Filed: Aug. 19, 2015
Latest Update: Aug. 19, 2015
Summary: STIPULATION TO EXCLUDE TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] ORDER RICHARD SEEBORG , District Judge . STIPULATION The United States of America, by and through Special Assistant United States Attorney Philip Kopczynski, and Kendrick Moore, by and through his attorney Richard Tamor, hereby stipulate that, with the Court's approval, the time between August 18, 2015 and September 22, 2015 is excludable under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), for continuit
Summary: STIPULATION TO EXCLUDE TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] ORDER RICHARD SEEBORG , District Judge . STIPULATION The United States of America, by and through Special Assistant United States Attorney Philip Kopczynski, and Kendrick Moore, by and through his attorney Richard Tamor, hereby stipulate that, with the Court's approval, the time between August 18, 2015 and September 22, 2015 is excludable under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), for continuity..
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STIPULATION TO EXCLUDE TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] ORDER
RICHARD SEEBORG, District Judge.
STIPULATION
The United States of America, by and through Special Assistant United States Attorney Philip Kopczynski, and Kendrick Moore, by and through his attorney Richard Tamor, hereby stipulate that, with the Court's approval, the time between August 18, 2015 and September 22, 2015 is excludable under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), for continuity of counsel and effective preparation by counsel.
[PROPOSED] ORDER
GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, upon stipulation of the parties,
THE COURT FINDS that failing to exclude the time between August 18, 2015 and September 22, 2015 would unreasonably deny the defendant continuity of counsel, and also deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).
THE COURT FURTHER FINDS that the ends of justice served by excluding the time between August 18, 2015 and September 22, 2015 from computation under the Speedy Trial Act outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time between August 18, 2015 and September 22, 2015 shall be excluded from computation under the Speedy Trial Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
