ROSEMARY LEDET, Judge.

This is an election-disqualification suit arising out of a race for the office of Louisiana House of Representatives 99th District.1 Dionisha Graham and Derrick Graham, Sr. — both duly qualified voters and electors in the 99th District — filed this suit objecting to the candidacy of Ray Crawford2 and seeking to disqualify him. The Grahams' sole ground for seeking to disqualify Mr. Crawford was pursuant to La. R.S. 18:492 A(7) — falsely certifying that he filed his Louisiana individual tax return for one of the previous five years, the 2012 tax year.3 The trial court ruled in the Grahams' favor, disqualified Mr. Crawford, and ordered that his name be stricken from the ballot. See La. R.S. 18:494 A.4 From that judgment, Mr. Crawford appeals. The Grahams filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely. For the reasons that follow, we deny the motion to dismiss the appeal and reverse the trial court's judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 8, 2015, Mr. Crawford filed a signed and notarized Notice of Candidacy form for the office of Louisiana House of Representatives 99th District. Included in the form was a certification, as required by La. R.S.18:463 A(2)(a)(iv), to the following:

On September 17, 2015, the Grahams filed an "Objection to Candidacy and Petition to Disqualify Candidate" (the "Original Petition"). The Grahams named as defendants "Raymond C. Crawford" and Tom Schedler, in his capacity as Louisiana Secretary of State. As noted at the out-set, the Grahams' sole ground for their objection to Mr. Crawford's candidacy was La. R.S. 18:492 A(7) — that he falsely certified his Notice of Candidacy form because he did not file his 2012 state tax return. For this reason, they averred that he should be disqualified from running as a candidate on the October 24, 2015 ballot.

On Saturday, September 19, 2015, the Grahams filed a Motion to Amend and Second Amended Objection to Candidacy and Petition to Disqualify Candidate (the "Amended Petition"). The Amended Petition was filed to correct the mistake in the name of the defendant. The Amended Petition renamed the defendant as "Ray Crawford." The record, however, reflects that the trial court did not sign the order allowing the Grahams to amend the petition until September 23, 2015.

On September 21, 2015, the hearing in this matter was held. At the hearing, it was established that the Grahams' Original Petition was served on Mr. Crawford's agent for service of process — Arthur Morrell, Clerk of Orleans Parish Criminal District Court — pursuant to La. R.S. 18:1408.5 Although Mr. Crawford was not personally served, he indicated at the hearing that he received unofficial notice — a telephone call from a third party on the night of Friday, September 18th — and thus he appeared at the hearing pro se. He explained that he had insufficient time to retain counsel.

At the hearing, the following three witnesses testified:

The only documentary evidence introduced at the hearing was the following:

Mr. Crawford testified that for the previous five years he was employed as a minister. He testified that he not only filed his 2012 return, but also received a $17.00 refund for that tax year.

Ms. LaFleur, whose job duties include responding to public record requests, testified that the LDR received a public records request for Mr. Crawford's tax returns for the previous five years. She identified the LDR's PR Response that she prepared; the LDR's PR Response indicated that Mr. Crawford filed his state tax returns for all the previous five years except for the tax year 2012. She explained that, as a result of that public records request, it was discovered that "for the tax year 2012 our system does not have a filing for Mr. Crawford." When asked whether she was absolutely certain that the LDR had no record of Mr. Crawford having filed a state return for the 2012 tax year, Ms. LaFleur replied: "I'm as certain as technology can be certain. We have a system. The system has been checked ever since the request came in up until 9:00 a.m. this morning [September 21, 2015] and we still do not show a filing in our system."

Following Ms. LaFleur's testimony, the trial court granted Mr. Crawford's request for a short recess to allow him to produce his accountant, Mr. Cojoe.6 When the hearing resumed, Mr. Crawford questioned Mr. Cojoe whether he had any documentation showing that Mr. Crawford's 2012 state tax return was filed. Mr. Cojoe replied that he had the 2012 E-Filing Form, which Mr. Crawford signed on February 8, 2013. Mr. Cojoe, however, acknowledged that the 2012 E-Filing Form only authorized him to file Mr. Crawford's tax return electronically and that the form did not prove that the LDR actually received his tax return.

In an apparent attempt to bolster Mr. Crawford's case, Mr. Cojoe testified that in 2012 the LDR underwent a system upgrade, causing several taxpayers' returns to be deemed as unfiled by LDR. As a result, Mr. Cojoe explained that he had to resubmit several taxpayers' individual tax returns. Mr. Cojoe, however, acknowledged that this was not the case for Mr. Crawford who received a refund for 2012.7 Following this testimony, Mr. Crawford was allowed to recall Ms. LaFleur, who acknowledged that the LDR underwent a system upgrade in 2012. When questioned regarding the 2012 E-Filing Form, Ms. LaFleur testified that it documented Mr. Crawford's permission to have his return filed electronically, but "it would not indicate to me that that was actually done." Continuing, she explained that "[i]f you want proof that it was filed electronically in our system, then you would request a certified copy showing that."8

At the close of the hearing, the trial court orally granted the Grahams' Objection to the Candidacy and Petition to Disqualify Mr. Crawford. On the following day, the trial court signed a written judgment disqualifying Mr. Crawford and ordering his name be stricken from the ballot. The judgment does not indicate the time it was rendered. See La. R.S. 18:1409 (providing that the judgment in an election-disqualification suit "shall indicate the date and time rendered."). The judgment does indicate the following regarding the date on which it was rendered:

This appeal followed.

Timeliness of the Appeal

The first issue to be addressed is the jurisdictional issue of the timeliness of the appeal. The time period for filing an appeal in an election-disqualification suit is set forth in La. R.S. 18:1409 D, which provides, in part, that "[w]ithin twenty-four hours after rendition of judgment, a party aggrieved by the judgment may appeal by obtaining an order of appeal and giving bond for a sum fixed by the court to secure the payment of costs." La. R.S. 18:1409 D (emphasis supplied).

After this appeal was lodged, the Grahams filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely. The Grahams contend that the trial court rendered judgment in open court at the close of the hearing on September 21, 2015, shortly before noon. The Grahams further contend that the trial court signed a written judgment the following day, which included the language quoted above — "JUDGMENT RENDERED on the 21st day of September." Citing the statutory language requiring an appeal be filed within twenty-four hours after the "rendition" of the judgment, the Grahams contend that Mr. Crawford's appeal filed two days — forty-eight hours — after the judgment was rendered is untimely.

By statute, a judgment is deemed to be rendered when it is signed by the trial judge. See La. R.S. 18:1409 J (providing that "[a]s used in this Chapter [CONTESTS AND CHALLENGES under Title 18, the Louisiana Election Code], judgment shall be deemed to have been rendered when signed by the judge."); see also La. C.C.P. art. 1911 A (providing that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, every final judgment shall contain the typewritten or printed name of the judge and be signed by the judge.").9 Although the trial court's judgment in this case indicates that it was "RENDERED" on September 21st, the trial court did not sign a judgment until the following day. By statute, the judgment was rendered on the day it was signed, September 22nd. The judgment does not indicate the time it was signed. Nonetheless, the well-settled principle is that "appeals are favored in the law. Unless the ground urged for dismissal is free from doubt, the appeal should be maintained." Castillo v. Russell, 05-2110 (La. 2/10/06), 920 So.2d 863 (citing U.S. Fire Insurance Co. v. Swann, 424 So.2d 240, 244-45 (La.1982)). Accordingly, we find Mr. Crawford's appeal, which was filed on the day after the judgment was signed and by statute rendered, is timely. We thus deny the Grahams' motion to dismiss the appeal.

Mr. Crawford's appeal

On appeal, Mr. Crawford asserts the following assignments of error:

Because we find merit to Mr. Crawford's second assignment of error, we do not reach the other assignments.

A de novo standard of review applies to an appellate court's review of a trial court's finding on personal jurisdiction. See New Inv. Properties, LLC v. ABC Ins. Co., 07-0943, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/21/07), 972 So.2d 392, 395. To place Mr. Crawford's second assignment of error in context, we review the facts regarding service of both the Original Petition and the Amended Petition.

As the trial court noted in its reasons for judgment, the Original Petition was served pursuant to La. R.S. 18:1407 on Mr. Crawford's agent for service of process, Mr. Morrell. The trial court further stated as follows:

The trial court thus found that service of the Original Petition was proper and provided jurisdiction. See La. R.S. 18:1408 D (providing that "[s]ervice of process on and citation of the appointed agent [the Clerk of Court], together with the posting of the petition as provided in R.S. 18:1406, shall be sufficient service to give the trial court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.")10

As noted earlier, the Grahams' named the wrong defendant in their Original Petition. As the Notice of Candidacy reflects, the candidate is "Ray Charles Crawford." An election suit must be instituted against the person whose candidacy is challenged. See La. R.S. 18:1402 A(1) (providing that the proper party is "[t]he person whose candidacy is objected to."). In an attempt to correct the mistake, the Grahams filed the Amended Petition on Saturday, September 19, 2015. In their certificate of service, the Grahams requested service on both Mr. Crawford and his agent for service of process, Mr. Morrell. There is no evidence that the Grahams made any attempt to have either Mr. Morrell or Mr. Crawford served with the Amended Petition before the hearing commenced on Monday, September 21, 2015.

At the hearing, the trial court raised the issue of service of the Amended Petition when Mr. Crawford, who was appearing pro se, was sworn in as the first witness. After Mr. Crawford identified himself as "Ray Charles Crawford," the trial court asked him whether he was also known as "Raymond C. Crawford." He responded in the negative and offered to produce his driver's license. At that point, the Grahams' attorney pointed out that they filed a motion to amend the petition to rename the defendant as Ray Crawford. The trial court asked whether the Amended Petition was served on the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court's attorney responded that he had not seen the Amended Petition. The trial court asked whether the Clerk of Court wished to waive service of the Amended Petition. Initially, the Clerk of Court's attorney responded as follows: "[W]e have no objection to it. We support it [the Amended Petition] being filed, but because we don't take a position in these kind of situations...." At this juncture, the following colloquy ensued:

The trial court never asked Mr. Crawford whether he agreed to waive service of the Amended Petition.

On appeal, Mr. Crawford contends that the trial court erred in failing to find it lacked personal jurisdiction over him. In support, he cites the trial court's failure to obtain a waiver of service of the Amended Petition from him. He contends that there is no precedent for allowing the clerk of court to verbally waive service for a candidate in open court. He notes that La. C.C.P. art. 1201 B and C state that a defendant may expressly waive citation and service by written waiver. He emphasizes that there was no written waiver. Moreover, he contends that "the proper individual to ask for a waiver of service would not be the agent for service, but the principal — Ray Crawford, the purported defendant standing in court whose life was affected by this failure of due process."

The Grahams counter that Mr. Crawford waived the objection to lack of personal jurisdiction by appearing at the hearing and participating. They also contend that Mr. Crawford was required to file a declinatory exception in order to preserve his objection of lack of personal jurisdiction.

Pursuant to La. R.S. 18:1407, a candidate appoints the clerk of court as his agent for service of process.11 Although the Original Petition was served on Mr. Morrell as Mr. Crawford's agent for service of process, the Original Petition named the wrong defendant. At the time of the hearing, neither Mr. Morrell nor Mr. Crawford had been served with the Amended Petition. Nor had the trial court granted the Grahams' motion to file their Amended Petition. Contrary to the Grahams' contention, Mr. Crawford could not waive personal jurisdiction by participating in the hearing because he was not named in the Original Petition. The fact that Mr. Crawford appeared at the hearing on the Original Petition thus was of no moment. Nor was Mr. Crawford required to file an answer to the Original Petition asserting a declinatory exception. See La. R.S. 18:1406.12

Although the clerk of court is appointed and authorized by statute to accept service for the candidate, the clerk of court is not authorized to waive service. See Landiak v. Richmond, 05-0758, pp. 6-7 (La. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 535, 541 (holding any doubt must be resolved in favor of allowing a candidate to run for public office). We thus find merit to Mr. Crawford's contention that the clerk of court's waiver of service of the Amended Petition was without effect. Because he was not asked to do so, Mr. Crawford could not waive service. We thus find there was no waiver of service of the Amended Petition. Accordingly, we find that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Mr. Crawford and that the judgment is thus invalid.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss the appeal filed by the appellees, Dionisha Graham and Derrick Graham, Sr., is denied. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL DENIED; REVERSED

TOBIAS, J., concurs.

BONIN, J., concurs in the result with reasons.

LOBRANO, J., dissents with reasons.

TOBIAS, J., concurs.

I respectfully concur. I write primarily to emphasize that the appeal in this matter is timely.

In pertinent part, La. R.S. 18:1409 states:

In my view, "rendition" of judgment means signing a judgment because Section 1409 D requires the dissatisfied party who wishes to appeal to obtain "an order of appeal." Reading Section 1409 in pari materia with La. C.C.P. art. 21211 makes it clear that only a written judgment may be appealed.2 See Fitzmorris v. Lambert, 382 So.2d 169 (La.1979); Burkett v. Lewis, 42,985 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/21/07), 966 So.2d 718; Davis v. Malveaux, 06-2096 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/24/06), 945 So.2d 70; Walker v. Rinicker, 29,361 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/6/96), 681 So.2d 1.

In the case at bar, the trial judge should have actually signed a judgment on the same day that she rendered her decision, which would have alleviated the confusion caused by rendering a decision on one day and signing a judgment on the next. Such would allow the clerk of court to "notify all parties or their counsel of record ... of the judgment." That is, until a judgment is signed, nothing exists about which to notify. Mr. Crawford appealed within twenty-four hours of the signing of judgment.

As a matter of law, an amendment to a timely filed petition in an election contest is permitted. In the case before us, the Grahams did not name the proper party-defendant by 4:30 p.m. on 17 September 2015, the statutory deadline.3 See La. R.S. 18:1406 B. They named "Raymond C. Crawford," not Ray Crawford, the appellant herein. This is no different from when the wrong person who is not solidarily liable with the person sued; if the wrong person is untimely sued, the claim against the proper party-defendant prescribes. In an election contest where all time limits are strictly construed and the time limits shortened dramatically from ordinary lawsuits, it is incumbent upon a plaintiff to name the correct party-defendant. In the case at bar, I do not find the amendments to the original petition by the Grahams filed after 17 September 2015 at 4:30 p.m., which are substantive in nature, to be timely or even permissible. See Lipsey v. Dardenne, 07-1487 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/29/07), 970 So.2d 1237; Garrison v. Connick, 288 So.2d 681 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 291 So.2d 778 (La.1974); Treadaway v. Plaquemines Parish Democratic Committee, 193 So. 609 (La.App.Orl.1940).

I further feel compelled to comment about my colleague's dissent in which he asserts, citing his dissent in Nixon v. Hughes, 15-1036 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/29/15), 176 So.3d 1135, 2015 WL 5708875, that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging a candidate for a seat in the Louisiana Legislature. La. Const. Art. III, § 4 sets forth the qualifications for a member of the legislature: (a) an elector; (b) at least 18 years of age on the date he qualifies for election; (c) residing in Louisiana for two years preceding his qualifying; and (4) actually being domiciled for one year in the legislative district from which he seeks election. La. Const. art. III, § 7 says that each house of the legislature is the judge of the qualifications and elections of its members. But La. Const. art. XI, § 1 requires the legislature to adopt an election code that provides "for the conduct of all elections."

Pursuant to the Article XI mandate, the legislature adopted the Louisiana Election Code, La. R.S. 18:1, et seq. Without going into a detailed analysis of the Code, suffice it to say that the legislature has set up a framework for qualifying for and conducting all elections, including members of the legislature. Thus, the legislature provided a means for a citizen to question whether an individual possessed the qualifications to run for the office of a member of the legislature. Without that statutory authority, in theory, and by way of example, a 10-year-old, a non-elector, a non-citizen, or a Louisiana nonresident could qualify and run for the office of a Louisiana legislature member and only after such individual's election could it be questioned by a house of the legislature. Such is clearly not the intent.

The La. Const. art. III, § 7 provision (judging of the qualifications and elections) is intended to allow a house of the legislature to eject a member for bona fide cause, such as a serious crime. To embrace otherwise would allow a house of the legislature to eject a member because of his religion or his articulation or support of unpopular causes — in other words a supposed "nonconformist." To think that the third branch of government, the judiciary, cannot provide a check upon the legislature in that regard would be pure bunkum.

BONIN, J., concurs in the result with reasons.

I concur because the result is that Reverend Ray Charles Crawford is permitted to stand for election to the House of Representatives. I, however, am of the view that the district court is without subject matter jurisdiction in a qualifications challenge to a candidate for a seat in the legislative branch of state government. See Nixon v. Hughes, 15-1036 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/29/15), 176 So.3d 1135, 2015 WL 5708875 (Bonin, J., dissenting).

LOBRANO, J., dissents with reasons.

I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the district court's judgment, disqualifying Ray Crawford from candidacy for the 99th Representative District for the State of Louisiana. I do not find that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Crawford. I find that the procedural defects addressed in the majority opinion are issues of sufficiency of citation and service, to which Crawford waived any objection when he made a general appearance in person at trial before the district court on September 21, 2015. See La. C.C.P. art 6; La. C.C.P. art. 925; La. C.C.P. art. 928.

I further find that, at the time Crawford signed his Notice of Candidacy, Crawford lacked sufficient knowledge of whether his accountant filed tax returns on Crawford's behalf for the year 2012. As Crawford did not know whether his accountant filed tax returns on his behalf for the year 2012, I find that Crawford falsely certified that he filed tax returns for the year 2012.

In Russo v. Burns, 14-1963 (La. 9/24/14), 147 So.3d 1111 ("Burns II"), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, without sending tax returns via certified mail or otherwise ensuring their delivery to the Louisiana Department of Revenue, the candidate, Burns, could not have known whether his tax returns were filed in compliance with Louisiana law when he signed his Notice of Candidacy. I do not interpret Burns II to reach the question as to whether a court is permitted to consider a candidate's subjective intent or good faith beliefs in determining if a candidate should be disqualified for making an allegedly false certification. Instead, I read Burns II to hold that it is false certification for a candidate to certify to facts of which the candidate does not have sufficient knowledge. I find the facts of Burns II analogous to the case on appeal, as Crawford could not have known whether the tax returns were filed by merely relying on the representations of his accountant, without further confirmation that the returns were filed. I would reach an equivalent result in this matter. For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the lower court disqualifying Crawford from candidacy for falsely certifying that he filed tax returns for the year 2012.