JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY, United States Magistrate Judge.
In this putative class action, Plaintiffs Curtis Johnson ("Johnson") and Anthony Aranda ("Aranda, and together "Plaintiffs") filed suit against their employer, Defendants Serenity Transportation, Inc. ("Serenity Transportation"), its owner David Friedel ("Friedel"), as well as Service Corporation International ("SCI"), SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. ("SCI California"), the Neptune Society of Central California, Inc. ("Neptune Society"),
Plaintiffs are "mortuary transportation drivers who carry dead bodies and other human remains from various locations (including nursing homes, hospitals, and homes) to Defendants' facilities." (Dkt. No. 50 ¶ 1.) Johnson worked as a driver for Defendants from January 1, 2012 to August 23, 2013, and Aranda from approximately August 2012 to March 2015. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) They bring this putative class action on behalf of themselves and the other 40-plus drivers that Defendants have employed during the relevant period. (Id. ¶ 17.)
Defendant Serenity Transportation is a mortuary transportation company that employed Plaintiffs within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), California Labor Code, and applicable Industrial Welfare Commission wage order ("IWC Wage Order") to transport decedents. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 17.)
Friedel is the owner, shareholder, CEO, and Board Member of Serenity Transportation, and an employer of Plaintiffs within the meaning of the FLSA, California Labor Code, and IWC Wage Order. (Id. ¶ 9.) Friedel "is the alter ego" of Serenity Transportation, which he operates for the purpose of concealing violations of the Labor Code. (Id.) Friedel dominates and controls the actions of Serenity Transportation and knowingly advised the company to treat the drivers as independent contractors to avoid employee status. (Id.) Friedel fails to respect Serenity Transportation's corporate form by failing to adequately capitalize it, failing to properly maintain its minutes and corporate records, maintaining sole ownership of all Serenity Transportation stock, using his personal home as the location for board meetings, and otherwise failing to conduct board meetings in compliance with the law. (Id.)
Together, Serenity Transportation and Friedel assign drivers to 24-hour shifts, five days a week, resulting in 120-hour work weeks. (Id. ¶ 18.) The drivers are made available 24 hours a day to SCI, SCI California, Lifemark, Neptune, and the County's Office of the Medical Examiner-Coroner. (Id.) Serenity Transportation and Friedel recruit and supervise drivers and advertise available driver positions online. (Id. ¶ 19.) The advertisements specify that drivers must be available for on-call shifts 24 hours a day and that the employer enforces a professional attire dress code. (Id. ¶ 19.) Once hired, Serenity Transportation and Friedel schedule drivers for shifts and retain the right to change the shifts at their discretion. (Id.) Friedel is personally involved in drafting hiring criteria, interviewing drivers, and scheduling their shifts. (Id. ¶ 19.) Together, Serenity
On both their website and in advertisements, Serenity Transportation and Friedel refer to the drivers as "staff." (Id. ¶ 29.) Serenity Transportation and Friedel lease equipment to drivers, including vehicles, radios, and stretchers. (Id.) Initially, when Serenity Transportation was founded in 2010 it classified the drivers as employees, but Friedel, in his capacity as a member of the corporation's Board of Directors, recommended that Serenity Transportation reclassify the drivers as independent contractors, and Serenity Transportation followed suit in February 2011. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 35.)
Drivers work for Serenity Transportation and Friedel continuously for many months or years. (Id. ¶ 33.) The drivers are, however, subject to termination by Serenity Transportation and Friedel at any time for any reason. (Id. ¶ 35.) Drivers are not required to possess a special license or undergo special training to perform Serenity Transportation's transportation services. (Id. ¶ 34.)
Serenity Transportation and Friedel served as labor contractors for SCI, SCI California, Neptune, Lifemark, and the County by providing drivers on an ongoing basis to meet those entities' needs. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 33.) SCI and SCI California provide funeral and end-of-life services in Alameda County and across the United States. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) Neptune and Lifemark provide cremation, removal, and end-of-life services in Alameda County and across the United States. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) The County provides investigation, removal, and autopsies in Santa Clara County. (Id. ¶ 15.) SCI, SCI California, Neptune, Lifemark, and the County all employed Plaintiffs by permitting them to work, exercising control over their wages, hours, and working conditions, and engaging them. (Id. ¶¶ 11-15.) The work that Plaintiffs and drivers generally performed for these Defendants was labor within the entities' usual course of business. (Id.)
The Customer Defendants control the means and methods by which drivers carry out their jobs by directing drivers as to how to handle and remove decedents. (Id. ¶ 23.) While Drivers were at each Joint Employer's location, drivers were under that Joint Employer's supervision and control. (Id. ¶¶ 24-26.) Specifically, SCI and SCI California promulgated detailed policies governing drivers' work, including requiring a particular type of identification band, specific labeling procedures, and a protocol for witnessing removal of human remains. (Id. ¶ 24.) SCI and SCI California retain the right to change these policies at any time. (Id.) They also retain the right to require that drivers receive ongoing training to provide services in compliance with the entities' service guarantee; detail the time period in which drivers must respond to calls; and require drivers to follow a professional dress code. (Id.)
Neptune worked with Serenity Transportation and Friedel to create policies governing the drivers' work, subject to change by Neptune, which include "instructions on how and where to record
Lifemark also worked with Serenity Transportation to create policies governing drivers' work subject to Lifemark's change. (Id. ¶ 26.) Lifemark's policies include instructions on "how and where to record information about the deceased, how to handle the deceased, and how Drivers should conduct themselves when arriving at and leaving Lifemark properties." (Id.)
The County also promulgated detailed policies governing the drivers' work subject to Change by the County at any time. (Id. ¶ 27.) These policies include identification and removal protocol at the County Coroner, including "the timeframe in which STI Drivers [are] expected to respond to different types of calls ...; the amount of time that Drivers [are] required to wait at the scene if the deceased [is] not ready to be transported; and `stand-by' and `dry-run' time." (Id.) The County requires drivers to keep records of service completion, and retained the right to keep its own records of runs. (Id.) The County also requires drivers to follow a dress code, refrain from displaying insignia besides the County Coroner's, specified rules for driver's vehicles' appearance and equipment and retains the right to inspect these vehicles at any time. (Id.) The County supplies some of the driver's equipment and otherwise requires that drivers act in accordance with instructions given by County staff at the scene. (Id.)
Defendants paid Plaintiffs under a common compensation plan and policy where drivers are paid a flat rate that Defendants set for each completed dispatch. (Id. ¶ 37.) All Defendants participate in this scheme "including by requiring Drivers to fill out proprietary paperwork on which Driver time is recorded." (Id.) As a result, drivers are not compensated for time spent awaiting calls. (Id.) This payment system fails to provide either minimum wage or overtime payment to drivers. (Id.)
Plaintiff Johnson initiated this action in Alameda County Superior Court on June 12, 2014 alleging that Serenity Transportation and Friedel violated certain provisions of the California Labor Code. (Dkt. No. 1.) While the case was pending in state court, Johnson amended the complaint to add SCI and Neptune as defendants and to add a claim under the FLSA. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 1; Dkt. No. 32-1.) SCI properly and timely removed the case to federal court. (Dkt. No. 1.) Johnson then filed a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") adding Plaintiff Aranda and naming Lifemark, SCI California, and the County as defendants. (Dkt. No. 16.) The Court then granted Plaintiffs leave to file a Third Amended Complaint ("TAC"), which removed certain previously-alleged causes of action and added others. (Dkt. No. 49.)
The now operative TAC includes ten causes of action against various groupings of defendants under federal and California labor law. The gravamen of almost all of Plaintiffs' claims against all Defendants is that drivers have been misclassified as independent contractors when they are really employees, and therefore Defendants have denied them the benefits of federal and California wage-and-hour laws. Defendants have moved to dismiss all claims against Friedel and the Customer Defendants as well as three of the ten causes of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a complaint as failing to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl.
Even under the liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), under which a party is only required to make "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," a "pleading that offers `labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir.2004); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir.2011) ("[A]llegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively."). The court must be able to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief ... [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 663-64, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the "court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Defendants move to dismiss the TAC on three main grounds: (1) failure to allege a basis for Friedel's liability; (2) failure to demonstrate that the Customer Defendants qualify as Plaintiffs' joint employers for the purposes of liability; and (3) failure to allege sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for the second, third, and seventh causes of action. The Court will address each in turn.
Plaintiffs allege that Friedel is the alter ego of Serenity Transportation such that he is liable for the corporation's violations. (Dkt. No. 51 ¶ 9.) "The alter ego doctrine arises when a plaintiff comes into court claiming that an opposing party is using the corporate form unjustly and in derogation of the plaintiff's interests."
When assessing whether there is unity of interest between a corporation and an individual for the purposes of piercing the corporate veil under alter ego liability, courts consider, among other factors:
Digby Adler Grp. LLC v. Image Rent a Car, Inc., 79 F.Supp.3d 1095, 1106-07 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 6, 2015) (citations omitted). Some courts have held that a plaintiff need only plead two or three of these factors to adequately plead unity of interest. See Daewoo Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Opta Corp., No. C 13-1247 JSW, 2013 WL 3877596, at *5 (N.D.Cal. July 25, 2013) (citation omitted); Pac. Mar. Freight, Inc. v. Foster, No. 10-CV-0578-BTM-BLM, 2010 WL 3339432, at *6 (S.D.Cal. Aug. 24, 2010) (citing authority holding that the identification of unity of interest plus two or three factors was adequate).
The TAC alleges more than mere conclusory allegations that courts generally find insufficient. See Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 112 F.Supp.3d 1011, 1042-43, No. CV 14-03305 MMM (CWx), 2015 WL 4069617, at *20 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 30, 2015) (collecting cases where plaintiffs merely alleged that the individual was the alter ego of the corporation). Plaintiffs specifically allege why there was such a unity of interest and ownership: Friedel "dominated and controlled the actions" of Serenity Transportation, failed to adequately capitalize Serenity Transportation, failed to properly maintain minutes and corporate records, maintained sole ownership of all stock, used his personal home as the location for board of director meetings, and failed to conduct board meetings as required by corporate by-laws and state law. (Dkt. No. 51 ¶ 9.) Based on these allegations, some factors weigh in favor of finding unity of interest, including domination or control by a sole individual, the failure to maintain adequate corporate minutes or records, an inference of use of a single address for the individual and the corporation, and inadequacy of the corporation's capitalization. See Digby Adler Grp., LLC, 79 F.Supp.3d at 1106-07. The TAC is silent as to the other factors, so they weigh against finding alter ego liability. Still, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged at least four elements in support of finding alter ego liability, which his enough to show unity of interest at the pleading stage. See Daewoo Elecs. Am. Inc., 2013 WL 3877596, at *5.
Defendants' reliance on Stewart v. Screen Gems-EMI Music, Inc., 81 F.Supp.3d 938 (N.D.Cal.2015), is misplaced. There, the Court found that the three elements — equitable ownership, use of same offices and employees, and identical officers and directors — were not enough to establish unity of interest for the purposes of personal jurisdiction after evidence of alter ego liability was actually submitted and reviewed. Id. at 956. Not so here, where the Court reviews only the four corners of the complaint.
Next, "California courts generally require evidence of some bad-faith conduct to fulfill the second prong of alter ego liability, [and] that bad faith must make it inequitable to recognize the corporate form." Smith v. Simmons, 638 F.Supp.2d 1180, 1192 (E.D.Cal. June 23, 2009). A plaintiff's difficulty collecting judgment from a corporation is not an inequitable result that warrants application of the alter ego doctrine. Neilson, 290 F.Supp.2d at 1117. Defendants harp on this rule, urging that there is no inequitable result solely based on the idea that Plaintiffs may not be able to obtain relief from Serenity Transportation alone. But this is not what Plaintiffs allege.
Instead, Plaintiffs urge that the inequitable result is that Friedel will be unjustly enriched by having directly profited from having unlawfully instructed Serenity Transportation to violate the California Labor Code by classifying the drivers
The first eight causes of action in the TAC allege liability against Friedel, in part, for having advised Serenity Transportation to treat drivers — who were initially classified as employees — as independent contractors knowing that they were, in fact, employees. Plaintiffs' allegations arise under California Labor Code § 2753, which provides in relevant party that a person "who, for money or other valuable consideration, knowingly advises an employer to treat an individual as an independent contractor to avoid employee status for that individual shall be jointly and severally liable with the employer if the individual is found not to be an independent contractor." Cal. Labor Code § 2753(a). The statute also includes a carve-out, noting that it does not apply to a "person who provides advice to his or her employer" or a licensed attorney providing legal advice. Id. § 2753(b).
The TAC alleges that Friedel was the CEO of Serenity Transportation. (Dkt. No. 46 ¶ 9.) Thus, because he is alleged to be an employee of the company, Defendants contend that the subsection (b) carve-out applies and Friedel is not vicariously liable under Section 2753. Defendants made this same argument in their opposition to
Defendants argue generally that, as a matter of logic, when a person performs as both employee and in other roles for his employer — like a member of board of directors — his employment relationship always precludes Section 2753 liability. On the one hand, this approach finds support in the legislative history of Section 2753, which explains that the addition of the section "was necessary because employers frequently relied on the services of employment consulting firms to find ways to streamline the business and cut costs." Noe v. Super. Ct., 237 Cal.App.4th 316, 330, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 836 (2015) (citation omitted). Thus, the purpose of Section 2753 was to combat outside consultants. See id. at 330, & n. 7, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 836. On the other hand, the statute is to be construed broadly in favor of protecting employees — i.e., those individuals misclassified by the employer. Id. (citations omitted). This weighs in favor of extending liability to employees acting in distinct capacities. Moreover, in other contexts, California courts have recognized the distinction between employee and a board member and found liability only where the defendant was acting in the capacity of the particular position that could give rise to liability. For example, in Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 208 Cal.App.3d 1250, 256 Cal.Rptr. 702 (1989), the court declined to apply the business judgment rule to officer-director defendants because the actionable conduct arose out of their role as officer employees, not as directors. Id. at 1265, 256 Cal.Rptr. 702. With no direct authority to rely on, and since the Court it required to interpret the Labor Code broadly to protect employees, see Noe, 237 Cal.App.4th at 330, 187 Cal.Rptr.3d 836, the Court concludes that, as pleaded, Section 2753 liability may attach where an officer-director provides misclassification advice in his role as director.
Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs have not alleged that Friedel received money or valuable consideration for providing the misclassification advice, so the claim fails anyway. But Plaintiffs have alleged that Friedel was the sole shareholder of Serenity Transportation. (Dkt. No. 51 ¶ 9.) Drawing all inferences in Plaintiffs' favor as required, one could reasonably infer that Friedel received the cost-savings benefit — i.e., withheld wages and benefits — that resulted from Serenity Transportation classifying drivers as independent contractors instead of employees. Thus, Plaintiffs have stated a claim for Friedel's vicarious liability under Section 2753, as well. The Court therefore declines to dismiss Friedel from this action.
Defendants next contend that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that SCI, SCI California, Neptune, Lifemark, and the County are liable to Plaintiffs as "joint employers" under the FLSA and California law. The joint employer doctrine recognizes that "even where business entities are separate, if they share control of the terms of conditions of an individual's employment, both companies can qualify as employers." Guitierrez v. Carter Bros. Sec. Servs., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-00351-MCE-CKD, 2014 WL 5487793, at *3 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 29, 2014) (citing Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 749-50 (9th Cir.1979)). "While [the] plaintiff is not required to conclusively establish that defendants were her joint employers at the pleading stage, [the] plaintiff must at least allege some facts in support of this legal conclusion." Hibbs-Rines v. Seagate Techs., LLC, No. C 08-05430 SI, 2009 WL 513496, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 2, 2009) (citation omitted).
A defendant must be an "employer" of the plaintiff to be liable under the FLSA. Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir.1983), abrogated on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985). The FLSA defines an employer as "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). The statute defines "to employ" as "to suffer or permit to work." Id. § 203(g). "[T]he Ninth Circuit has held that the definition of employer under the FLSA should be construed to mean that an individual is subject to liability under the FLSA where an individual exercises control over the nature and structure of the employment relationship, or economic control over the relationship." Arias v. Raimando, No. 2:13-cv-00904-TLN-EFB, 2015 WL 1469272, at *4 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 30, 2015) (citations omitted).
"Two or more employers may be "joint employers" for the purposes of the FLSA." Maddock v. KB Homes, Inc., 631 F.Supp.2d 1226, 1232 (C.D.Cal.2007). "All joint employers are individually responsible for compliance with the FLSA." Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a). Whether an entity is a "joint employer" under the FLSA is a question of law. Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 638 (9th Cir.1997).
The Supreme Court has explained that the "economic reality" of an employment situation determines whether an employer-employee relationship exists under the FLSA. Goldberg v. Whitaker House Co-op., 366 U.S. 28, 33, 81 S.Ct. 933, 6 L.Ed.2d 100 (1961). "The FLSA itself does
29 C.F.R. § 791.2(b). Thus, the regulations indicate that "joint employment will generally be considered to exist when 1) the employers are not `completely disassociated' with respect to the employment of the individuals and 2) where one employer is controlled by another or the employers are under common control." Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 918 (9th Cir.2003).
The Ninth Circuit, in turn, has adopted a four-part "economic reality" test to determine when the employer-employee relationship exists. See Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470. These factors include whether the employer: "(1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records." Id.; see also Moreau v. Air France, 356 F.3d 942, 946-47 (9th Cir.2004) (confirming applicability of the Bonnette factors for the economic reality test). In Torres-Lopez v. Mary, the Ninth Circuit added to this analysis eight secondary "non-regulatory" factors that support joint employer status, including whether:
In addition to pleading facts in support of the Bonnette and Torres-Lopez factors, a plaintiff seeking to hold multiple entities liable as joint employers must plead specific facts that explain how the defendants are related and how the conduct underlying the claims is attributable to each defendant. See Freeney v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. CV 15-02376 MMM (PJWx), 2015 WL 4366439, at *18 (C.D.Cal. July 16, 2015); Adedapoidle-Tyehimba, 2013 WL 4082137, at *5. Ultimately, all of these factors are meant to guide a court's analysis, but the ultimate determination must be based "upon the circumstances of the whole activity." Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 91 L.Ed. 1772 (1947); Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470 ("The [] factors ... provide a useful framework for analysis ... but they are not etched in stone and will not be blindly applies."). At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff need only allege facts demonstrating some of the Bonnette or Torres-Lopez factors to survive. See, e.g., Guitierrez, 2014 WL 5487793, at *5-6.
Turning to the more specific allegations against each Customer Defendant, SCI and SCI California enacted policies requiring drivers to use particular labeling and removal protocol; requiring that drivers receive training; detailing the time period in which drivers were to respond to calls; and specifying that drivers dress "in a professional manner." (Id. ¶ 24.) Merely requiring drivers to dress professionally while on the job plainly does not give rise to joint employer liability; this "policy" does not even identify the particular clothing that the drivers must wear. And while one identified policy is that SCI and SCI California require that drivers receive training, Plaintiffs do not allege that the training comes from those entities or has anything to do with those entities' policies. Thus, the claim against SCI and SCI California turns on those entities' labeling and removal protocol and policies detailing the time period in which drivers must respond to calls. There is no allegation that SCI and SCI California control the drivers' driving routes or schedules. These allegations provide some indication that SCI and SCI California had limited control over the employees' work conditions, but the inference is weak at best.
Turning to Neptune, Plaintiffs allege that the entity created policies with instructions on how and where drivers must record information about the deceased, how to handle the deceased, and the order in which drivers were to complete tasks. (Id. ¶ 25.) The TAC does not detail what those policies were — i.e., what tasks were included and, how they were enforced, if at all. Further undercutting any inference of Neptune's control is the allegation that Neptune "worked with STI and Friedel" to create the policies. (Id.) Even drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, that Neptune did not have its own policies governing the drivers but rather created policies with the drivers' actual employer undercuts the conclusion that Neptune itself exercised control over the drivers' working conditions through these policies.
The same is true of Lifemark, which is alleged to have worked with Serenity Transportation and Friedel to create policies and procedures including instructions on how and where to record information about the deceased, how to handle the deceased, and how drivers should conduct themselves while located on Lifemark property. (Id. ¶ 26.) As above, the TAC does not detail what those policies are; without them, the Court has no ability to suss out the extent to which the policies actually indicate Lifemark's control over the drivers' working conditions. Nor does the TAC allege that Lifemark itself monitored or enforced the policies. Thus, as written, the allegations against Neptune and Lifemark give rise only to an anemic inference that the entity exercised control over the drivers' work conditions and schedules.
The County presents a slightly different picture. The TAC alleges that the County promulgated policies about the timeframe in which drivers must respond to different types of calls, the amount of time drivers were required to wait at the scene if the deceased was not ready to be transported, and "stand-by" and "dry-run" time. (Id. ¶ 27.) This is enough, at this stage of litigation, to plausibly establish that the Customer Defendants exercise control
Thus, the second Bonnette factor provides some support for a finding of joint employer status for the County, and minimal support for such finding as to SCI, SCI California, Neptune, and Lifemark.
Plaintiff's argument that it has no knowledge regarding whether other Defendants [besides the County] retained employment records" because those Defendants "have not substantially responded to any discovery requests" misses the mark. (Dkt. No. 52 at 13.) This approach — allowing Plaintiffs to cure pleading defects at the back end through facts gleaned through discovery rather than pleading facts in the complaint — flips the relevant pleading standard on its head. Twombly and Iqbal require a plaintiff to plead enough facts from which a plausible inference of joint employment status can be drawn to survive dismissal, and thereafter proceed to discovery, not the other way around.
The Court now turns to the second through seventh Torres-Lopez factors. See Moreau, 356 F.3d at 952. As for the second factor, there are no allegations that "responsibility under the contract was standard for the industry and could be passed from one contractor to another without material change and little negotiation[,]" so this factor weighs against a finding of joint employer status. Torres-Lopez, 111 F.3d at 640. Similarly, there are no allegations that SCI, SCI California, Neptune or Lifemark has an interest in any of the equipment the drivers used — i.e., the cars or other equipment used to transport the bodies, so the third factor weighs against a finding that they are joint employers. The TAC alleges that the County "retained the right to supply some of the equipment, including body bags, plastic sheeting, and body shrouds." (Dkt. No. 50 ¶ 27.) On the other hand, the TAC does not allege that the County actually supplied any of this equipment or had any ownership or other interest in the drivers' cars. Thus, this factor provides a modicum of support for a finding of joint employer status only for the County. There are no allegations pertaining to the fourth Torres-Lopez factor, but the fifth and sixth weigh in favor of joint employer status inasmuch as the TAC alleges that the services rendered were piecework as drivers received a flat rate per run and required no special skill or license requirement and that the drivers had no opportunities for profit or less depending on their managerial skill. Seventh, Plaintiffs allege that there was permanence in the working relationship, but at the same time allege that the Customer Defendants could remove a driver from their work route at any time and were provided to the Customer Defendants as labor contractors on a per-call basis. This factor is therefore a wash. In short, the third (ever so slightly), fifth, and sixth factors support a finding of joint employment as for the County, and only the fifth and sixth support such a finding as to SCI, SCI California, Neptune and Lifemark.
But besides a mechanical application of these factors, the facts of Torres-Lopez itself are also instructive. There, the nominal employer effectively had no employees
The Bonnette factors weigh the heaviest in the joint employment analysis under federal law, see Moreau, 356 F.3d at 946-47, and as set forth above, only one of the factors provides any support for a finding of joint employer status. Plaintiffs are unable to cite a case suggesting that a single Bonnette factor is enough for joint employment even at the pleading stage. Analysis of the secondary Torres-Lopez factors likewise provides only minimal support for such a conclusion. Ultimately, as the Ninth Circuit instructs, the factors are just a guide and what matters is the totality of the circumstances alleged. See Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730, 67 S.Ct. 1473; Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470. In light of the Bonnette and Torres-Lopez factors, and viewing the economic realities test as a whole, the TAC does not adequately allege that any of the Customer Defendants are actually functioning as joint employers of the drivers. Plaintiff shall have leave to amend to cure the defects discussed above.
The Court reaches the same conclusion applying California law, which has its own test for determining joint employment.
In actions to recover unpaid minimum wages pursuant to Cal. Labor Code § 1194, as here, "the standards to determine whether Defendants are directly liable are set out in Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal.4th 35, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (2010), where the California Supreme Court held that the definition of `employer' for minimum wage purposes is provided in the orders of California's Industrial Welfare Commission ("IWC")[.]" Ochoa v. McDonald's Corp., 133 F.Supp.3d 1228, 1232, No. 14-cv-02098-JD, 2015 WL 5654853, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 25, 2015); see Martinez, 49 Cal.4th at 52, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259; see, e.g., Futrell v. Payday Cal., Inc., 190 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1429, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 (2010); Betancourt v. Advantage Human Resourcing, Inc., No. 14-cv-01788-JST, 2014 WL 4365074, at *2-3 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 3, 2014); Torres v. Air to Ground Servs., Inc., 300 F.R.D. 386, 394-95 (C.D.Cal.2014); Taylor v. Waddell & Reed Inc., No. 09-cv-02909 AJB (WVG), 2013 WL 435907, at *3 (S.D.Cal. Feb. 1, 2013) (citation omitted); Arredondo v. Delano Farms Co., No. CV F 09-01247-LJO-DLB, 2012 WL 2358594, at *9 (E.D.Cal. June 20, 2012) (citation omitted). The IWC Wage Order provides three alternative definitions for the term "to employ." Martinez, 49 Cal.4th at 64, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259. It means: "(a) to exercise control over the wages, hours or working conditions, or (b) to suffer or permit to work, or (c) to engage, thereby creating a common law employment relationship." Id. at 64, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259.
Notably, Plaintiffs argued that another test should primarily drive the determination
Plaintiffs argue that since Martinez, a number of courts have continued to apply only the common law Borello right-to-control test without reference to Martinez or the IWC Wage Order definitions. See, e.g., Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir.2014); Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 754 F.3d 1093, 1100-01 (9th Cir.2014); Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal.4th 522, 530-31, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 332, 327 P.3d 165 (2014). But the cases on which Plaintiffs rely are distinguishable. First, in those cases the parties agreed that the Borello test applied. More importantly, the courts in those cases were determining whether a single entity had accurately classified workers as employees versus independent contractors, rather than whether secondary entities were joint employers, as is the case here. See Alexander, 765 F.3d at 988; Ruiz, 754 F.3d at 1100-01; Ayala, 59 Cal.4th at 530-31, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 332, 327 P.3d 165. The only case Plaintiffs cite that involved a court determining whether a secondary entity counted as a joint employer is Guitierrez v. Carter Bros. Sec. Servs., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-00351-MCE-CKD, 2014 WL 5487793 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 29, 2014). The Guitierrez court applied only the Borello test to determine whether the plaintiffs had adequately alleged that a certain entity was a joint employer under California law, but relied on Ayala, which, as described above, does not involve joint employer allegations. In short, Plaintiffs' authority does not persuade the Court that the IWC Wage Order definitions discussed in Martinez should not govern the analysis of whether the Customer Defendants are joint employers under California law.
Still, the question of the scope of Martinez's application has not yet been resolved. As one court in this District recently explained, "[a]lthough Martinez involved alleged minimum wage violations under California Labor Code § 1194, California courts have applied the Martinez definition to causes of action arising under other section of the Labor Code as well." Ochoa, 133 F.Supp.3d at 1232, 2015 WL 5654853, at *2 n. 3 (collecting cases). The California Supreme Court has not yet decided whether Martinez
Notably in Martinez, the California Supreme Court also implied that Borello may not apply to wage claims at all because the facts are distinguishable. 49 Cal.4th at 73, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 ("Assuming the decision in [Borello] has any relevance to wage claims, a point we do not decide, the case does not advance plaintiffs' argument."). But, to date, the California Supreme Court has not held that Borello is inapplicable. Thus, to the extent that Borello is relevant to any of the definitions of employer under the IWC Wage Order, the Court will still reference standards set forth in that case.
Under Martinez, an entity employs workers if it "directly or indirectly, or through an agent or any other person, employs or exercises control" over their wages, hours, or working conditions. IWC Wage Order No. 9-1002 § 2(G). The language is disjunctive, and control over only one such factor will give rise to joint employer liability. See Martinez, 49 Cal.4th at 59, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259. "While this language is potentially quite broad in scope, California courts have circumscribed it by denying employer liability for entities that may be able to influence the treatment of employees but lack the authority to directly control their wages, hours or conditions." Ochoa, 133 F.Supp.3d at 1233, 2015 WL 5654853, at *3.
For example, in Martinez, the plaintiff workers sued a farmer and two produce merchants that sold the farmer's produce. 49 Cal.4th at 42, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259. The Martinez court held that the merchants were not joint employers. While the merchant could decide how much to pay the farmer, which would then influence how much the farmer paid the workers, this was not enough to constitute control over wages. Id. at 72, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259. Moreover, while the merchants instituted some policies pertaining to the manner and method of packing the produce, only the farmer decided which field the workers would harvest, hired and fired the workers, trained and supervised them, determined their rate and manner of pay, and set their hours. Id. Thus, only the farmer, not the merchant, had ultimate control over wages, hours, and working conditions and constituted an employer. Id. Other courts applying California law have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Futrell, 190 Cal.App.4th at 1432-33, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 (on defendant's motion for summary judgment, noting that an entity that "does not control the hiring, firing, and day-to-day supervision of workers" is not an employer); Ochoa, 133 F.Supp.3d at 1236, 2015 WL 5654853, at *5 (on defendant's motion for
An entity can be held liable as an employer for "suffering or permitting to work" only if it "fail[s] to perform the duty of seeing to it that the prohibited condition does not exist." Martinez, 49 Cal.4th at 69, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (internal quotation marks omitted). Put another way, the "basis of liability is the defendant's knowledge of and failure to prevent the work from occurring." Id. at 70, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (emphasis in original). Merely receiving the benefit of the employees' work is not enough to establish liability under the "suffer or permit to work" standard. Id.
In Martinez, the California Supreme Court concluded that the produce merchants were not employers because "neither had the power to prevent plaintiffs from working." Id. Instead, only the farmer "had the exclusive power to hire and fire his workers, to set their wages and hours, and to tell them when and where to report to work." Id. The court reasoned that while the merchants "might as a practical matter have forced [the farmer] to lay off workers or to divert their labor to other projects" by no longer doing business with the farmer, but "[s]uch a business relationship, standing alone, does not transform the purchaser into the employer of the supplier's workforce." Id. Other courts have similarly underscored that an entity does not "suffer or permit" workers to work where they do not have hiring and firing power. See, e.g., Futrell, 190 Cal. App.4th at 1434, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 513; Ochoa, 133 F.Supp.3d at 1238-39, 2015 WL 5654853, at *7. This is true even where the entity monitors the workers' performance and can exercise influence over the workers' actual employer. See, e.g., Ochoa, 133 F.Supp.3d at 1238-39, 2015 WL 5654853, at *7 (citations omitted).
Under Martinez, "to engage" means to create a common law employment relationship. Martinez, 49 Cal.4th at 64, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259. Under the common law, "[t]he principal test of an employment relationship is whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired."
California courts also consider "several `secondary' indicia of the nature of a service relationship." Borello, 48 Cal.3d at 350, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399; Futrell, 190 Cal.App.4th at 1434, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 513.
Id.; see also Futrell, 190 Cal.App.4th at 1434, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 513. The factors "[g]enerally ... cannot be applied mechanically as separate tests; they are intertwined and their weight depends often on particular combinations." Borello, 48 Cal.3d at 350, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399 (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs argue that the allegations in the TAC meet all three definitions of an employer under Martinez.
Plaintiffs contend that the Customer Defendants exercise control over both their wages and working conditions sufficient for a finding of joint employment. With respect to wages, Plaintiffs insist that the Customer Defendants in part set the drivers' compensation, based on the allegation that "Drivers are paid a flat rate set by Defendants for each dispatch they complete." (Dkt. No. 50 ¶ 37.) But the employment contract indicates that drivers receive a percentage of the fees for services that the Customer Defendants pay. (Dkt. No. 51-1 at 7.) While this makes clear that the Customer Defendants' initial fee contributes to the ultimate determination of how much drivers receive, Serenity Transportation alone is alleged to have responsibility for determining the rate at which drivers were ultimately paid. The California Supreme Court squarely rejected the exact argument that Plaintiffs now advance. See Martinez, 49 Cal.4th at 52, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259 (concluding that the merchant's provision of funds to the farmer does not constitute control over the workers' wages even though the provision of funds affects the farmer's payments to the workers). Thus, the TAC does not adequately allege that the Customer Defendants exercise control over the drivers' wages.
Nor does the TAC allege facts that give rise to a plausible inference that the Customer Defendants exercise control over the drivers' working conditions based on the policies they are alleged to have promulgated. While the TAC includes some allegations regarding policies that the Customer Defendants promulgated with respect to the drivers' work and that certain Customer Defendants (namely, SCI and SCI California) required drivers to undergo training, mere imposition of requirements or oversight of workers' performance is not enough to make the overseeing entity a joint employer absent hiring and firing power. See Martinez, 49 Cal.4th at 70, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259; Futrell, 190 Cal.App.4th at 1432-33, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 513; Ochoa, 133 F.Supp.3d at 1236-37, 2015 WL 5654853, at *5.
Plaintiffs rely on Villalpando v. Exel Direct, Inc., No. 12-cv-04137 JCS, 2014 WL 1338297, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 28, 2014), for the proposition that general allegations
And indeed, besides conclusory allegations that the Court does not accept as true, there are no factual allegations supporting the proposition that the Customer Defendants could hire or fire drivers from their positions. While they could request that a driver be removed from their rotation — i.e., that the driver no longer performs pickups for them — there are no allegations that this removal affects the driver's employment with Serenity Transportation. Thus, the allegations do not plausibly establish that removal from one Customer Defendant's routes does not result simply in the driver doing runs for other customers. See Martinez, 49 Cal.4th at 70, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259; Futrell, 190 Cal.App.4th at 1432-33, 119 Cal.Rptr.3d 513; Ochoa, 133 F.Supp.3d at 1236-37, 2015 WL 5654853, at *5. Further, the TAC alleges that it was Serenity Transportation and Friedel that were responsible for day-to-day supervision of the drivers. Thus, the TAC does not allege that the Customer Defendants exercised control over the drivers' working conditions as defined in Martinez.
For each of these reasons, the TAC does not allege that the Customer Defendants exercised control over the drivers' wages working conditions sufficient for a finding of joint employer status under the first prong of Martinez.
Plaintiffs' argument as to the second prong fares no better. Plaintiffs barely push back against Defendants' assertion that the TAC fails to allege that the Customer Defendants "suffered or permitted" the drivers to work under the meaning of Martinez. Indeed, Plaintiffs' opposition dedicates a single sentence in support of the proposition that the TAC meets the suffer-or-permit-to-work standard. (Dkt. No. 52 at 10:17-19.) Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that the allegation that the Customer Defendants "helped set workers' wages and determined in part the workers' work location and hours established that it may have had knowledge of and failed to prevent the allegedly unlawful work from occurring[.]" (Id.)
However, just like the alleged joint employers in Martinez, as explained above, Serenity Transportation is alleged to have exclusive power to hire and fire the drivers and to set their wages and hours. Martinez, 69 Cal.4th at 69, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259. While the Customer Defendants retain the right to request that a driver be removed from their route, that
As for the third prong, whether the Customer Defendants "engaged" drivers, the Court considers whether the Customer Defendants created a common law employment relationship with the drivers. Martinez, 49 Cal.4th at 64, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 514, 231 P.3d 259.
The primary inquiry is whether the Customer Defendants had the right to exercise control over the drivers. The inquiry is similar to the FLSA analysis. Plaintiffs allege that SCI/SCI California retained the right to control the drivers' work by enacting detailed labeling and witness removal protocol requiring that drivers receive training, detailing the time period in which drivers must respond to calls, and retaining the right to control driver dress code. (Dkt. No. 50 ¶ 24.) Neptune allegedly created policies and procedures including instructions on how and where to record information, how to handle the deceased, and the order in which drivers were to complete tasks. (Id. ¶ 25.) Similarly, Lifemark allegedly created policies and procedures about how and where to record information about the deceased, how to handle the deceased, and how drivers should conduct themselves when arriving at and leaving Lifemark properties. (Id. ¶ 26.) The County, in turn, promulgated policies governing identification and removal protocol, including the timeframe in which drivers were expected to respond, the amount of time that drivers must wait at the scene, records drivers must keep, professional dress requirements, and certain vehicle and equipment requirements. (Id. ¶ 27.) These allegations are enough to plausibly establish that the Customer Defendants had some control over some of the details of the drivers' work.
As for the secondary factors, while Plaintiffs argue that the Customer Defendants had the right to terminate drivers as explained above, the actual allegations are that the Customer Defendants could remove drivers from their rotation. Next, Plaintiffs allege that transportation of human remains is not a distinct occupation or business from the Customer Defendants, but rather was integral to their work: SCI and SCI California allegedly hired drivers themselves, and Neptune and Lifemark advertise and offer removal transportation services as part of their end-of-life services. (Dkt. No. 50 ¶¶ 30-31.) They have alleged that no skill, special training or specialized license is required to do the work (id. ¶ 34), and that drivers were made available to the Customer Defendants on an ongoing basis, which implies an indefinite working relationship (id. ¶ 33).
On the other hand, other secondary factors are not pleaded: while Plaintiffs allege in a conclusory manner that the Customer
To be sure, Plaintiffs do "not have to satisfy every factor in order to establish an employment relationship" at the pleading stage. See Betancourt, 2014 WL 4365074, at *6 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs have not cited any cases holding that a weak showing of right to control coupled with some secondary indicia of an employment relationship is enough. However, looking holistically at all of the factors, given that the control alleged is weak and that there are no allegations that the Customer Defendants could hire and fire drivers, Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged an employment relationship. At oral argument, Plaintiffs contended that they could allege additional factors to support these factors. Plaintiffs shall have leave to amend to include additional support for these factors.
As written, the TAC does not adequately allege any basis for joint employer liability under the standards set forth in Martinez. Because Plaintiffs have therefore failed to plausibly establish a basis for the Customer Defendants' joint employer liability under either federal or California law, the Court will therefore dismiss all claims against the Customer Defendants with leave to amend.
In the second cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are liable for failing to pay drivers minimum wage for all hours worked because drivers were not compensated for "on call" or "standby time" waiting for new pick-up assignments in violation of California Labor Code § 1194 and IWC Wage Order 9-2001. (Dkt. N. 50 ¶¶ 70-89.) Defendants move to dismiss this claim on the ground that the TAC contains insufficient allegations that Plaintiffs are entitled to be paid for their on-call and standby time.
California law requires employees to be paid for "all hours" worked "at the statutory or agreed rate and no part of this rate may be used as a credit against a minimum wage obligation." Armenta v. Osmose, Inc., 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 323, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 (2005). Thus, "a piece-rate formula that does not compensate directly for all time worked does not comply with California Labor Codes, even if, averaged out, it would pay at least minimum wage for all hours worked." Cardenas v. McLane Foodservs., Inc., 796 F.Supp.2d 1246, 1252 (C.D.Cal.2011); see also Gonzalez v. Downtown LA Motors, LP, 215 Cal.App.4th 36, 49, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (2013) (noting that employees compensated on a piece-rate basis must be paid minimum wage for all hours worked). The gravamen of the second cause of action is that Plaintiffs
"It is well established that an employee's on call or standby time may require compensation." Mendiola v. CPS Sec. Solutions, Inc., 60 Cal.4th 833, 840, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 124, 340 P.3d 355 (2015); see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944) ("Facts may show that the employee was engaged to wait, or they may show that he waited to be engaged."); see, e.g., Madera Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Madera, 36 Cal.3d 403, 406, 204 Cal.Rptr. 422, 682 P.2d 1087 (1984) (concluding that officers' on-call mealtime was compensable hours worked).
"California courts considering whether on-call time constitutes hours worked have primarily focused on the extent of the employer's control." Mendiola, 60 Cal.4th at 840, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 124, 340 P.3d 355 (citations omitted). In fact, "[t]he level of the employer's control over its employees ... is determinative" in resolving whether the on-call or standby time constitutes compensable hours worked. "When an employer directs, commands, or restrains an employee from leaving the work place ... and thus prevents the employee from using the time effectively for his or her own purposes, that employee remains subject to the employer's control. According to [the definition of hours worked], that employee must be paid." Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 583, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000). California courts consider a number of factors when determining whether an employer had control during on-call time, including:
Mendiola, 60 Cal.4th at 841, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 124, 340 P.3d 355 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Owens v. Local No. 169, 971 F.2d 347, 351 (9th Cir.1992)). Courts also consider whether the "[o]n-call waiting time ... is spent primarily for the benefit of the employer and its business." Gomez v. Lincare, Inc., 173 Cal.App.4th 508, 523-24, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 388 (2009).
Applying the factors identified in Mendiola to these allegations, there are no on-premises living requirement or excessive geographical restrictions alleged, so the first two factors weigh against compensable on-call time. With respect to the
Plaintiffs rely on Renfro v. City of Emploria, Kansas, 948 F.2d 1529, 1535 (10th Cir.1991), for the proposition that the TAC allegations are sufficient to state a plausible claim that Plaintiffs' on-call time was compensable. Not so. First, Renfro involved whether time was compensable under the FLSA, not California Labor Law; the standards are different, as federal law considers the agreement between the parties and California law does not. Even if Renfro were binding on this Court, there the workers were required to report to duty within 20 minutes of being paged and received as many as 13 calls during an on-call period. Id. at 1535. Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs do not allege that they had to respond within 20 minutes; instead, they merely state "within a specified time period."
In short, as presently written, Plaintiffs have alleged facts that they "waited to be engaged," not that they were "engaged to wait." The second cause of action is therefore dismissed to the extent that it asserts failure to compensate on-call time.
Plaintiff's third cause of action alleges that Defendants failed to pay them overtime wages in violation of California Labor Code § 510 and IWC Wage Order 9-2001 § 3. (Dkt. No. 50 ¶¶ 90-97.) Labor Code Section 510 "requires employees to be paid not less than one and on-half times their `regular rate of pay' for all hours in excess of eight [hours] in a day or 40 [hours] in a week." Gonzalez, 215 Cal.App.4th at 52, 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (citing DLSE Manual § 49.2.1.2). "The `regular rate of pay' in a piece rate system is calculated by diving the employee's `total earnings' for the week, or in the alternative, to pay one and one-half times the employee's piece-rate for all overtime hours." Id.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' overtime claim must be dismissed because Plaintiffs have not shown that they worked in excess of 8 hour works days or 40 workdays precisely because they have not shown that they are entitled to compensation for on-call time. The Court declines to dismiss this cause of action. As discussed above, the TAC as written fails to establish
The seventh cause of action, a "pay stub" violation, arises under Labor Code Section 226 and IWC Wage Order No. 9 § 7. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have failed to comply with their obligation to provide Plaintiffs, semi-monthly or at the time of each payment of wages, with accurate, itemized written statements describing the total number of hours worked. (Dkt. No. 50 ¶¶ 124-132.)
Labor Code Section 226 requires an employer's semi-monthly wage statement to include an accurate itemized written statement including nine categories of information, including the total number of hours worked. Cal. Labor Code § 226. "To recover damages under [S]ection 226, subdivision (e), an employee must suffer injury as a result of a knowing and intentional failure by an employer to comply with the statute." Price v. Starbucks Corp., 192 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1142, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 174 (2011). The mere fact that the information was missing from the wage statement is not a cognizable injury. See id. at 1142-43, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 174 (noting that the "deprivation of [the] information, standing alone is not a cognizable injury") (internal quotation marks, citation, and footnote omitted); see also Milligan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 577 Fed.Appx. 718, 719 (9th Cir.2014) (citation omitted) ("[T]he injury requirement ... cannot be satisfied simply because one of the nine itemized requirements in [Section 226] is missing from a wage statement."). However, "the types of injuries on which a Section 226 claim may be premised include `the possibility of not being paid overtime, employee confusion over whether they received all wages owed them, difficulty and expense involved in reconstructing pay records, and forcing employees to make mathematical computations to analyze whether the wages paid in fact compensated them for all hours worked." Ortega v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 258 F.R.D. 361, 374 (C.D.Cal.2009) (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that their wage statements did not show the actual and total number of hours worked and that, as a result, they have been precluded from accurately monitoring the number of hours worked, determining whether they have been lawfully compensated for all hours worked, and seeking any owed overtime. (Dkt. No. 50 ¶¶ 126, 129.) Courts have found that a plaintiff's "inability to determine their hourly wage meets the minimal-injury requirement of Section 226." Soto v. Diakon Logistics (Del.), Inc., No. 08-CV-33-L WMC, 2013 WL 4500693, at *10 (S.D.Cal. Aug. 21, 2013); Ortega, 258 F.R.D. at 374. Thus, Plaintiffs state a cognizable claim for violation of Labor Section 226.
Generally, when a complaint is dismissed, "leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires." Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 (9th Cir.2010); see Fed. R. Civ. P.
Here, Plaintiffs have already amended her claims three times. However, Plaintiff's first and second amended complaints were filed as of right, and the Court granted Plaintiffs leave to file the third upon Plaintiffs' request. Thus, none of the amendments followed briefing on a motion to dismiss, so the Court has not had an opportunity to put Plaintiffs on notice of any deficiencies. At oral argument, Plaintiffs represented that they can allege further facts to render plausible at least some of the dismissed claims. Accordingly, the Court will grant leave to amend.
For the reasons described above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion to dismiss. Specifically, the Court declines to dismiss the claims against Friedel or the third and seventh causes of action. However, the Court dismisses the claims against the Customer Defendants, but Plaintiffs shall have lead to amend to add allegations that establish that the Customer Defendants were joint employers for the purposes of the FLSA and the California Labor Code. In addition, the Court dismisses with leave to amend the second cause of action to the extent that it asserts failure to compensate for on-call time. Plaintiffs' amended complaint is due by November 16, 2015.
This Order disposes of Docket No. 51.
