacked standing, but vacated the court's jurisdictional rulings regarding Johnson. See Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.2002).

Following our decision, Belaid Gherebi filed an amended next-friend habeas petition in this Court, on behalf of his brother Faren, in which the standing issue is not present. In his February 2003 Amended Petition, Gherebi4 alleged violations of the U.S. Constitution and the Third Geneva Convention arising out of his involuntary detention at Guantanamo, a naval base "under the exclusive and complete jurisdiction of the respondents," and he further claimed that, "Respondents have characterized Gherebi as an `unlawful combatant,' and have denied him status as a prisoner of war, have denied him rights under the United States Constitution, ... have denied him access to the United States Courts," and have denied him access to legal counsel.5 The government did not respond. Thereafter, Gherebi urged this Court to resolve the "threshhold question" of federal subject matter jurisdiction in a motion to grant his petition summarily.6 At that point, the government moved to dismiss Gherebi's petition without prejudice to its being re-filed in the district court, or alternatively, to transfer it to the district court so that the district judge could decide the question of jurisdiction. A motions panel of this Court granted the government's request, transferring Gherebi's petition to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. After additional motions were filed with the district court urging summary disposition of the jurisdictional question, that court issued a reasoned order on May 13, 2003 dismissing Gherebi's petition for lack of jurisdiction. See Gherebi v. Bush, No. CV 03-1267-AHM(JTL) 262 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (C.D.Cal. May 13, 2003) (order dismissing petition for lack of jurisdiction). The court held that Johnson v. Eisentrager controlled and foreclosed jurisdiction over Gherebi's petition in any federal court because Guantanamo "is not within sovereign U.S. territory." Id. at 1070. In so holding, the court described its conclusion as "reluctant[]," id. at 1066, and expressed hope that "a higher court w[ould] find a principled way" to provide the remedy of habeas corpus. Id. at 1073.

On appeal before this Court, Gherebi argues that (1) the district court erred in holding that Johnson v. Eisentrager precludes the district courts of this nation from exercising jurisdiction over his petition; and (2) the District Court for the Central District of California has jurisdiction to hear the writ because the custodians of the prisoners are within the jurisdiction of the court. We agree with Gherebi on both points. In so holding, we underscore that the issue before us is not whether Gherebi's detention will withstand constitutional inquiry, but rather whether the courts of the United States are entirely closed to detainees held at Guantanamo indefinitely — detainees who would appear to have no effective right to seek relief in the courts of any other nation or before any international judicial body.

We recognize that the process due "enemy combatant" habeas petitioners may vary with the circumstances and are fully aware of the unprecedented challenges that affect the United States' national security interests today, and we share the desire of all Americans to ensure that the Executive enjoys the necessary power and flexibility to prevent future terrorist attacks. However, even in times of national emergency — indeed, particularly in such times — it is the obligation of the Judicial Branch to ensure the preservation of our constitutional values and to prevent the Executive Branch from running roughshod over the rights of citizens and aliens alike. Here, we simply cannot accept the government's position that the Executive Branch possesses the unchecked authority to imprison indefinitely any persons, foreign citizens included, on territory under the sole jurisdiction and control of the United States, without permitting such prisoners recourse of any kind to any judicial forum, or even access to counsel, regardless of the length or manner of their confinement. We hold that no lawful policy or precedent supports such a counter-intuitive and undemocratic procedure, and that, contrary to the government's contention, Johnson neither requires nor authorizes it. In our view, the government's position is inconsistent with fundamental tenets of American jurisprudence and raises most serious concerns under international law.7

Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the district court that jurisdiction over Gherebi's habeas petition does not lie. Because we also conclude that personal jurisdiction may be asserted against respondent Rumsfeld in the Central District of California, we remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not resolve here, and leave to the district court to decide, the distinct and important question whether a transfer to a different district court may be appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

A. Johnson v. Eisentrager as a bar to jurisdiction

To support its contention that habeas jurisdiction does not lie with respect to the Guantanamo detainees in the Central District or any other district court of the United States, the government relies primarily on Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 70 S. Ct. 936, 94 L. Ed. 1255 (1950). Johnson involved a habeas petition by German enemy prisoners detained in Landsberg Prison, Germany, after being tried and sentenced to a fixed term of confinement by a U.S. Military Commission in Nanking, China for offenses committed in China subsequent to the unconditional surrender of Germany at the end of World War II. The Court declined to exercise jurisdiction, holding that the German national petitioners, tried in China for acts committed there, and confined to prison in Germany, had no right to seek a writ of habeas corpus in a United States court to test the legality of such detention. Id. at 790, 70 S. Ct. 936.

In connection with its holding, the Court discussed two factors: first, that the prisoners were "alien enemies" in a declared war, see generally id. at 769-776, 70 S. Ct. 936 (discussing the significance of alien enemy status and the reach of jurisdiction); and second, that the petitioners were detained outside "any territory over the which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States." Id. at 777-78, 70 S. Ct. 936; see generally id. at 777-85, 70 S. Ct. 936 (discussing the significance of extraterritorial situs, or situs outside U.S. sovereign territory, and the reach of jurisdiction). The Court explained:

We are cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other country where the writ is known, has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction. Nothing in the text of the Constitution extends such a right, nor does anything in our statutes.

399 U.S. at 768, 90 S. Ct. 2230 (emphasis added). The Johnson Court did not suggest that the mere "alien enemy" status of petitioners would be sufficient in itself for the denial of habeas jurisdiction; rather it emphasized that in the case of alien enemies habeas is not available when their acts and the situs of their trial and detention all lie outside of this nation's territorial jurisdiction.8

The government contends that the exercise of habeas jurisdiction over Gherebi's petition is foreclosed by Johnson because the conditions that justified the Court's decision there apply equally to Gherebi and the other Guantanamo detainees. We may assume, for purposes of this appeal, that most, if not all of those being held at Guantanamo, including Gherebi, are indeed the equivalent of "alien enemies," indeed "enemy combatants," although we do not foreclose here Gherebi's right to challenge the validity of that assumption upon remand. The dispositive issue, for purposes of this appeal, as the government acknowledges, relates to the legal status of Guantanamo, the site of petitioner's detention. It is our determination of that legal status that resolves the question regarding the dispositive jurisdictional factor: whether or not Gherebi is being detained within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States or within its sovereign jurisdiction, as the case may be.

On this appeal, the government does not dispute that if Gherebi is being detained on U.S. territory, jurisdiction over his habeas petition will lie, whether or not he is an "enemy alien." In Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 63 S. Ct. 1, 87 L. Ed. 3 (1942) and In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 66 S. Ct. 340, 90 L. Ed. 499(1946), the Court reviewed the merits of the habeas petitions filed by enemy alien prisoners detained in U.S. sovereign (or then-sovereign) territory. In Quirin, the Court rejected on the merits the claim of enemy German petitioners held in Washington DC (and executed there) that the President was without statutory or constitutional authority to order them to be tried by a military commission for the offenses with which they were charged and had been convicted by the Commission; it then ruled that the Commission had been lawfully constituted and the petitioners lawfully tried and punished by it. 317 U.S. at 20-21, 63 S. Ct. 1. In Yamashita, the Court reviewed on the merits a similar World War II habeas claim on behalf of an enemy Japanese general, detained in the Philippines, which was U.S. territory at the time. Yamashita had already been tried, convicted, and sentenced to death by a military commission. Following Quirin, 317 U.S. at 7-9, 63 S. Ct. 1, the Court determined that the commission had been lawfully constituted, and that petitioner was lawfully detained pursuant to his conviction and sentence. Id. at 25-6, 63 S. Ct. 1. We need not resolve the question of what constitutional claims persons detained at Guantanamo may properly allege if jurisdiction to entertain habeas claims exists. Suffice it to say that if jurisdiction does lie, the detainees are not wholly without rights to challenge in habeas their indefinite detention without a hearing or trial of any kind, and the conditions of such detention.

With respect to the Guantanamo detainees, the government contends that, under Johnson, the touchstone of the jurisdictional inquiry is sovereignty — not mere territorial jurisdiction — and that the United States does not maintain sovereignty over the territory at issue. Jurisdiction is foreclosed, the government argues, because although the 1903 Lease agreement (and the 1934 Treaty continuing the agreement ["the Lease and continuing Treaty"])9 which governs the terms of Guantanamo's territorial relationship to the United States cedes to the U.S. "complete jurisdiction and control" over the Base, it recognizes the "continuance of ultimate sovereignty" in Cuba. In other words, in the government's view, whatever the Lease and continuing Treaty say about the United States' complete territorial jurisdiction, Guantanamo falls outside U.S. sovereign territory — a distinction it asserts is controlling under Johnson.

Although we agree with the government that the outcome of the jurisdictional question in this case hinges on the legal status of the situs of Gherebi's detention, we do not read Johnson as holding that the prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction is sovereignty rather than territorial jurisdiction. Nor do we believe that the jurisdiction the United States exercised over Landsberg Prison in Germany is in any way analogous to the jurisdiction that this nation exercises over Guantanamo. When the Johnson petitioners were detained in Landsberg, the limited and shared authority the U.S. exercised over the Prison on a temporary basis nowhere approached the United States' potentially permanent exercise of complete jurisdiction and control over Guantanamo, including the right of eminent domain. The United States has exercised "complete jurisdiction and control" over the Base for more than one century now, "with the right to acquire ... any land or other property therein by purchase or by exercise of eminent domain with full compensation to the owners thereof."10 We have also treated Guantanamo as if it were subject to American sovereignty: we have acted as if we intend to retain the Base permanently, and have exercised the exclusive, unlimited right to use it as we wish, regardless of any restrictions contained in the Lease or continuing Treaty.

When conducting its jurisdictional inquiry in Johnson, the Court spoke at different times of U.S. "territorial jurisdiction" and "sovereignty" — using the latter term on a minority of occasions11 because it was indisputable that Landsberg Prison was not within either U.S. territorial jurisdiction or U.S. sovereign territory. The only question for the Johnson Court was whether it could exercise jurisdiction over petitioners' habeas claims in light of the fact that they were being detained on foreign ground that was not, under any recognized legal standard, treated as American territory. And while the Court expressly distinguished Yamashita on the basis that the United States possessed "sovereignty at this time over these insular possessions," (the Philippines), the Court nowhere suggested that "sovereignty," as opposed to "territorial jurisdiction," was a necessary factor. In fact, immediately following this statement, the Court specifically noted three "heads of jurisdiction" that petitioners might have invoked, none of which used the term "sovereignty" and all of which referred instead to "territory":

Yamashita's offenses were committed on our territory, he was tried within the jurisdiction of our insular courts and he was imprisoned within territory of the United States. None of these heads of jurisdiction can be invoked by these prisoners.

Id. at 780, 70 S. Ct. 936 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Johnson in no way compels the conclusion that, where the U.S. exercises "territorial jurisdiction" over a situs, that degree of territorial authority and control is not sufficient to support habeas jurisdiction. To the contrary, it strongly implies that territorial jurisdiction is sufficient. In short, we do not believe that Johnson may properly be read to require "sovereignty" as an essential prerequisite of habeas jurisdiction.12 Rather territorial jurisdiction is enough.

It is evident that the United States exercises sole territorial jurisdiction over Guantanamo. "Territorial jurisdiction" exists as to "territory over which a government or a subdivision thereof, or court, has jurisdiction." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1473 (6th ed.1990). The U.S. government exercises the "power to proscribe, prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce the law" in Guantanamo, see New Jersey v. New York, No. 120, 1997 WL 291594, at * 28 (1997), received at 520 U.S. 1273, and reviewed at 523 U.S. 767, 118 S. Ct. 1726, 140 L. Ed. 2d 993 (1998) (describing the "natural and ordinary meaning of `jurisdiction'"), and further, the government's jurisdiction is both "complete," see 1903 Lease, art. III, supra note 9, and exclusive, see 1903 Supplemental Agreement, art. IV, id. (providing that U.S. courts exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction over citizens and aliens, alike, for offenses committed on the Base). See also 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 236, 242 (1982) (opinion of then Asst. Attorney General Ted Olsen) (concluding that Guantanamo falls within "exclusive United States' jurisdiction," "because of the lease terms which grant the United States `complete jurisdiction and control over' that property"). Where a nation exercises "exclusive jurisdiction" over a territory, territorial jurisdiction lies. See U.S. v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1172-76 (9th Cir.2000) (examining a provision of a congressional act that defined territorial jurisdiction to include territory within the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the United States).

Here, the relationship between territorial jurisdiction and the right to file habeas petitions is particularly clear. The United States exercises exclusive criminal jurisdiction over all persons, citizens and aliens alike, who commit criminal offenses at the Base, pursuant to Article IV of the Supplemental Agreement. See supra note 9. We subject persons who commit crimes at Guantanamo to trial in United States courts.13 Surely, such persons enjoy the right to habeas corpus in at least some respects. Under these circumstances, for purposes of our jurisdictional inquiry, it is apparent that the United States exercises exclusive territorial jurisdiction over Guantanamo and that by virtue of its exercise of such jurisdiction, habeas rights exist for persons located at the Base. We reiterate that the essence of our inquiry involves the legal status of the situs of petitioner's detention — not the question whether "enemy combatants" in general are precluded from filing habeas petitions, or the question whether any particular constitutional issues may be raised. The first of these questions is answered by Quirin and Yamashita and the second is not before us.

In sum, we conclude that by virtue of the United States' exercise of territorial jurisdiction over Guantanamo, habeas jurisdiction lies in the present case.14 Although our conclusion is dispositive of the principal issue before us, we also consider an alternative ground for our holding: whether the U.S. exercises sovereignty over Guantanamo.

2. Sovereignty and the 1903 Lease and Continuing Treaty of 1934

Even if we assume that Johnson requires sovereignty, our decision that habeas jurisdiction lies is the same. In this regard, we conclude that, at least for habeas purposes, Guantanamo is a part of the sovereign territory of the United States. Both the language of the Lease and continuing Treaty and the practical reality of U.S. authority and control over the Base support that answer. Moreover, the present case is far more analogous to Yamashita than to Johnson: here, like in Yamashita but contrary to the circumstances in Johnson, the United States exercises total dominion and control over the territory in question and possesses rights of eminent domain, powers inherent in the exercise of sovereignty, while Cuba retains simply a contingent reversionary interest that will become effective only if and when the United States decides to relinquish its exclusive jurisdiction and control, i.e. sovereign dominion, over the territory. Thus, we hold that the prerequisite to the exercise of habeas jurisdiction is met in the case of Guantanamo, whether that prerequisite be "territorial jurisdiction" or "sovereignty." We now turn to an analysis of the term "sovereignty" and its application, for purposes of habeas, to the United States' role at Guantanamo. The government argues that, under the plain terms of the Lease, the "continuance" of Cuba's "ultimate" sovereignty means that Cuba retains "maximum" or "definitive" sovereignty over the Base during the indefinite period of U.S. reign, and consequently, that Guantanamo cannot be classified as U.S. sovereign territory for the purposes of our jurisdictional inquiry. The government's assertion requires us to consider whether "ultimate" is to be construed as a "temporal" or a "qualitative" modifier. In other words, does the Lease (and the 1934 continuing Treaty) vest sovereignty in Cuba "ultimately" in the sense that Cuba's sovereignty becomes substantively effective if and when the United States decides to abandon its physical and absolute control of the territory (or to put it differently, is Cuba's sovereignty residual in a temporal sense); or does the Lease (and the continuing Treaty) vest "basic, fundamental" or "maximum" (the alternative qualitative meaning of "ultimate" discussed infra) sovereignty in Cuba at all times, and specifically during the indefinite period in which the United States maintains complete jurisdiction and control over the Base? We conclude that, as used in the Lease, "ultimate sovereignty" can only mean temporal and not qualitative sovereignty. We also conclude that, during the unlimited and potentially permanent period of U.S. possession and control over Guantanamo, the United States possesses and exercises all of the attributes of sovereignty, while Cuba retains only a residual or reversionary sovereignty interest, contingent on a possible future United States' decision to surrender its complete jurisdiction and control.15

"Ultimate" is defined principally in temporal, not qualitative, terms. Black's Law Dictionary defines "ultimate" to mean:

At last, finally, at the end. The last in the train of progression or sequence tended toward by all that precedes; arrived at as the last result; final.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1522. Similarly, Webster's Third New International's first two definitions state:

ultimatus completed, last, final

1a: most remote in space or time: farthest, earliest ...

2a: tended toward by all that precedes: arrived at as the last result ...

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2479 (1976). Webster's then gives as the less-frequently used meaning the definition urged here by the government:

3a: basic, fundamental, original, primitive...

Id.

The primary definition (including Webster's first and second meanings) dictates a construction of the Lease under which sovereignty reverts to Cuba if and when the United States decides to relinquish control. Therefore, under that definition, the United States enjoys sovereignty during the period it occupies the territory. Adopting the alternative qualitative construction (Webster's third and fourth meanings, and the government's proffered definition) would render the word "ultimate" wholly superfluous. If the Lease vests sovereignty in Cuba during the indefinite period as to which it has ceded to the U.S. "complete jurisdiction and control," nothing would be added to the use of the term "sovereignty" by employing a modifier describing sovereignty as "basic, fundamental" or "maximum." If the government's understanding of ultimate were correct, no sovereignty would vest in the United States at any time and all sovereignty would vest in Cuba at all times with or without the use of the word "ultimate." In such circumstance, a simple statement that Cuba retains sovereignty would suffice. In contrast, construing "ultimate" to mean "last, final" or "arrived at as the last result," or in practical terms a reversionary right if and when the lease is terminated by the United States, serves to define the nature of Cuban sovereignty provided for under the Lease and gives meaning and substantive effect to the term "ultimate." Under the preferred construction of "ultimate," the use of that term in the Lease establishes the temporal and contingent nature of Cuba's sovereignty, specifying that it comes into being only in the event that the United States abandons Guantanamo: in such case, Guantanamo reverts to Cuba and to Cuban sovereignty rather than being subject to some other actual or attempted disposition. Most important, under the preferred temporal construction, Cuba does not retain any substantive sovereignty during the term of the U.S. occupation, with the result that, during such period, sovereignty vests in the United States. This Court's duty to give effect, where possible, to every word of a treaty, see United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539, 75 S. Ct. 513, 99 L. Ed. 615 (1955), should make us reluctant to deem treaty terms, or terms used in other important international agreements, as surplusage. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 150 L. Ed. 2d 251 (2001). This is especially the case when a term occupies a pivotal place in a legal scheme, id., as does the word "ultimate" in Article III of the 1903 Lease. In construing the Lease and continuing Treaty, we adopt the primary, temporal definition of the term, as used in the English language — a term that gives its use as a modifier substantive meaning.16

That the Lease uses the word "continuance" to describe Cuba's "ultimate sovereignty" does nothing to undercut the temporal construction of "ultimate." As we have explained, during the period the United States exercises dominion and control, i.e. sovereignty, over Guantanamo, Cuba retains a contingent sovereign interest — a reversionary right that springs into being upon a lawful termination of the U.S. reign. It is this reversionary interest that is "continued" even as substantive (or qualitative) sovereignty is ceded to the United States. In effect, the lease functions not unlike a standard land disposition contract familiar in the area of property law, in which the partitioning of a bundle of rights into present and future interests is commonplace.17

Finally, the term "ultimate" sovereignty must be construed in context. It is clearly the temporal definition of "ultimate," not its qualitative counterpart, that most naturally and accurately describes the nature of Cuban sovereignty in Guantanamo. By the plain terms of the agreement, the U.S. acquires full dominion and control over Guantanamo, as well as the right to purchase land and the power of eminent domain. Until such time as the United States determines to surrender its rights, it exercises full and exclusive executive, legislative and judicial control over the territory, and Cuba retains no rights of any kind to do anything with respect to the Base.18 If "ultimate" can mean either "final" (temporal) or "basic, fundamental, and maximum" (qualitative), given that Cuba does not under the agreement retain any degree of control or jurisdiction over Guantanamo during the period of United States occupation, the use of the term "ultimate" as a modifier of "sovereignty" in that agreement can only mean "final" (temporal) and not "basic, fundamental, and maximum" (qualitative). Accordingly, we conclude that the Lease and continuing Treaty must be construed as providing that Cuba possesses no substantive sovereignty over Guantanamo during the period of the U.S. reign. All such sovereignty during that indefinite and potentially permanent period is vested in the United States.

3. Conduct of the Parties Subsequent to the Lease and Continuing Treaty

There is another consideration that militates in favor of our concluding that the United States is presently exercising sovereignty over Guantanamo. For a considerable period of time, our government has purposely acted in a manner directly inconsistent with the terms of the Lease and continuing Treaty. Those agreements limit U.S. use of the territory to a naval base and coaling station. Contrary to the relevant provisions of the agreements, the United States has used the Base for whatever purposes it deemed necessary or desirable. Cuba has protested these actions in public fora and for years has refused to cash the United States' rent checks. See Center for International Policy's Cuba Project, Statement by the Government of Cuba to the National and International Public Opinion (Jan. 11, 2002), at http://ciponline.org/cuba/cubaproject/cubanstatement.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). At the same time, the Cuban government has admitted that it is powerless to prevent U.S. uses that conflict with the terms of the Lease and continuing Treaty.19 Id.

Sovereignty may be gained by a demonstration of intent to exercise sovereign control on the part of a country that is in possession of the territory in question and that has the power to enforce its will. See United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246, 254, 4 L. Ed. 562 (1819) (hostile occupation gives "firm possession" and the "fullest rights of sovereignty" to the occupying power, while suspending the sovereign authority of the land whose territory is being occupied); Cobb v. U.S., 191 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir.1951) (an occupying power may acquire sovereignty through an act of formal annexation or "an expression of intention to retain the conquered territory permanently"); see also Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 614, 13 L. Ed. 276 (1850) (the U.S. had "sovereignty and dominion" over the occupied Mexican territory, where "the country was in the exclusive and firm possession of the U.S., and governed by its military authorities acting under the orders of the President"). Cf. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 119, 21 S. Ct. 302, 45 L. Ed. 448 (1901) (where the occupation policy expressly disavows "exercise of sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control" over the occupied area, and is aimed at the establishment of a government to which the area may be restored, this occupied territory is considered "foreign"). With respect to Guantanamo, the sovereign face of U.S. authority and power has taken shape in recent decades. It has emerged, practically, through the concrete actions of a powerful nation intent on enforcing the right to use the territory it occupies without regard to any limitations. Whatever question may have existed about our sovereignty previously, our insistence on our right to use the territory for any and all purposes we desire, and our refusal to recognize the specific limitation on our rights provided in the Lease and continuing Treaty, removes any doubt that our sovereignty over Guantanamo is complete.

The United States originally leased the Base, pursuant to the 1903 agreement, for use as a naval and coaling station. See 1903 Lease, supra note 9. Base relations remained stable through the two world wars, but after the United States terminated diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1961, following the Cuban revolution, the United States began to use the base for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement. See Guantanamo Bay, A Brief History, at http://www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/Default.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). At the same time, many citizens of the host country sought refuge on the Base, and U.S. Marines and Cuban militiamen began patrolling opposite sides of the Base's fence line — patrols that have continued 24 hours a day ever since. Id. In 1964, Fidel Castro cut off water and supplies to the Base and Guantanamo became and remains entirely self-sufficient, with its own water plant, schools, transportation, entertainment facilities, and fast-food establishments. See Gerald Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L.REV. 1197, 1198 (1996). As of 1988, approximately 6,500 people lived on the Base, including civilian employees of several nationalities, see id. (describing the findings of one researcher), and the United States has employed hundreds of foreign nationals at Guantanamo, including Cuban exiles and Jamaicans. Id. at 1128. Today, the Base is in every way independent of Cuba and in no way reliant on Cuba's cooperation.

The United States' refusal to limit its dominion and control to the use permitted by the Lease and continuing Treaty became more pronounced in the 1990's, when President Clinton used the Base as a detention facility for approximately 50,000 Haitian and Cuban refugees intercepted at sea trying to reach the United States for refuge.20 See Laura Bonilla, Afghan War Prisoners in Guantanamo, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 29, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25095452. In 1999, President Clinton again proposed using the Base in a manner not authorized by the terms of the lease — this time to house 20,000 refugees from Kosovo. See Philip Shenon, U.S. Chooses Guantanamo Bay Base in Cuba for Refugee Site, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1999, at A13. Although, in the end, this plan was not implemented, the earlier actions only foreshadowed the 2002 arrival of over 600 individuals alleged to be members of Al-Queda or the Taliban, who were transported to Guantanamo by the U.S. military for reasons wholly unrelated to the operation of a naval base and coaling station.

If "sovereignty" is "the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is governed," "the power to do everything in a state without accountability," or "freedom from external control: autonomy, independence,"21 it would appear that there is no stronger example of the United States' exercise of "supreme power," or the adverse nature of its occupying power, than this country's purposeful actions contrary to the terms of the lease and over the vigorous objections of a powerless "lessor." See also New Jersey, 1997 WL 291594, at * 30 ("The plain and ordinary import of jurisdiction without exception is the authority of a sovereign."). Any honest assessment of the nature of United States' authority and control in Guantanamo today allows only one conclusion: the U.S. exercises all of "the basic attribute[s] of full territorial sovereignty." See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685, 110 S. Ct. 2053, 109 L. Ed. 2d 693 (1990). Accordingly, we conclude that, under any reading, Johnson does not bar this Court's jurisdiction over Gherebi's habeas petition.

4. The Guantanamo Lease and Treaty and the Panama Canal Zone Treaty

Our conclusion that habeas jurisdiction lies in this case is bolstered by a comparison of the Guantanamo Lease and continuing Treaty and the Panama Canal Zone Treaty. The two contemporaneously negotiated agreements are unparalleled with respect to the nature of the cession of quintessentially sovereign powers to the United States. Concluded the same year by the Theodore Roosevelt administration,22 the Guantanamo and Canal Zone agreements are widely viewed as substantially similar. See, e.g., 35 Op. Att'y Gen. 536, 540 (1929) (noting that the Canal Zone agreement "would appear to be no less comprehensive a grant than the lease from Cuba").23 Both agreements provide for the ceding of all dominion and control over the territory without temporal limitation, and each limits U.S. use to a particular purpose. Both afford the U.S. the right of eminent domain and the right to purchase real property. Both provide for yearly payments to the ceding nation as specified in the agreements. Only a voluntary act on the part of the United States could, given the terms of the two agreements, result in the restoration of the territory to the ceding country.24

Under the terms of the Panama Convention, in the eyes of our government of the time, "the sovereignty of the Canal Zone [wa]s not an open or doubtful question." 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 376, 376 (Sept. 7, 1907). It passed to the United States. As the Attorney General opined:

Article 3 of the treaty transfers to the United States, not the sovereignty by that term, but "all the rights, power, and authority" within the Zone that it would have if it were sovereign, "to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority ..." The omission to use words expressly passing sovereignty was dictated by reasons of public policy, I assume; but whatever the reason the treaty gives the substance of sovereignty, and instead of containing a mere declaration transferring the sovereignty, descends to the particulars "all the rights, power, and authority" that belong to sovereignty, and negatives any such "sovereign rights, power, or authority" in the former sovereign.

Id. at 377-78 (Sept. 7, 1907) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Guantanamo Lease and continuing Treaty transferred all of the power and authority that together constitute "sovereignty," and therefore transferred sovereignty itself. See 25 Op. Att'y Gen 441, 444 (1905) (stating that the "Canal Zone is now within the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States") (emphasis added); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 113, 116 (Jan. 30, 1907) ("Unquestionably [Articles II and II] of the treaty imposed upon the United States the obligations as well as the powers of a sovereign within the territory described[.]") (emphasis added); 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 19, 21 (July 24, 1908) (referring to the U.S. as "succeed[ing] to the sovereignty of the territory" in the Canal Zone) (emphasis added); 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 44, 49-50 (1916) ("[T]he treaty itself ... is the patent... by which the United States acquired its sovereignty and property rights in the Canal Zone") (emphasis added).25

Pursuant to this 1903 Convention, the United States created a complete system of courts for the Canal Zone, see Egle v. Egle, 715 F.2d 999, 1011 n. 15 (5th Cir. 1983), including a U.S. District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, a legislative court which exercised both federal and local jurisdiction over citizens and foreign nationals alike, see FED. R.CRIM. PROC. 54 (Advisory Note to Subdivision (a)(1), ¶ 9 (citing 48 U.S.C. former §§ 1344, 1345)), and issued final decisions reviewable by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1294. Both the Canal Zone district court and the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction to hear the habeas petitions of detainees in the Zone. See Voloshin v. Ridenour, 299 F. 134 (5th Cir.1924) (reviewing three habeas petitions against a U.S. Marshal for the Canal Zone). This jurisdictional regime continued in existence until October 1979, when, "by the Panama Canal Treaty, the United States relinquished sovereignty over the Canal Zone." Egle, 715 F.2d at 1010 (emphasis added). See supra note 24.

Information about the practical implementation of the jurisdictional regime that exists in Guantanamo is comparatively sparse. But see supra note 13. As we have explained in Section II(A)(1), however, pursuant to Article IV of the 1903 Supplemental Agreement, the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction over citizens and aliens alike who commit crimes on the Base. Such persons are subject to trial for their offenses in United States courts.26 Under the Agreement and continuing Treaty, Cuba is required to turn over to the U.S. authorities any persons, including Cubans, who commit an offense at Guantanamo. See supra note 9.

That, in the case of the Canal Zone, the U.S. established a court physically located in the territory whereas in the case of Guantanamo it used the services of U.S. courts located on the mainland is of no legal significance. What is critical is that in both instances, the United States exercised criminal jurisdiction over the territory and the persons there present, and that U.S. criminal statutes applied to aliens and U.S. citizens alike. In such circumstances, it is difficult to understand why persons who are subject to criminal prosecution in the United States for acts committed at Guantanamo should not have the right to seek a writ of habeas corpus for an alleged wrong committed against them at that location — including the act of unlawful detention. Indeed, Article IV of the Supplemental Agreement would appear to be dispositive of the jurisdictional question before us.

In sum, the similarity between the Guantanamo and Canal Zone agreements — two sets of documents unique in the nature of their cession of exclusive dominion and control to the United States — provides additional support for our conclusion that jurisdiction lies over Gherebi's claim. The fact the Canal Zone district court and the Fifth Circuit entertained individual claims both constitutional and non-constitutional until Panama re-assumed sovereign control, and that U.S. courts have exercised criminal, if not civil, jurisdiction over actions occurring at Guantanamo, simply provides one further compelling reason why we are unwilling to close the doors of the United States courts to Gherebi's habeas claim.

We wish to emphasize that the case before this Court does not require us to consider a habeas petition challenging the decisions of a military tribunal — a case that might raise different issues. Unlike the petitioners in Johnson, and even in Yamashita and Quirin, Gherebi has not been subjected to a military trial. Nor has the government employed the other time-tested alternatives for dealing with the circumstances of war: it has neither treated Gherebi as a prisoner of war (and has in fact declared that he is not entitled to the rights of the Geneva Conventions, see supra note 7), nor has it sought to prosecute him under special procedures designed to safeguard national security. See U.S. v. Bin Laden, 2001 WL 66393 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.25, 2001) (limiting access to confidential information). Instead, the government is following an unprecedented alternative27: under the government's theory, it is free to imprison Gherebi indefinitely along with hundreds of other citizens of foreign countries, friendly nations among them, and to do with Gherebi and these detainees as it will, when it pleases, without any compliance with any rule of law of any kind, without permitting him to consult counsel, and without acknowledging any judicial forum in which its actions may be challenged. Indeed, at oral argument, the government advised us that its position would be the same even if the claims were that it was engaging in acts of torture or that it was summarily executing the detainees. To our knowledge, prior to the current detention of prisoners at Guantanamo, the U.S. government has never before asserted such a grave and startling proposition. Accordingly, we view Guantanamo as unique not only because the United States' territorial relationship with the Base is without parallel today, but also because it is the first time that the government has announced such an extraordinary set of principles — a position so extreme that it raises the gravest concerns under both American and international law.

In sum, we hold that neither Johnson v. Eisentrager nor any other legal precedent precludes our assertion of jurisdiction over Gherebi's habeas petition. Although we agree with the government that the legal status of Guantanamo constitutes the dispositive factor in our jurisdictional inquiry, we do not find that Johnson requires sovereignty rather than simply the existence of territorial jurisdiction, which unquestionably exists here. Alternatively, we conclude that both the Lease and continuing Treaty as well as the practical reality of the U.S.'s exercise of unrestricted dominion and control over the Base compel the conclusion that, for the purposes of habeas jurisdiction, Guantanamo is sovereign U.S. territory.

B. The Jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California

Having determined that Johnson and other legal precedent do not act as a bar to the jurisdiction of Article III courts, we turn now to the question of whether the District Court for the Central District of California has personal jurisdiction over a proper respondent in this case. The habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), permits the writ to be granted by district courts "within their respective jurisdictions." The writ

... does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.... Read literally, the language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian.28 Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 495, 93 S. Ct. 1123, 35 L. Ed. 2d 443 (emphasis added). A court has personal jurisdiction in a habeas case "so long as the custodian can be reached by service of process." Id.

The government argues, based on Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 489, 91 S. Ct. 995, 28 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1971), that the custodian must be physically present so that he may be served in the Central District. In Schlanger, the Court concluded that "the absence of the [proper] custodian is fatal to the jurisdiction of the Arizona District Court." Id. at 491, 91 S. Ct. 995(emphasis added). However, one year later, in Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341, 345, 92 S. Ct. 1693, 32 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1972), the Court distinguished Schlanger, see id. at 344-45, 92 S. Ct. 1693, and held that habeas jurisdiction is proper even though the custodian is not physically present in the relevant district, as long as the custodian is within reach of the court's process. The Court reasoned:

That such "presence" may suffice for personal jurisdiction is well settled, McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S. Ct. 199, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223; Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95, and the concept is also not a novel one as regards to habeas corpus jurisdiction. In Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 65 S. Ct. 208, 89 L. Ed. 243, we said that habeas corpus may issue "if a respondent who has custody of the prisoner is within reach of the court's process...." Strait's commanding officer is "present" in California through his contacts in that State; he is therefore "within reach" of the federal court in which Strait filed his petition. See Donigian v. Laird, 308 F. Supp. 449, 453; cf. United States ex. rel. Armstrong v. Wheeler, D.C., 321 F. Supp. 471, 475.

Id. at 345 n. 2, 92 S. Ct. 1693 (emphasis added). By invoking International Shoe, and speaking in terms of "contacts" and the "reach of the court's process," the Court in Strait imported the standard doctrine of personal jurisdiction into the analysis of jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See also id. at 349, 92 S. Ct. 1693 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion in Strait held that "the type of contacts that have been found to support state jurisdiction over nonresidents under cases like [International Shoe] would also suffice for habeas jurisdiction").

Having established that Secretary Rumsfeld need not be physically present in order for the Central District to exercise jurisdiction, the next question is whether the Secretary has the requisite "minimum contacts" to satisfy the forum state's long-arm statute,29 which extends jurisdiction to the limits of due process. See CAL.CODE OF CIV. PRO. 410.10. Constitutional due process concerns are satisfied when a nonresident defendant has "certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional conceptions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945). Where a defendant's activities in the forum are substantial, continuous, and systematic, general jurisdiction is available, and the foreign defendant is subject to suit even on matters unrelated to his or her contacts with the forum. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S. Ct. 413, 96 L. Ed. 485 (1952). Here, the activities of Secretary Rumsfeld and the department he heads are substantial, continuous, and systematic throughout the state of California: California has the largest number of military facilities in the nation (sixty-one), including major military installations, Department of Defense laboratories, and testing facilities. See California's Technology, Trade, and Commerce Agency, Business & Community Resources, Military Base Revitalization, http://www.commerce.ca.gov/state/ttca (last visited Nov. 10, 2003). Many of these activities are carried out in the Central District of California. Accordingly, we conclude that Secretary Rumsfeld has the requisite "minimum contacts" to satisfy California's long-arm statute, and we hold that the United States District Court for the Central District has jurisdiction over Gherebi's nominal custodian, Secretary Rumsfeld, for purposes of § 2241(a).

Although we hold that Johnson does not bar habeas jurisdiction and further determine that the Central District may exercise personal jurisdiction over the Secretary, the question of venue presents a final, additional issue. The government has suggested that we might transfer the petition to the Eastern District of Virginia.30 The applicable rule is that "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (providing for transfer where venue is wrongly laid).31 In making the decision to transfer,

a court must balance the preference accorded the plaintiff's choice of forum with the burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum. The defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting the plaintiff's choice of forum. As part of this inquiry, the court should consider private and public interest factors affecting the convenience of the forum. Private factors include the "relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling; and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make the trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 S. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1947). Public factors include "the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the `local interest in having localized controversies decided at home;' the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern the action; the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of foreign law and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty." Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n. 6, 102 S. Ct. 252 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 509, 67 S. Ct. 839).

Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir.1986). Some of the above considerations are clearly not applicable to habeas cases. Moreover, as a general matter, the district court is not required to "determine the best venue," Bates v. C & S Adjusters, Inc., 980 F.2d 865, 867 (2d Cir.1992) (discussing the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391), and transfer under § 1404(a) "should not be freely granted." In re Nine Mile, Ltd., 692 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir.1982). Section 1404(a) provides for transfer to a more convenient forum, "not to a forum likely to prove equally convenient or inconvenient," Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 646, 84 S. Ct. 805, 11 L. Ed. 2d 945 (1964), and a "transfer should not be granted if the effect is simply to shift the inconvenience to the party resisting the transfer." Id. Further, there is a strong "presumption in favor of plaintiff's choice of forums." Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S. Ct. 839. This presumption must be taken into account when deciding whether the convenience of the parties — rather than the convenience of respondent — requires a transfer.

In the typical habeas case, problems of venue are simplified by the fact that "the person with the immediate control over the prisoner has the literal power to `produce' the body and is generally located in the same place as the petitioner." Henderson, 157 F.3d at 122. Here, however, the question is significantly more complicated. The place where the prisoner is being held and in which the immediate custodian is located is not a suitable or even possible venue; instead, a next-friend habeas movant, resident of California, is petitioning on behalf of a prisoner held outside of the physical confines of the United States. Also, in this case, factors such as the convenience of parties and witnesses and the ease of access to sources of proof cannot be weighed with the same ease and transparency afforded by the typical habeas proceeding. Finally, the public interest factors, which may be of critical importance here, are such that it is not possible to evaluate them adequately until after the government has presented its arguments in the district court.

In short, here, the question of the appropriate venue involves different considerations than are present in the ordinary case. While respondent Rumsfeld's presence in the Eastern District of Virginia might appear, at first blush, to warrant transfer to that district, there may be substantial considerations that will weigh in favor of determining that venue is proper in the Central District of California.32 In any event, the government has not formally moved to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or put forth the appropriate evidence to support its case;33 the parties have not briefed this issue; and no court has had occasion to consider the relevant factors bearing on venue such as ease of access to sources of proof and the convenience and cost of obtaining witnesses. Finally, the public interest factors in this case may require particularly careful scrutiny once the complete record is before the district court. All of these questions are best resolved, in the first instance, by the district court, and we express no view on the proper outcome here. Accordingly, we remand to the Central District to determine whether venue is proper, should the government renew its motion in that forum.

D. The desirability of a full exploration of the jurisdictional issues by the Courts of Appeals.

The dissent asserts that we should defer our decision in this case until after the Supreme Court has decided the pending Guantanamo detainee case in which certiorari has been granted. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C.Cir.2003), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 534, 157 L. Ed. 2d 407, 2003 WL 22070725 (Nov. 10, 2003). We strongly disagree. The Supreme Court has always encouraged the Courts of Appeal to resolve issues properly before them in advance of their determination by the Supreme Court, reasoning that having a variety of considered perspectives will aid the Court's ultimate resolution of the issue in question. See United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 66, 110 S. Ct. 387, 107 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1989) (noting that the Court "benefit[s] from the views of the Court[s] of Appeals"); United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160, 104 S. Ct. 568, 78 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1984) (noting that the Court benefits when several Courts of Appeal hear an issue prior to Supreme Court review); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 135, 97 S. Ct. 965, 51 L. Ed. 2d 204 (1977) (lauding the "wisdom of allowing difficult issues to mature through full consideration by the courts of appeals" and noting that having a variety of perspectives can "vastly simplif[y] our task"). Circuit courts have also noted the importance of several circuits' examining important legal questions before the Supreme Court makes a final determination. Va. Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 393 (4th Cir.2001) (emphasizing that opinions from multiple circuits helps develop "important questions of law" and that the Supreme Court benefits from "decisions from several courts of appeals"); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 447 (7th Cir.1994) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (noting that conflicting decisions "among the circuits ... [lend] the Supreme Court [the] benefit of additional legal views that increase the probability of a correct disposition"). This is especially the case here, given the importance of the issue, the dearth of considered opinions, and the conflict in views and reasoning that, as a result of our opinion, will now be available to the Supreme Court.

We hold that the district court erred in concluding, based on Johnson v. Eisentrager, that no district court would have jurisdiction over Gherebi's habeas petition. We also hold that the Central District may exercise jurisdiction in this case because the Secretary of Defense is subject to service of process under the California long-arm statute. Finally, we remand to the district court for consideration of the question whether transfer to a different district than the Central District of California would be appropriate.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.

With regret, I must respectfully dissent.

The second sentence of its opinion contains the key to the majority's errors here: "The issues we are required to confront are new, important, and difficult." Maj. op. at 1280. Although the issues that we confront are important and difficult, they are not new. Because the issues are not new, we are bound by existing Supreme Court precedent, which the majority misreads. Because the issues are important and difficult, the Supreme Court has decided to revisit them, and we should await the Supreme Court's imminent decision.

In Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 70 S. Ct. 936, 94 L. Ed. 1255 (1950), the Supreme Court held that an enemy alien who was detained by the United States military overseas could not bring a petition for habeas corpus in the courts of the United States. Our courts lack jurisdiction in that circumstance, and the sole remedy for the enemy alien lies with the political branches of government.1 Id. at 779-81, 70 S. Ct. 936.

A straightforward reading of Johnson makes it clear that "sovereignty" is the touchstone, under current law, for the exercise of federal courts' jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court explained, the petitioners in Johnson could not bring a habeas petition because they committed crimes, were captured, were tried, and were being detained outside "any territory over which the United States is sovereign." Id. at 777, 70 S. Ct. 936.

The majority invents the novel proposition that, because the Supreme Court used the phrase "territorial jurisdiction" more often than it used the term "sovereignty," the former concept governs and the latter may be disregarded. Maj. op. at 1287-88. Counting phrases is not, in my view, a valid method of analyzing the Court's meaning.

More telling is the way in which the Court distinguished cases in which enemy aliens were allowed to bring habeas petitions in federal courts, cases like Yamashita v. Styer (In re Yamashita), 327 U.S. 1, 66 S. Ct. 340, 90 L. Ed. 499 (1946). In Johnson the Court held that Yamashita was different because, in Yamashita, the United States had "sovereignty" over the place where the petitioner was held and, therefore, the federal courts had jurisdiction "[b]y reason of our sovereignty." Johnson, 339 U.S. at 780, 70 S. Ct. 936. "Sovereignty" was the only distinction on which Johnson relied. There may be, as the majority argues, other possible distinctions, but they were of no moment to the Johnson Court, whose opinion we must construe.

In short, the holding in Johnson precludes federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over an enemy alien who is detained — and who has always been — outside the sovereign territory of the United States. Only the Supreme Court may modify the "sovereignty" rule established by Johnson. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S. Ct. 1917, 104 L. Ed. 2d 526 (1989) ("If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."). The majority cites no authority in which the Supreme Court has declared that Johnson is no longer good law.

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a consolidated appeal that presents an opportunity for the Court to revisit Johnson's "sovereignty" rule. See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C.Cir.2003), supra note 1. Until the Supreme Court informs us otherwise, however, the key inquiry remains whether the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base ("Guantanamo") is sovereign territory of the United States.

a. The Guantanamo Lease

(i) The Lease Recognizes the "Continuance of Ultimate Sovereignty" by Cuba Over Guantanamo.

The majority concludes "that, at least for habeas purposes, Guantanamo is a part of the sovereign territory of the United States." Maj. op. at 1290. There are two things wrong with that sentence.

First, it is unclear how a place can be, as the majority implies Guantanamo is, a part of "the sovereign territory of the United States" for habeas purposes but not for other purposes. The "sovereignty" that Johnson requires appears to be the ordinary kind. Cf. Black's Law Dictionary 1402 (7th ed.1999) (defining "sovereignty" as: "1. Supreme dominion, authority, or rule. 2. The supreme political authority of an independent state. 3. The state itself.").

Second, and more fundamentally, Guantanamo is the sovereign territory of Cuba. The relevant treaty explains that "the United States recognizes the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the above described areas of land and water." Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 16-23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, T.S. No. 418 ("Guantanamo Lease") (emphasis added).2

The majority's interpretation of the Guantanamo Lease is problematic because the majority takes the phrase "ultimate sovereignty" out of context. I already have cited the definition of "sovereignty." The 1913 version of Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary offers these definitions for "ultimate":

1. Farthest; most remote in space or time; extreme; last; final.

2. Last in a train of progression or consequences; tended toward by all that precedes; arrived at, as the last result; final.

3. Incapable of further analysis; incapable of further division or separation; constituent; elemental; as, an ultimate constituent of matter.

Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary 1560 (1913), http://humanities.uchicago.edu/forms_unrest/webster.form.html.

The majority reads the Lease's use of "ultimate" in the temporal sense ("most remote in ... time"). In context, however, I believe that the Lease is using "ultimate" in the sense of "extreme," "incapable of further division or separation," or "elemental." That is, key to understanding the phrase "ultimate sovereignty" is to recognize the significance of the contextual term "continuance."3

The 1913 dictionary offers these definitions for "continuance":

1. A holding on, or remaining in a particular state; permanence, as of condition, habits, abode, etc.; perseverance; constancy; duration; stay.

2. Uninterrupted succession; continuation; constant renewell [sic]; perpetuation; propagation.

3. A holding together; continuity. [Obs.]

4. (Law)(a) The adjournment of the proceedings in a cause from one day, or from one stated term of a court, to another. (b) The entry of such adjournment and the grounds thereof on the record.

Id. at 313. The only definitions that make sense in the present context are the first and second ones — the third being obsolete, and the fourth being obviously irrelevant. Thus, the Lease's use of the word "continuance" denotes the ongoing nature of Cuba's "ultimate sovereignty" over Guantanamo.

The majority's attempt to explain away the contextual use of the words "continuance" and "ultimate" is unpersuasive. The majority reads the Lease to vest in Cuba only a "contingent sovereign interest — a reversionary right that springs into being upon a lawful termination of the U.S. reign. It is this reversionary interest that is `continued' even as substantive (or qualitative) sovereignty is ceded to the United States." Maj. op. at 1293.

The Lease might have created such a reversionary right (although I read it differently). But the Lease logically could not have continued such a right, because no such "reversionary" right existed before the Lease was signed (when Cuba indisputably was the sole sovereign over Guantanamo).

By contrast, if "ultimate" refers not to the temporal activation of a reversionary interest, but to ongoing elemental, indivisible sovereignty, the whole phrase — "the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba" — in the Guantanamo Lease makes sense. The Lease is discussing the continuance of the elemental, indivisible sovereignty of Cuba with respect to Guantanamo.4

The drafters of the Lease wanted to make clear that, although the United States was granted powers that often run with sovereignty (e.g., "complete jurisdiction and control"), in fact Cuba was retaining all sovereignty over Guantanamo for itself. That is to say, Cuba retained ultimate, or elemental, or indivisible sovereignty, despite the fact that the United States would be allowed to act, de facto, a lot like a sovereign would act.

The majority's concerns about what the word "ultimate" could add to the concept of "sovereignty," maj. op. at 1291-92, are thus misplaced. The Lease goes to great pains to explain that all sovereignty over Guantanamo is "unbundled" from the rights of jurisdiction and control. Cuba keeps the former continually, while the United States enjoys the latter. The word "ultimate" serves the purpose of preventing the United States from asserting that it has any legal sovereignty deriving from the jurisdiction and control that it enjoys. In the absence of the word "ultimate," one could conclude that Cuba had handed over not only the rights to jurisdiction and control, but also the underlying sovereignty that forms the basis for the authority to enjoy (or, as here, to transfer the right to enjoy) those rights.

The contemporaneously signed Spanish version of the Lease supports a substantive, rather than temporal, understanding of the term "ultimate" even more strongly than the English version. See United State v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88, 8 L. Ed. 604 (1833) ("If the English and the Spanish parts can, without violence, be made to agree, that construction which establishes this conformity ought to prevail."). The Spanish version of the disputed text reads: "Si bien los Estados Unidos reconocen por su parte la continuación de la soberania definitiva de la República de Cuba." Convenio de 16/23 de Febrero de 1903, Entre la República de Cuba y los Estados Unidos de América para arrendar á los Estados Unidos (bajos las condiciones que habran de convenires por los dos Gobiernos) tierras en Cuban para estaciones carboneras y navales, Tratados, Convenios y Convenciones (Habana 1936) (emphasis added). There is no dispute that "soberania" refers to "sovereignty" or that "continuación" equates to the English cognate "continuation." The word "definitiva" is the feminine form of the adjective "definitivo," which meant to a reader at the time "[d]ícese de lo que decide, resuelve o concluye": a term used to describe that which decides, resolves or concludes [a matter]. Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana por la Real Academia Española 329 (Decimocuarta ed.1914). A contemporaneous Spanish-to-English dictionary translated "definitivo" as (not surprisingly) "definitive" or "determinate." A New Pronouncing Dictionary of the Spanish and English Languages 209 (1908). At the time, "definitive" was understood primarily to mean "[d]eterminate; positive; final; conclusive; unconditional; express." Webster's at 382. Similarly, "determinate" was defined as "[h]aving defined limits; not uncertain or arbitrary; fixed; established; definite[;][c]onclusive; decisive; positive." Id. at 401. Although a temporal sense could be squeezed out of those definitions, their most natural meaning is that the issue of sovereignty was decided, resolved, or concluded in favor of Cuba.

(ii) Other Terms of the Lease Suggest That Cuba Retains Sovereignty Over Guantanamo.

Other provisions of the Lease demonstrate that Cuba currently enjoys sovereignty over Guantanamo. Article III of the Lease states that Cuba consents to the United States' exercise of jurisdiction and control over Guantanamo "during the period of the occupation" by the United States. The 1913 Webster's dictionary defines "occupation" (in relevant part) as "1. The act or process of occupying or taking possession; actual possession and control; the state of being occupied; a holding or keeping; tenure; use; as, the occupation of lands by a tenant." Webster's at 994. Thus, the United States, as an "occupier," enjoys the status of a tenant rather than a landlord. Indeed, it would be odd for a sovereign to be described as "occupying" its own lands; instead, the term usually means the exercise of control by one nation over the sovereign territory of another.

Additionally, if the United States were a true sovereign, it could permissibly do many things at Guantanamo that it is not entitled to do. For instance, the United States may not permissibly change the use of the land (say, by raising commercial crops);5 if the United States were sovereign, it could raise commercial crops. If the property is abandoned, the lease ends automatically;6 if the United States were sovereign, it could allow the land to lie idle without jeopardizing its sovereignty and its concomitant right to use the property later. Cuban trade vessels must be allowed free passage;7 if the United States were sovereign, it could choose to refuse passage to another nation's vessels for economic, political, or other reasons. The United States pays rent; if it were sovereign, it would have the legal right to use the land without paying another sovereign state annually for the privilege. The United States never has enjoyed these rights because Cuba, as sovereign, never relinquished them.

The majority asserts that the United States has repeatedly breached the terms of the Lease by using Guantanamo other than as a naval base and coaling station. Maj. op. at 1294.8 The majority then reasons that sovereignty is demonstrated by the United States' repeated violations of the Lease. Maj. op. at 1294. That conclusion does not follow.

The fact that Cuba lacks the political or military might necessary to hold the United States responsible for breaching the Lease does not mean that the United States has not breached the Lease or that the Lease has ceased to exist.9 The ability to violate terms of an agreement with impunity does not render a party legally free to ignore the agreement. It means only that the party in breach is spared the practical consequences of its improper acts. If a celebrity tenant breaches his lease by keeping unauthorized pets, and the landlord feels that she can do nothing about it, the tenant does not thereby become the owner of the house. Indeed, the landlord may not even have waived the right to enforce the no-pet term of the lease later. Rather, the tenant is in breach of the lease but escapes the attendant consequences.

Similarly, even if the United States has violated the Lease, it simply is big enough and strong enough that Cuba has been unable to enforce its legal entitlements. This difference in power does not erase the United States' obligations under the Lease, nor does it mean that Guantanamo is a part of the sovereign territory of the United States. The Lease is actually a lease, albeit a highly unusual one with a very pushy tenant.

As is the case with most leases, the tenant has a right of quiet enjoyment during the lease term. The owner — even though "ultimate" ownership "continues" during the term of the lease — gives up jurisdiction and control over the property with whatever limits are agreed by the parties to the lease. That is just what happened here. Even a life tenancy or an option to buy does not convey fee simple ownership to the tenant.

b. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty

The majority seeks to bolster its conclusion that Guantanamo is part of the sovereign territory of the United States by referring to the 1904 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty ("Panama Canal Treaty"), which authorized construction of the Panama Canal. Maj. op. at 1296-97. An examination of the Panama Canal Treaty actually weakens the majority's case, however.

The Attorney General's Opinion explained that, in the view of the executive branch:

Article 3 of the treaty transfers to the United States, not the sovereignty by that term, but "all the rights, power and authority" within the Zone that it would have if it were sovereign....

The omission to use words expressly passing sovereignty was dictated by reasons of public policy, I assume; but whatever the reason the treaty gives the substance of sovereignty, and instead of containing a mere declaration transferring the sovereignty, descends to the particulars "all the rights, power, and authority" that belong to sovereignty, and negatives any such "sovereign rights, power, or authority" in the former sovereign.

26 Op. Att'y Gen. 376, 377 (1907). Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty, on which the Attorney General's Opinion relied, reads in its entirety:

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States all the rights, power and authority within the zone mentioned and described in Article II of this agreement and within the limits of all auxiliary lands and waters mentioned and described in said Article II which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory within which said lands and waters are located to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority.

Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal to Connect the Waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Nov. 18, 1903, U.S.-Panama, art. III, 33 Stat. 2234 (emphasis added).

The text of Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty differs from the provisions of the Guantanamo Lease. The Guantanamo Lease never says that the United States is granted "all" of the "rights, power and authority" that it would enjoy "if it were the sovereign." To the contrary, the Guantanamo Lease mentions the concept of sovereignty in connection with Cuba, not in connection with the United States. The Guantanamo Lease provides that "the United States recognizes the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the above described areas of land and water." Guantanamo Lease, art. III (emphasis added). There is no similar recognition in the Panama Canal Treaty.

The Panama Canal Treaty and the Guantanamo Lease share many similarities, as the majority points out. But the only question here is whether the United States was granted sovereignty, and the texts of the documents differ dramatically on this point. The Panama Canal Treaty granted "all the rights, power and authority" of a "sovereign" to the United States, with no express reservation of sovereignty to Panama. The Guantanamo Lease is just the opposite; it grants to the United States the "exercise" of "complete jurisdiction and control over and within" a designated area, while reserving "the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty" to Cuba. This distinction in the texts of the two documents must be deemed intentional and must be given effect. The Panama Canal Treaty passed sovereignty to the United States, while the Guantanamo Lease did not.

A comparison of the provisions of the two documents with respect to eminent domain, likewise, underscores the differing treatment of sovereignty. In the Guantanamo Lease, Cuba gives the United States the power of eminent domain; that is, this is a lease with an option to buy. Guantanamo Lease, art. III. If the United States were sovereign, this provision would be redundant because, by definition, a sovereign could exercise the power of eminent domain.

An examination of the Panama Canal Treaty illustrates this truism. In the Panama Canal Treaty, Panama gave the United States a similar power of eminent domain, or a lease with an option to buy, only with respect to areas that were not given to the United States as its sovereign territory — the cities and harbors of Panama and Colon. Panama Canal Treaty, arts. II and VII. In the areas as to which Panama ceded sovereignty, such a clause was unnecessary because the power of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty. But, in both the Guantanamo Lease and the Panama Canal Treaty, in areas as to which Cuba and Panama (respectively) retained sovereignty the option to buy had to be granted specifically as a contractual term.

One additional point bears mention. The executive branch has taken the position that "the United States has no claim of sovereignty over the leased areas" of Guantanamo. Brief for Appellees George W. Bush et al., filed June 18, 2003, at 17. Rather, "Guantanamo Bay Naval Base is located within the sovereign territory of the Republic of Cuba." Id.

The Supreme Court has recently reminded us that the Constitution allocates the foreign relations power to the federal executive in recognition of the "concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign nations." Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2386, 156 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). "`Although the source of the President's power to act in foreign affairs does not enjoy any textual detail, the historical gloss on the "executive Power" vested in Article II of the Constitution has recognized the President's "vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations."'" Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767, 92 S. Ct. 1808, 32 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1972) (explaining that the President has "the lead role ... in foreign policy"); Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109, 68 S. Ct. 431, 92 L. Ed. 568 (1948) (noting the President's role as the "Nation's organ in foreign affairs").

The majority today declares that the United States has sovereignty over territory of a foreign state, over the objections of the executive branch. Indeed, both parties to the Guantanamo Lease and its associated treaties — Cuba and the United States (through the executive branch) — maintain that Guantanamo is part of Cuba. Nevertheless, the majority announces that the United States has annexed Guantanamo. In so doing, the majority "compromise[s] the very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments." Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 147 L. Ed. 2d 352 (2000). It has created an inconsistency in our nation's foreign policy, with one branch (which has primary responsibility in this field) declaring that the United States is not sovereign over Guantanamo, and a second branch (which is not politically accountable) declaring that it is. The complications that flow from such a situation are as obvious now as they were to the framers, who chose to avoid them by granting to the President the lead authority in foreign affairs.

Perhaps in some circumstance, a federal court would be obliged in the execution of its constitutional duties to declare, over the objections of the executive branch, that the United States is sovereign over some territory. However, in view of the constitutional allocation of powers, and the need for the United States to speak with one voice in dealing with foreign nations, federal courts should tread lightly. The question whether the United States has sovereignty over Guantanamo is undeniably close. That being so, the issue is particularly sensitive and the declarations by the executive branch regarding foreign policy should carry significant weight. The majority's failure to credit the executive branch's position on sovereignty over Guantanamo is an unwise and unwarranted extension of judicial authority in an arena belonging primarily to the executive branch.

As noted, the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a consolidated appeal that provides the Court with an opportunity to consider the question about which the majority and I disagree. The orders granting certiorari were limited to this question: "Whether United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba." I believe that we should wait to hear the Supreme Court's answer to that question, because the views that we express here will become obsolete as soon as the Supreme Court renders its decision.

The issues that Mr. Gherebi raises are significant and troubling. Under existing Supreme Court precedent, however, I do not believe that we have jurisdiction to reach them.10 There are good arguments that can (and undoubtedly will) be made in support of the proposition that federal courts should have the power to hear habeas petitions of prisoners held by officers of the United States government, whatever the prisoners' nationality and whatever their situs of imprisonment. If the Supreme Court is persuaded by those arguments to modify or overrule Johnson, I look forward to reaching the merits of this case. But until the Supreme Court speaks, nothing that the majority or I say can have any legal effect. Our decision is, in a practical sense, advisory. I therefore believe that we should defer submission until the Supreme Court decides Rasul and Al Odah.

It is of grave concern when federal courts, traditionally the guardians of our Constitution and our liberties, turn away claims that government officials have violated an individual's rights. I am reluctant, as was the district court, to hold that the court lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Gherebi's petition for habeas corpus, and my view should not be mistaken for approval either of Mr. Gherebi's detention or of the precedent that prevents us from scrutinizing it. But I am equally reluctant to distort treaties, leases, and Supreme Court cases to reach a more desirable outcome. Change in the law, if any there will be, must come from the Supreme Court. Failing that, a remedy, if any there will be, must come from Congress and the executive branch.

Accordingly, and regrettably, I dissent.