This case raises the question whether the automatic set-aside of a conviction under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA), 18 U.S.C. Secs. 5005-5026, requires the district court to seal court records that disclose the conviction. The district court set aside appellant's conviction, but denied his motion to seal the court record of that conviction. Relying upon our prior rationale in Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226 (D.C.Cir.1979), which held that the set-aside provision precludes general public access to FBI "conviction records," we now hold that the same provision also requires the district court to restrict public access to court records that disclose a set-aside conviction.

Appellant pled guilty in district court to unlawful possession of cocaine, a misdemeanor. See D.C.Code Ann. Sec. 33-502. On August 18, 1980, the district court sentenced appellant to three years probation under the FYCA. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5010(a). Appellant was unconditionally discharged from probation prior to expiration of the three year term and his conviction was set aside under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5021(b).1 Pursuant to the FYCA's set-aside provision, as interpreted by Webster, 606 F.2d at 1244, the district court also ordered the FBI to close off all records of the conviction to everyone except law enforcement authorities for use in criminal investigations.

Appellant argues that these actions do not sufficiently comply with the FYCA. He now holds a bachelor's degree, and is presently enrolled in a graduate program abroad. He hopes to pursue a teaching career afterwards, and fears that his arrest and court records may prevent him from doing so. For these reasons, appellant moved the district court to seal his court file and to order that the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) remove records of his arrest from publicly accessible files. The district court denied both requests, stating only that under Webster "set-aside never requires expunction of arrest records." United States v. Doe, Cr. No. 80-254 (D.D.C. July 11, 1983) (Order denying motion). This appeal of that denial followed.2

The meaning of the FYCA's language--that "the discharge ... from probation ... shall automatically set aside the conviction"--was the subject of Judge Harold Greene's comprehensive and scholarly opinion for this court in Webster, 606 F.2d at 1226. Webster relied on the "crystal clear" intent of the Act "to give youthful ex-offenders a fresh start, free from the stain of a criminal conviction, and an opportunity to clean their slates to afford them a second chance in terms of both jobs and standing in the community." Id. at 1235. Since, however, the language of the Act sets aside only convictions, and says nothing of arrests, Webster ordered the FBI to remove physically from public files only conviction and not arrest records. In addition, Webster responded to the government's legitimate law enforcement needs by allowing the conviction records to be used for criminal investigation purposes. Thus, after considering the language, legislative history and purpose of the FYCA, Webster interpreted the set-aside provision to require that

the conviction records must be physically removed from the central criminal files and placed in a separate storage facility not to be opened other than in the course of a bona fide criminal investigation by law enforcement authorities and where necessary for such an investigation.

606 F.2d at 1244.

Webster's analysis convinces us that the FYCA also requires removal from the public domain of court records documenting the existence of a conviction already set aside. Such records, if open to public scrutiny, are no different in their effect from conviction records in the hands of the FBI; they leave the rehabilitated youth's conviction a matter of public record. In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, any person walking in off the street, knowing only the name of the convicted youth, can retrieve the court records of his conviction. Webster prevents the FBI from responding affirmatively to an employer's call to find out if an employee, or prospective employee, was ever convicted of a crime, when the conviction has been set aside under the FYCA. But, without too much more effort, the employer can get the information from the courthouse. We therefore read Webster to require the restriction of public access to court records that document the fact of conviction in set-aside cases.3

Government counsel argues that the language of section 5021 says nothing of court records; it speaks only of convictions. In fact, the provision does not explicitly mention any kind of records. But, as Webster made clear, that omission does not indicate congressional intent that conviction records be left open to public inspection. Quite the contrary, the existence of a conviction, Webster reasoned, is the target of section 5021. It follows that when court records evidence the conviction, they fall within the language of the set-aside provision as much as FBI records that do presumably the same thing.4

The government also argues that sealing court records of any kind contravenes the traditional policy that such records should be open to public scrutiny. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S. Ct. 1306, 1311, 55 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1978). This argument, of course, is correct, as far as it goes, but it ignores a long line of precedent and practice establishing that, for good reason, this presumption may be overcome and records may be sealed. Thus courts on their own have frequently invoked equitable powers to seal their records in special circumstances,5 and numerous statutes provide for sealing.6 Under section 5021, moreover, restriction on public access is minimized since the trial itself is open, and the court record continues to be available while the appellant is still on probation or parole, before he becomes eligible for a set-aside. By the time the conviction is set aside, after the ex-offender has been discharged from probation, the newsworthiness of (and public interest in) the underlying events will likely have waned. It seems clear to us that Congress' strong interest in giving ex-offenders a fresh start free from the social stigma of conviction7 led it to override the residual public interest in knowing about the conviction at that stage.8

Just as Webster acknowledged the government's legitimate interests in its own access to conviction records for law enforcement and historical accuracy purposes, we honor its similar interests in access to court records. Webster struck a balance between the remedial purpose of section 5021 and legitimate government interest in maintenance of conviction records, by ordering that conviction records be physically removed from public files rather than destroyed, 606 F.2d at 1243-44. We strike a similar balance here with respect to court records. Judges and other court officers may need to consult the court records as part of their judicial administrative duties, or if information in the records bears on related cases. Also, law enforcement officials may need to look at the court records or transcripts as part of a related criminal investigation. Thus, in holding that section 5021 mandates limited access to court records of a set-aside conviction, we in no way restrict access to such records by law enforcement personnel or officers of the court who have legitimate law enforcement or judicial administrative purposes for consulting the records. All we require is that court records revealing a set-aside conviction of a FYCA individual not be generally available to the public.9

The government finally pleads that special circumstances might make public access especially appropriate in some cases. They offer two examples: (1) where the youthful ex-offender has been tried along with a co-defendant who does not qualify for a set-aside, and (2) where the youth is a repeat offender with a prior set-aside conviction. The first example brings into focus the practical problems of removing court records from public files but, we believe, they can be taken care of administratively.10 The second example highlights the youthful offender who, in the government's view, may not be deserving of the benefit of expungement because he has already had the benefit once of FYCA treatment and a set-aside. Before a youth is sentenced under the FYCA, the sentencing judge must determine that he can benefit from the provisions of the Act, i.e., that he can be rehabilitated. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5010. It may be that a youthful offender who has already had one conviction set aside is less likely to meet this threshold determination. But, once a judge determines that the youthful offender can benefit from FYCA sentencing, regardless of prior FYCA treatment, the Act itself provides that if he meets section 5021's criteria then his conviction must be set aside. We hold today that the set-aside includes removal of court records of his conviction from public access, but we can find no authority for applying that rule on a discretionary basis according to the blameworthiness of the ex-offender.

The government's argument, however, does serve to remind us that there may be situations, which we cannot envision, where access to court records by persons other than court officers and law enforcement personnel might be legitimate and important in the interests of justice.11 If such situations arise, we do not mean to straightjacket the equitable powers of the district court to allow limited access to court records of previously set-aside convictions. In this case, however, the government concedes that there are no special circumstances weighing against restricting public access. We thus hold that the FYCA's statutory scheme, as interpreted by our prior decision in Webster, requires that the court records of appellant's set-aside conviction be removed from public access.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court improperly denied appellant's motion to seal court records of his set-aside conviction. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.