ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

SAMUEL CONTI, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Now before the Court is Plaintiff Thomas A. Gonda, Jr., M.D.'s motion for leave to a file a motion for reconsideration. ECF No. 98 ("Mot."). The Court finds it appropriate to rule on the motion without further briefing or a hearing pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-9(d). For the reasons set forth below, Dr. Gonda's motion is DENIED.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Civil Local Rules require a party to obtain leave of the court before moving for reconsideration. A party seeking reconsideration of an order must show that (1) a material difference in law or fact exists from that which was presented to the Court, and that the party applying for reconsideration could not have known such fact through the exercise of reasonable diligence at the time of the order; (2) new material facts or a change of law occurred after the issuance of the order; or (3) a manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order. Civ. L.R. 7-9(b).

"Indeed, `a motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.'" Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits the Court to relieve a party from an order for several reasons: "(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that by due diligence could not have been discovered before the court's decision; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) voiding of the judgment; (5) satisfaction of the judgment; (6) any other reason justifying relief." Shove v. Ayers, No. C08-2946 RMW (PR), 2009 WL 2605372, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). "To prevail upon a motion to reconsider, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the Court to reverse its prior decision." Walker v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 107 F.Supp.2d 1135, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2000).

III. DISCUSSION

Dr. Gonda seeks reconsideration of the Court's order granting Defendants leave to amend their answer to add an affirmative defense. See ECF No. 94. That order permitted Defendants to add an affirmative defense alleging that Dr. Gonda released his claims in this action when he signed a settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement") disposing of his wrongful termination lawsuit against Defendant The Permanente Medical Group ("TPMG"). The need for Defendants to plead the additional affirmative defense arose when Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which argued that Dr. Gonda had waived all claims against Defendants by signing the Settlement Agreement. See ECF Nos. 67 ("Defs. SJ Mot."), 84 (finding that Defendants were required to amend their answer before they could argue the affirmative defense).

The Court's order granting leave to amend was premised on a finding that Dr. Gonda would not suffer undue prejudice as a result of Defendants' amendment. Dr. Gonda had argued that allowing Defendants leave to amend their answer would prejudice him, because the amendment would require the Court either to postpone the hearing on cross motions for judgment or deny Dr. Gonda adequate time to conduct discovery. The Court found that Dr. Gonda had the opportunity to conduct discovery before the discovery deadline. In part, the finding of no prejudice was based on Defendants' representation to the Court that Dr. Gonda had failed to timely pursue discovery into the Settlement Agreement and that any need to conduct additional discovery after the discovery deadline would be prejudice of his own making. Specifically, Defendants argued that "[i]f Gonda needed additional time for discovery, he should have advised the Court in September of 2014 instead of sitting on his hands." ECF No. 85 ("Defs.' Supp. Br.") at 9.

Dr. Gonda argues that the Court failed to consider certain material facts. Dr. Gonda informed TPMG of his intent to depose its 30(b)(6) deponent regarding the Settlement Agreement on October 17, 2014. ECF No. 69-1 ("Higbee Decl.") ¶ 3. Then, on November 5, Dr. Gonda served a notice of deposition of TPMG relating to "all communications" regarding the drafting of the Settlement Agreement. See ECF No. 82 ("Defs.' Disc. Br.") at 1. Dr. Gonda noticed the deposition for November 13, 2014, about two weeks before the close of discovery.

None of these facts appear in Dr. Gonda's supplemental brief regarding Defendants' leave to amend their answer. See ECF No. 91 ("Pl.'s Supp. Br."). They appear in Defendants' counsel's declaration, which was attached to Defendants' motion for a protective order, filed on November 12, 2014. The Court terminated that motion without prejudice because Magistrate Judge Ryu is handling discovery issues in this case. See ECF No. 79. The Civil Local Rules require a party seeking leave to move for reconsideration to show that the Court failed to consider "material facts . . . which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order." Civ. L.R. 7-9(b). It is unclear whether the facts Dr. Gonda cites were "presented to the Court," as they were presented only in a motion that should have been filed before Judge Ryu, and not in any of the papers or exhibits related to the briefing on Defendants' leave to amend or the underlying summary judgment motion.

However, Defendant's presentation of the facts in their supplemental brief was at best disingenuous and misleading and at worst deliberately dishonest. The discovery cutoff in this case was December 1, 2014. Defendants suggested to the Court that any need for Dr. Gonda to conduct additional discovery after the deadline was his own fault because he had been "sitting on his hands" before the deadline. See Defs.' Supp. Br. at 9. The truth is that Dr. Gonda informed Defendants of his intention to conduct additional discovery on October 17, about five weeks after Defendants had informed Dr. Gonda that they intended to file a motion for summary judgment based on the Settlement Agreement, and about three weeks before Defendants actually filed that motion. Dr. Gonda noticed the deposition on November 5, one day before Defendants filed their motion. The need to conduct additional late discovery, therefore was not a result of Dr. Gonda's delay. Rather, the discovery delay was caused because Defendants refused to produce a witness for the deposition and instead filed their motion for a protective order on November 12. To suggest to the Court that the delay was of Dr. Gonda's making comes uncomfortably close to fraud by an adverse party — one of the reasons for relief specified in Rule 60(b).1

Under other circumstances, the Court might grant Dr. Gonda's motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration. However, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is still pending, and cross-motions for judgment are set to be heard on March 6. Additionally, even were the Court to grant Dr. Gonda's motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration, the Court would deny the motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the Court finds it appropriate to resolve this motion now, so that Defendants' motion for summary judgment may be decided before the March 6 date. Because the facts that Dr. Gonda presents would not alter the Court's ruling on Defendants' leave to amend, the Court DENIES the motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration.

For two reasons, the facts that the Dr. Gonda urges the Court to consider are not "of a strongly convincing nature to induce the Court to reverse its prior decision." Walker, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1138. First, the Court has concluded — for reasons that will be fully explained in the order on Defendants' motion for summary judgment — that the Settlement Agreement is integrated and its language is unambiguous. It is not susceptible to any reasonable interpretation that would permit Dr. Gonda's claims. Accordingly, the evidence that Dr. Gonda seeks through the deposition (communications regarding the "negotiations, drafting, review, analysis, interpretation and/or explanation of any of the terms of the settlement") would not be admissible to contradict the plain language of the Settlement Agreement. As a result, Dr. Gonda's additional discovery is unnecessary. In fact, the Court addresses a substantially identical issue in ruling on the summary judgment motion, as one of Dr. Gonda's arguments was that ruling on the summary judgment motion should be postponed until Dr. Gonda could conduct further discovery.

Second, "a finding of prejudice is not automatic but dependent upon a party's ability to articulate why a late amendment is prejudicial." Pineida v. Lee, No. 12-CV-01171-JST, 2014 WL 2927160, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2014) (emphasis in original). "The adverse party's burden of undertaking discovery, standing alone, does not suffice to warrant denial of a motion to amend a pleading." Id. (quoting U.S. ex rel Maritime Admin. v. Cont'l Illinois Nat'l. Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 889 F.2d 1248, 1255 (2d Cir. 1989)). Even if additional discovery were necessary in this case, a short postponement of the hearing date to permit Dr. Gonda to conduct a deposition would not constitute undue prejudice. The parties agreed to stay this case for almost two years during arbitration of Dr. Gonda's wrongful termination action and his administrative appeals. Dr. Gonda did not give any reason why a short delay to conduct another deposition would unduly prejudice him.

Thus the Court finds that, even if it had considered the facts that Dr. Gonda now presents, it would have permitted Defendants leave to amend. Because Dr. Gonda's "motion for reconsideration . . . would likely be futile if it were permitted, [Dr. Gonda's] motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration" is denied. Samet v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 5:12-CV-1891-PSG, 2014 WL 1782821, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2014).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Dr. Gonda's motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration is DENIED. It is not clear to the Court that Dr. Gonda has "cleared the high bar for leave to file a motion for reconsideration." Samet, 2014 WL 1782821, at *3. Even if he had, consideration of the facts that Dr. Gonda presents would not change the outcome.

IT IS SO ORDERED.