This appeal presents a novel question: In a dispute between a pro se complainant and a federal agency directly implicating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 as augmented by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,2 who, if anyone, has the responsibility of informing the complainant of his statutory right to apply for an appointment of counsel to represent him in ensuing litigation in a federal district court? In the case before us, appellant, unaware of that right, was without a lawyer in the District Court, and he there suffered a dismissal of his discrimination action against the Federal Reserve Board. Our call is now to decide whether on that account appellant should be afforded another opportunity to sustain his claim, this time after seeking the assistance of counsel.

We hold that the involved federal agency is under a duty suitably to advise a lawyerless complainant that the court may, in its discretion, provide counsel on request. Since the Board did not do so here, and appellant did not otherwise learn of his right to ask for counsel and was prejudiced by lack of legal representation, we vacate the dismissal order and remand the case for further proceedings.

* Resolution of this appeal necessitates recitation of relatively few of the events preceding the advent of suit. Appellant submitted several employment applications to the Federal Reserve Board over a three-year period,3 and viewed the Board's invariably unfavorable responses as racial discrimination violative of Title VII.4 Subsequently, appellant pursued to a conclusion the administrative remedies afforded by the Board, but obtained no satisfaction whatsoever.5

Along the way, in a letter to appellant incorporating the decision of its equal employment opportunity examiner, the Board had stated:

(Y)ou have the right to have your complaint reviewed by the Board of Governors, and you have 15 days from the receipt of this letter to request such a review. In addition, in accordance with section 14 of the Board's regulations, you have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within 30 days from receipt of final action taken by the Board on your complaint.6

But nowhere in this letter, or otherwise in any manner, did the Board ever mention the court's authority to appoint counsel for lay complainants in Title VII lawsuits.7

After receiving notice of the final agency action, appellant, unaided by a lawyer, timely filed a handwritten complaint in the District Court.8 That was dismissed as "incomprehensible,"9 but appellant was permitted to file an amended complaint,10 after which the court found it necessary to hold two status conferences in an effort to clarify it. Appellant was not represented by an attorney at either conference or at any other stage of the District Court proceedings.

The transcripts of the status conferences portray the handicap that a layman often faces when he lacks counsel in court. Indeed, they suggest that, despite commendable efforts by the court and the Board's lawyer to explain matters to appellant, at times he really did not understand what was transpiring.11 But one conspicuous example need be cited for present purposes. The court decided to limit the trial to a de novo evaluation of the evidence in the administrative record, as supplemented by exhibits from the parties, and, if appellant wished, by his own live testimony.12 As events turned out, however, appellant did not offer additional testimony.13 He now insists on appeal that the reason simply was that he did not comprehend the course of procedure the court prescribed.14

Ultimately, the District Court held that appellant had failed to sustain his averment of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.15 Accordingly, it dismissed the action,16 whereupon appellant came here. He has been represented by counsel throughout this appeal.

Appellant contends that the District Court erred in failing to appoint, sua sponte, a lawyer to represent his cause.17 By our analysis, this argument is wide of the mark. Title VII imposes a duty on the court to consider an appointment of counsel for a complainant but only upon his application,18 and there was no such request in this case. Appellant protests, however, that he could not reasonably be expected to ask for a court-appointed attorney when, throughout his tenure in the District Court, he "remained absolutely ignorant" of the court's discretion to furnish one in a Title VII case.19 In light of appellant's factual premise which the record gives no cause to doubt we must determine who, if anyone, bears the responsibility of acquainting lawyerless Title VII complainants with the court's authority in this regard.20 We conclude that there is this duty, and that it lies with the agency disposing of the discrimination claim administratively.

Faced as we are with a task basically one of statutory construction, we start with the pertinent statutory language:21

Upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for (the) complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs, or security.22

We begin, too, mindful that this provision, like any other statute, must be read in a manner that " 'effectuates rather than frustrates the major purpose of the legislative draftsmen,' "23 and we find its objective abundantly clear. Congress realized that many litigants pressing Title VII grievances would have but limited financial resources24 and scant knowledge of the intricacies of legal procedure.25 In granting complainants the right to request counsel,26 and the courts discretionary authority to appoint counsel, Congress intended to mitigate this evident disadvantage.27 Nonetheless, as all too well exemplified by this appeal, both the right and the power remain among those procedural niceties with which a layman may not be familiar, and complainants unaware of their rights obviously are incapable of asserting them. We would mock Title VII's scheme of lay-initiated lawsuits28 if we failed to realize that Congress must have contemplated a step, at some point in the process, assuring that complainants know that the court is licensed to consider, and in appropriate situations to grant, requests for an assignment of counsel.

The legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 lends substantial support to the view that Congress intended some suitable notification to unrepresented complainants. The 1972 statute, which extended Title VII coverage to the bulk of the federal workforce,29 also enlarged the role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the enforcement of Title VII in the private sector.30 The regulatory machinery was extensively overhauled, the rights of affected applicants and employees were strengthened and broadened,31 and the importance of a reasonably informed claimant was reemphasized.32 As the Senate Report on the amending bill explained:

Provisions of present law requiring that the person aggrieved be notified of his rights have been retained. Especially in light of the further safeguards in this bill, the Commission is expected, at the commencement and at other appropriate stages of the proceedings, to fully notify the aggrieved person in clear and understandable fashion of the various procedural rights and steps open to him. Too often a person files a charge but then blunders along lost in the bureaucratic process. The Committee believes that further steps should be taken, including perhaps follow-up notification, to ensure that an aggrieved person knows at apropriate (sic) times the status of the case and his rights under the law.33

From the very beginning, Congress has authorized Title VII complainants to bring civil actions on their discrimination claims if they remain unsatisfied after administrative proceedings have run their course.34 An invariable statutory concomitant of this license to sue has been the requirement that complainants be given notice of the administrative disposition of their complaints35 a notice prerequisite to suit.36 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, whose regulatory realm has always included private-sector employees,37 has promulgated regulations incorporating "the procedures ... for carrying out its responsibilities in the administration and enforcement of Title VII."38 One such regulation specifies that the so-called "right to sue" notice shall include "advice concerning the institution of (a) civil action by the person claiming to be aggrieved, where appropriate."39 And at least since 1973, the standard right-to-sue notice utilized by the Commission has told discrimination claimants, as a part of that advice, that

(i)f you do not have a lawyer, or are unable to obtain the services of a lawyer, take this notice to the United States District Court which may, in its discretion, appoint a lawyer to represent you.40

These administrative prescriptions bear weighty decisional significance under well settled principles, to which we may once again resort for guidance:

An administrative interpretation of a statute by an agency entrusted with its enforcement commands great deference in the courts.41 "Particularly is this respect due when the administrative practice at stake 'involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.' "42 Where the agency is authorized to issue regulations to which Congress has imparted the force of law, ... its interpretation is entitled to an even larger measure of esteem.43 And "(t)o sustain the (agency's) application of (the) statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings."44

True it is that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's practice of informing complainants on the potential for appointed counsel does not achieve a perfect score under these standards, for it did not originate contemporaneously with the enactment of Title VII in 1965.45 We think, however, that it scores well enough to warrant serious consideration in the interpretation we are summoned to make.46 It was, after all, a step taken ostensibly as a matter of statutory duty by an agency entrusted with enforcement of Title VII from its inception.47 It implements an express exercise of the agency's rulemaking power favoring "advice concerning the institution of (a) civil action,"48 one following closely on the heels of congressional emphasis on procedural protections for lay employees endeavoring to work their way through the statutory process.49 The practice is thoroughly consistent with Title VII's legislative history,50 and is not in the least a deviation from any prior position authoritatively voiced by the Commission.51

Weighing, then, the statutory text,52 the legislative and administrative histories,53 the remedial goals54 and the sheer commonsense in the matter,55 we are constrained to hold that Title VII imposes the requirement that complainants be informed that in the event of suit the court is authorized to appoint counsel in appropriate situations upon request. This responsibility is but one facet of the broader congressional expectation that Title VII claimants would be advised generally on their rights.56 That is a function effectively dischargeable only at the administrative level.57 Indeed, there hardly could be a more propitious occasion to speak to counsel-appointment than when the complainant is notified that he is free to sue.58 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is doing just that in all cases that are brought before it,59 predominantly, those in the private sector.60 If the will of Congress is to be fully effectuated, implicated agencies must do the same for those who charge forbidden discrimination in federal employment.61

It follows that when a complainant is prejudiced because the agency left him ignorant of his right to seek court-appointed counsel, his claim for rectification is meritorious. This conclusion accords with our earlier interpretations of the legislative history and policies underlying Title VII. Two of our fairly recent decisions, Coles v. Penny62 and Bell v. Brown,63 underscore our solid adherence to the principle that lay complainants cannot be penalized for failing to assert procedural rights which the involved agency has neglected to adequately explain. In Coles, a federal employee did not file suit within 30 days of receipt of notice of unfavorable agency action, the period statutorily specified therefore.64 The notice had not informed him either of his right to sue or of the short period within which he could do so. In holding, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that he could not be bound to the 30 day limitation,65 we pointed out that "(t)hirty days is not a long period in which to expect a pro se complainant to become aware of and exercise his statutory right to sue."66 We also reiterated the oftstated judicial admonition that "Title VII is remedial in character and should be liberally construed to achieve its purposes,"67 and we added:

(W)e doubt that Congress intended to provide a judicial remedy ... which is so easily forfeited by those whose rights it vindicates. A statutory construction likely in so many cases to render meaningless the provision of a judicial remedy is hardly the "practical and reasonable" one that we should seek.68

Bell v. Brown, decided just over a year later, presented another situation in which an aggrieved federal employee filed his civil action late, this time because no right-to-sue notice was sent directly to him. We held that mailing of the notice only to his legal representative did not trigger the 30-day filing period because the employee had not "received" notification within the meaning of the statutory language.69 We reminded that " 'where congressional purpose is unclear, courts have traditionally resolved ambiguities in remedial statutes in favor of those whom the legislation was designed to protect.' "70 We noted that our reading of the statutory word "receipt" not only harmonized with "the fundamental objectives" of Title VII but also "comport(ed) ... with the everyday realities of Title VII litigation."71 We concluded that any other interpretation could "render meaningless" the judicial remedy that the statute provides.72

The instant case presents a similar dilemma. Here, too, we are confronted by statutory silence on the central question, yet we must avoid a construction that robs the statutory right to sue of its value. Appellant, like the plaintiff in Coles, was unaware of an important procedural right because the agency responsible for informing him of it did not do so. No more here than in Coles should he have to pay the price of dismissal for his lack of legal sophistication.

As in Bell, we must resolve any statutory ambiguity in favor of appellant.73 In the context of a highly remedial statute, we cannot assume that congressional imprecision indicates congressional indifference. Nor should we lose sight of the "everyday realities of Title VII litigation,"74 one of which as this case attests is that many lay claimants will remain unaware of the district courts' authority to appoint counsel for them unless they are so informed by the agency involved. Rather, we can rest secure in the knowledge that Congress certainly did not intend to discourage civil actions by such complainants, or to handicap them in the conduct thereof.

We hold, then, that Title VII requires federal agencies conducting proceedings thereunder to inform administratively unsuccessful complainants that in the event of suit the court has discretionary power to appoint counsel for them. We further hold that a litigant who, for unawareness of the court's power, fails to request counsel should not be penalized because the agency has been remiss in this duty. Appellant's discrimination claim thus must be returned to the District Court.75 In the exercise of an informed discretion, the court must first determine whether an appointment of counsel for appellant should be made,76 and if so to proceed accordingly. In any event, the record must be reopened for receipt of appellant's testimony live,77 and for such further proceedings as may be in order. Should new evidence be introduced, the court must then reconsider de novo the proofs as a whole. To these ends, the judgment appealed from is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court.

So ordered.