STIPULATION AND ORDER EXCLUDING TIME FROM SEPTEMBER 22, 2015 TO JANUARY 13, 2016 UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

EDWARD M. CHEN, District Judge.

The defendants and their respective counsel, and counsel for the government, appeared for a Status Conference on the above-captioned cases on September 22, 2015. At that hearing, the defendants stated that they are in the process of gathering information for a contemplated motion to dismiss the indictments. The Court set a briefing schedule for that motion with a hearing and status conference set for January 13, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. The Court also noted that the United States' Motion Seeking Ruling on Defendants' Claim that the Government Engaged in Selective Enforcement and Selective Prosecution is still pending.

Based on the representations of defense counsel at the hearing regarding the preparation for the motion to seek further discovery under United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), and on the basis of the pending motion filed by the government, the Court found that the time between September 22, 2015, and the further Status Conference on January 13, 2016, is reasonably necessary to permit the effective preparation of counsel for the defendants in each case, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. Based on the findings, the Court determined the time should be excluded from the limits of the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)(D) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).

Based on the findings of the Court, the parties agree and stipulate that the time between September 22, 2015 and January 13, 2016 should be excluded from the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act. The defendants in each of the cases captioned above, through undersigned counsel, also agree not to seek dismissal under Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure based on this continuance, and agree not to argue that their constitutional right to a speedy trial is violated by the continuance from September 22, 2015 to January 13, 2016.

ORDER

For the reasons stated above and at the hearing on this matter held on September 22, 2015, the Court finds that the exclusion of time from September 22 2015, through and including January 13, 2016, is warranted based on the pending motion and that the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)(D) and 3161(h)(7)(A). The failure to grant the continuance would deny counsel for each of the defendants in the above-captioned cases reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).

IT IS SO ORDERED.