ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (Docket No. 25)

EDWARD M. CHEN, District Judge.

On June 4, 2015, Plaintiff Nick Miletak filed a pro se motion to set aside a settlement agreement1 he reached in 2013 with Defendant AT&T Services to resolve this litigation, and asks this Court to set this action for trial. Docket No. 25 (Motion). Miletak brings the instant motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) and 60(d)(3). See id. The motion is wholly without merit and is therefore DENIED. The hearing on Miletak's motion, currently scheduled for July 16, 2015, is accordingly VACATED.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) provides that the Court "may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment" due to "fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) (emphasis added). Here, Miletak's Rule 60(b)(3) motion fails for at least two fundamental reasons. First, Miletak admits in his motion that his opponent, Defendant AT&T Services, did not commit any fraud. See Motion at 2 ("This motion in no way attempts to suggest wrongdoing by the Defendant or its counsel. Plaintiff believes that at all times during litigation the Defendant and its counsel acted ethically and negotiated in good faith."). Rather, Miletak claims that his own attorney defrauded him by failing to disclose that he did not have professional liability insurance and by refusing to immediately withdraw from representing Miletak upon Miletak's request. Even if this conduct could be called fraudulent, Miletak's attorney is not an "opposing party," and thus Miletak is not eligible for relief under Rule 60(b)(3). See Chang v. Rockridge Manor Condominium, No. C-07-4005 EMC, 2010 WL 3063185, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2010) (Chen, J.) (recognizing that "Rule 60(b)(3) concerns misconduct by an opposing party only"). In any event, Miletak's motion is untimely. Rule 60(c)(1) provides that any motion for relief from final judgment brought under Rule 60(b)(3) must be brought "no more than a year after the entry of the judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Here, Miletak's motion was filed more than one year after the entry of final judgment in this case. Thus, his Rule 60(b)(3) motion is without merit. See Chang, 2010 WL 3063185, at *4 (finding Rule 60 motion time barred because of failure to comply with Rule 60(c)(1)'s one year rule).

Miletak's motion under Rule 60(d)(3) is similarly without merit. Rule 60(d)(3) gives the court power to "set aside a judgment for fraud on the court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3). As this Court has previously explained, "`fraud on the court' is read narrowly to mean `only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication.'" Chang, 2010 WL 3063185, at *4 (quoting Appling v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir. 2003)). Such fraud "must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Chang, 2010 WL 3063185, at *4 (citing England v. Doyle, 281 F.2d 304, 309-10 (9th Cir. 1960)). Miletak has presented no such evidence of fraud on the court, nor could he. The claimed fraud was perpetrated by his attorney against him, and has nothing to do with the "integrity of the judicial process itself." Id. at *4.

This order disposes of Docket No. 25.

IT IS SO ORDERED.