Filed: Nov. 02, 2015
Latest Update: Nov. 02, 2015
Summary: ORDER RE: PROPOSED AMENDED JUDGMENT MAXINE M. CHESNEY , District Judge . Before the Court is the "First Amended Judgment Pursuant to Stipulation; [Proposed] Order and Judgment," filed by plaintiffs on October 12, 2015, on behalf of themselves, defendant El Camino Paving, Inc. ("El Camino"), and Marie Santellan Alva ("Alva"), whom the stipulating parties seek to add as a defendant to the above-titled action. 1 Having read and considered the parties' stipulation, the Court rules as follows.
Summary: ORDER RE: PROPOSED AMENDED JUDGMENT MAXINE M. CHESNEY , District Judge . Before the Court is the "First Amended Judgment Pursuant to Stipulation; [Proposed] Order and Judgment," filed by plaintiffs on October 12, 2015, on behalf of themselves, defendant El Camino Paving, Inc. ("El Camino"), and Marie Santellan Alva ("Alva"), whom the stipulating parties seek to add as a defendant to the above-titled action. 1 Having read and considered the parties' stipulation, the Court rules as follows. ..
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ORDER RE: PROPOSED AMENDED JUDGMENT
MAXINE M. CHESNEY, District Judge.
Before the Court is the "First Amended Judgment Pursuant to Stipulation; [Proposed] Order and Judgment," filed by plaintiffs on October 12, 2015, on behalf of themselves, defendant El Camino Paving, Inc. ("El Camino"), and Marie Santellan Alva ("Alva"), whom the stipulating parties seek to add as a defendant to the above-titled action.1 Having read and considered the parties' stipulation, the Court rules as follows.
On February 19, 2010, plaintiffs filed their initial complaint and, on November 22, 2011, their First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), in which plaintiffs alleged (1) El Camino had failed to "make timely fringe benefit contributions" for the time periods of "December 2009; December 2010; January and February 2011; and July through September 2011" (see FAC at 3:26-4:3); (2) El Camino had failed to pay "interest and liquidated damages" for the time period of "January 2006 through June 2011" (see FAC at 4:4-5); and (3) an "audit" was necessary to determine if El Camino owed "additional amounts" (see FAC at 6:7-8). On August 2, 2012, Magistrate Judge Elizabeth D. Laporte issued a Report and Recommendation, in which she recommended that the Court grant a motion for default judgment filed by plaintiffs, and which the Court adopted by order filed August 24, 2012. In said order, the Court resolved the claims for monetary relief set forth in the FAC, by granting judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against El Camino in the amount of $174,069.03 (see Order, filed August 24, 2014, at 1:26-2:2), and resolved the claim for injunctive relief, by ordering El Camino to submit to an audit for the time period "beginning January 1, 2009 to the present," i.e., to August 24, 2012 (see id. at 2:3-8). Thereafter, on August 27, 2012, the Clerk of Court entered judgment on the Court's order.
By the instant stipulation, the parties seek entry of an amended judgment that awards in favor of plaintiffs and against El Camino and Alva the amount of $517,360.28, a figure which, according to the parties, consists of "$281,851.00 in delinquent contributions for the period of December 2009 through July 2015, plus liquidated damages, interest and attorney's fees in the amount of $235,509.28." (See Proposed First Amended Judgment at ¶¶ 2-3.)2 The stated time period extends beyond the dates identified in the FAC and the order granting plaintiffs' motion for default judgment, and, consequently, the parties necessarily are seeking adjudication of claims not previously alleged by plaintiffs in the above-titled action.
Although the parties have not expressly cited to a federal rule or other authority in support of their stipulated request, the Court construes the parties' stipulation as a joint request to (1) set aside, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the judgment entered on August 27, 2012, and (2) rather than require plaintiffs to file an amended or supplemental complaint to allege new claims, to enter a new judgment resolving the claims previously adjudicated by the Court as well as the new claims, all under the terms set forth in a settlement agreement between the parties.
A district court is "not obligated to vacate prior orders or a judgment pursuant to a settlement." See Roberts v. Trimac Transportation Services (Western), Inc., 2014 WL 6068483, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2014) (citing cases). In this instance, however, it would appear vacatur of the judgment entered August 27, 2012, is appropriate. First, "each party will benefit from vacatur." See id. Specifically, the trust funds managed by plaintiffs will receive additional funds to be used for the beneficiaries of the funds, and defendants are "spared the uncertainty of continuing litigation." See id. Further, "vacatur will ultimately serve [to] conserv[e] judicial and public resources." See id. at *2. Lastly, the parties do not seek vacatur for the purpose of having a "trial court's findings . . . wiped from the books," see id. at *1 (internal quotation and citation omitted); rather, the parties, in their proposed amended judgment, seek in essence to retain in the public record the Court's findings and to add further findings thereto.
Nonetheless, the Court declines to approve the stipulated request at this time. In particular, the parties request the Court incorporate in the proposed amended judgment "[t]he terms and conditions of [their] Settlement Agreement (see Proposed First Amended Judgment at 4:3-4; see also id. at 1:12-16, 3:14-23, 3:27-4:2, 5:7-8 (referencing settlement agreement)), but have not filed a copy thereof.
Accordingly, the parties are hereby DIRECTED to file, no later than November 23, 2015, a copy of their settlement agreement or, in the alternative, to file by said date a revised proposed amended judgment that does not incorporate by reference any terms of that agreement.
IT IS SO ORDERED.