ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY PENDING RESOLUTION OF INTER PARTES REVIEW

(Re: Docket Nos. 79, 95, 124, 126, 162, 165, 171, 134.

PAUL S. GREWAL, District Judge.

Part of the quid pro quo of any stay pending inter partes review before the Patent Office is the promise of simplification. Not a guarantee, to be sure, but at least a promise that in exchange for freezing a case on the court's docket, significant issues may go away for good. Where the IPR will address some, but not all, claims asserted in the district court, relative to the quo the value of the quid shrinks considerably.

Defendants HTC America, Inc., HTC Corporation, AT&T Mobility LLC, Cellco Partnership, Sprint Spectrum L.P., Kyocera Corporation, Boost Mobile, T-Mobile USA, Inc. and ZTE (USA), Inc. seek a stay pending resolution of an inter partes review now before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.1 Plaintiff Adaptix Inc. opposes. Because the court is not convinced that a stay would enhance efficiency in a case where only certain claims are in review proceedings, the motion is DENIED.

I.

A stay is an "intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review, and accordingly is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result to the appellant."2 "There is no per se rule that patent cases should be stayed pending reexamination, because such a rule `would invite parties to unilaterally derail' litigation."3 "A court is under no obligation to delay its own proceedings by yielding to ongoing PTO patent reexaminations, regardless of their relevancy to infringement claims which the court must analyze."4

Adaptix filed these relates suits for infringement of United States Patent Nos. 7,454,212 and 6,947,748. On November 26, 2014, Kyocera filed petitions for IPR as to both patents.5 Defendants moved for a stay in mid-March, and the parties appeared for oral argument in late April.6 On June 10, 2015, the PTAB instituted IPR on claims 8, 9, 21 and 22 of the `7487 but denied institution of IPR on claims 1, 8-13, 15, 18, 19 and 23-29 of the '212 patent.8

II.

This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338. The parties further consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

III.

"Courts have inherent power to manage their dockets and stay proceedings, including the authority to order a stay pending conclusion of PTO reexamination."9 "In determining whether to grant a stay pending PTO review, courts consider: (1) whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set; (2) whether a stay will simplify the issues in question and trial of the case; and (3) whether a stay would unduly prejudice or present a clear tactical disadvantage to the non-moving party."10 Applying these standards to the situation at hand, the court is not persuaded that a stay makes sense.

First, discovery in this set of cases is advanced. Courts in this district have routinely refused to grant a stay pending IPR where a case is past the early stages of proceedings.11 While the range of what qualifies as "early stage" is relative, there is a general consensus that where "the parties have fully briefed the issue of claim construction, attended a Markman hearing, and received a claim construction order," discovery is well underway such to counsel against granting a stay.12 And there is no colorable claim that these cases are any different.13 Here, a trial date is set for August 2016, the court has construed claims not once, not twice, but three times, the parties have exchanged voluminous document productions—in the Wave 1 cases at the very least—and fact discovery is set to close in just over a month.14 With the trial date just under a year away, these cases have already reached an advanced stage, and this court has put significant work into getting these cases this far. This all weighs against granting a stay.

Second, it seems unlikely that the PTAB's review will simplify the issues in these cases enough to justify granting a stay. Sure, "waiting for the outcome of the reexamination could eliminate the need for trial if the claims are cancelled or, if the claims survive, facilitate trial by providing the court with expert opinion of the PTO and clarifying the scope of the claims."15 But here, the PTAB only instituted IPR in Kyocera's petition as to the `748 patent, which only encompasses four claims. By contrast, the PTAB denied Kyocera's petition as to all 17 claims challenged in the `212 patent. With fewer than 25 percent of the claims at issue subject to inter partes review,16 the overall effect of any PTAB decision—whether it cancels all or some claims, amends all or some claims, or allows all or some claims to survive—will be minimal relative to the number of claims not under review.17 This also weighs against granting a stay.18

Third, other than delayed gratification, Adaptix cannot show that "a stay would [cause undue] prejudice or present a clear tactical disadvantage."19 "Mere delay in the litigation does not establish undue prejudice."20 Rather, courts decline to find undue prejudice where the parties are not direct competitors and where any resulting prejudice can be addressed through a final damages award.21 Here, while it is undisputed that the parties are not in direct competition, Adaptix argues that a stay would hamper its ability to enforce and license its patens.22 While at least one court has given a nod to this kindof harm,23 the court is not persuaded that Adaptix would suffer any cognizable prejudice from a stay of these proceedings. That being said, in light of the court's findings as to the first and second prongs, on balance, the court finds that a stay is inapproprite.

SO ORDERED.