WILLIAM H. ORRICK, District Judge.
Petitioner Andre Scott seeks federal habeas relief from his state convictions because the trial court (1) failed to properly answer the jury's question and (2) used an invalid juvenile adjudication to enhance his sentence. While the trial judge should have answered the jury's question directly, as the California Court of Appeal noted, the error was harmless. And though the trial judge erroneously enhanced Scott's sentence by using an invalid juvenile adjudication, Scott's claim is moot because the California Court of Appeal modified Scott's judgment to strike the enhancements. For the reasons set forth below, the petition for habeas relief is DENIED.
In April, 2007, Scott and Larry Douglas, who were both pimps, shot at two persons as punishment for their failure to pay the prostitutes Scott and Douglas sent to them. Roommates Muhamad Sagier and Jason Wilson asked two women at separate times to come to their apartment for sexual services. Each woman left without providing any such services. They were not paid. Scott and Douglas later came to the apartment armed. They chased after Sagier, who attempted to barricade himself in his bedroom, and kicked down the door:
(Id. at 18.) The police recovered three .22 caliber shell casings and five .40 caliber shell casings from the apartment. (Id. at 3-5.)
In 2010, a Santa Clara County Superior Court jury convicted Scott of two counts of attempted murder and found true an allegation that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation in the commission of the attempted murders. (Ans., Ex. 4 at 1.) Scott admitted at trial to a prior juvenile adjudication, which the trial court counted as a strike conviction to enhance Scott's sentence by ten years under California's Three Strikes law (Cal. Penal Code section 667(a)). (Ans., Ex. 4 at 1-2 (State Appellate Opinion, People v. Scott, et al., No. H035845, 2012 WL 2343268 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 20, 2012) (unpublished).) He received a sentence of 40 years-to-life in state prison.
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal reduced Scott's sentence to 30 years-to-life. Other than achieving this sentence reduction, Scott's attempts to overturn his convictions and sentences through the state courts were unsuccessful. This federal habeas petition followed.
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), this Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
"Under the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000).
"Under the `unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409.
When presented with a state court decision that is unaccompanied by a rationale for its conclusions, a federal court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state-court decision is objectively reasonable. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). This "[i]ndependent review is not a de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which [a federal court] can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable." See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). "[W]here a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784 (2011).
Scott claims that the trial court's response to the jury question about the attempted murder counts violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Pet. at 1.) The state appellate court summarized the facts as follows:
(Id. at 10-15.)
The state appellate court rejected Scott's claim because, while the trial court's response was in error, there was no prejudice:
(Id. at 17-19.)
To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that the disputed instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). The instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Id. In other words, a federal habeas court must evaluate the jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)).
A trial judge has wide discretion in charging the jury, a discretion which carries over to the judge's response to a question from the jury. Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 2003). Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987). It is "presumed that the jury fully understood the judge's answer and appropriately applied the jury instructions," if the jury does not ask a follow up question after a trial court has directed the jury's attention to the constitutionally adequate instruction that answers its question. Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 196 (2009).
Habeas relief is not warranted because the state appellate court reasonably rejected the claim that the trial court's response rendered Scott's trial fundamentally unfair or violated his Sixth Amendment rights. While the trial court should have said "no" to the jury's question, the trial court gave the jury the correct instructions before deliberations and guided the jurors back to those correct instructions in his response to their question. This Court must presume that the jury understood the trial court's instruction and applied the correct standard. Marsh, 481 U.S. at 206; Sarausad, 555 U.S. at 196.
As the state appellate court reasonably determined, there was no prejudice. The trial court directed the jury to the original instructions, which accurately stated the law. They were not misinformed or misled. The jury found true an allegation that Scott acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation in the commission of the attempted murders, the correct standard for attempted murder. And there was very strong evidence that Scott intended to kill. He and Douglas came to Sagier and Wilson's apartment armed. They shot at the unarmed Sagier at least five times, injuring him. Then they pursued Wilson and shot him. The state appellate court's decision was reasonable and therefore is entitled to AEDPA deference. This claim is DENIED.
At trial, Scott admitted that in 1997, when he was 16, he was found guilty at a juvenile proceeding of robbery. (Ans., Ex. 7, Vol. 18 at 3636-3638.)
Scott claims that the trial court's use of his juvenile conviction to calculate his sentence violated his right to due process for the same reasons defense counsel raised in court. (Pet. at 1.) This claim is moot. The state appellate court concluded that a juvenile conviction does not qualify as a strike conviction under section 667(a), and in consequence Scott's sentence was adjusted downward by 10 years, the same number of years imposed because of the putative strike. (Ans., Ex. 4 at 28, 30.) Because Scott's sentence has been modified, there is no relief that this Court can give on his claim.
The state court's adjudication of Scott's claims did not result in decisions that were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor did they result in decisions that were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the petition is DENIED.
A certificate of appealability will not issue. Reasonable jurists would not "find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Scott may seek a certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit.
The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.
