Filed: Aug. 05, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: Error: Bad annotation destination United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 04-1564 DATAMIZE, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PLUMTREE SOFTWARE, INC., Defendant-Appellee. Theodore Stevenson, III, McKool Smith, P.C., of Dallas, Texas, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief was Amber Hatfield Rovner, of Austin, Texas. Of counsel was Douglas A. Cawley, of Dallas, Texas. Michael B. Levin, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, of Palo Alto, California, argued for defendant-appell
Summary: Error: Bad annotation destination United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 04-1564 DATAMIZE, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PLUMTREE SOFTWARE, INC., Defendant-Appellee. Theodore Stevenson, III, McKool Smith, P.C., of Dallas, Texas, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief was Amber Hatfield Rovner, of Austin, Texas. Of counsel was Douglas A. Cawley, of Dallas, Texas. Michael B. Levin, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, of Palo Alto, California, argued for defendant-appelle..
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Error: Bad annotation destination
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
04-1564
DATAMIZE, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PLUMTREE SOFTWARE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Theodore Stevenson, III, McKool Smith, P.C., of Dallas, Texas, argued for
plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief was Amber Hatfield Rovner, of Austin, Texas.
Of counsel was Douglas A. Cawley, of Dallas, Texas.
Michael B. Levin, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, of Palo Alto, California,
argued for defendant-appellee. With him on the brief were Michael A. Ladra, David H.
Kramer, Christopher R. Parry, and Bart E. Volkmer.
Appealed from: United States District Court for the Northern District of California
Chief Judge Vaughn R. Walker
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
04-1564
DATAMIZE, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PLUMTREE SOFTWARE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________
DECIDED: August 5, 2005
__________________________
Before CLEVENGER, BRYSON, and PROST, Circuit Judges.
PROST, Circuit Judge.
Datamize, L.L.C. (“Datamize”) appeals from a decision of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California holding each claim of United States
Patent No. 6,014,137 (“the ’137 patent”) invalid as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2.
See Datamize, L.L.C. v. Plumtree Software, Inc., No. 3:02-CV-05693 VRW (N.D. Cal.
July 9, 2004). We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. The ’137 Patent and Related Prosecution History
The ’137 patent, entitled “Electronic Kiosk Authoring System,” discloses a
software program that allows a person to author user interfaces for electronic kiosks.
“The authoring system enables the user interface for each individual kiosk to be
customized quickly and easily within wide limits of variation, yet subject to constraints
adhering the resulting interface to good standards of aesthetics and user friendliness.”
’137 patent, Abstract; see also id. at col. 3, ll. 28-32.
The authoring system gives the system author a limited range of pre-defined
design choices for stylistic and functional elements appearing on the screens. Id. at col.
3, ll. 52-57. “[M]ajor aesthetic or functional design choices . . . as well as hierarchical
methods of retrieving information may be built into the system [while] taking into account
the considered opinions of aesthetic design specialists, database specialists, and
academic studies on public access kiosk systems and user preferences and problems.”
Id. at col. 3, ll. 57-64.
Claim 1, the ’137 patent’s only independent claim, recites:
1. In an electronic kiosk system having a plurality of interactive electronic
kiosks for displaying information provided by a plurality of information
providers, a method for defining custom interface screens customized for
individual kiosks of said plurality and operable to make different
assortments of said information available for display at different kiosks of
said plurality, said method comprising the steps of:
providing a master database of information from said plurality of
information providers, said master database referencing substantially
all information content from said providers to be displayed on any of
said plurality of kiosks;
providing a plurality of pre-defined interface screen element types, each
element type defining a form of element available for presentation on
said custom interface screens, wherein each said element type permits
limited variation in its on-screen characteristics in conformity with a
desired uniform and aesthetically pleasing look and feel for said
interface screens on all kiosks of said kiosk system,
each element type having a plurality of attributes associated therewith,
wherein each said element type and its associated attributes are
subject to pre-defined constraints providing element characteristics
in conformance with said uniform and aesthetically pleasing look and
feel for said interface screens, and
04-1564 2
wherein said plurality of pre-defined element types includes at least one
pre-defined window type, at least one pre-defined button type, and at
least one pre-defined multimedia type;
selecting a plurality of elements to be included in a custom interface
screen under construction, said plurality of elements being selected
from said plurality of pre-defined elements types, said plurality of
selected elements including at least one button type;
assigning values to the attributes associated with each of said selected
elements consistent with said pre-defined constraints, whereby the
aggregate layout of said plurality of selected elements on said interface
screen under construction will be aesthetically pleasing and functionally
operable for effective delivery of information to a kiosk user;
selecting from said master database an assortment of information content
deriving from selected ones of said information providers to define kiosk
information content for an individual kiosk of said kiosk system;
associating said kiosk information content with at least a portion of said
selected elements for said interface screen under construction; and
linking said at least one selected button type element to an action
facilitating the viewing of at least portions of said kiosk information
content by a kiosk user.
’137 patent, col. 20, l. 37-col. 21, l. 23 (emphases added). At issue in this appeal is the
definiteness of “aesthetically pleasing” as it is used in the context of claim 1 of the ’137
patent.
The “aesthetically pleasing” claim language was not discussed by the inventor or
the patent examiner during prosecution of the application that led to the ’137 patent.
The language was discussed, however, during prosecution of a continuation application
to the ’137 patent, which eventually issued as United States Patent No. 6,460,040 (“the
’040 patent”). The patent examiner reviewing the application leading to the ’040 patent
rejected a claim as being indefinite for using the phrase “aesthetically pleasing.” In
response to this rejection, the inventor argued that the phrase is definite, but ultimately
04-1564 3
deleted it, stating in part that it is “not intended to identify qualities separate and apart
from the remainder of this claim element” and is “superfluous and unnecessary.”
B. The District Court Proceedings
Datamize sued Plumtree Software, Inc. (“Plumtree”) for infringing the ’137 patent,
and Plumtree responded by moving for summary judgment on the ground that the ’137
patent is invalid for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. The district court granted
Plumtree’s motion, concluding that the ’137 patent’s only independent claim is indefinite
due to use of the phrase “aesthetically pleasing.”
The district court began its analysis of the definiteness of “aesthetically pleasing”
by referring to dictionary definitions of the words “aesthetic” and “pleasing.” The court
determined that the ordinary and customary meaning of the phrase is “having beauty
that gives pleasure or enjoyment” or, in other words, “beautiful,” a meaning the court
believed to be “quite subjective.” Next, the court turned “to determine whether the
patent’s specification provides an explicit definition of the term that clarifies or differs
from its ordinary dictionary meaning.” After reciting parts of the specification, the court
concluded that the specification does not limit the subjectivity of the phrase
“aesthetically pleasing.”
The district court then reviewed the prosecution history of the ’137 and ’040
patents. The court concluded that the prosecution history of the ’040 patent “does not
provide a more objective means of ascertaining the meaning of ‘aesthetically pleasing.’
In fact, the prosecution history suggests that the language has little meaning at all.”
The district court went on to compare the current case with several district court
and Federal Circuit opinions addressing indefiniteness. It concluded that three district
04-1564 4
court cases deal with terms that are similar to “aesthetically pleasing” in that they are all
terms “with very subjective ordinary meanings that are not sufficiently narrowed by the
patents in question.” See Mossman v. Broderbund Software, Inc., No. 98-71244-DT,
1999 WL 696007 (E.D. Mich. May 18, 1999) (“readily follow”); STX, Inc. v. Brine, Inc.,
37 F. Supp. 2d 740 (D. Md. 1999), aff’d,
211 F.3d 588 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“improved
handling and playing characteristics”); Semmler v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
990 F. Supp.
967 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (“considerable fuel savings”). On the other hand, the court
rejected a comparison with two of our cases, since in those cases the terms were either
“not controlled by individual subjective impressions” or “sufficiently well-defined by the
patent to make the meaning of the entire term readily discernable.” See All Dental
Prodx, L.L.C. v. Advantage Dental Prods., Inc.,
309 F.3d 774 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“original
unidentified mass”); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,
359 F.3d 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“surrender value protected investment credits”).
The district court next rejected proposed constructions of “aesthetically pleasing”
offered by Datamize, stating that “[t]he term ‘aesthetically pleasing’ must mean
something different from predefined constraints or limitations” since “predefined
constraints” are separate limitations in claim 1. Furthermore, the court stated that
“aesthetically pleasing” must be given meaning and cannot be read out of the claim.
The court also rejected the argument that “aesthetically pleasing” should be evaluated
from the system author’s viewpoint and that anyone else’s perception is irrelevant,
stating that “the court would be hard-pressed to construe a patent term so that it would
turn on the subjective beliefs of those individuals who will use the authoring tool.”
04-1564 5
Finally, the district court rejected expert testimony offered by Datamize for
various reasons: expert testimony is disfavored and cannot vary or contradict claim
language; the expert admitted that no objective measure of aesthetics is disclosed in
the specification or any of various references; the expert relied upon an article published
after the application for the ’137 patent was filed; and the article relied upon admitted
that no one knows how to measure aesthetic value and that some people doubt that it
can be measured.
Concluding that the phrase “aesthetically pleasing” in claim 1 is “hopelessly
indefinite,” the district court granted Plumtree’s motion for summary judgment of
invalidity. Since claim 1 is the ’137 patent’s sole independent claim, the court’s grant of
summary judgment of indefiniteness as to claim 1 invalidated each claim in the ’137
patent.
Datamize appeals the grant of summary judgment of invalidity for indefiniteness.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. High Concrete
Structures, Inc. v. New Enter. Stone & Lime Co., 377 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
“A determination of claim indefiniteness is a legal conclusion that is drawn from the
court’s performance of its duty as the construer of patent claims.” Personalized Media
Communications., L.L.C. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,
161 F.3d 696, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Thus, as with claim construction, we exercise de novo review over the conclusion that a
claim is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2.
Id.
04-1564 6
B. The Law of Indefiniteness
Every patent’s specification must “conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (2000). Because the claims perform the fundamental
function of delineating the scope of the invention, Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d
1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the purpose of the definiteness requirement is to ensure
that the claims delineate the scope of the invention using language that adequately
notifies the public of the patentee’s right to exclude, Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n,
341 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he statutory requirement of particularity and
distinctness in claims is met only when [the claims] clearly distinguish what is claimed
from what went before in the art and clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future
enterprise.” United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942). The
definiteness requirement, however, does not compel absolute clarity. Only claims “not
amenable to construction” or “insolubly ambiguous” are indefinite. See Novo Indus.,
L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp.,
350 F.3d 1348, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Honeywell
Int’l, 341
F.3d at 1338; Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States,
265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 2001). Thus, the definiteness of claim terms depends on whether those terms can
be given any reasonable meaning. Furthermore, a difficult issue of claim construction
does not ipso facto result in a holding of indefiniteness. Exxon Research &
Eng’g, 265
F.3d at 1375. “If the meaning of the claim is discernible, even though the task may be
formidable and the conclusion may be one over which reasonable persons will disagree,
we have held the claim sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on indefiniteness grounds.”
04-1564 7
Id. In this regard it is important to note that an issued patent is entitled to a statutory
presumption of validity. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000). “By finding claims indefinite only if
reasonable efforts at claim construction prove futile, we accord respect to the statutory
presumption of validity and we protect the inventive contribution of patentees, even
when the drafting of their patents has been less than ideal.” Exxon Research &
Eng’g,
265 F.3d at 1375 (citation omitted). In this way we also follow the requirement that clear
and convincing evidence be shown to invalidate a patent. See Budde v. Harley-
Davidson, Inc.,
250 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
In the face of an allegation of indefiniteness, general principles of claim
construction apply. See Oakley, Inc. v. Sunglass Hut Int’l, 316 F.3d 1331, 1340-41
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that a determination of definiteness “requires a construction of
the claims according to the familiar canons of claim construction”). Intrinsic evidence in
the form of the patent specification and file history should guide a court toward an
acceptable claim construction. Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 03-1269, -1286, slip op. at 10
(Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en banc). And while “we have emphasized the importance of
intrinsic evidence in claim construction, we have also authorized district courts to rely on
extrinsic evidence,” such as expert testimony.
Id. at 18. In construing claims, “what
matters is for the court to attach the appropriate weight to be assigned to those sources
in light of the statutes and policies that inform patent law.”
Id. at 31.
C. Analysis
With these principles in mind, we proceed to the question at hand: whether the
’137 patent’s use of “aesthetically pleasing” meets the standards articulated in our case
law concerning definiteness. We begin our analysis by noting our agreement with the
04-1564 8
district court’s understanding that the ordinary meaning of “aesthetically pleasing”
includes “having beauty that gives pleasure or enjoyment” or, in other words, “beautiful.”
We also recognize that the district court’s opinion presents a reasoned and detailed
analysis of both the intrinsic evidence, including the specification of the ’137 patent and
the prosecution history of the ’040 patent, and the extrinsic evidence in the form of
Datamize’s expert testimony. Datamize, however, argues that the district court erred by
considering the phrase “aesthetically pleasing” divorced from the context of claim 1.
Datamize is right to point out that the phrase “aesthetically pleasing” should be
considered in the context of claim 1. Claim construction involves reviewing the intrinsic
evidence of record, including the claim language itself. See Chimie, 402 F.3d at 1377;
Abbott Labs. v. Syntron Bioresearch, Inc.,
334 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(explaining that usage of disputed claim terms in the context of the claims as a whole
informs the proper construction of the terms).
“Aesthetically pleasing” is used three times in claim 1. The first use of
“aesthetically pleasing” relates to the look and feel of custom interface screens on
kiosks:
providing a plurality of pre-defined interface screen element types, each
element type defining a form of element available for presentation on
said custom interface screens, wherein each said element type permits
limited variation in its on-screen characteristics in conformity with a
desired uniform and aesthetically pleasing look and feel for said
interface screens on all kiosks of said kiosk system,
’137 patent, col. 20, ll. 50-57 (emphasis added). The second use relies on the first use
for antecedent basis and similarly relates to the look and feel of interface screens:
each element type having a plurality of attributes associated therewith,
wherein each said element type and its associated attributes are
subject to pre-defined constraints providing element characteristics in
04-1564 9
conformance with said uniform and aesthetically pleasing look and feel
for said interface screens,
Id. at col. 20, ll. 58-63 (emphasis added). The third use provides a slightly different
context, relating to the aggregate layout of elements on the interface screen:
assigning values to the attributes associated with each of said selected
elements consistent with said pre-defined constraints, whereby the
aggregate layout of said plurality of selected elements on said interface
screen under construction will be aesthetically pleasing and functionally
operable for effective delivery of information to a kiosk user;
Id. at col. 21, ll. 6-12 (emphasis added). Thus, in the context of claim 1, “aesthetically
pleasing” relates to the look and feel of custom interface screens on kiosks, and the
aggregate layout of elements on an interface screen is apparently one example or
aspect of the interface screens that may be “aesthetically pleasing.”
This context, while helpful in terms of identifying the components of the claimed
invention that must be “aesthetically pleasing,” does not suggest or provide any
meaningful definition for the phrase “aesthetically pleasing” itself. Merely understanding
that “aesthetically pleasing” relates to the look and feel of interface screens, or more
specifically to the aggregate layout of elements on interface screens, fails to provide
one of ordinary skill in the art with any way to determine whether an interface screen is
“aesthetically pleasing.”
Datamize, however, contends that when construed in the context of claim 1, the
phrase “aesthetically pleasing” applies to the process of defining a “desired” result and
not the actual result itself. Datamize believes a reasonable construction of
“aesthetically pleasing” in the context of the claims involves the intent, purpose, wish, or
goal of a person practicing the invention: that person simply must intend to create an
“aesthetically pleasing” interface screen; whether that person actually succeeds is
04-1564 10
irrelevant. In other words, Datamize suggests we adopt a construction of “aesthetically
pleasing” that only depends on the subjective opinion of a person selecting features to
be included on an interface screen. Indeed, Datamize argues that the district court
erred by requiring an objective definition for the phrase “aesthetically pleasing.” Citing
our decision in Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1575-76
(Fed. Cir. 1986), Datamize maintains that a claim term need not be subject to a single,
objective definition to be definite but rather may include a subjective element.
According to Datamize, subjective terms are permissible so long as one of ordinary skill
in the art would understand their scope. In this regard, Datamize, citing Seattle Box Co.
v. Industrial Crate & Packing, Inc.,
731 F.2d 818, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1984), implies that
“aesthetically pleasing” includes “words of degree” that are not fatally imprecise.
Datamize also contends that the existence of aesthetic constraints in a computer
program, as opposed to purely functional constraints, would be circumstantial evidence
of a person’s subjective “desire” to achieve an “aesthetically pleasing” look and feel for
an interface screen. Related to these arguments, Datamize believes that the person
practicing the invention is the “system creator,” defined by Datamize as the person who
creates the authoring software. According to Datamize, the appropriate inquiry would
focus on whether a system creator makes aesthetic choices to limit or constrain the
possible on-screen characteristics of screen elements since these choices would reflect
a subjective intent to create an “aesthetically pleasing” look and feel for an interface
screen.
Datamize’s proposed construction of “aesthetically pleasing” in the context of
claim 1 is not reasonable for several reasons. First and foremost, the plain meaning of
04-1564 11
the claim language requires that the look and feel of interface screens actually be
“aesthetically pleasing.” The first use of “aesthetically pleasing” in claim 1 clearly sets
forth two requirements for the look and feel of interface screens: the look and feel must
be (1) uniform and (2) “aesthetically pleasing.” That the uniform and “aesthetically
pleasing” look and feel must also be “desired” does not alter that fact.
Furthermore, in Orthokinetics we did not conclude, as Datamize suggests, that
the absence of an objective definition for a claim term does not render the phrase
indefinite. In that case we concluded that the phrase “so dimensioned” in the following
limitation is not indefinite: “wherein said front leg portion is so dimensioned as to be
insertable through the space between the doorframe of an automobile and one of the
seats thereof.” Orthokinetics, 806 F.2d at 1575. We noted that based on expert
testimony it was undisputed that one of ordinary skill in the art would easily have been
able to determine the appropriate dimensions that the claim language required.
Id. at
1576. One desiring to build and use the invention, a travel chair, “must measure the
space between the selected automobile’s doorframe and its seat and then dimension
the front legs of the travel chair so they will fit in that particular space in that particular
automobile.”
Id. The fact that the claims were intended to cover the use of the
invention with various types of automobiles made no difference; we concluded that the
phrase “so dimensioned” is as accurate as the subject matter permits since automobiles
are of various sizes.
Id. Thus, in Orthokinetics we recognized that an objective
definition encompassed by the claim term “so dimensioned” could be applied to
innumerable specific automobiles.
04-1564 12
In stark contrast to Orthokinetics, here Datamize has offered no objective
definition identifying a standard for determining when an interface screen is
“aesthetically pleasing.” In the absence of a workable objective standard, “aesthetically
pleasing” does not just include a subjective element, it is completely dependent on a
person’s subjective opinion. To the extent Datamize argues that such a construction of
“aesthetically pleasing” does not render the phrase indefinite, we disagree. The scope
of claim language cannot depend solely on the unrestrained, subjective opinion of a
particular individual purportedly practicing the invention. See Application of Musgrave,
431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (noting that “[a] step requiring the exercise of
subjective judgment without restriction might be objectionable as rendering a claim
indefinite”). Some objective standard must be provided in order to allow the public to
determine the scope of the claimed invention. Even if the relevant perspective is that of
the system creator, the identity of who makes aesthetic choices fails to provide any
direction regarding the relevant question of how to determine whether that person
succeeded in creating an “aesthetically pleasing” look and feel for interface screens. A
purely subjective construction of “aesthetically pleasing” would not notify the public of
the patentee’s right to exclude since the meaning of the claim language would depend
on the unpredictable vagaries of any one person’s opinion of the aesthetics of interface
screens. While beauty is in the eye of the beholder, a claim term, to be definite,
requires an objective anchor. Thus, even if we adopted a completely subjective
construction of “aesthetically pleasing,” this would still render the ’137 patent invalid.
Furthermore, “aesthetically pleasing” does not exactly compare to words of
degree such as “substantially equal to,” see Seattle Box Co., 731 F.2d at 826, “about,”
04-1564 13
see BJ Servs. Co. v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc.,
338 F.3d 1368, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir.
2003), or “substantial absence,” see Exxon Research &
Eng’g, 265 F.3d at 1380-81.
The language, however, invokes a similar analysis. “When a word of degree is used the
district court must determine whether the patent’s specification provides some standard
for measuring that degree.” Seattle Box
Co., 731 F.2d at 826. Similarly, when faced
with a purely subjective phrase like “aesthetically pleasing,” a court must determine
whether the patent’s specification supplies some standard for measuring the scope of
the phrase. Thus, we next consult the written description. See id.; see also
Chimie,
402 F.3d at 1377 (“‘When the claim language itself lacks sufficient clarity to ascertain
the scope of the claims,’ we look to the written description for guidance.” (quoting
Deering Precision Instruments, L.L.C. v. Vector Distribution Sys., Inc.,
347 F.3d 1314,
1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003))).
The inventor describes various advantages of his invention in the “Summary of
the Invention” section of the ’137 patent. Most relevant to the construction of
“aesthetically pleasing,” the inventor states:
The authoring system enables the user interface for each individual kiosk
to be customized quickly and easily within wide limits of variation, yet
subject to constraints adhering the resting [sic, resulting, see ’137 patent,
Abstract] interface to good standards of aesthetics and user
friendliness. . . . It is a further advantage of the present authoring system
that an individual using the authoring software to devise a kiosk interface
screen (that individual is referred to herein as a “system author”) is only
given a limited range of choices for stylistic and functional elements
appearing in the screen displays. In this way major aesthetic or functional
design choices such as button syles [sic] and sizes, window borders, color
combinations, and type fonts as well as hierarchical methods of retrieving
information may be built into the system taking into account the
considered opinions of aesthetic design specialists, database specialists,
and academic studies on public access kiosk systems and user
preferences and problems.
04-1564 14
’137 patent, col. 3, ll. 28-32; 52-64. Furthermore, in the “Detailed Description of
Illustrative Embodiments” section of the ’137 patent, the inventor, discussing a particular
embodiment of the invention, states:
A closer look at the structure of the screen layout of FIG. 2A is in order.
The buttons 21 have a fixed predefined size, which is chosen not only to
make them aesthetically pleasing in appearance, but also easy to use on
a touch screen by persons generally unpracticed with touch screen
operation. The button placement in FIG. 2A is generally fixed along two
adjacent edges. This is an aesthetic choice, but it is a choice that is forced
by the authoring software to assure that once an aesthetically and
functionally acceptable button size and layout has been chosen, it will be
maintained throughout all further screen layouts for all kiosks without
having to expend time and effort re-creating an acceptable button layout
anew for each kiosk. Other aesthetic button layouts may also be used, but
once a general button layout is devised, the software makes it available
for use in all kiosk interface screens. Considering that many many [sic]
screen layouts will generally have to be set up and then regularly revised,
limiting the system author’s freedom to devise new button patterns and
button styles greatly enhances the ease with which new kiosks may be
brought in operation and ensures that the button pattern will be
aesthetically and operationally acceptable. . . . The authoring system of
the present invention then allows each kiosk to be customized quickly and
easily while maintaining a high degree of variability in the screen layouts
without sacrificing aesthetic appearance.
’137 patent, col. 5, ll. 35-56.
In general, neither these statements nor any others in the written description set
forth an objective way to determine whether an interface screen is “aesthetically
pleasing.” The description of the advantages of the invention indicates that there are
“good standards of aesthetics,” which of course implies that there are also standards of
aesthetics that are “not good.” The inventor does not attempt to explain what
distinguishes the two, except to say that experts, specialists, and academics may have
views that are influential in determining what aesthetic standards are good. Some
statements indicate particular aspects of the screen that might affect whether the screen
04-1564 15
is “aesthetically pleasing”: button styles, sizes, and placements, window borders, color
combinations, and type fonts. There is no indication, however, other than by referring to
“the considered opinions of aesthetic design specialists, database specialists, and
academic studies on public access kiosk systems and user preferences and problems,”
how to determine what button styles, sizes, and placements, for example, are
“aesthetically pleasing.” Moreover, whatever the considered opinions of unnamed
people and studies say is altogether unclear.
And while the description of an embodiment provides examples of aesthetic
features of screen displays that can be controlled by the authoring system, it does not
explain what selection of these features would be “aesthetically pleasing.” Major
aesthetic choices apparently may include some aspect of button styles and sizes,
window borders, color combinations, and type fonts. The written description, however,
provides no guidance to a person making aesthetic choices such that their choices will
result in an “aesthetically pleasing” look and feel of an interface screen. For example,
the specification does not explain what factors a person should consider when selecting
a feature to include in the authoring system. Left unanswered are questions like: which
color combinations would be “aesthetically pleasing” and which would not? And more
generally, how does one determine whether a color combination is “aesthetically
pleasing”? Again, one skilled in the art reading the specification is left with the unhelpful
direction to consult the subjective opinions of aesthetic design specialists, database
specialists, and academic studies.
Simply put, the definition of “aesthetically pleasing” cannot depend on an
undefined standard. See Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1342 (finding indefinite claim requiring
04-1564 16
comparison to moving target since the patent failed to direct those of ordinary skill in the
art to a standard by which the appropriate comparison could be made). Reference to
undefined standards, regardless of whose views might influence the formation of those
standards, fails to provide any direction to one skilled in the art attempting to determine
the scope of the claimed invention. In short, the definition of “aesthetically pleasing”
cannot depend on the undefined views of unnamed persons, even if they are experts,
specialists, or academics. Thus, the written description does not provide any
reasonable, definite construction of “aesthetically pleasing.”
We must also analyze the prosecution history to determine whether it provides
any reasonable construction of “aesthetically pleasing.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582.
Since the ’040 patent is a continuation of the ’137 patent, the ’040 patent’s prosecution
history is relevant material that we should consider. See Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech
Sys., Inc.,
357 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (recognizing that “the prosecution
history of one patent is relevant to an understanding of the scope of a common term in a
second patent stemming from the same parent application”).
The attorney prosecuting the ’040 patent responded to a rejection for
indefiniteness of the phrase “aesthetically pleasing” by making the following statements:
In context “aesthetically pleasing look and feel” is that which is “desired,”
“chosen,” or “predetermined” for uniform appearance. It does not call for
the subjective application of some external standard of aesthetics.
The “aesthetically pleasing” language is not itself intended to imply
judgment on the relative artistic merits of the “look and feel.”
[O]ne practicing the invention can create an “aesthetically pleasing look
and feel” that is “desired” by that person and that is maintained as desired
on screens of the system.
04-1564 17
Whether the system creator’s sense of aesthetics complies with some
other standard of beauty or good taste is irrelevant to the claims.
[T]he “aesthetically pleasing” language is not intended to identify qualities
separate and apart from the remainder of this claim element. Accordingly,
the deleted language is superfluous and unnecessary to the claims.
These statements merely confirm the understanding derived from the context of the
claims and the specification: that the phrase “aesthetically pleasing” fails to delineate
the scope of the invention using language that adequately notifies the public of the
patentee’s right to exclude. By arguing that “aesthetically pleasing” does not depend on
any standard of aesthetics other than a purely subjective standard held by any person
who steps into the role of the system creator, the prosecuting attorney would eliminate
any objective meaning for the phrase “aesthetically pleasing.” As discussed, this would
be improper.
We next consult the extrinsic evidence in the record. See Frank’s Casing Crew &
Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR Techs., Ltd., 292 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Pall Corp.
v. Micron Separations, Inc.,
66 F.3d 1211, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“In construing the
claims we look to the language of the claims, the specification, and the prosecution
history. Extrinsic evidence may also be considered, if needed to assist in determining
the meaning or scope of technical terms in the claims.” (internal citation omitted)).
Datamize points to its expert, Jeremy Rosenblatt, who testified in a declaration
that persons of ordinary skill in the relevant art would recognize that “[t]he terms
‘aesthetic’ and ‘aesthetically pleasing’ in the patent serve to make it clear that the
motivation of limiting selection is to allow the system creator to enforce his/her will
regarding the ‘look and feel’ and aesthetic aspects rather than solely functionality.” The
expert also provided a list of what he denominated “generally accepted” parameters of
04-1564 18
design that contribute to a display getting high marks from users for being “aesthetically
pleasing.” The list included symmetry, consistency, predictability, simplicity, cleanliness,
and non-crowdedness. The expert concluded that in his opinion “one of ordinary skill in
the art of software development of kiosks and computer user interfaces would
understand the claims and be able to determine whether their own work was or was not
covered by the claims in question.”
The expert’s declaration attempts to identify parameters that one skilled in the art
might reference when attempting to determine whether an interface screen is
“aesthetically pleasing.” But the identification of parameters one might consider fails to
explain how the parameters should be evaluated or weighed to reach the conclusion
that an interface screen is “aesthetically pleasing.” And while indefiniteness does not
depend on the difficulty experienced by a particular person in comparing the claims with
the prior art or the claims with allegedly infringing products or acts, see SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1340-41 (Fed. Cir. 2005), even the
expert could not determine whether the look and feel of particular interface screens are
“aesthetically pleasing” using the parameters he specified, instead testifying that
whether an interface screen is “aesthetically pleasing” is a “multidimensional question”
that is “not amenable to a single-word answer.” The inability of the expert to use the
parameters he himself identified to determine whether an interface screen is
“aesthetically pleasing” militates against the reasonableness of those parameters as
delineating the metes and bounds of the invention.
Datamize also argues that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the
phrase “aesthetically pleasing” to distinguish aesthetic constraints from purely functional
04-1564 19
constraints. To support this argument, Datamize first points to the Supreme Court’s use
of the phrase “aesthetically pleasing”: “[t]o qualify for [design patent] protection, a
design must present an aesthetically pleasing appearance that is not dictated by
function alone, and must satisfy the other criteria of patentability.” Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989) (emphasis added). According to
Datamize, “[i]f the term ‘aesthetically pleasing’ is sufficiently definite for courts to apply
in determining whether something qualifies for design patent protection, then it is also
sufficiently definite for a trier of fact to apply in determining infringement.” Datamize
also points to Mr. Rosenblatt’s declaration, which it believes shows that one of ordinary
skill in the art would understand “aesthetically pleasing” to distinguish functionality from
aesthetics. Datamize maintains that infringement could be shown by looking to
constraints imposed by the system creator: aesthetic constraints, such as limitations in
terms of size and placement of on-screen elements, would be objective evidence of the
infringer’s “desire” to achieve a “uniform and aesthetically pleasing look and feel.”
We reject Datamize’s attempt to rely on an understanding of the phrase
“aesthetically pleasing” derived from design patent law. Use of the phrase “aesthetically
pleasing” in design patent law relates to the threshold question of patentability. See
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 148. A design patent protects a particular ornamental, or
“aesthetically pleasing” as opposed to functional, design.
Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 171).
In contrast, a utility patent protects “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,” 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2000), the scope of which is defined by the patent’s written claims, see Johnson &
Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co.,
285 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc)
04-1564 20
(“[C]laims define the scope of patent protection.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. In
light of this basic difference between design patent law and utility patent law, it is clear
that the understanding of “aesthetically pleasing” used in design patent law bears no
reasonable relationship to utility patent law generally. Furthermore, Datamize has not
pointed to any discussion in the ’137 patent indicating that “aesthetically pleasing”
means “aesthetic rather than functional” as opposed to its ordinary meaning of beautiful
in the context of this patent in particular. Thus, while creative, Datamize’s argument
fails.
We also reject Datamize’s more general argument, based on its expert’s
declaration, that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the phrase
“aesthetically pleasing” to distinguish aesthetic constraints from purely functional
constraints. Datamize’s argument, as well as its citation to its expert’s declaration,
improperly ignores the plain meaning of the claim language. Furthermore, its proposed
construction would improperly eliminate the word “pleasing” from the phrase
“aesthetically pleasing.” See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d
1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc.,
299 F.3d 1336,
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002). We would subvert the definiteness requirement if we allowed a
word to be eliminated from a phrase when the phrase cannot be given a reasonable
meaning except in the absence of that word. Furthermore, because the phrase
“aesthetically pleasing” does not simply distinguish aesthetic constraints from purely
functional constraints, Datamize’s argument, again based on its expert’s declaration,
that infringement could be shown by determining whether aesthetic constraints are
imposed by the system creator is irrelevant.
04-1564 21
Finally, additional cases cited by Datamize at oral argument fail to persuade us
that “aesthetically pleasing” can be given any reasonable meaning. Datamize points us
to Koito Manufacturing Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, L.L.C., 381 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
and Combined Systems, Inc. v. Defense Technology Corp. of America,
350 F.3d 1207
(Fed. Cir. 2003). According to Datamize, these cases confirm that intent may properly
form part of a phrase’s claim construction.
Datamize apparently references the second footnote of Koito Manufacturing,
which states:
The jury instruction stated that the “predetermined general direction”
means the “prevalent direction of flow determined before injection of the
liquid plastic into the mold.” (Emphasis added). The instruction thus
connotes an element of forethought and planning, which we note is a
logically essential part of the patent. The mold designer must be aware of
the flow direction that will result upon an injection of plastic so that he can
assure himself that the next flow direction will be different. We have held
that the construction of a patent term may require an actor to have
knowledge of certain facts. See Combined Sys., Inc. v. Def. Tech. Corp.
of Am., 350 F.3d 1207, 1211-14 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (construing “forming
folds” to require “the deliberate and systematic creation of folds”). In the
present case, Turn-Key chose to limit its claims with a scienter
requirement and thus was correctly required to demonstrate
foreknowledge of flow directions to prove infringement.
381 F.3d at 1150 n.2. This footnote identifies the unremarkable proposition that a
patent applicant may use claim language that requires a person to have foreknowledge
of certain facts when practicing the invention. Consistent with this proposition, claim 1
is not indefinite for using the term “desired,” which requires foreknowledge and even
intent on the part of the person practicing the invention. Neither would claim 1 be
indefinite if an “aesthetically pleasing” look and feel for an interface screen was
objectively verifiable. For example, the “general direction” construed in Koito
Manufacturing and the “folds” construed in Combined Systems can be objectively
04-1564 22
verified and do not depend on a particular person’s unfettered, subjective opinion. The
’137 patent, however, fails to provide any objective way to determine whether the look
and feel of an interface screen is “aesthetically pleasing.” As explained above, claim 1
is indefinite for this reason.∗
CONCLUSION
“Aesthetically pleasing,” as it is used in the only independent claim of the ’137
patent, fails to “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the
patentee regards as his invention.” See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. We therefore affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity of all claims of the ’137 patent.
AFFIRMED
∗
In both its opening and reply briefs, Datamize states that in SuperGuide
Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004), we affirmed the
district court’s construction of “desired format” and that that construction supports its
construction of “desired uniform and aesthetically pleasing look and feel” in the context
of claim 1. We disagree. In SuperGuide, the parties did not dispute the district court’s
construction of “desired format” and so we did not reinterpret the phrase, let alone affirm
the district court’s claim construction.
Id. at 883. We also did not address the
definiteness of the district court’s claim construction. See
id. Finally, unlike the present
case, the phrase at issue in SuperGuide did not involve any modifiers between the word
“desired” and the noun it modified, “format.”
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