KIMBERLY J. MUELLER, District Judge.
In April 2014, a jury acquitted attorneys Jesse Santana and David Vasquez of all charges of bribing a witness and obstructing justice. In this civil lawsuit, filed after the criminal trial's conclusion, Santana and Vasquez contend the prosecution was part of a plan to thwart Santana's appointment to the Sutter County Superior Court. The defendants all move to dismiss under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and several also filed special motions to strike the complaint under California Civil Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the state's "anti-SLAPP" statute.
The court held a hearing on August 7, 2015. Jaime Leaños appeared for Santana and Vasquez. Lauren Calnero appeared for Yuba County, Patrick McGrath, John Vacek, Mary Barr, and Gene Stober. John Whitesides appeared for the City of Marysville and Randall Elliot. Michael Fox appeared for Judge Julia Scrogin. Wendy Green appeared for Timothy Evans. After considering the parties' briefing and the arguments at hearing, the court grants the motions to dismiss, in part with leave to amend, and grants in part and denies in part the special motions to strike without prejudice to renewal.
The story of Santana's and Vasquez's complaint spans several years. At this stage, their case rests on only allegations, but on a motion to dismiss, the court regards these allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Santana and Vasquez allege as follows.
A little more than eight years ago, in early November 2007, Detective Randall Elliott of the Marysville Police Department met with Socorro Acevedo, her mother, and her sister about an alleged case of abuse. Compl. ¶ 34, ECF No. 1. Acevedo, at the time younger than eighteen, told Elliott that Joseph Griesa, her boss at a local towing company, had physically and sexually abused her at work. Id. She showed Elliott some sexual text messages she had received from Griesa. Id. ¶ 50. After the interview, Elliott attempted to investigate her story by making a pretextual phone call to Griesa, but was unsuccessful. Id. ¶ 51. He told Acevedo it would be a tough case to prosecute because the trial would likely come down to a he-said, she-said credibility contest. Id. But he suggested Acevedo could pursue a civil remedy. Id. ¶¶ 35-36.
After Elliott told Acevedo and her family the police could probably not help them, he again contacted Griesa, the alleged abuser, who was a former probation officer. Id. ¶ 52. Elliott said he was investigating Acevedo's allegations that Griesa sexually abused Acevedo, gave him a copy of the relevant Penal Code sections, and told him to talk to a lawyer before saying anything. Id. Griesa agreed. Id. He hired David Vasquez. Id. ¶ 53. Vasquez called Elliott, who told him about the charges he was investigating. Id. Vasquez said he would be on vacation, and asked that Elliott wait to forward the results of his investigation to the District Attorneys' Office until after he returned and had a chance to review the case and talk about it with Griesa. Id. ¶ 54. Elliott agreed to wait. Id.
Later the same month, Elliott heard from Acevedo's sister that Griesa had begun removing his computer, video camera, and other things from his office. Id. ¶ 55. She said these items contained evidence of the alleged abuse and would corroborate Acevedo's story, so Elliott should obtain a warrant and search Griesa's office. Id. ¶ 56. It was a late Friday afternoon, and Elliott thought it would take hours to prepare an affidavit and obtain a warrant from a judge and much longer to search the tow yard where Griesa worked. Id. ¶ 57. He said a warrant would not be worth the effort because a search would turn up no evidence. Id. ¶ 58. He reiterated his impression that the case would come down to a credibility contest between Griesa and Acevedo, and never obtained a warrant. Id. ¶ 58.
In the meantime, Acevedo and her family had contacted an attorney, Jesse Santana. Id. ¶ 37. They told him the interview with Elliott had left them feeling helpless. Id. Santana agreed to represent them pro bono and reassured them of their option to seek compensation from Griesa in a civil case. Id. ¶¶ 38, 41. Santana said the family had some time before they needed to file a complaint, and that he could attempt to negotiate a settlement with Griesa, but because Acevedo was younger than eighteen, a judge would need to approve any agreement. Id. ¶ 39. Acevedo told Santana she preferred to keep the lurid details of the ordeal private; she feared that if her father learned about the abuse, he could suffer a stroke, and that if her brother learned about it, he would take matters into his own hands. Id. ¶ 40. She said she didn't want to testify about the abuse in court or file any criminal charges. Id. Santana agreed to pursue a settlement with Griesa and avoid the publicity of a civil complaint or criminal case. Id. ¶ 41.
Griesa had similar conversations with Vasquez. Id. ¶¶ 69-70. Griesa was concerned that if Acevedo's allegations were made public, they would be extremely damaging to his reputation, to his high school coaching position, and to his business. Id. ¶ 69. Vasquez told Griesa that sexual assault victims generally choose not to testify about the abuse in open court, and that if the District Attorney learned Acevedo would not testify, charges might not be filed. Id. ¶ 78. Vasquez cautioned this was no guarantee, and a criminal case was always a possibility, id., but Griesa said he was not worried about a criminal prosecution and asked Vasquez how to handle the civil suit, id. ¶ 70. Vasquez said he could attempt to resolve the case out of court and avoid any public disclosure of Acevedo's allegations, and Griesa asked him to try. Id. ¶¶ 70-71. In a follow-up meeting, Vasquez cautioned Griesa again he could make no guarantees about the criminal case, but the two discussed a possible good-faith payment of $50,000 to encourage civil settlement discussions. Id. ¶¶ 70, 72. Vasquez deposited the money into his client trust account and cautioned Griesa that any final settlement would need court approval; Griesa urged Vasquez to avoid any publicity and danger to himself and the family business. Id. ¶ 73.
At some point, Santana contacted Vasquez. Id. ¶ 42. The two discussed a possible settlement, and eventually $100,000 was proposed as a fair amount. Id. Santana reported the results of his negotiations to Acevedo and her family and reminded them they would need to obtain court approval. Id. ¶ 43. Santana drafted a proposed civil release, which he forwarded to Vasquez. Id. ¶ 44. When Vasquez learned Acevedo preferred not to testify in court against Griesa, he requested an addition to the draft: Acevedo would promise to "exercise any privilege she may have pursuant to law, not to testify in any proceedings." Id. ¶ 45. No one objected to this amendment. Id. A later draft agreement provided as follows:
Id. In December 2007, about a month after Acevedo and her family first met with Detective Elliott, she and her mother signed a release that included the language quoted above. Id. ¶¶ 45-46. Acevedo made it clear she wanted to put the episode behind her and move away to college. Id. ¶¶ 46-47. Santana again reminded them the settlement would not be final until Griesa signed the release and it was approved by a judge. Id. ¶ 48.
During these negotiations, no criminal case was filed, but Griesa understood the criminal case was always a possibility. Id. ¶ 77. He saw the settlement payment as a business decision because he could not afford public disclosure. Id. ¶ 79. Griesa never spoke to Santana about Acevedo or her claims, and Santana never attempted to dissuade Acevedo from testifying against Griesa. Id. ¶ 79.
Vasquez contacted Detective Elliott to tell him about the possible civil settlement between Acevedo and Griesa. Id. ¶ 60. Elliott said this could be a good resolution to the case. Id. ¶ 61. But Elliott never documented his awareness of these negotiations or his impression that a civil settlement could be a good resolution. Id. ¶ 62. Vasquez also spoke about the proposed settlement with Melanie Bendorf, a Yuba County Deputy District Attorney. Id. ¶ 60. And Santana called Elliott to say he was representing Acevedo and that she wanted to avoid a criminal prosecution, put the ordeal behind her, and move out of town for college. Id. ¶ 63. Finally, Griesa contacted Elliott to talk about the release and his agreement to pay $100,000. Id. ¶ 76. Elliott told Griesa to get a second opinion. Id.
Soon after speaking to Santana and Vasquez, Elliott finalized a report of his investigation and submitted it to the District Attorney's office. Id. ¶ 65. Rather than recommending criminal charges be filed against Griesa, Elliott recommended charges against Santana and Vasquez. Id.
The settlement agreement between Griesa and Acevedo never became final. Acevedo changed her mind about the release, id. ¶ 66, and Griesa never signed it, id. ¶ 80. Acevedo never received the $50,000 deposited in Vasquez's trust account, and the money was returned to Griesa. Id. ¶ 81. Griesa found a new lawyer, Timothy Evans. Id. ¶ 83. Acevedo also found a new lawyer. Id. ¶ 68. Santana called Detective Elliott to tell him Acevedo had a new attorney and that she wanted to say more about crimes Griesa had committed against her. Id. ¶¶ 67-68. Santana was not paid. See id. ¶ 41. Elliott said Acevedo could call him if she wanted. Id. ¶ 67. Santana offered to give Elliott the name and number of her new lawyer, but Elliott said he was not interested. Id. ¶ 68.
Before Santana took on his representation of Acevedo, he had submitted his application to the Governor's office for an appointment to a vacant seat on the Sutter County Superior Court. Id. ¶ 82. He was a prominent Hispanic lawyer with a strong support base among the Hispanic community. Id. Vasquez was one of his supporters. Id.
Susan Green, a former Sutter County District Attorney, had applied for the same vacant seat. Id. Among her supporters were Judge Julia Scrogin of the Sutter County Superior Court, Yuba County District Attorney Patrick McGrath, Yuba County Deputy District Attorneys Melanie Bendorf and John Vacek, Detective Elliott, and Griesa's new attorney, Timothy Evans. Id. ¶ 83. Each preferred Green over Santana for the judgeship. Id. ¶ 84. They knew the Governor would be announcing an appointment as early as June 2008; soon after they learned Santana had applied, they concocted the criminal investigation and prosecution against Santana to scuttle his application and sully his reputation. Id. ¶¶ 85-86, 90. The plan was to charge Vasquez to cover up their ulterior motive; he was "collateral damage." Id. ¶ 85. In anticipation of Santana's application, the conspirators held a "secret meeting" to discuss the filing of unfounded criminal charges against him. Id. ¶ 87.
Together—along with Yuba County District Attorney Investigators Gene Stober and Mary Barr—Scrogin, McGrath, Bendorf, Vacek, Elliott, and Evans "abused their positions of power, conducted and pursued a negligent and improper investigation, fabricated and pursued criminal charges, improperly and illegally empaneled a criminal grand jury, knowingly presented incompetent and irrelevant evidence, withheld exonerating evidence and maliciously prosecuted Jesse Santana and David Vasquez." Id. ¶ 88. Santana and Vasquez were indicted "for conspiracy to obstruct justice, bribery, dissuading a witness, and dissuading a witness for financial gain." Id. ¶ 90.
With their knowledge and approval, a warrant to search Santana's and Vasquez's law offices was prepared and executed. Id. ¶ 92. They found Griesa's file. See id. ¶ 96. Evans, who at this time represented Griesa, told Griesa the District Attorney's office would not file charges against him if he agreed to cooperate in the investigation of Santana and Vasquez and testify against them. Id. ¶ 95. Griesa agreed to cooperate in the investigation in return for the defendants' promise not to file child molestation and sexual assault charges against him. Id. ¶¶ 96-97.
In November 2008, Judge Scrogin empaneled a grand jury to oversee Santana's investigation and consider an indictment. Id. ¶ 98. She selected and swore in the grand jurors and presided over a contempt hearing in which Acevedo was compelled to provide testimony to the grand jury against Santana. Id.
Judge Scrogin "had a history with Santana." Id. ¶ 99. In 2004, when she was a prosecutor, she lost a high-profile murder case against a client of Santana's. Id. Before she empaneled the grand jury in Santana's prosecution, Scrogin had admitted to bias against him arising from her support of Green for the Superior Court judgeship; Scrogin had also written a letter to the Governor in support of Green. Id. ¶ 100. In the months before she presided over the grand jury considering Santana's case, she therefore had consistently recused herself from any case in which Santana appeared as counsel. Id. ¶ 101. But she did not recuse herself from the grand jury proceedings in Santana's case, even after Acevedo's attorney requested her recusal. Id. ¶ 103.
After Judge Scrogin empaneled the grand jury, McGrath, Bendorf, Vacek, Elliott, and Stober "knowingly fabricated false charges and presented incompetent and irrelevant evidence, withheld exonerating and other information that they were constitutionally obligated to present to the grand jury, unlawfully and illegally obtained an indictment against Jesse Santana and David Vasquez, without probable cause." Id. ¶ 105.
In January 2009, Green was appointed to the Sutter County Superior Court. Id. ¶ 107. Santana, of course, was not. In September 2010, he filed a writ with the California Court of Appeal to set aside the indictment against him on account of Judge Scrogin's bias. Id. ¶ 108. In an unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal found Judge Scrogin was indeed biased and had acted "without fundamental jurisdiction to empanel a grand jury to indict defendant Santana, and her actions toward that end were therefore void." Santana v. Super. Ct., No. C066008, 2012 WL 1777801, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. May 16, 2012).
After the Court of Appeal set aside Santana's indictment, Santana and Vasquez were prosecuted by criminal complaint rather than indictment. Id. ¶ 111. A state magistrate and the California Superior Court and found the prosecution was founded on probable cause. See generally Marysville & Elliott Req. J. Not. Ex. C, ECF No. 11-2.
Santana and Vasquez filed their complaint in this court on April 13, 2015 against Yuba County, the Yuba County District Attorney's Office, McGrath, Bendorf, Vacek, Barr, Stober, the Marysville Police Department, Elliott, Judge Scrogin, and Evans. Id. at 1. They allege five claims: (1) violation of the Fourth Amendment, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, against all the defendants except Evans, id. ¶¶ 123-28; (2) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, against all the defendants except Evans, id. ¶¶ 129-34; (3) malicious prosecution, against all the defendants, id. ¶¶ 135-39; (4) negligence, against all the defendants, id. ¶¶ 140-43; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, against all the defendants, id. ¶¶ 144-47. They request damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. Id. at 28.
The defendants, in four groups, have filed motions to dismiss and special motions to strike. First, the Yuba County defendants (The County, the District Attorney's Office, McGrath, Bendorf, Vacek, Barr, and Stober) move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and move to strike the complaint under California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. They argue they are state actors and are therefore immune under the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. They also point out that the complaint attacks actions they undertook as prosecutors and witnesses, so they contend they are entitled to immunity, both under federal and state law. If they are not immune, the Yuba County defendants argue Santana and Vasquez cannot state a claim for malicious prosecution because the investigation and prosecution were founded on probable cause. They also argue Santana and Vasquez cannot state a substantive due process claim for malicious prosecution. And finally, Yuba County argues the complaint's factual allegations are inadequate to show it is liable as a municipality.
As for the complaint's state-law claims, the Yuba County defendants request dismissal of any state claims for lack of jurisdiction if the federal claims are dismissed; and they alternatively request a more definite statement. See generally Yuba Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 19. Their motion to strike is based on similar legal arguments, but also contends that Santana and Vasquez cannot support their allegations with evidence. See generally Yuba Mot. Strike, ECF No. 20.
Second, the City of Marysville and Detective Elliott move to dismiss for essentially the same reasons as the Yuba County defendants, drawing attention to previous state court decisions finding Santana's and Vasquez's prosecution was based on probable cause. See generally Marysville Mot., ECF No. 11-1.
Third, Judge Scrogin moves to dismiss, arguing that she is protected by absolute immunity as a judge and immunity as a state actor under the Eleventh Amendment. Should the court find she is not immune, she argues Santana's and Vasquez's claims are barred both as untimely under the statute of limitations and under the California Government Tort Claims Act. See generally Scrogin Mot., ECF No. 16-1.
Fourth, Evans moves similarly to dismiss and to strike. He argues the complaint includes no allegation of his participation in the prosecution itself, and he argues that regardless of his absence from the alleged scheme, the defendants had probable cause to charge plaintiffs. He also argues the court lacks subject matter over the claims against him, which are founded solely on state law. See generally Evans Mot., ECF No. 8-1. If the state law claims are allowed to proceed in federal court, he argues Santana and Vasquez cannot show he was negligent because he never had an attorney-client relationship with either of them. He argues they cannot state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because his actions were not beyond the bounds of decency.
Santana and Vasquez filed an opposition to each motion. Opp'n Yuba Dismiss, ECF No. 24; Opp'n Yuba Strike, ECF No. 25; Opp'n Evans, ECF No. 21; Opp'n Marysville, ECF No. 28; Opp'n Scrogin, ECF No. 23. The defendants each replied. See Yuba Reply Dismiss, ECF No. 29; Yuba Reply Strike, ECF No. 30; Evans Reply, ECF No. 26; Marysville Reply, ECF No. 28; Scrogin Reply, ECF No. 27.
As a preliminary matter, although the complaint alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, it does not identify the basis of these claims. On its own motion, the court strikes these allegations and orders a more definite statement of any § 1981 claims. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 367 & n. 5 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he court, acting sua sponte, should have struck the plaintiff's complaint . . . and instructed plaintiff's counsel to file a more definite statement.").
The court first addresses the special motions to strike, then the motions to dismiss.
California enacted Section 425.16 of the Code of Civil Procedure "to curtail the `disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.'" Bulletin Displays, LLC v. Regency Outdoor Adver., Inc., 448 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1178-79 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(a)). It is meant as a procedural remedy for any person sued in a so-called "strategic lawsuit against public participation," or SLAPP,
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). Special motions to strike under this section are commonly referred to as anti-SLAPP motions. See, e.g., Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 261 (9th Cir. 2013), pet. rehr'g en banc denied, 736 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2013); Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 655 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011).
The legislature meant Section 425.16 to provide defendants a cheap, early opportunity to squelch meritless litigation. Soukup, 39 Cal. 4th at 278. An anti-SLAPP motion calls for a "summary judgment-like procedure," Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, 35 Cal.4th 180, 192 (2005), that proceeds in two stages:
Soukup, 39 Cal. 4th at 278-79 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). The statute's language must be construed broadly. Id. § 425.16(a).
When sitting in diversity, a federal district court applies federal procedure and state substantive law. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010). In 1999, the Ninth Circuit found section 425.16 applies in federal courts. U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970-73 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Makaeff, 736 F.3d at 1182 ("California's anti-SLAPP statute, by creating a separate and additional theory upon which certain kinds of suits may be disposed of before trial, supplements rather than conflicts with the Federal Rules.") (Wardlaw and Callahan, JJ., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). Sections 425.16(f) and (g),
This structure has led some district courts to adopt a tiered approach to anti-SLAPP motions. First, "[i]f an anti-SLAPP motion is based on legal deficiencies in the complaint, a federal court `must determine the motion in a manner that complies with the standards set by Federal Rules 8 and 12.'" Bulletin Displays, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1180 (quoting In re Bah, 321 B.R. 41, 45 n.6 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2005)); accord Rogers, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 982. Second, "[i]f a defendant makes an anti-SLAPP motion based on the plaintiff's failure to submit evidence to substantiate its claims, the motion is treated as a motion for summary judgment, and discovery `must be developed sufficiently to permit summary judgment under Rule 56.'" Id. (quoting In re Bah, 321 B.R. at 45 n.6); accord Rogers, 57 F. Supp. at 982; see also Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 846-47 (reversing to allow for further discovery); Shropshire v. Fred Rappoport Co., 294 F.Supp.2d 1085, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ("The Court is unable to resolve this issue at this stage of the proceeding, when no discovery has been permitted, because the applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute turns on disputed questions of fact.").
At hearing, the defendants explained that their motions argue both legal and evidentiary deficiencies. The court therefore first determines whether the defendants have made a "threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity." Soukup, 39 Cal. 4th at 278(citation and quotation marks omitted). Then, for claims passing this test, the court addresses the complaint's purported legal deficiencies to determine whether the plaintiffs have "demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Because this analysis essentially overlaps with the remaining motions based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, separate treatment is unnecessary. Cf. Yuba Mot. Strike 8-9 & n.2 (incorporating by reference the arguments in the concurrent motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); Yuba Reply Strike 4-5 & n.1 (same).
Because the court dismisses the complaint in part with leave to amend, to the extent the defendants challenge the plaintiffs' ability to put forward evidence, the special motions are denied without prejudice to renewal after any amendments to the pleadings and any discovery allowed or required by the Federal Rules.
Section 425.16 applies only to state-law claims when those claims are invoked in federal court. Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2010). The complaint alleges three state-law claims: malicious prosecution, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Each is based on the same alleged wrongs—the investigation and prosecution of criminal charges against Santana and Vasquez—so they may be considered together.
Section 425.16 reaches all claims "arising from any statement or writing made in, or in connection with an issue under consideration or review by, an official proceeding or body." Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 31 Cal.4th 728, 734 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). That is, section 425.16 reaches (1) "any written or oral statement or writing made before a . . . judicial proceeding," (2) "any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body," and (3) "any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e); see also Jarrow, 31 Cal. 4th at 734. An activity need not be constitutionally protected; rather, the defendant "need only show that the activity falls within the scope of [section 425.16(e)]." Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, Inc. v. Happening House Ventures, 184 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1549 (2010). Claims arising from litigation activity, including malicious prosecution claims against attorneys, therefore fall within the reach of section 425.16. See, e.g., Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056 (2006); Zamos v. Stroud, 32 Cal.4th 958, 965 (2004); Jarrow, 31Cal. 4th at 741.
Here, the complaint alleges Evans supported Green for the Sutter County judgeship, Compl. ¶¶ 83-84, and planned to help cook up charges against Santana and Vasquez to spoil Santana's application, id. ¶ 91. Evans allegedly conspired with the Yuba County defendants to conduct a "negligent and improper investigation," to fabricate evidence, to illegally empanel a grand jury, and to present incompetent and irrelevant evidence in a scheme of malicious prosecution. Id. ¶ 88. Santana and Vasquez allege that he knew about and approved of a recklessly untruthful application for a warrant to search their offices, id. ¶ 92, and that he persuaded Griesa to waive his attorney-client privilege, id. ¶¶ 95-97.
In essence, Santana and Vasquez allege Evans helped find evidence to support the criminal prosecution, which he understood would prevent Santana's judicial appointment. These are litigation activities California courts have found to be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. See, e.g., Jarrow, 31 Cal. 4th at 741 (bringing and maintaining a case is a protected activity, even if allegedly done maliciously and without probable cause); Dickens v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 117 Cal.App.4th 705, 714 (2004) ("[A] malicious prosecution cause of action predicated upon the claim the defendants . . . were instrumental in bringing upon a criminal prosecution against the plaintiff . . . is subject to an anti-SLAPP motion."); Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 47 Cal.App.4th 777, 784 (1996) ("communications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding" are protected activities).
Counties, district attorneys, deputy district attorneys, and investigators are "persons" within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute, which protects governmental entities and their representatives.
Despite the fact that California courts have extended section 425.16 to district attorneys and litigation activities, the defendants have cited no case to show section 425.16 applies to the litigation activities of district attorneys in criminal cases specifically. See Yuba Mot. Strike at 7-8. Neither has the court located any directly relevant published decision,
The state court of appeal held that the deputized district attorneys were deputy district attorneys as a matter of law. See id. at 660-65. Therefore, because "[t]he complaint was based on defendants' filing of the criminal action against plaintiffs and the presentation of evidence before the grand jury," the prosecution was a protected activity. Id. at 665-66. To support this conclusion, the court of appeal cited two civil-litigation cases, Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 (1999), and Dove Audio, 47 Cal. App. 4th at 784.
In light of this reasoning, this court concludes that the litigation activities of district attorneys and their deputies in criminal cases are protected activities within the meaning of section 425.16. Because the anti-SLAPP statute protects persons who are "instrumental in bringing upon a criminal prosecution," Dickens, 117 Cal. App. 4th at 714, the court concludes it applies to Investigators Barr and Stober as well.
Turning now to the substance of section 425.16's test, the complaint alleges the Yuba County defendants supported Green over Santana for the vacant judgeship, Compl. ¶¶ 82-84, and secretly planned to investigate and charge Santana to derail his candidacy, id. ¶¶ 85-87. They conducted a "negligent and improper investigation, . . . fabricated and pursued criminal charges, improperly empaneled a criminal grand jury, knowingly presented incompetent and irrelevant evidence, withheld exonerating evidence and maliciously prosecuted" Santana and Vasquez. Id. ¶ 88. They supported their application for a warrant to search Santana's and Vasquez's offices with a recklessly untruthful statement of facts. Id. ¶ 92. After the case was turned over to the State Attorney General's office, they "participated as investigators and witnesses" in the trial against Santana and Vasquez. Id. ¶¶ 111-12.
The thrust of these allegations is simple: the Yuba County defendants planned and executed a criminal prosecution on a deficient evidentiary basis, all in an effort to secure Green's appointment to the bench. Like Evans's alleged actions, these are litigation activities subject to the protection of section 425.16. See also Zucchet v. Galardi, 229 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (2014) ("[T]rial testimony and statements made to prosecutors preparing for a trial fall under the definition of activity in furtherance of the right to free speech or petition as defined in the anti-SLAPP statute."); Miller, 150 Cal. App. 4th at 652 ("the defendants' filing of [a] criminal action against plaintiffs and the presentation of evidence before the grand jury" was protected activity).
Although the complaint alleges protected activities within the scope of section 425.16, Santana and Vasquez may evade the defendants' motions to strike if the "assertedly protected speech or petitioning activity was illegal as a matter of law." Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299, 305 (2006). A defendant's conduct is "illegal as a matter of law" if he either concedes his conduct was illegal or if "uncontroverted and conclusive evidence" establishes as much. Id. at 320. This is a separate question from the plaintiff's probability of prevailing, i.e., the second part of the section 425.16 test, addressed in a separate section below. Id.
Here, although Santana and Vasquez allege the defendants offered false testimony or committed crimes, the defendants deny these allegations. Neither does uncontested and conclusive evidence establish the defendants' conduct was illegal as a matter of law. Construed in the light most favorable to Santana and Vasquez, the evidence
In arguing Evans's conduct was illegal as a matter of law, Santana and Vasquez also cite the Court of Appeal's opinion in Santana v. Superior Court, vacating Santana's indictment. See Opp'n Evans at 16. They seem to argue that because Evans gave false testimony, section 425.16's protection evaporates. See, e.g., Lefebvre v. Lefebvre, 199 Cal.App.4th 696, 705 (2011). But the Santana court did not find that Evans gave false testimony; rather, it expressed confusion about why Evans had offered testimony on civil compromise: criminal charges had not yet been filed, so "the person injured" could not "appear[] before the court in which the action in pending." 2012 WL 1777801 at *7 & n.12 (quoting Cal. Pen. Code § 1378). Evans's testimony to the grand jury was at worst irrelevant or unhelpful to the indictment decision, not illegal.
In conclusion, the defendants have met their burden to show plaintiffs' state-law claims arise from protected activity. The court therefore proceeds to an evaluation of the complaint's legal sufficiency, the second stage of the anti-SLAPP inquiry.
As described above, in the face of an anti-SLAPP motion, a plaintiff must establish a "probability" he will prevail in his claim. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1); Bulletin Displays, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1179. Because the court here tables questions of evidence until discovery is developed, as required by the Federal Rules, the plaintiffs' burden is similar to that they face when confronted by a federal-law motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. See, e.g., Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 840; Bulletin Displays, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1179. In fact, "[i]f a defendant makes a special motion to strike based on alleged deficiencies in the plaintiff's complaint, the motion must be treated in the same manner as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . ." Rogers, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 983.
A party may move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the complaint lacks a "cognizable legal theory" or if its factual allegations do not support a cognizable legal theory. Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). The court assumes these factual allegations are true and draws reasonable inferences from them. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A complaint need contain only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not "detailed factual allegations," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But this rule demands more than unadorned accusations; "sufficient factual matter" must make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or formulaic recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Evaluation under Rule 12(b)(6) is a context-specific task drawing on "judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679. And aside from the complaint, district courts have discretion to examine documents incorporated by reference, Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2012); affirmative defenses based on the complaint's allegations, Sams v. Yahoo! Inc., 713 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013); and proper subjects of judicial notice, W. Radio, 678 F.3d at 976.
Should a motion to dismiss be granted, district courts ordinarily allow the plaintiff leave to amend "when a viable case may be presented." Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002). However, "liberality in granting leave to amend is subject to several limitations." Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint would cause the opposing party undue prejudice, is sought in bad faith, constitutes an exercise in futility, or creates undue delay. Id. The court's decision is one of discretion. Id.
With these rules in mind, the court addresses the defendants' motions.
The Yuba County defendants argue for dismissal of all of the claims against them.
As a preliminary matter, "[w]hen both a municipal officer and a local government entity are named, and the officer is named only in an official capacity, the court may dismiss the officer as a redundant defendant." Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) ("As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity."). The official-capacity claims against the individual Yuba County defendants are therefore dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend.
Santana and Vasquez assert several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That section provides, in relevant part,
42 U.S.C. § 1983. A claim under § 1983 includes two elements: "(1) the defendants acted under color of law, and (2) their conduct deprived [the plaintiff] of a constitutional right." Stein v. Ryan, 662 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original). Here, the defendants challenge only the second element, whether Santana and Vasquez were deprived of a constitutional right.
The complaint alleges violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Compl. at 24-26. At hearing, the plaintiffs clarified they allege both direct violations of these Amendments and independent claims for malicious prosecution to deny them of the same rights. For their part, the Yuba County defendants contend both that they are immune from liability and that the substantive allegations against them are inadequately pled. The court addresses first the immunities they assert.
Federal law recognizes several varieties of absolute immunity in § 1983 cases. Here, the individual Yuba County defendants raise three. First, they argue the
"Claims under § 1983 are limited by the scope of the Eleventh Amendment." Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat. Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). Actions against states and state officials in their official capacities can proceed in three circumstances: when the state gives its consent; when Congress abrogates the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity in a valid exercise of power; and when a plaintiff seeks prospective relief from a government official. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). Here, California has not consented to this action, the plaintiffs do not seek prospective relief, and Congress did not abrogate California's immunity by passing § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979). The plaintiffs do not dispute these conclusions; moreover, as noted above, the claims against the Yuba County defendants in their official capacities are redundant of the claims against the County in this case.
But "state officials, sued in their individual capacities, are `persons' within the meaning of § 1983," and "[t]he Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits." Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991). "Personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); accord Monell v. N.Y. City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). The individual-capacity claims may proceed if otherwise adequately alleged and if not barred by another immunity.
State prosecuting attorneys are absolutely immune in actions for damages under § 1983 when they act within the scope of their duties by initiating and pursuing criminal prosecutions, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976), carrying out "the traditional functions of an advocate," Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997). Absolute immunity protects even against claims of malicious prosecution, use of perjured testimony, and suppression of material evidence. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. It is meant to avoid "deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his public duties, and the possibility he would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by the public trust." Id. at 423. This rule represents a painful sacrifice, to be sure: absolute prosecutorial immunity may well leave "the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty." Id. at 427. It should come as no surprise then that immunity is not automatic and that the Supreme Court recognizes absolute immunity sparingly. Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636-37 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87 (1991)). The prosecutor who asserts absolute immunity bears the burden to show the protection is justified. Genzler, 410 F.3d at 636.
Absolute prosecutorial immunity applies only to conduct "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Burns, 500 U.S. at 486 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). For this reason, when a prosecutor argues she is absolutely immune under this rule, the court must determine whether she performed a "quasi-judicial function." Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003). If so, she is immune, even if she violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id. In making this determination, the court looks not to the prosecutor's motivation, but to the "ultimate acts" themselves. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
Many activities that take place before a prosecution is officially instituted may be protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33. For example, appearing in court in support of an application for a search warrant, presenting evidence at a hearing, evaluating evidence, interviewing witnesses, and preparing charging documents are all acts subject to the protection of absolute immunity. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130; Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); Burns, 500 U.S. at 492. But giving legal advice to the police is not. Burns, 500 U.S. at 496. And a prosecutor enjoys only qualified immunity, not absolute immunity, for investigatory, administrative, or investigative functions such as "gathering physical evidence and conducting interrogations to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether probable cause exists to arrest a suspect." Broam, 320 F.3d at 1028, 1031. Similarly, absolute immunity does not protect a prosecutor who fabricates evidence during the early stages of an investigation, or who holds defamatory press conferences. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275-77.
Here, McGrath, Bendorf, and Vacek are absolutely immune to claims regarding their actions "preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial"; this includes "the professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police and appropriate preparation for its presentation at trial or before a grand jury." Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. These tasks are part of their duties as "advocate[s] for the State." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33. The plaintiffs therefore may not maintain this action on the basis of their allegation that McGrath, Bendorf, and Vacek "fabricated and pursued criminal charges, improperly empaneled a grand jury, knowingly presented incompetent and irrelevant evidence, withheld exonerating evidence, and maliciously prosecuted" Santana and Vasquez. Compl. ¶ 88. Even if unconstitutional, these were the acts of advocates preparing for trial and are protected by absolute immunity. See Genzler, 410 F.3d at 637-38.
Santana and Vasquez also allege McGrath, Bendorf, and Vacek planned and participated in an investigation that began long before evidence was gathered, victims were interviewed, search warrants were obtained, or charges were prepared. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 85-87 (secret plans to investigate and charge Santana); id. ¶ 92 (participation in the collection of evidence). Prosecutors act like the police when they "search[] for clues and corroboration that might give [them] probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested," and accordingly they bear only qualified immunity for these acts. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. Like the hypothetical prosecutor the Supreme Court described in Buckley, who "plans and executes a raid on a suspected weapons cache," McGrath, Bendorf, and Vacek may assert only qualified immunity in defense to the plaintiffs' claims that they helped collect and manufacture the evidence against Santana and Vasquez.
The defendants' immunity as prosecutors does not extend to their testimony at the criminal trial, which certainly is not provided as part of an advocate's traditional role. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130. But another immunity protects the testimony of trial witnesses: "a trial witness has absolute immunity with respect to any claim based on the witness' testimony." Rehberg v. Paulk, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1497, 1505 (2012) (emphasis in original); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1983). Even perjury on the witness stand does not destroy this immunity. Rehberg, 132 S. Ct. at 1505.
Here, despite this immunity, Santana and Vasquez argue McGrath, Bendorf, and Vacek are liable for their testimony in the criminal trial because they participated in the criminal case as both witnesses and prosecutors. Compl. ¶ 112; Opp'n Yuba Dismiss at 8 (citing Kalina, 522 U.S. 118). In Kalina, the Supreme Court held that although a state deputy district attorney was absolutely immune for actions undertaken "in connection with the preparation and filing of. . . the information and the motion for an arrest warrant," she could be held liable under § 1983 for certifying "under penalty of perjury" that the facts underlying the information and motion were true.
Unlike in Kalina, the testimony at issue in this case would have been protected by absolute immunity had another witness given it. That is, this case is more like Briscoe, where the Supreme Court found that a police officer enjoyed absolute immunity for trial testimony. 460 U.S. at 335-36. At the time they testified in the criminal trial, McGrath, Bendorf, and Vacek had turned control of the prosecution over to the Attorney General's office, so the conflicts that would normally have tainted their testimony had dissipated. The court recognizes that although they were no longer assigned to the case, they nonetheless remained prosecutors. And not only were they prosecutors; they were the very prosecutors who had decided to prosecute Santana and Vasquez. Nevertheless, the court concludes that if a police officer enjoys absolute immunity for testimony at trial about a case he investigated, see Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 326-27, it is hard to see why a prosecutor formerly assigned to the case should not enjoy the same immunity. Moreover, "[t]he central focus" in determining absolute immunity is "the nature of the judicial proceeding itself," not the identity of the witness. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 334; see also Kalina, 522 U.S. at 127.
Moreover, the reasons that motivated the Supreme Court to grant lay witnesses and police-officer witnesses testimonial immunity apply equally to a witness who was formerly a prosecutor in the case. A trial witness's immunity from damages under § 1983 is part of the same common-law "cluster of immunities protecting the various participants in judge-supervised trials." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978). Ironclad immunity is necessary "to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation." Id. The Supreme Court has recognized, "again and again," the alternative "would disserve the broader public interest." Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 345.
First, the official-capacity claims against the individual Yuba County defendants are dismissed with prejudice as either redundant or barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but the individual-capacity claims against the same defendants may proceed if otherwise adequately alleged. Second, the district attorney defendants are immune from liability for actions undertaken in their personal capacities inasmuch as those actions were prosecutorial and not investigative. And third, the Yuba County defendants are also immune to any claims arising from their testimony at the criminal trial. The complaint is dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend to the extent these immunities apply. The court now turns to the substantive adequacy of the complaint's federal claims against the Yuba County defendants.
As noted above, Santana and Vasquez allege violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive due process and equal protection of the law, their Fourth Amendment right to be free of unlawful searches and seizures, and malicious prosecution to deprive them of each of the same rights. The court addresses first the
Santana and Vasquez allege violations of their Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process, and clarify this claim "stems from the malicious prosecution." Opp'n Yuba Dismiss at 11.
"[N]o substantive due process right exists under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from prosecution without probable cause." Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994)); accord Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 919 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 must be based on a specific constitutional right). The motion is therefore granted with prejudice and without leave to amend as to this claim.
The Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, on the other hand, provides an adequate basis for a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution. See, e.g., Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1070. The equal protection clause protects every person within a State's jurisdiction from intentional or arbitrary discrimination, including by a State's agents. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (citing Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cnty., 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)). When considering a claim for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, the court's first step is to identify the classification that gave rise to the alleged discrimination; the type of classification dictates how closely the court scrutinizes its justification. See, e.g., Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 589 (9th Cir. 2008); Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1277 (9th Cir. 2004). One of three specific levels of scrutiny normally applies: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or the default test, rational basis review. Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 543 (9th Cir. 2004). Strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny are applicable to claims of discrimination on the basis of a suspect classification or when a plaintiff alleges deprivation of fundamental rights. See, e.g., Kahawaiolaa, 386 F.3d at 1277. Otherwise the court considers whether the classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See, e.g., Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23 (1989). "Under this standard, a `State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.'" Lazy Y Ranch, 546 F.3d at 589 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cntr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)).
Here, the complaint does not clearly allege the basis of any classification. Its Fourteenth Amendment claim invokes only due process, not equal protection. See Compl. at 25. The motion must therefore be granted. Nevertheless, the complaint's allegations are generally consistent with both a theory of classification on the basis of political association, see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 83-85 (the defendants, all associated with the District Attorney's office, discriminated against Santana because he was not part of their circle), and a theory of racial discrimination, see, e.g., id. ¶ 82 (Santana was a "prominent Hispanic lawyer"). The motion is therefore granted with leave to amend.
The defendants correctly note that political association is not a suspect classification. See, e.g., Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 36 (lst Cir. 2006) (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 293 (2004) (plurality opinion)); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 406 (1992) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) ("A defamation statute that drew distinctions on the basis of political affiliation . . . would unquestionably fail rational-basis review."). But the fact that a plaintiff lacks membership in a suspect class calls for rational basis review, not dismissal. Rational basis review is "the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial scrutiny," Dallas, 490 U.S. at 26, but it is a meaningful standard nonetheless. The Ninth Circuit has held that when a defendant provides the court with no rational basis for the classification, a motion to dismiss must be denied, even if the defendant articulates reasons for the decision itself. See Lazy Y Ranch, 546 F.3d at 590. In any event, the viability of an as-yet-unpleaded claim is better tested in a later motion to dismiss. See, e.g., SAES Getters S.p.A. v. Aeronex, Inc., 219 F.Supp.2d 1081, 1086 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
The Fourteenth Amendment claims are dismissed with leave to amend as described above.
"The Fourth Amendment safeguards `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001) (quoting U.S. Const. am. IV). It goes without saying that an unreasonable search or seizure is an element of any § 1983 claim for violation of the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003).
A prosecution intended to deny a person of his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures may also serve as the basis for a claim under § 1983. See, e.g., Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1069. The plaintiff must allege the defendants prosecuted him with malice, without probable cause, and for the purpose of denying him of his Fourth Amendment right, see id. at 1066, and that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurred, Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 135 (2015). Malicious prosecution actions are not limited to prosecutors; others who wrongly cause charges to be filed may also be liable. Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1066.
Here, it is unclear whether Santana and Vasquez allege a search or seizure ever occurred.
The Yuba County Superior Court's records suggest Santana and Vasquez remained at liberty on their own recognizance throughout the prosecution. See Elliott Req. J. Not., Ex. B, ECF No. 11-2. The Ninth Circuit recently declined to decide whether a defendant who faces felony charges in California has been subjected to a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment if he remains always at liberty on his own recognizance. Yousefian, 779 F.3d at 1015 n.6 (citing Karam, 352 F.3d at 1193-94). Several years ago, however, in Karam, the circuit court found that a defendant who faced misdemeanor charges and who remained at liberty on her own recognizance could not succeed in a Fourth Amendment case because she had not been "seized." 352 F.3d at 1193-94. In reaching this decision, the court considered several facts: the defendant had not been charged with a felony, she was not required to report to anyone, and she was required only to make court appearances and obtain the court's permission if she wanted to leave the state. Id. at 1194. Any seizure was therefore "de minimis," and she could not state a Fourth Amendment claim. Id. A clear majority of federal circuit courts have similarly concluded that "a pre-arraignment, non-felony summons requiring no more than a later court appearance does not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure." Burg v. Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 99-101 (2d Cir. 2010) (collecting authority on this point from the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits).
This case mirrors Karam but for one important detail: Santana and Vasquez faced felony charges, not misdemeanor charges. "The contours of the holding in Karam are not entirely defined as to the significance, by itself, of the felony charge." McCabe v. Hart, 357 F. App'x 151, 153 (9th Cir. 2009). The provenance of the distinction between those who face misdemeanor charges and felony charges is likely Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994); several circuit opinions cite that concurrence as persuasive authority. See e.g., Burg, 591 F.3d at 97-98; Karam, 352 F.3d at 1194; see also DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770, 789 (6th Cir. 1999). In Albright, Justice Ginsburg wrote as follows:
510 U.S. at 278-79 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). No other justice joined Justice Ginsburg in this reasoning, however, and several federal circuit courts disagree. See, e.g., Bielanski v. Cnty. of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 638 (7th Cir. 2008); Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1162 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds, Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010); Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Mata v. Anderson, 685 F.Supp.2d 1223, 1251 (D.N.M. 2010) (collecting authority), aff'd, 635 F.3d 1250 (10th Cir. 2011); cf. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 872 (9th Cir. 2006) ("People released pending trial . . . have suffered no judicial abridgment of their constitutional rights.").
For example, despite considering Justice Ginsberg's arguments in Albright, the First Circuit determined that categorizing "standard conditions of pretrial release" as a Fourth Amendment seizure would be "much too ambitious a view of the law." Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2001). The court based its decision on the Supreme Court's holding in Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989), which emphasized the concepts of "physical control" and "termination of freedom of movement" as requirements for a Fourth Amendment seizure. Id. at 56 (internal citations omitted). The First Circuit refused to find a seizure absent any arrest, detention, restriction of travel, or other "deprivation of . . . liberty." Id.
Another judge of this district has concluded that "[t]he fact of a felony charge, of itself, is not determinative of a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. It is the fact of the felony charge with other restrictions that is important." Fenters v. Chevron, No. 05-1630, 2010 WL 5477710, at *23 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2010). In Fenters, the plaintiff was charged with felony embezzlement. Id. at *19. She was booked, fingerprinted, and released on her own recognizance, although she was required to appear at all times and places the court ordered, and she could not leave the state without the court's permission. Id. at *19, 21. The district court found this was not a seizure, so the defendants were granted summary judgment. Id. at *21.
This court agrees a felony charge cannot alone remove Santana and Vasquez from the logical bounds of Karam. But neither does the fact that Santana and Vasquez faced felony charges alone establish their seizure. Whether they were seized depends not on the charges filed against them, but on the restrictions they faced as a result. See, e.g., Karam, 352 F.3d at 1193-94 (pretrial release conditions were not a seizure because the plaintiff had been required only to make court appearances and obtain the court's permission if she wanted to leave the state); Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 860-61 (5th Cir. 1999) (pretrial release conditions amounted to a seizure because the plaintiff was required to appear in court, obtain permission before leaving the state, report regularly to pretrial services, sign a personal recognizance bond, and give financial and other identifying information to officers), abrogated on other grounds, Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003); Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222-23 (3d Cir. 1998) (although it was a "close question," a seizure occurred when the plaintiff was required to pay a bond, attend court hearings, contact pretrial services weekly, and was prohibited from traveling outside New Jersey and Pennsylvania); Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 946 (2d Cir. 1997) (pretrial release conditions subjected the plaintiff to a seizure because he could not leave the state and was required to appear in court many times); Nieves, 241 F.3d at 56 (no seizure occurred when plaintiffs were charged with multiple felonies and required to appear in court, but released on their own recognizance, not required to post a monetary bond, not restricted in their travel, or "otherwise exposed to any significant deprivation of liberty").
As these examples show, the inquiry is a factual one wherein the court looks to what particular restrictions Santana and Vasquez faced. Because the complaint includes no allegation that an unreasonable search or seizure occurred, the motion must be granted. As the deficiency could be cured by sufficient additional factual allegations, the motion will be granted with leave to amend unless amendment would be futile for some other reason.
The defendants argue any amendment would be futile because the charges and prosecution were founded on probable cause. "[P]robable cause is an absolute defense to malicious prosecution." Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2009). The Yuba County defendants do not argue directly they had probable cause to believe Santana and Vasquez had committed a crime. Rather, they cite previous state court decisions to that effect and argue Santana and Vasquez are collaterally estopped or precluded from relitigating the issue. If this were true, then amending the Fourth Amendment claim would be futile.
"In determining the collateral estoppel effect of a state court judgment, federal courts must, as a matter of full faith and credit, apply that state's law of collateral estoppel." In re Bugna, 33 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994). In California, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings. Lucido v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal.3d 335, 341 (1990). A state court's finding of probable cause may preclude later litigation of the same question in federal court, including when raised in a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983. Wige v. City of L.A., 713 F.3d 1183, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing McCutchen v. City of Montclair, 73 Cal.App.4th 1138 (1999)); Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1068. A court looks to five "threshold requirements":
Lucido, 51 Cal. 3d at 341. In a case like this one, a common rejoinder is that the evidence the defendants had when they decided to arrest or prosecute was different from the evidence presented to the state court that found probable cause. See, e.g., Wige, 713 F.3d at 1186; Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1068; McCutchen, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 1147. For example, if the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing was discovered only after an arrest was made, if the evidence presented to the state court was fabricated, or if the prosecutors lied or their conduct was otherwise "wrongful," collateral estoppel does not apply. Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1068; see also Wige, 731 F.3d at 1186.
Awabdy illustrates these rules well. In that case, the plaintiff, Mr. Awabdy, was a former member of the city council. 368 F.3d at 1065. While he was on the city council he butted heads with other municipal officials. Id. He alleged that a cabal of two other city councilmembers, a police officer, and the city manager was formed to falsely claim he embezzled public funds so as to torpedo his reelection campaign. Id. The group also allegedly made it known they intended to "get" Awabdy because he was of "Arabic extraction." Id. Charges were brought two weeks before the election, and Awabdy was defeated, while the other incumbents were reelected. Id. at 1065-66. The next month he was held to answer on embezzlement charges, although the district attorney later dismissed the charges in the interests of justice. Id. at 1066. Awabdy then brought an action in federal court, alleging claims under § 1983 for malicious prosecution to deprive him of his rights under the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 1065. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. See id. at 1068. It held that collateral estoppel did not bar litigation of probable cause because Awabdy had alleged the charges against him were based on fraud, false accusations, and wrongful conduct. Id. In other words, relitigation of probable cause was not precluded because the plaintiff alleged the earlier probable cause determination was wrongfully obtained.
Here, Santana and Vasquez cite Awabdy to argue any state court decision on probable cause has no preclusive effect. In reply, the defendants protest only the complaint's lack of detail. See, e.g., Yuba Reply Dismiss at 6 ("Plaintiffs continuously fail to be specific about what exactly was fraudulent, corrupt or fabricated. Further, they fail to allege or explain that absent the unidentified fabricated evidence or false statement, the remaining information would not have been sufficient to support probable cause."); Marysville Reply at 6 ("Plaintiffs do not contend that either of their appeals was tainted by fabricated evidence or other prosecutorial misconduct.").
The complaint's allegations go beyond conclusory statements of wrongful conduct: Green was a friend of the defendants and a former district attorney. The defendants intended to prevent Santana from becoming a judge. They met and spoke about Santana's candidacy, Green's candidacy, and a possible criminal case against Santana. The defendants agreed not to prosecute Griesa so they could pursue the case against Santana and Vasquez, and Judge Scrogin empaneled the grand jury in Santana's case despite recusing herself from several earlier cases in which Santana appeared as counsel. This is not to say the complaint plausibly alleges the defendants lacked probable cause, cf. infra pages 56-57; rather, the allegations of wrongful conduct simply remove the complaint from the preclusive shadow of previous state court decisions. Moreover, the court considers here only whether amendment would be futile.
A careful reading of Awabdy also confirms this is the correct result. The relevant passage is phrased in the conjunctive: "[C]ollateral estoppel does not apply when the decision to hold a defendant to answer was made [1] on the basis of fabricated evidence presented at the preliminary hearing or [2] as the result of other wrongful conduct by state or local officials." 368 F.3d at 1068. In other words, collateral estoppel does not apply if the previous decision was allegedly the result of "wrongful conduct by state or local officials," even if the plaintiff does not point out specific fabrications. Id. The circuit court's statement of Mr. Awabdy's allegations also supports this reading: it listed no specific statements other than to note the embezzlement charge was, generally, false. See id. at 1065-66. In fact, the record on appeal contained no details about the embezzlement charge at all, and the court listed them only in the margin, apparently for context. See id. at 1065 n.1.
Finally, no information on the record here shows the California state courts' previous decisions weighed the possibility of the defendants' false accusations or wrongful conduct. See generally, Marysville & Elliott Req. J. Not. Ex. C, ECF No. 11-2.
Municipalities may be held liable as "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). A plaintiff who seeks to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 must "identify a municipal `policy' or `custom' that caused the plaintiff's injury." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). "Locating a `policy' ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality." Id. at 403-04.
In general, no heightened pleading standard applies to § 1983 claims, Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164 (1993), but to plead a Monell claim and withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, allegations in a complaint "may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively." AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)).
Here, the complaint includes no allegation of the County's policy or practice and gives the defendants no notice of how the plaintiffs intend to prove the County's liability. Santana and Vasquez cite Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Department for the proposition that "a claim of municipal liability under § 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss when the claim is nothing more than a bare allegation that conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice." Opp'n Yuba Dismiss at 4 (citing 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988)). But this rule no longer reflects federal law, which now requires sufficient factual allegations to "plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief" for all aspects of a plaintiff's claim under Monell and § 1983. See, e.g., Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637; Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216.
In their opposition brief, Santana and Vasquez also argue the County had a policy of keeping the judicial bench racially homogenous. Opp'n Yuba Mot. Dismiss 14. They did not allege these facts in their complaint. The motion is granted on this claim, but with leave to amend.
The court now turns to the complaint's state law claims against the Yuba County Defendants. They argue several state-law immunities protect them from liability.
In California, "[a] public employee is not liable for injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause." Cal. Gov't Code § 821.6. This section's "principal function" is to defuse claims of malicious prosecution. Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 487-88 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Kayfetz v. California, 156 Cal.App.3d 491 (1984)), but courts must construe it broadly, see, e.g., Gillan v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1048 (2007). The immunity associated with section 821.6 protects "all employees of a public entity," even non-attorneys and those without legal training. Asgari v. City of L.A., 15 Cal.4th 744, 756-57 (1997) (citation and quotation marks omitted). It applies equally "to actions taken in preparation for formal proceedings," including investigations, which are "an essential step toward the institution of formal proceedings." Catsouras v. Dep't of Cal. Hwy. Patrol, 181 Cal.App.4th 856, 889 (2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted). And it encompasses claims for negligence and emotional distress. See, e.g., Amylou R. v. Cnty. of Riverside, 28 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1211 (1994); Johnson v. City of Pacifica, 4 Cal.App.3d 82, 86-87 (1970). The section includes no exception for claims of a conspiracy. Citizens Capital Corp. v. Spohn, 133 Cal.App.3d 887, 889 (1982).
California law also protects a "privileged publication or broadcast . . . [i]n any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law . . . ." Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b). This protection does not apply to claims of malicious prosecution, but it extends to any communication, whether or not a "publication," as long as the communication is "required or permitted by law in the course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the objects of the litigation, even though the publication is made outside the courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is involved." Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 (1990). "The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action." Id. Like section 821.6, section 47(b) is construed broadly. See, e.g., Thornton v. Cal. Unemp't. Ins. Appeals Bd., 204 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1418 (2012).
Here, these sections combine to immunize the Yuba County defendants from the state law claims. First, the Yuba County defendants' actions were all undertaken in connection with the criminal case, including their investigation. As section 821.6 provides, it is irrelevant whether the defendants' actions were undertaken maliciously or without probable cause, and as noted above, section 821.6 guards against claims of negligence and for emotional distress. Second, the defendants' testimony in the criminal trial falls squarely within the confines of section 47(b). See Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 213 ("The principal purpose of section [47(b)] is to afford litigants and witnesses the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The plaintiffs' only response is that the Yuba County defendants did not act as prosecutors. Opp'n Yuba Dismiss at 17. As noted above, section 821.6 applies equally to non-lawyers.
The motion is granted as to the state law claims against the Yuba County defendants. Because the motion is granted as to each claim against the individual defendants, the claims against the County must also be dismissed. The plaintiffs are granted leave to amend if possible within the confines of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
Finally, the Yuba County defendants move for a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). Rule 12(e) allows such a motion if the complaint "is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Whether to grant a motion under Rule 12(e) is a matter of discretion. Griffin v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 817 F.Supp.2d 1152, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
Here, the complaint tells a long and complicated story, and could very likely have been drafted more elegantly, but it is not so confusing as to call for a wholesale reworking. Should Santana and Vasquez file an amended complaint, however, the court admonishes them to carefully distinguish which claims they advance against each defendant, in which capacity, and on what grounds. The motion for a more definite statement is denied.
As a preliminary matter, the Marysville defendants have informed the court that the parties had stipulated to the dismissal of the federal claims against the City of Marysville. Notice of Mot. at 3, ECF No. 11. The parties also reached a stipulation that should the court dismiss the state claims against the City, the plaintiffs would not seek leave to amend. Id. The parties confirmed this stipulation at hearing. The federal claims against the City are therefore dismissed with prejudice. Similarly, the City of Marysville and its Police Department are sued duplicatively. See, e.g., Brouwer v. City of Manteca, No. 07-1362, 2008 WL 2825099, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2008). The Marysville Police Department is therefore dismissed with prejudice.
With respect to the federal claims, Elliott advances many of the same arguments as the Yuba County defendants. For the reasons described above,
Defendants.
To review, the complaint alleges Elliott met with Acevedo and her family and heard Acevedo relate her claims of physical and sexual abuse by Griesa. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 49-50. He saw sexual text messages from Griesa on Acevedo's phone, but nonetheless expressed his belief her claims would lead to no prosecution because the case would devolve into a credibility contest. Id. ¶¶ 35-36, 51. Elliott then called Griesa to tell him about Acevedo's allegations, gave Griesa citations to relevant Penal Code sections, and advised him to make no statement. Id. ¶ 52. Elliott also told Vasquez, Griesa's lawyer, about the charges he was investigating. Id. ¶ 53. After one of Acevedo's sisters called to alert him that Griesa had begun removing files from his office, Elliott refused to obtain a search warrant. Id. ¶ 56. The complaint alleges Elliott did this despite his belief that he had sufficient information to send the case to the district attorney's office. Id. ¶ 59.
Before Elliott filed any report, he heard about the civil settlement from Vasquez. Id. ¶ 60. Elliott told Vasquez this "might be a good resolution." Id. ¶ 61. Elliott also heard from Santana that Acevedo preferred a civil resolution and wanted to put the matter behind her. Id. ¶ 63. This was unsurprising to him because he understood victims of sexual assault prefer not to face their accusers or testify in court. Id. ¶ 64. At some point, Elliott also heard directly from Griesa that Griesa had agreed to pay $100,000, and Elliott told Griesa to seek a second opinion. Id. ¶ 76.
Santana and Vasquez allege Elliott supported Green's candidacy and did not want Santana to become a judge. Id. ¶¶ 83-85. The complaint alleges generally that Elliott was a part of a conspiracy against Santana, see id. ¶¶ 83-85, 88, but does not allege his presence at a meeting at which the alleged co-conspirators discussed their plan, see id. ¶ 87. The complaint alleges generally that Elliott fabricated evidence and withheld exonerating evidence, but does not specify Elliott's role in the part of the conspiracy that actually brought about the trial. See id. ¶ 105.
The complaint alleges conduct within the protections of section 821.6: actions undertaken by a public employee in the scope of his employment in preparation for a criminal prosecution. That section also applies to all the complaint's state law claims: malicious prosecution, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d at 487-88; Amylou R., 28 Cal. App. 4th at 1211; Johnson, 4 Cal. App. 3d at 86-87.
Santana and Vasquez's only argument to the contrary is that Marysville may be liable under California Government Code section 815.2(a). Marysville Opp'n at 18. That section provides, "A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative." Cal. Gov't Code § 815.2(a). But under the same section, "a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability." Id. § 815.2(b).
As to the City, based on the parties' stipulation, the state law claims are dismissed without leave to amend. As to Elliott, the same claims are dismissed with leave to amend if possible consonant with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
Judge Scrogin's motion is founded on three arguments. She challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against her, contends she is immune under the doctrine of judicial absolute immunity, and argues that even if the court were to reach the merits of the claims against her, the complaint states no claim upon which relief can be granted.
A federal court cannot adjudicate the merits of any claim over which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). Judge Scrogin argues both that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims against her and that this action is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
"Standing is the threshold issue of any federal action," Employers-Teamsters Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund v. Anchor Capital Advisors, 498 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir. 2007), and functions as a limitation on the court's judicial power, see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). The requirement of Article III standing imposes three specific constraints: (1) the plaintiff must suffer a concrete and particularized "injury in fact;" (2) the injury and conduct complained of must be causally connected, and the injury must be traceable to the defendant's challenged actions; and (3) the injury must be "likely" to be resolved by resolution favorable to the plaintiff. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). "The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements." Id. at 561. At this early stage, it is enough for the plaintiffs to allege these three elements are satisfied. See id.
Here, the complaint's allegations make out a case or controversy between and among Santana, Vasquez, and Scrogin. They allege she and the other defendants conspired to prosecute them and allege their reputations have been ruined. They allege Judge Scrogin participated in this conspiracy by, among other things, seating a grand jury to indict them. And they allege Judge Scrogin is civilly liable and must compensate them by paying money damages. Cases like Grant v. Johnson, 15 F.3d 146 (9th Cir. 1994), or In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1982), are distinguishable. In those cases, the plaintiffs lacked standing because they challenged laws the defendant judges had no role in passing and no ability to repeal. Here, in contrast, no statute's constitutionality is at issue and no judge is "adjudicating cases pursuant to state law." Grant, 15 F.3d at 147. The plaintiffs have standing.
Under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts have no jurisdiction over claims against states, state agents, and state instrumentalities. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997). Several years ago, the Ninth Circuit held,
Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). In addition, the Supreme Court has held that "an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. The court therefore concludes that to the extent the complaint alleges claims against Judge Scrogin in her official capacity, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to address them. See, e.g., Holland v. Andrews, No. 11-01733, 2011 WL 6838642, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2011) (dismissing official-capacity claims against a Los Angeles Superior Court judge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 6838640 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2011). The Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims against state officials in their personal capacity, however. See, e.g., Hafer, 502 U.S. at 31; Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. The court therefore turns to those claims.
"It is well settled that judges are generally immune from civil liability under section 1983." Meek v. Cnty. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (per curiam)). The Supreme Court has carefully guarded judicial immunity, reasoning that "a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871). A judge's errors should be corrected on appeal, not by subsequent civil litigation. In re Thomas, 508 F.3d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Civil liability, if imposed, "would contribute not to principled and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
Judicial immunity is not withdrawn for actions undertaken in bad faith or with malice. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. Neither does "grave procedural error[]" defeat judicial immunity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978). This immunity remains intact despite unfair, controversial, and callous decisions, see id. at 363-64, and applies even in the face of allegations the judge acted corruptly, Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554; see also Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) ("[A] conspiracy between judge and prosecutor to predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding, while clearly improper, nevertheless does not pierce the immunity extended to judges and prosecutors.").
Judicial immunity may be overcome in only two circumstances: first, when the plaintiff alleges damages arising from "actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity," and second, if the judge acted "in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12.
Here, Santana and Vasquez argue Judge Scrogin acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction. Opp'n Scrogin at 4. They cite the California Court of Appeal's decision in Santana's appeal, which set aside his indictment because it found the trial court had acted without "fundamental jurisdiction." See id.; Santana, 2012 WL 1777801, at *10. They argue the Court of Appeal's phrase, "without fundamental jurisdiction," is a synonym of "in clear absence of all jurisdiction," and therefore Judge Scrogin is not protected by judicial absolute immunity. Opp'n Scrogin Mot. at 4.
The phrase "without fundamental jurisdiction" has a specific meaning: "A court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense when it has no authority at all over the subject matter or the parties, or when it lacks any power to hear or determine the case." People v. Ford, 61 Cal.4th 282, 286 (2015) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The absence of fundamental jurisdiction is distinct from a second type of jurisdictional flaw: "When a trial court has fundamental jurisdiction but fails to act in the manner prescribed, it is said to have acted `in excess of its jurisdiction.'" Id. at 287. One difference between these jurisdictional faults is their effect on the resulting order or ruling. If a court lacks fundamental jurisdiction, its ruling is void, whereas a ruling in excess of jurisdiction is "valid until set aside." Id. at 286-87.
In Christie v. City of El Centro, the state court of appeal considered whether the disqualification of a judge deprived him of fundamental jurisdiction, such that any ruling by that judge is void. See 135 Cal.App.4th 767, 776-80 (2006). Although the court noted some uncertainty in the case law, it concluded that "the orders of disqualified judges are void and must be vacated." Id. at 779 (citing, inter alia, Giometti v. Etienne, 219 Cal. 687, 688-89 (1934) (per curiam)). It was for this holding that the Santana court cited Christie and quoted the phrase "without fundamental jurisdiction." See 2012 WL 1777801, at *10 & nn. 17-18.
This leaves the question of the relationship between an "absence of fundamental jurisdiction" under California law and a "clear" or "complete absence of all jurisdiction" under federal law. At first glance, the California Supreme Court's distinction between judicial actions undertaken without "fundamental jurisdiction" and actions taken "in excess of jurisdiction," see Ford, 61 Cal. 4th at 286-87, seems to parallel the difference the United States Supreme Court identifies between actions in "clear absence of all jurisdiction" and "in excess of [the judge's] authority," see Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 356-57 & n.7. For example, as noted above, the Ford court describes actions in excess of jurisdiction by explaining that although a judge may have fundamental jurisdiction, she may act outside her authority by ignoring limitations imposed by "the Constitution, a statute, or relevant case law." 61 Cal. 4th at 286-87. And the Bradley and Sparkman Courts drew a distinction between a probate judge who tries a criminal case and a judge of the criminal court who convicts a defendant of a nonexistent crime. See 435 U.S. at 357 n.7 (citing 80 U.S. at 352). If this analogy were to hold, then by acting without fundamental jurisdiction, Judge Scrogin would have acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction, and would not be protected by absolute judicial immunity.
Although the relationship between the "absence of fundamental jurisdiction" and the "clear absence of all jurisdiction" is facially plausible, on closer examination, the federal test proves more demanding. Two Ninth Circuit decisions show why. First, in Rosenthal v. Justices of the Supreme Court of California, the court considered whether a disbarred lawyer could bring claims against a justice of the California Supreme Court. 910 F.2d 561, 563-64 (9th Cir. 1990). The plaintiff argued the defendant justice was not protected by judicial absolute immunity because the justice had signed his name to an order after recusing himself earlier in the case. Id. at 565. The Ninth Circuit was unpersuaded, and reasoned that to the extent the justice erred by signing the later order, the error was harmless. Id. at 565-66. The Ninth Circuit recognized the order was void if the justice in fact should have recused himself, citing Giometti v. Etienne, supra. Id. at 565 (citing 219 Cal. at 688-89). As noted above, Giometti is the decision the Christie court relied on to hold, in 2006, that because a disqualified judge acts without fundamental jurisdiction, "the orders of disqualified judges are void and must be vacated." 135 Cal. App. 4th at 779. Yet in Rosenthal, the Ninth Circuit concluded, "A judge is immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for acts in excess of his jurisdiction, so long as the acts themselves were judicial." 910 F.2d at 565-66 (citing Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 355-57, and Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351). This reasoning suggests the lack of fundamental jurisdiction is not dispositive.
Second, in Sadoski v. Mosley, a former criminal defendant sued the state court judge who had sentenced her. 435 F.3d 1076, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2006). She argued the defendant judge had acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction because the state supreme court held on appeal that the defendant judge "did not have jurisdiction." Id. Again the Ninth Circuit was unpersuaded. It quoted Sparkman: "[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority . . . ." Id. at 1079 (quoting 435 U.S. at 356). Therefore the defendant judge was entitled to absolute immunity, and again, the lack of jurisdiction was not dispositive.
Very rarely are judges found to have acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction. This case does not fit any exception. For example, in Maestri v. Jutkofsky, a town justice exercised jurisdiction over a non-adjoining town in clear violation of state law. 860 F.2d 50, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1988). It was undisputed that the judge knew he lacked territorial jurisdiction. Id. at 53. The Second Circuit summarized, "For a judge to assume authority outside the geographic bounds of his office is the kind of clear judicial usurpation which cannot be condoned by any grant of immunity. No public policy would be served by granting immunity for such arrogant excesses of authority." Id.
Moreover, the core of Santana's and Vasquez's complaint concerns Judge Scrogin's alleged bias against Santana. See Compl. ¶¶ 98-107; Opp'n Scrogin Mot. at 4-7. In a virtual phalanx, federal courts have concluded that allegations of bias or a conflict of interest do not deprive a judge of absolute immunity.
Here, the motion is granted as to the federal claims against Judge Scrogin. However, because the complaint alleges in conclusory manner that Judge Scrogin also acted as investigator or prosecutor, see, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 84-86, the motion is granted with leave to add factual allegations showing Judge Scrogin's actions were nonjudicial, if possible under Rule 11.
The California Government Claims Act regulates claims against public entities. DiCampli-Mintz v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 55 Cal.4th 983, 989 (2012). If a person does not present a claim at the time and manner prescribed by that Act, he or she may not file a lawsuit against a California public entity. Id. at 989-90 (citing Cal. Gov't Code §§ 905, 911.2, and 945.4). "Even if the public entity has actual knowledge of facts that might support a claim, the claims statutes still must be satisfied." Id. at 990. The rule applies equally to actions litigated in federal court. Young v. City of Visalia, 687 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1152 (E.D. Cal. 2009). A federal court complaint must therefore include allegations that either demonstrate or excuse compliance with the Act, otherwise the complaint must be dismissed. Id.
California Government Code section 915(c) applies to claims against a "judicial branch entity." Cal. Gov't Code § 915(c); see also J. Council of Cal. v. Super. Ct., 229 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1095 (2014). That section provides that claims "against a superior court or a judge" must be delivered or mailed to "the court executive officer." Cal. Gov't Code § 915(c)(1). Under section 915(e), a claim is "deemed to have been presented in compliance with [section 915] even though it is not mailed or provided as in [that] section," if the claim is "actually received by the court executive officer, court clerk/administrator, court clerk, or secretariat of the judicial branch entity." Id. § 915(e)(4).
Here, Santana and Vasquez allege they "presented a written claim for damages with the State of California defendant, Yuba County Superior Court Judge Julia Scrogin, pursuant to California Government Code Section 910 et seq." Compl. ¶ 11. They do not allege compliance with section 915(c), i.e., presentation of a claim to the court executive officer. When Judge Scrogin identified this omission in her motion to dismiss, Santana and Vasquez responded, that "On October 22, 2014, plaintiffs presented their Notice of Claim to Scrogin by filing it with the Victims Compensation and Government Claims Board." Opp'n Scrogin at 19 (citing Compl. ¶ 11). They argue this was sufficient under Government Code section 915(e)(2). This fact does not appear in the complaint, and the court construes it as a request for leave to amend; however, amendment on this ground would be futile. The California Court of Appeal recently rejected an identical argument after a careful construction of section 915(e)(2), concluding that the legislature intended notice to be provided as described in section 915(e)(4). See J. Council, 229 Cal. App. 4th at 1096-97, 1100-01. Because amendment would not cure the presentation defect, the motion is granted with prejudice and without leave to amend as to the state-law claims.
Evans first challenges this court's subject matter jurisdiction, and second moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over all "civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. District courts also have subject matter jurisdiction over any civil action "authorized by law to be commenced by any person . . . [t]o recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Here, because the complaint alleges claims under § 1983 for violations of federal constitutional rights, the court has subject matter jurisdiction over those federal claims.
The complaint also alleges claims under state law, and the court must have subject matter jurisdiction over each. See Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 66 n.1 (1996). Evans argues that because he and the plaintiffs are all residents of California and because the complaint includes no federal claims against him, the court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against him. Evans Mot. Dismiss at 7-8. This argument overlooks the effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which provides that if this court has original jurisdiction over a particular civil action, it also has jurisdiction "over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action . . . that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A state law claim is part of the same case or controversy if it and the federal claim together "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact, such that the relationship between the federal claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional case." City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165 (1997) (citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted).
The state law claims against Evans are part of the same case or controversy as the federal claims against the other defendants. As summarized above, the complaint alleges Evans participated in the same conspiracy to prosecute Santana. He, like the other defendants, allegedly supported Green for the judicial appointment, disfavored Santana, and believed a criminal prosecution would undermine Santana's application. Santana and Vasquez allege he helped to plan the prosecution, fabricated evidence, and withheld exonerating evidence. The court therefore has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims against Evans under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
A district court may nevertheless decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim in four instances: "(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction." Id. § 1367(c). These four circumstances are the exclusive means by which a district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction. Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545, 1556 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Cal. Dep't of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008).
None of the exceptions listed in § 1367(c) applies to this case. The parties have identified no novel or complex questions of California law, the claims against Evans do not predominate, and the court has allowed the plaintiffs leave to amend. Finally, the court is aware of no compelling reason to decline jurisdiction, and the efficient resolution of this action will more likely be accomplished in this forum, as a whole. See also Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them").
Evans argues the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to support each of the claims against him, especially because the complaint alleges his involvement began only after the investigation was underway. See Evans Mot. at 9-11. Santana and Vasquez respond that (1) additional facts obtained after the complaint was filed show Evans was involved in this case before the investigation began; and (2) Evans is liable because he was part of a conspiracy to investigate and prosecute them. See Opp'n Evans at 12-14.
As to the first argument, on a motion to dismiss, the court does not consider evidence outside the complaint unless it is subject to judicial notice or can be incorporated by reference. These rules do not allow the court to consider the additional factual information Santana and Vasquez identify in their briefing in opposition to Evans's motion.
The second argument calls for closer inspection. A conspiracy indeed "renders each participant in the wrongful act responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrong[,] regardless of the degree of his activity." Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc., 131 Cal.App.4th 802, 823 (2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The elements of a claim for civil conspiracy under California law are (1) "the defendant had knowledge of and agreed to both the objective and the course of action that resulted in the injury"; (2) "there was a wrongful act committed pursuant to that agreement"; and (3) the plaintiffs sustained damages as a result. Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc., 131 Cal.App.4th 802, 823 (2005).
Evans argues conspiracy claims are uniformly subject to a "heightened pleading standard" in federal court. Reply at 2 (citing Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997); Burns v. Cnty. of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989); and Woodrum v. Woodward Cnty., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989)). This is incorrect. First, the cases cited do not support Evans's statement. Harris addressed the pleading standard in Bivens
Rather, in federal court, when a plaintiff alleges a defendant was party to a state-law civil conspiracy, Rule 9(b) raises the pleading standard when "the object of the alleged conspiracy is fraudulent." Wasco Prods., Inc. v. Southwall Techs., Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2006); accord Mintel Learning Tech., Inc. v. Beijing Kaidi Educ., No. 06-7541, 2007 WL 2288329, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2007) ("[I]t is true that courts have applied a heightened pleading standard to claims of civil conspiracy—but generally only with respect to claims of civil conspiracy to commit fraud."). Here, other than formulaic allegations the defendants "acted with fraud, oppression, and/or malice" unsupported by any factual allegation, see Compl. ¶¶ 33, 147, the complaint alleges no fraud or misrepresentation. Elsewhere the complaint makes clear the object of this alleged conspiracy was not to defraud Santana or Vasquez, but to smear Santana and to prevent his appointment. Rule 8, not Rule 9(b), therefore governs the complaint's allegations.
The complaint's factual allegations support a plausible claim of civil conspiracy. The complaint alleges Evans, a friend of the other defendants and supporter of Green's judicial appointment, met with the other defendants to "discuss[] the filing of unfounded criminal charges against Jesse Santana to scuttle his judicial appointment." Compl. ¶¶ 87, 91. He knew about the defendants' plan to fabricate charges against Santana and Vasquez and agreed with their goal. Id. ¶¶ 91-92. He took part in this plan by arranging for Griesa, his client, to waive his attorney-client privilege so that the conspirators could obtain Vasquez's files. Id. ¶ 95. It also appears beyond any reasonable dispute Evans testified as an expert before the grand jury that indicted Santana. See Santana v. Superior Court, 2012 WL 1777801 at *7. Evans's interpretation of these allegations as innocuous may be equally plausible, but the Ninth Circuit has held, "If there are two alternative explanations, one advanced by defendant and the other advanced by plaintiff, both of which are plausible, plaintiff's complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. Only if the "defendant's plausible alternative explanation is so convincing that plaintiff's explanation is implausible" will the complaint be dismissed. Id. (emphasis in original).
The complaint's allegations are sufficient at this stage to state a claim of civil conspiracy. This leaves the substantive viability of each state-law claim.
"To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the prior action (1) was initiated by or at the direction of the defendant and legally terminated in the plaintiff's favor, (2) was brought without probable cause, and (3) was initiated with malice." Siebel v. Mittlesteadt, 41 Cal.4th 735, 740 (2007). As noted above, because the complaint alleges the prosecution was part of a civil conspiracy, "[e]ach member of the conspiracy becomes liable for all acts done by others pursuant to the conspiracy, and for all damages caused thereby." Berg & Berg, 131 Cal. App. 4th at 823. Here, the first and third elements present no difficult questions: Santana's prosecution was the conspiracy's main event, the co-conspirators were the prosecutors and investigators, Santana and Vasquez were acquitted, and the prosecution's goal was to prevent Santana's judicial appointment.
Whether the defendants had probable cause is another matter.
Here, Santana and Vasquez allege the prosecution lacked probable cause because it was based on fabricated evidence wrongfully obtained. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 88. The complaint does not specify which evidence was fabricated or wrongfully obtained. In light of the complaint's other allegations, for example that the defendants knew Griesa had paid $50,000 and Acevedo had agreed not to testify against him, a conclusory allegation of fabricated evidence is insufficient to state a plausible claim. The motion is granted as to this claim.
The well-known elements of a negligence action are the defendant's duty, breach of that duty, proximate cause, and damages. See, e.g., Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal.4th 465, 477 (2001). For reasons similar to those described immediately above, the complaint does not plausibly allege the defendants breached any duty because an "obvious alternative explanation" for their alleged misconduct makes the complaint's theory implausible, see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567: the defendants had probable cause to believe Santana and Vasquez had committed bribery and had obstructed justice. They could not have breached any duty by prosecuting Santana and Vasquez for crimes supported by probable cause, even if the prosecution would also effectively lock in Green's judicial appointment. The motion is granted as to this claim.
A complaint states a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress when it alleges (1) the defendant's conduct was outrageous; (2) the defendant either intended to cause emotional distress or acted with reckless disregard to the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress; and (4) the defendant's conduct actually and proximately caused that emotional distress. Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church, 47 Cal.3d 278, 300 (1988). The defendant's conduct is sufficiently "outrageous" when it is "so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community." Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 209 (1982). Here, again, the complaint's allegations do not plausibly allege the defendants lacked probable cause to prosecute. The defendants did not act outside the bounds of all decency by advancing a cause they believed was supported by probable cause. The motion is granted as to this claim.
Each of the deficiencies noted in this section may be cured in an amended complaint; the motion is granted with leave to amend, if possible within the confines of Rule 11. But cf. Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b); Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation Corp., 137 Cal.App.4th 1, 5 (2006) (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 and Civil Code section 47(b) are construed similarly and broadly). Because the claims against Evans are dismissed with leave to amend, the court does not reach the viability of any hypothetical federal claims. These claims, if alleged in an amended pleading, are more properly tested in a later motion to dismiss. See, e.g., SAES Getters, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 1086.
1. The complaint is DISMISSED. Leave to amend is granted as follows:
2. The special motions to strike are GRANTED IN PART to the extent they are based on the legal deficiencies described in this order. To the extent the special motions to strike are based on factual deficiencies, however, the motions are DENIED IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
3. The Yuba County defendants' motion for a more definite statement is DENIED.
4. This order resolves ECF Nos. 8, 11, 15, 16, 19, and 20.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(f), (g).
