FOR PUBLICATION
  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No. 08-50276
                Plaintiff-Appellee,
               v.                                 D.C. No.
                                              3:07-cr-02872-JM-1
JUAN HERON-SALINAS,
                                                   OPINION
             Defendant-Appellant.
                                          
         Appeal from the United States District Court
            for the Southern District of California
          Jeffrey T. Miller, District Judge, Presiding

                    Submitted May 6, 2009*
                      Pasadena, California

                       Filed May 20, 2009

   Before: John T. Noonan, Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, and
              Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.

                       Per Curiam Opinion




  *The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

                                6019
                UNITED STATES v. HERON-SALINAS             6021




                         COUNSEL

Jennifer L. Coon, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San
Diego, California, for the defendant-appellant.

Nicole Acton Jones, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Appellate Sec-
tion, Criminal Division, San Diego, California, for the
plaintiff-appellee.


                          OPINION

PER CURIAM:

   Juan Heron-Salinas appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion to dismiss his indictment for attempted entry into the
United States after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326. Heron-Salinas claims that his underlying deportation
was invalid under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) because his conviction
for assault with a firearm under California Penal Code section
245(a)(2) is not a “crime of violence,” as that term is defined
in 18 U.S.C. § 16.

   [1] We have previously held that aiding and abetting
assault with a deadly weapon in violation of California Penal
Code section 245(a)(1) is categorically a crime of violence
under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and that an alien convicted of that
crime is an aggravated felon under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).
Ortiz-Magana v. Mukasey, 

, 654 (9th Cir. 2008);
see also Ocampo-Duran v. Ashcroft, 

, 1134-35
(9th Cir. 2001).
6022            UNITED STATES v. HERON-SALINAS
  [2] California Penal Code section 245(a)(1) and 245(a)(2)
proscribe the same conduct, the only difference being the type
of weapon involved. Today we hold that a conviction for
assault with a firearm under California Penal Code section
245(a)(2) is categorically a “crime of violence” and an “ag-
gravated felony” for immigration purposes.

   Heron-Salinas argues that California Penal Code section
245 does not contain the requisite mens rea or use of force to
qualify as a crime of violence under section 16. Heron-Salinas
is incorrect. Section 16 defines a “crime of violence” as:

    (a) an offense that has as an element the use,
    attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
    against the person or property of another, or

    (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by
    its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical
    force against the person or property of another may
    be used in the course of committing the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 16. Under a plain reading of the statute, the ele-
ments of assault with a firearm — an unlawful attempt, cou-
pled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the
person of another with a firearm — satisfy the requirements
of section 16(a) and (b). See Cal. Penal Code §§ 240,
245(a)(2).

   [3] In California, assault “requires an intentional act and
actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the
act by its nature will probably and directly result in the appli-
cation of physical force against another.” People v. Williams,

, 204 (Cal. 2001). This definition closely tracks
the language in § 16(b). Attempting to commit a violent
injury on another person with a firearm “naturally involve[s]
a person acting in disregard of the risk that physical force
might be used against another in committing an offense.” Leo-
               UNITED STATES v. HERON-SALINAS             6023
cal v. Ashcroft, 

, 10-11 (2004). The mens rea
requirement is met.

   Heron-Salinas next argues that section 245 is not a crime
of violence because, in California, “assault includes an uncon-
sented touching of the victim,” rather than actual force, as
required by section 16. People v. Rosen, 

,
454 (Ct. App. 2007). Today we do not address the broader
question of whether all forms of assault under the California
Penal Code are crimes of violence. The use of a firearm in the
commission of the crime is enough to demonstrate that actual
force was attempted or threatened under section 16(a). Simi-
larly, one who assaults another by means of a firearm neces-
sarily disregards the substantial risk that in the course of
committing the offense he might intentionally use actual
physical force against the victim under section 16(b).

   [4] Assault with a firearm naturally falls within the cate-
gory, “crime of violence,” under the “ordinary meaning” of
that term. See 

. Heron-Salinas was con-
victed of a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16.

  Accordingly, the conviction is AFFIRMED.