Filed: Jan. 26, 2015
Latest Update: Jan. 26, 2015
Summary: ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE NATHANAEL M. COUSINS, Magistrate Judge. The Court recently ruled on Jaramillo's and defendants' in limine motions. Dkt. No. 107. In that order, the Court stated it would provide further explanation as to (1) Jaramillo's in limine motion concerning defense expert's testimony, and (2) defendant's in limine motion concerning issues decided at summary judgment. I. JARAMILLO'S IN LIMINE MOTION A. Motion in limine No. 1 : To exclude defense expert's testimony and report
Summary: ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE NATHANAEL M. COUSINS, Magistrate Judge. The Court recently ruled on Jaramillo's and defendants' in limine motions. Dkt. No. 107. In that order, the Court stated it would provide further explanation as to (1) Jaramillo's in limine motion concerning defense expert's testimony, and (2) defendant's in limine motion concerning issues decided at summary judgment. I. JARAMILLO'S IN LIMINE MOTION A. Motion in limine No. 1 : To exclude defense expert's testimony and report ..
More
ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE
NATHANAEL M. COUSINS, Magistrate Judge.
The Court recently ruled on Jaramillo's and defendants' in limine motions. Dkt. No. 107. In that order, the Court stated it would provide further explanation as to (1) Jaramillo's in limine motion concerning defense expert's testimony, and (2) defendant's in limine motion concerning issues decided at summary judgment.
I. JARAMILLO'S IN LIMINE MOTION
A. Motion in limine No. 1: To exclude defense expert's testimony and report
GRANTED IN PART. While a police practices expert may testify as to standard police procedures and training, the expert may not offer an opinion as to what conclusions the jury should reach. See Jones v. Devaney, 107 Fed. Appx. 709, 711 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that the "district court properly confined the testimony of plaintiffs' police practices expert to admissible evidence and to issues of fact") (citing Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., 299 F.3d 1053, 1066 n.10 (9th Cir. 2002) ("expert testimony concerning an ultimate issue is not per se improper," but "an expert witness cannot give an opinion as to her legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an ultimate issue of law")); see also Hangarter v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[I]nstructing the jury as to the applicable law is the distinct and exclusive province of the court.") (citations and quotation marks omitted).
In particular, "[i]n excessive force cases, an expert may not opine on whether the `Defendants' use of force was reasonable under the circumstances' as this `is just such an opinion on an ultimate issue of law that risks usurping the jury's province.'" Minter v. Galios, No. 12-cv-02905 JSC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36954, at *13-14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2014) (quoting Martinez v. Davis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15406, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2011)).
Here, defendants wish to have expert Jeffrey Martin testify, in part, that "the Officers acted reasonably and pursuant to training in the use of force to control and apprehend Plaintiff," and that "the knee strike [to Jaramillo] was a reasonable application of force in this case." Dkt. No. 104 at 2 (Joint Expert Witness List). As an expert on police practices, Martin can testify as to the standard police practices and training that govern City of San Mateo officers. But Martin cannot testify whether Officers Von Glahn, Leishman, and Montojo used reasonable force against Jaramillo. See Jimenez v. Sambrano, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67060, at *8-9 (S.D. Cal. July 31, 2009) (stating that "[w]hether Defendants' use of force was unreasonable or excessive is an ultimate issue of law in this case" and therefore the expert's "opinions in this regard are inadmissible").
Below are examples from Martin's expert report of proper and improper expert testimony:
Section Section or Excerpt Proper/Improper
3.A "[Officers Von Glahn, Leishman, and Montojo] acted Improper
upon the totality of the facts known to them at the time,
and acted reasonably in responding with force to overcome
Mr. Jaramillo's attempted flight and physically active
resistance to their lawful detention."
3.C "Officer Von Glahn's, Leishman's and Montojo's Proper
detention of Mr. Jaramillo was consistent with their
training as California peace officers . . ."
3.C ". . . and [the officers] reasonably believed Mr. Jaramillo Improper
had committed a violation of the California Vehicle
Code."
3.D "Officer Von Glahn's, Leishman's and Montojo's attempts Proper
to detain Mr. Jaramillo were consistent with their training
as California peace officers . . ."
3.D ". . . and [the officers] reasonably believed they had Improper
reasonable suspicion to [detain Mr. Jaramillo]."
3.E "Officer Von Glahn's, Montojo's and Leishman's attempts Proper
to place Mr. Jaramillo under arrest were consistent with
their training as California peace officers.
3.F "The officers were legally authorized to respond with force Improper
against Mr. Jaramillo in order to overcome his resistance
to their lawful detention and to control Mr. Jaramillo's
concealed left hand as it posed a serious threat to the
officers' safety."
3.F "California peace officers are trained to watch the hands of Proper
subjects with whom they are interacting, as it is the hands
that can hold weapons with which officers may be
assaulted."
3.F "Officer Von Glahn, Leishman and Montojo certainly Improper
could not take the gamble that Mr. Jaramillo was not
bringing a gun or edged weapon out of the pocket with his
left hand, because if Mr. Jaramillo were doing so, Officer
Von Glahn, Leishman, and Montojo would have probably
been attacked before Officers Von Glahn, Leishman, and
Montojo could have taken action to successfully defend
themselves or each other."
3.G "The officers provided proper care for Mr. Jaramillo after Improper —
the arrest by asking if he was injured and offering medical irrelevant, not an
attention." issue at trial
3.H "The officers' actions were in full conformance with the Improper as
polices of the San Mateo Police Department." irrelevant to the
extent opinion is
presented to
defeat Jaramillo's
Monell claim.
3.I "Peace officers may also use personal weapons to strike Proper
available targets during an arrest/detention to control a
combative and/or resistive subject, especially during
ground control encounters."
3.I "In the circumstances facing the officers and the difficulty Improper
both Officers Leishman and Montojo were having in
removing Mr. Jaramillo's left hand from the jacket pocket,
the use of the single knee strike to the left side of Mr.
Jaramillo's torso was a reasonable application of force."
II. DEFENDANTS' IN LIMINE MOTION
A. Motion in limine No. 1: To preclude Jaramillo from presenting on issues decided at summary judgment
GRANTED IN PART. The following chart identifies whether Jaramillo's causes of actions were decided at summary judgment.
Jaramillo's Claim Resolved/Not Resolved at Summary
Judgment
§ 1983 excessive force Not resolved
§ 1983 false imprisonment and false arrest Resolved in favor of defendants
§ 1983 claims based on other constitutional Not resolved
violations (e.g., Fourteenth Amendment)
§ 1983 claim against San Mateo (Monell) Resolved in favor of defendants
Assault and battery Not resolved
Intentional infliction of emotional distress Not resolved
Negligence Not resolved
Breach of Duty Resolved in favor of defendants
False arrest and imprisonment Resolved in favor of defendants
California Civil Code § 52.1 Not resolved
California Civil Code § 51.7 Resolved in favor of defendants
Here, defendants seek to exclude evidence or argument concerning issues that were resolved at summary judgment, as well as evidence or argument concerning issues that were not. The Court rules as follows:
Defendants Seek To: Ruling
(1) Exclude evidence that GRANTED with reservation. Jaramillo is not precluded
the officers lacked from presenting evidence describing the circumstances that
probable cause to make led up to the officers' contact with Jaramillo. See Bryan v.
contact with Jaramillo MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010) (considering
the "totality of the circumstances" in determining whether
officer used reasonable force)
(2) Exclude evidence that GRANTED. See Dkt. No. 80 at 17-18 ("[B]ecause the Court
the officers lacked concludes that there is no triable issue of fact over whether
probable cause to arrest probable cause existed to arrest Jaramillo under § 148,
Jaramillo summary judgment on the officers false arrest claim is
GRANTED.").
(3) Preclude plaintiff from DENIED. The Court did not find that Jaramillo did in fact
presenting evidence resist arrest; only that there was no triable issue over whether
over whether Jaramillo the officers had probable cause to arrest Jaramillo.
resisted arrest.
(4) Preclude plaintiff from GRANTED with reservation. See Dkt. No. 80 at 17 ("Von
presenting evidence Glahn's actions of identifying herself as an officer, flashing
over whether a her badge, and discussing traffic violations would lead a
reasonable person reasonable person to conclude that she indeed was a police
would have known officer."). The Court applied an objective standard in its
Office Von Glahn was analysis of Jaramillo's false arrest claim. But the Court's
an actual police officer. ruling does not prevent Jaramillo from presenting evidence as
to his own subjective thoughts over Von Glahn's identity.
(5) Exclude evidence that GRANTED. The Court granted the City's motion for
the City has a policy, summary judgment on Jaramillo's Monell claim.
custom or practice
which caused the
alleged injuries
(6) Exclude evidence that GRANTED. The Court granted the City's motion for
the City failed to summary judgment on Jaramillo's Monell claim.
properly discipline its
officers
(7) Exclude evidence that GRANTED. The Court granted the City's motion for
the City ratified the summary judgment on Jaramillo's Monell claim.
improper conduct of its
officers
(8) Exclude evidence that GRANTED. The Court granted the City's motion for
the City failed to summary judgment on Jaramillo's Monell claim.
adequately train and/or
supervise its officers
(9) Exclude evidence that GRANTED as to the City and DENIED as to the officers.
the officers and/or the The Court granted defendants' motion for summary
City breached a duty of judgment on Jaramillo's breach of duty claim against the
care under state law City, but denied defendants' motion as to Jaramillo's
negligence claim against the officers.
(10) Exclude evidence DENIED. The Court granted defendants' summary
that the officers' judgment motion as to Jaramillo's claim under § 51.7. Dkt.
conduct both before No. 80 at 27 (finding Jaramillo failed to present evidence,
and after Jaramillo's aside from his subjective belief, that officers were "motivated
arrest was motivated in by prejudice" because of Jaramillo's race or national origin).
any way by Jaramillo's But the Court's ruling does not preclude Jaramillo from
race/national origin. introducing evidence of racial animus that could go towards
supporting his other claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
