O'ROURKE, J.
Defendants and appellants San Diego County Office of Education (Office) and Randolph E. Ward, Ed.D. appeal from a purported judgment on plaintiff and respondent Rodger Hartnett's petition for writ of mandate ordering Office to reinstate Hartnett's employment and awarding him $234,703.55 in back pay. Before entering judgment, the trial court purported to sever Hartnett's petition for writ of mandate from the remaining causes of action and issued the judgment under a new case number. On appeal, Office contends (1) the judgment is barred by collateral estoppel; (2) the court misinterpreted Education Code section 45306 in reaching its decision; and (3) the court erred by making its own findings concerning the amount of Hartnett's back pay without remanding the matter to the proper administrative forum. Hartnett has moved to dismiss Office's appeal on grounds the appeal is from an interlocutory judgment on a nonappealable order. He has also asked us to sanction Office for filing a frivolous appeal.
We conclude the trial court lacked authority to sever Hartnett's petition for writ of mandate and issue it as a judgment under a new case number for the purpose of permitting an immediate appeal. The existence of other pending causes of action between Office and Hartnett renders the order granting Hartnett's petition interlocutory, and we conclude no exception to the one final judgment rule applies. We therefore dismiss Office's appeal as from a nonappealable order, and in so doing necessarily do not reach Office's contentions, which may be raised on a timely appeal once the trial court enters an appealable judgment in the matter. Under these unique circumstances, we deny Hartnett's motion for sanctions.
In April 2008, Hartnett, who had been terminated from his employment as a claims coordinator with Office, sued Office, Ward, and other individual Office employees for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, civil conspiracy to commit wrongful termination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Hartnett v. San Diego County Office of Education et al. (Super. Ct. S.D. County, 2011, No. 37-2008-00081583-CU-WT-CTL).) In part, Hartnett alleged he was wrongfully terminated as a result of Office's failure to accommodate his "visual processing impairment" disability and in retaliation for his investigation of allegedly illegal practices involving Office's panel attorneys.
Several weeks later, Hartnett filed, under the same case number, a "petition for writ of mandate for reinstatement with back pay" under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. He argued that as a classified permanent public employee with a property interest in continued employment, he was entitled to, but denied, due process. Specifically, he asserted the record provided to the officer conducting his Skelly hearing (Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 (Skelly)
The trial court took the matter under submission, declining to rule on the writ petition in view of pending demurrers and motions to strike. It gave Office's counsel an opportunity to supplement its papers in response to Hartnett's reply arguments.
On September 25, 2008, Hartnett filed a verified "second petition for writ of mandate on merits of dismissal," incorporating by reference his first writ petition and lodging a record of the proceedings before Office's personnel commission (the commission). In his second petition, Hartnett argued (1) the commission acted without jurisdiction in upholding his termination; (2) he did not receive a fair trial; and (3) the commission abused its discretion in that it failed to conduct an investigation, its decision was not supported by the findings, and its findings were not supported by the evidence.
On October 1, 2008, the trial court issued its order denying Hartnett's first writ petition. It deemed the petition to constitute an amendment to Hartnett's complaint adding a cause of action for mandamus relief seeking reinstatement and an award of back pay. The court ruled Hartnett's evidence showed Office was not responsible for any substantial delay and there was no evidence of delay caused by Office rising to a level that infringed his due process rights. It rejected Hartnett's argument that he was entitled to a hearing within a specified time under Education Code section 44944 or Government Code section 19578, finding neither statute applicable because he was not a certificated employee. The court further rejected Hartnett's argument that he was denied his discovery rights, pointing out he had not sought review of the hearing officer's decision, but only reinstatement and back pay, which were not proper remedies for an asserted denial of discovery. The court ruled Office's attorney was in a position adverse to Hartnett and did not operate under a conflict of interest so as to render the hearing unfair. As for Hartnett's due process challenges to a hearing that had occurred after he filed his writ, the court ruled Hartnett's petition did not seek proper relief, i.e., remand to the hearing officer. It pointed out Hartnett had not filed a new or amended writ petition seeking such relief, and he had not provided a record of the hearing.
On October 22, 2008, Office and Ward answered Hartnett's second writ petition. They opposed the second petition in part on grounds it was barred by res judicata, and objected to Hartnett's evidence. The parties submitted supplemental briefing on various issues, including whether Hartnett's appeal of a ruling on Office's special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16) required a stay of the writ proceedings.
On March 25, 2009, the trial court granted Hartnett's second petition and issued a writ of mandate compelling Office to immediately reinstate Hartnett. It found Hartnett was entitled to an award of back pay from the date of termination through reinstatement. The court declined to address Hartnett's arguments regarding unreasonable delay and denial of discovery, which had been raised in his prior petition, and ruled the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in handling discovery and evidence. However, it ruled the commission "did not proceed in the manner required by law because it failed to conduct an investigation prior to the hearing as required by Education Code section 45306." Relying on Ahlstedt v. Board of Education (1947) 79 Cal.App.2d 845, the court reasoned: "A classified civil service employee is entitled to have the statutory procedure for dismissal strictly followed. . . . Where this procedure was not followed `the dismissal was abortive, ineffective, and for all purposes unauthorized, leaving nothing upon which the commission could base a hearing or further exercise of its discretion.' . . . [Hartnett] raised this issue in a letter to the Personnel Commission. [Office's] opposition does not address this issue. As the dismissal was ineffectual, [Hartnett] is entitled to reinstatement." In view of its conclusion, the court did not address the hearing officer's findings or the penalty imposed. The court issued a writ on April 17, 2009.
Office moved to vacate the court's order on Hartnett's second writ petition, and in the alternative sought a new trial. It argued the court had legally erred by finding Office had not addressed Hartnett's arguments as to the investigation required by Education Code section 45306. According to Office, Hartnett had raised the issue in both writs and Office had supplementally briefed the question, thus the court's ruling on the first writ was law of the case. It argued the court likewise made a ruling against law by concluding that Education Code section 45306 required both an investigation and hearing; that Ahlstedt did not stand for the proposition that both were required, and the statute could not be construed to require a separate investigation and hearing. Office argued that the hearing, in which the commission reviewed exhibits, heard testimony, and issued a conclusion, constituted the investigation.
The court tentatively denied the motion,
Office appealed from the March 25, 2009 and July 8, 2009 orders. This court dismissed the appeal and denied Office's request to treat it as a writ. (Hartnett v. San Diego County Office of Education et al. (Oct. 9, 2009, D055524) [nonpub. opn.].)
Following dismissal of its appeal, Office notified Hartnett he was being placed on paid administrative leave, and that his back pay owed, if any, was being addressed with legal counsel. In early December 2009, it tendered back pay, and then terminated his employment again effective March 5, 2010. During this time, Hartnett unsuccessfully pursued a civil contempt citation against Office for failing to reinstate his employment and pay him the appropriate amount of back pay.
Hartnett sought to enforce the writ of mandate by motion, which Office opposed. Ultimately, the trial court treated Hartnett's motion as one to amend the cause of action for writ and granted it to amend the claim to seek the payment of $259,358,82 in back wages and benefits. It set a hearing on the petition, as to which Hartnett would have the burden of proof, for the "limited purpose of admitting evidence and issuing a ruling on the specific amount of back wages due to [Hartnett] as a result of the first termination that was deemed to be procedurally improper by this Court."
On February 28, 2011, following an evidentiary hearing, the court issued a statement of decision on the amended cause of action for a writ of mandate. Making detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and rejecting Office's arguments that it lacked jurisdiction, the court concluded Hartnett was entitled to specified awards of back pay, reimbursement for health care premiums he had incurred, and interest for the disputed period.
On March 30, 2011, the court issued its writ of mandate and also granted Office's ex parte request to sever the writ proceeding from the main action and issue it under a new case number. The court awarded Hartnett $234,703.55, consisting of $193,083.06 in back pay, $33,775.61 in interest, and $7,844.88 in health care premium reimbursement. The writ provides: "[Office] stipulated to providing [Hartnett] back pay at the M-45 salary classification instead of the reduced M-38 designation. The court then granted [Office's] request to sever the writ proceedings from the main action. . . . [¶] . . . [Office] entered into the above stipulation solely in order to facilitate an immediate right to appeal this Court's March 25, 2009 and February 28, 2011 orders and the eventual judgment on those orders. In doing so, [Office] in no way waived any of its appellate rights."
On April 25, 2011, the court filed a judgment on the writ of mandate under case No. 37-2008-00081583-CU-WT-CTL. It reentered the judgment on May 13, 2011, under the new case number, No. 37-2011-00090348-CU-WM-CTL, and changed the amount of interest awarded on the judgment from 10 percent to 7 percent per annum. Office filed a notice of appeal from the May 13, 2011 judgment.
Hartnett moves to dismiss this appeal on grounds Office appeals from an interlocutory judgment on a nonappealable order. He maintains that Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1999) 7 Cal.4th 725 (Morehart) compels dismissal of Office's appeal because the trial court's severance of the writ proceeding from the underlying action for the purpose of permitting an immediate appeal is unauthorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 and thus invalid.
Pointing out Hartnett made contrary arguments in connection with its first appeal, Office argues we should distinguish Morehart. It maintains that, unlike Morehart, all of the issues in the administrative mandamus action (Hartnett's entitlement to and amount of back pay) have been decided by the trial court and that action is concluded and final. It points out that Morehart does not involve a situation, as here, where an administrative mandamus action was joined to Hartnett's civil action as an accommodation to him, and later severed and assigned an entirely new case number. Office argues Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commission (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688 (Griset) is not dispositive on the issue (again pointing to Hartnett's prior arguments along those lines in a September 2009 letter brief on appeal), and it asks us to apply the logic of McClure v. County of San Diego (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 807, which was assertedly embraced in Morehart, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 746.
We cannot agree with Office. Parties cannot create appellate jurisdiction where none otherwise exists. (See Kurwa v. Kilsinger (2013) ___ Cal.4th ___ [2013 WL 5477602]; City of Gardean v. Rikuo Corp. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 595, 605, citing Don Jose's Restaurant, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 115, 118-119; Hoveida v. Scripps Health (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1468.) As we explain, this principle, as well as the holdings of Morehart, supra, 7 Cal.4th 725 and Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th 688, compel us to conclude the court's decision to sever the writ petition and enter judgment strictly for the purpose of permitting a direct and immediate appeal despite other pending causes of action between the parties is unauthorized, and that the May 13, 2011 judgment is in fact an interlocutory order that is not appealable as a final judgment.
It is of course fundamental that the existence of an appealable order or judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1; Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 696; MinCal Consumer Law Group v. Carlsbad Police Department (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 259, 163.) "Under the one final judgment rule, "`an appeal may be taken only from the final judgment in an entire action.'" [Citations.] "`The theory [behind the rule] is that piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action would be oppressive and costly, and that a review of intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case.'" [Citations.] [¶] The one final judgment rule is `a fundamental principle of appellate practice' [citation], recognized and enforced in this state since the 19th century." (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 756; see Griset, at p. 697.)
Under the "one final judgment rule," an appeal may be taken from a final judgment, but not from an interlocutory judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1); see Kurwa v. Kilsinger, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___ [2013 WL 5477602, * 2]; County of San Diego v. Arzaga (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1343-1344.) And an appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that does not dispose of all of the causes of action between the parties. (Kurwa, at p. ___ [2013 WL 5477602, * 2]; Morehart, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 741, 743; Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 697.) Such a judgment "is necessarily `interlocutory' (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)), and not yet final, as to any parties between whom another cause of action remains pending." (Morehart, at p. 741.) "[A]n appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to complete the disposition of all the causes of action between the parties even if the causes of action disposed of by the judgment have been ordered to be tried separately, or may be characterized as `separate and independent' from those remaining." (Morehart, at p. 743; Griset, at p. 697.)
The parties are familiar with Morehart. There, the plaintiffs sued the County of Santa Barbara alleging several causes of action, including for a writ of mandate. (Morehart, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 735.) The trial court ordered that cause of action and two others seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to be tried separately from causes of action seeking damages for inverse condemnation and violation of civil rights, and later filed a judgment as to the writ of mandate and other separately tried claims. (Id. at pp. 735-736.) The Court of Appeal in Morehart found the judgment "`separately appealable on a severed issue'" (id. at p. 736) but the California Supreme Court rejected that theory of appealability, which was expressed in Schonfeld v. City of Vallejo (1976) 50 Cal.App.3d 401 and its progeny, including Highland Development Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 169.
One of Morehart's criticisms of Schonfeld was that the appellate court had "failed to recognize that Code of Civil Procedure section 1048 no longer authorizes severance of a civil action." (Morehart, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 737, fn. 3.) Instead, the statute, which had previously given trial courts discretion to sever an action, grants the court authority to "`order a separate trial' "of any cause of action or separate issue. (Ibid.)
Recently, the California Supreme Court decided Kurwa v. Kilsinger, supra, ___ Cal.4th ___, and reaffirmed the principles of Morehart. In Kurwa, based on the parties' agreement, the trial court entered a judgment dismissing a plaintiff's action (in part alleging a breach of fiduciary duty) with prejudice, with the exception of a defamation cause of action and the defendant's cross-complaint, which the court dismissed without prejudice. (Id. at p. ___ [2013 WL 5477602 *1].) The parties expressly agreed to waive the statute of limitations as to their defamation claims so as to "allow the parties to `test the issue' of breach of fiduciary duty and `get a ruling' from the appellate court before disposing of the defamation claims, which were `kind of outside this whole discussion.'" (Ibid.) The Supreme Court held these maneuverings, in view of the parties' agreement to preserve the voluntarily dismissed counts for potential litigation, resulted in a judgment that failed to complete the disposition of all the causes of action between the parties and was thus not appealable. (Id. at p. ___ [2013 WL 5477602 * 5].)
Office urges us to distinguish Morehart, which did not involve the process used by the trial court, that is, first joining the writ petition with Hartnett's complaint and then separately issuing the judgment on the petition under a new case number pursuant to Office's stipulation. But Morehart acknowledged the possibility of such a procedure. It said in a footnote: "In the cases [following Schonfeld], it is unclear whether issues which were purportedly `severed' from other issues were in fact formally severed (such that two separate cases with separate docket numbers and separate judgments would be rendered), or were merely bifurcated, that is, certain issues or causes of action were ordered tried separately." (Morehart, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 739, fn. 7.) In our view, Morehart's reasoning, which recognizes trial courts are no longer authorized to sever causes of action, applies whether causes of action are bifurcated or "formally" severed and then resolved separately, as the trial court did here. Office also urges us to follow this court's conclusion in McClure v. County of San Diego, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d 807, which was decided before Morehart. McClure followed at least one case expressly disapproved in Morehart to depart from the one final judgment rule in circumstances akin to this one so as to minimize "unnecessary delay and economic hardship. . . ." (McClure, at p. 811.) To the extent McClure reached its holding without also finding the circumstances appropriate to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, it does not survive Morehart.
We have not found, and Office has not provided, any authority for the trial court's severance of Hartnett's writ petition from the remainder of the action, either by statute, California Rules of Court, or local rule.
In sum, the trial court was without authority to "sever" Hartnett's writ petition from the remaining causes of action and assign it under a new case number for the purpose of conferring appellate jurisdiction. Because causes of action remain pending between Hartnett, Office and Ward, the May 13, 2011 "final judgment" lacks the requisite finality to be appealable, and consideration of this appeal would contravene the one final judgment rule.
Office asks us to permit its appeal to proceed under the collateral order exception to the one final judgment rule. Under that exception, "`[w]here the trial court's ruling on a collateral issue "is substantially the same as a final judgment in an independent proceeding" [citation], in that it leaves the court no further action to take on "a matter which . . . is severable from the general subject of the litigation" [citation], an appeal will lie from that collateral order even though other matters in the case remain to be determined. [Citation.] . . . [¶] In determining whether an order is collateral, "the test is whether an order is `important and essential to the correct determination of the main issue.' If the order is `a necessary step to that end,' it is not collateral. [Citations.]" [Citation.]' [Citation.] Generally, in order for the collateral order to be appealable, the order "`must direct the payment of money by appellant or the performance of an act by or against him."'" (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 781.)
Adopting arguments previously made by Hartnett, Office suggests that the judgment at issue involves whether Hartnett was afforded due process by the commission and not the merits of his dismissal. It acknowledges its appeal may "`have some collateral effect on [Hartnett's] causes of action for disability discrimination and whistleblower retaliation by offsetting some of his economic damages,'" but maintains the "`order of reinstatement with back pay is clearly ancillary to the balance of [Hartnett's] case.'"
We recognize the May 13, 2011 judgment directs the payment of money and is dispositive of the issue of Hartnett's right to an investigation under Education Code section 45306 before his Skelly hearing and termination. But Morehart rejected the notion that appealability can be conferred by assessing whether the issues involved in a writ petition appear to be separate, distinct or independent from remaining causes of action. In view of Morehart, supra, 7 Cal.4th 725, we decline to apply the collateral order exception broadly to these circumstances. The California Supreme Court has recently admonished that "`exceptions to the one final judgment rule should not be allowed unless clearly mandated.'" (In re Baycol Cases I & II, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 757, italics added.) "[T]he essence of the collateral order doctrine is that the matter concluded by the order should be truly `distinct and severable from the general subject of the litigation'" (Muller v. Fresno Community Hosp. & Medical Center (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 887, 904, italics added; see also City of Colton v. Singletary, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 781) and we are not convinced the judgment finally resolves such a matter. The general subject of the litigation is the validity of Hartnett's termination from Office and Office's motives for his termination, including whether Office and Ward terminated Hartnett for his asserted whistleblower activities. The extent or quality of Office's actions, including whether or not it conducted an investigation, can be indicative of improper motives. It would not be appropriate for this court to address these issues without a full record and without a final disposition of all of Hartnett's causes of action relating to his termination. Under the circumstances, we cannot say the court's order is "unquestionably collateral to the merits of the case." (Meehan v. Hopps (1955) 45 Cal.2d 213, 216-217.)
Office finally asks us to treat its appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, arguing the merits are fully briefed; it has no adequate remedy at law presumably due to its inability to obtain a stay; and it will suffer irreparable injury if it must pay Hartnett before its right to appeal becomes ripe. Office asserts its appeal "could be lost altogether" because it would not be subsumed in an appeal from a judgment on Hartnett's remaining claims. Office does not explain how or why it would lose its right to an appeal from a judgment on Hartnett's remaining causes of action, and we decline to address that point, which is made without authority or reasoned legal argument. (In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 191, 214.)
Though we have discretion to treat Office's appeal from the judgment as a petition for a writ of mandate, we decline to do so. There are no unusual or extraordinary circumstances warranting the exercise of such discretion. (Morehart, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 746-747 [defective appeal would be treated as a writ in part because the issue was of continuing public interest and likely to recur as it involved the orderly planning for development of thousands of subdivision parcels]; Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401; Black Diamond Asphalt, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 109, 114 [discretion to treat purported appeal as a petition for writ of mandate "should be exercised sparingly and only in unusual circumstances"]; H.D. Arnaiz, Ltd. v. County of San Joaquin (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1366-1367 [a request to treat a nonappealable order as a writ should only be granted under extraordinary circumstances compelling enough to indicate the propriety of a petition for writ in the first instance].) "`Generally, a writ must be issued in all cases "where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law."'" (In re Marriage of Lafkas (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1429,1434.) Office has not presented any exigent or compelling reasons why review of the interlocutory order should not await the rendition of a final judgment; indeed, it has an adequate remedy by an appeal from the final judgment.
Under the foregoing principles, we grant Hartnett's motion to dismiss this appeal. The fact that Hartnett's writ petition was originally brought as a separate pleading (albeit under the same case number), deemed an amendment to his complaint, then severed from the remaining action and assigned a new case number for purposes of entering judgment, does not distinguish this case from Morehart, or otherwise provide a basis for avoiding the application of the one final judgment rule. Therefore, there is no final disposition of all causes of action between Hartnett and Office and, accordingly, there is no final judgment from which Office may appeal. (Morehart, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 741, 743.) Lacking an appealable judgment (or appealable order), we do not have jurisdiction to consider Office's appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1; Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 697-698; Jacobs-Zorne v. Superior Court (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1064, 1070.)
Hartnett asks us to sanction Office and Ward in the amount of $28,800 (for his attorney's 72 hours of work at $400 per hour) plus costs for filing this appeal. He argues the appeal is frivolous as taken from a nonappealable order and interlocutory judgment, contrary to authority on point (Morehart, supra, 7 Cal.4th 725), and with counsel's knowledge of our prior dismissal of Office's appeal from the same underlying order in Hartnett v. San Diego County Office of Education et al., supra, D055524. Hartnett points out Office did not address appealability in its brief or cite to adverse precedent, and he argues it "knowingly employed procedures in the trial court to obtain the `severed' judgment appealed from under its `new' case number when that procedure was specifically disapproved by the same precedent." Hartnett further argues Office's grounds for appeal were not supported by law or a good faith argument for a change in that law. Finally, Hartnett maintains the appeal was taken solely to cause delay; he asserts Office knew it should have filed a writ to obtain review but filed an appeal because appeals involve greater effort and expense and are not as speedy as writ review. He accuses Office of "scorched earth and dilatory litigation tactics. . . ."
We decline to award sanctions. "`[A]ny definition [of a frivolous appeal] must be read so as to avoid a serious chilling effect on the assertion of litigants' rights on appeal. Counsel and their clients have a right to present issues that are arguably correct, even if it is extremely unlikely that they will win on appeal. An appeal that is simply without merit is not by definition frivolous and should not incur sanctions. Counsel should not be deterred from filing such appeals out of a fear of reprisals. . . . In reviewing the dangers inherent in any attempt to define frivolous appeals, . . . courts cannot be "blind to the obvious: the borderline between a frivolous appeal and one which simply has no merit is vague indeed. . . . The difficulty of drawing the line simply points up an essential corollary to the power to dismiss frivolous appeals: that in all but the clearest cases it should not be used." [Citation.] The same may be said about the power to punish attorneys for prosecuting frivolous appeals: the punishment should be used most sparingly to deter only the most egregious conduct.'" (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 513.)
An appeal should be deemed frivolous "`only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive—to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment—or when it indisputably has no merit—when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit.'" (In re Reno, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 513.)
The circumstances here are unique. The trial court thought it appropriate to assist Office in obtaining an immediate and direct appeal by severing Hartnett's petition and rendering a "final judgment." Though it cannot be said Office "`had nothing to gain from delay[ing]'" (Kolender v. San Diego County Civil Service Com'n (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 716, 723) its payment of back pay to Hartnett, given that Office proceeded under the impression it had a final judgment, we cannot say Office's appeal was taken in bad faith to delay the matter. Nor can we say the appeal was patently and completely without merit, in view of the trial court's actions.
The appeal is dismissed. The matter is remanded to the trial court to vacate the May 13, 2013 judgment and issue it as an order under case No. 37-2008-00081583-CU-WT-CTL. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
McDONALD, J., Concur.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
I Concur in the result.
