Filed: Jun. 25, 2020
Latest Update: Jun. 25, 2020
Summary: FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 25 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT THOMAS CHARLES HORNE, Attorney No. 19-15942 General; KATHLEEN M WINN, D.C. No. 3:18-cv-08010-SPL Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MEMORANDUM* SHEILA SULLIVAN POLK, in her official capacity as the Yavapai County Attorney, Defendant-Appellee. THOMAS CHARLES HORNE, Attorney No. 19-15943 General; KATHLEEN M WINN, D.C. No. 3:18-cv-08010-SPL Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SHEILA SU
Summary: FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 25 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT THOMAS CHARLES HORNE, Attorney No. 19-15942 General; KATHLEEN M WINN, D.C. No. 3:18-cv-08010-SPL Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MEMORANDUM* SHEILA SULLIVAN POLK, in her official capacity as the Yavapai County Attorney, Defendant-Appellee. THOMAS CHARLES HORNE, Attorney No. 19-15943 General; KATHLEEN M WINN, D.C. No. 3:18-cv-08010-SPL Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SHEILA SUL..
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FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUN 25 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THOMAS CHARLES HORNE, Attorney No. 19-15942
General; KATHLEEN M WINN,
D.C. No. 3:18-cv-08010-SPL
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
SHEILA SULLIVAN POLK, in her
official capacity as the Yavapai County
Attorney,
Defendant-Appellee.
THOMAS CHARLES HORNE, Attorney No. 19-15943
General; KATHLEEN M WINN,
D.C. No. 3:18-cv-08010-SPL
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
SHEILA SULLIVAN POLK, in her
official capacity as the Yavapai County
Attorney,
Defendant-Appellant.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 4, 2020**
Seattle, Washington
Before: KLEINFELD, W. FLETCHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Thomas Horne and Kathleen Winn (“plaintiffs”) sued Sheila Polk under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Polk violated their due process rights when, in her role
as Yavapai County Attorney, she served as both advocate and adjudicator in an
Arizona administrative action brought against them. Below, Polk moved to
dismiss, arguing inter alia that she was entitled to judicial immunity and that
plaintiffs’ claim was time-barred. The district court ultimately held that Heck v.
Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994), did not apply, and therefore accrual of plaintiffs’
cause of action was not tolled pending the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision that
Polk had violated their due process rights. See Horne v. Polk,
394 P.3d 651 (Ariz.
2017). The district court also held that Polk was not entitled to judicial immunity.
Plaintiffs appealed, and Polk cross-appealed the judicial immunity
determination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2
novo a district court’s dismissal based on the statute of limitations. Mills v. City of
Covina,
921 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2019). We affirm.
The applicable limitations period is two years. See TwoRivers v. Lewis,
174
F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542. “Under federal law, a
claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which
is the basis of the action.” Klein v. City of Beverly Hills,
865 F.3d 1276, 1278 (9th
Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs knew or had reason to
know of their injury when Polk, who rendered the final decision in their
administrative case, admitted in a brief to the Arizona Court of Appeals that she
was also “involved with the prosecution of the case, by assisting with the
preparation and strategy.” That brief was filed in February 2015. Yet the plaintiffs
did not bring their § 1983 claim until January 2018, after their administrative case
had been resolved upon remand. Their claim was therefore not made within two
years of its accrual.
Plaintiffs argue that because Heck has been applied in the context of § 1983
claims stemming from prison disciplinary proceedings, which are administrative in
nature, it may therefore be applied to the § 1983 claim stemming from their
administrative case. See Edwards v. Balisok,
520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997) (applying
Heck in a prison disciplinary context); see also Muhammad v. Close,
540 U.S. 749,
3
754 (2004) (characterizing “prison disciplinary proceedings” as “administrative
determinations”). Plaintiffs’ argument is overbroad. Heck applies where there is
an underlying criminal conviction or sentence. Its limited extension involves a
species of administrative decisions that the Supreme Court has acknowledged is
similar to criminal proceedings. See
Edwards, 520 U.S. at 647 (analogizing the
prison disciplinary petitioner in question to a criminal defendant). Plaintiffs’
administrative case, on the other hand, involved only a monetary penalty.
Because we hold that plaintiffs’ § 1983 action is time-barred, we do not
reach the question presented in Polk’s cross-appeal of the district court’s decision
on judicial immunity.
AFFIRMED.
4