Filed: May 28, 2015
Latest Update: May 28, 2015
Summary: STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER EXCLUDING TIME FROM OTHERWISE APPLICATION SPEEDY TRIAL ACT CALCULATION & REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE OF STATUS CONFERENCE JON S. TIGAR , District Judge . STIPULATION IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by the parties, through undersigned counsel, that: 1. The parties appeared before the Court on May 8, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. for a status hearing. Mr. Smith was present and represented by Deputy Public Defender Joyce Leavitt. Assistant United States Attorney Sarah Hawkins app
Summary: STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER EXCLUDING TIME FROM OTHERWISE APPLICATION SPEEDY TRIAL ACT CALCULATION & REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE OF STATUS CONFERENCE JON S. TIGAR , District Judge . STIPULATION IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by the parties, through undersigned counsel, that: 1. The parties appeared before the Court on May 8, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. for a status hearing. Mr. Smith was present and represented by Deputy Public Defender Joyce Leavitt. Assistant United States Attorney Sarah Hawkins appe..
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STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER EXCLUDING TIME FROM OTHERWISE APPLICATION SPEEDY TRIAL ACT CALCULATION & REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE OF STATUS CONFERENCE
JON S. TIGAR, District Judge.
STIPULATION
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by the parties, through undersigned counsel, that:
1. The parties appeared before the Court on May 8, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. for a status hearing. Mr. Smith was present and represented by Deputy Public Defender Joyce Leavitt. Assistant United States Attorney Sarah Hawkins appeared for the Government. The parties requested a continuance of the matter, with time excluded for effective preparation of counsel.
2. Accordingly, with the parties' agreement as to the new date, the Court scheduled another status hearing for June 5, 2015, 9:30 a.m., with the understanding that the parties would submit a Stipulation and Proposed Order excluding time.
3. The parties now formalize their request for exclusion of time in this matter and respectfully submit and agree that the period from May 8, 2015 through and including June 5, 2015 should be excluded from the otherwise applicable Speedy Trial Act computation because the continuance is necessary for effective preparation of counsel, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
4. The parties concur that granting the exclusion would allow the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation of counsel and continuity of counsel. See 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). The parties also agree that the ends of justice served by granting such an exclusion of time for the purposes of effective preparation of counsel outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
[PROPOSED] ORDER
Based upon the above-described Stipulation, THE COURT FINDS THAT the ends of justice served by granting a continuance from May 8, 2015 through and including June 5, 2015 outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, and that failure to grant such a continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
Accordingly, THE COURT ORDERS THAT the period from May 8, 2015 through and including June 5, 2015 is excluded from the otherwise applicable Speedy Trial Act computation, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
