ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

(Re: Docket No. 30)

PAUL S. GREWAL, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Jenna Coffey, individually and on behalf of similarly situated Plaintiffs, moves for reconsideration of her unjust enrichment/quasi-contract claim. Because the Ninth Circuit recently decided that the duplicative nature of an unjust enrichment/quasi-contract claim is not a valid reason to dismiss it, the court GRANTS Coffey's motion.1

I.

"Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law. There may also be other, highly unusual, circumstances warranting reconsideration."2

In August 2013, the court dismissed Plaintiffs' claim for restitution based on unjust enrichment/quasi-contract.3 The court specifically held that because "Plaintiffs' quasi-contract theory rests on the same allegations already covered by their other claims, which also provide for restitution as a remedy, the claim is `merely duplicative of statutory or tort claims' and must be dismissed."4

Coffey requests reconsideration on the grounds that Astiana "requires that [she] be allowed to pursue a claim for unjust enrichment."5

II.

This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The parties further consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).6

As a preliminary matter, while Nestlé may be right that Coffey was dilatory in bringing this motion, its contention that Coffey "relinquished and waived" her unjust enrichment claim is insufficient.7 This court has broad discretion to reconsider and revise its prior orders.8

Nestlé also argues that Coffey's motion should be denied because "the `unjust enrichment' claim [she is] trying to assert is not for restitution" but only for nonrestitutionary disgorgement9— an entirely new claim. Since Astiana denied dismissal of a claim for restitution but did not discuss nonrestitutionary disgorgement, Nestlé asserts that the Ninth Circuit's decision is "entirely beside the point of what [Coffey] seek[s] in [her] motion[] for reconsideration."10 Nestlé's argument is unfounded. Coffey explicitly requests reconsideration of her original unjust enrichment/quasi-contract claim before she discusses nonrestitutionary disgorgement as a remedy.11 Coffey's claim for restitution is appropriately before the court in a request for reconsideration.

III.

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Astiana is "an intervening change in controlling law" and therefore presents a valid basis for reconsideration.12

First, Astiana settled the long-standing question of whether a court may dismiss a claim for unjust enrichment as merely duplicative of other statutory or tort claims.13 Astiana involved a putative class action suit in which Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant falsely labeled its cosmetic products as "All Natural."14 Plaintiffs claimed that such false labeling deceived customers into buying those products and unjustly enriched Defendant as a result.15 The complaint sought damages under California's Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising Law and under a quasi-contract theory.16 Before the class-certification stage, the district court dismissed the quasi-contract claim, "concluding that restitution `[was] not a standalone cause of action in California and [that the claim was] nonsensical as pled in any event.'"17 The Ninth Circuit agreed that unjust enrichment did not constitute a standalone cause of action in California.18 However, it confirmed that "[w]hen a plaintiff alleges unjust enrichment, a court may `construe the cause of action as a quasi-contract claim seeking restitution.'"19 Accordingly, the court found that Plaintiffs' allegations were "sufficient to state a quasi-contract cause of action."20 The court then held that "[t]o the extent the district court concluded that the [claim] was nonsensical because it was duplicative of or superfluous to [Plaintiffs'] other claims, this [was] not grounds for dismissal."21

The unambiguous holding in Astiana requires this court to side with Coffey and reinstate her claim for restitution based on unjust enrichment/quasi-contract.22 Coffey's amended complaint alleged that "Defendant sold Misbranded Food Products to Plaintiffs" and that "[a]s a result of Defendant's fraudulent and misleading labeling . . . Defendant was enriched at the expense of Plaintiffs and the class."23 This allegation is sufficient to state a quasi-contract cause of action. "That the claim may be duplicative of Plaintiff's statutory claims under the UCL, FAL, and [California Consumer Legal Remedies Act] is not a proper ground for dismissal at this stage of the litigation, particularly as Plaintiff seeks to represent a nationwide class on her claim for quasi-contract."24

Second, Nestlé's reliance on Lanovaz v. Twinings North America25 to support its opposition is misplaced because the facts and posture of that case are distinguishable to those here. In Lanovaz, Plaintiff also sought reconsideration of her unjust enrichment claim, which had been dismissed as "duplicative of her consumer protection claims" under the UCL, FAL and CLRA.26 But Lanovaz filed her motion for reconsideration after the court had "denied certification of a damages class based upon [her] consumer protection claims."27 Lanovaz's motion for reconsideration further sought damages in the form of restitutionary disgorgement, a remedy also available under her UCL claim.28 Yet, Lanovaz had not pursued this remedy in her prior motion for class certification (which, as mentioned above, was ultimately denied).29 The court thus determined that Lanovaz's use of the unjust enrichment claim was an improper "vehicle for belatedly obtaining a second bite at class certification."30 In other words, Lanovaz "could have sought certification of a damages class equivalent to a damages class based upon an unjust enrichment claim" but chose not to do so.31 She therefore could not "seek class certification of a damages class under an unjust enrichment claim in light of the court's prior Certification Order."32 "[T]o the extent [the] dismissal was in error in light of Astiana, [it] did not limit the remedies plaintiff could have sought at the class certification stage."33 The court essentially denied the motion by reason of harmless error.34

This is not the case here. Coffey has not yet presented the court with a motion for class certification.35 Reinstating Coffey's quasi-contract claim will not give her another bite at obtaining class certification or otherwise unreasonably prejudice Nestlé in any way.

Third, to be clear, the court reinstates Coffey's claim for restitution based on unjust enrichment/quasi-contract as pled in the amended complaint,36 but does not grant Coffey leave to seek damages in the form of nonrestitutionary disgorgement.

Coffey may not seek damages in the form of nonrestitutionary disgorgement for two reasons. First, "[a] motion for reconsideration `may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.'"37 Coffey's amended complaint did not discuss nonrestitutionary disgorgement as a remedy for quasi-contract, and the two cases on which Coffey primarily relies to support her argument for nonrestitutionary disgorgement summarize precedent that predated the court's August 2013 dismissal of Coffey's quasi-contract claim.38 As such, Coffey could have reasonably raised an argument for nonrestitutionary disgorgement earlier in this litigation, but chose not to do so. She cannot use a motion for reconsideration to raise that argument now.

Second, nonrestitutionary disgorgement is not the appropriate remedy for a quasi-contract claim based on alleged mislabeling of a consumer product.39 Coffey cites a number of cases to support her argument that she can pursue nonrestitutionary disgorgement under a quasi-contract theory. But none of those cases address that remedy in the context of a product mislabeling claim.40 The nonrestitutionary disgorgement remedy which Coffey seeks would require Nestlé "to surrender . . . all profits earned as a result of [the alleged] unfair business practice regardless of whether those profits represent money taken directly from persons who were victims of the unfair practice."41 Yet, Coffey's amended complaint specifically sought restitution, "a remedy whose purpose is `to restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds in which he or she has an ownership interest.'"42 "The proper measure of restitution in a mislabeling case is the amount necessary to compensate the purchaser for the difference between a product as labeled and the product as received," not the full purchase price or all profits.43 "There is no reason to go beyond the price premium, and doing so would result in a windfall to plaintiff."44

IV.

Coffey's motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. As discussed above, Coffey may amend her complaint to include a claim for restitution based on unjust enrichment/quasi-contract, but may not include a claim for damages in the form of nonrestitutionary disgorgement.

SO ORDERED.