EDWARD J. DAVILA, District Judge.
Plaintiff Piyush Gupta ("Plaintiff") filed the instant employment action against Defendant International Business Machines Corporation ("IBM"), alleging wrongful termination and disability discrimination. Presently before the court is IBM's Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication.
Federal jurisdiction arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441(a). After carefully reviewing the parties' pleadings in conjunction with oral argument, IBM's motion will be granted in part and denied in part for the reasons explained below.
Plaintiff began to work with IBM in May 2009, when IBM acquired Plaintiff's startup company. Dep. of Piyush Gupta ("Pl. Dep."), Dkt. No. 36, Ex. P at 28, 31. This was Plaintiff's second tour with IBM, as he had previously worked for the company from 1984 to 1995.
In 2013, Plaintiff worked at IBM as Vice President, Product Management. Decl. of Inhi Cho Suh ("Suh Decl."), Dkt. No. 34 at ¶ 3. Partly as a result of frequent and extended business trips, Plaintiff developed back problems and began to experience back pain in 2011. Decl. of Piyush Gupta ("Pl. Decl."), Dkt. No. 41 at ¶ 17. Since February 2011, IBM knew of Plaintiff's back problems, and throughout 2012 and 2013, Plaintiff continued to travel extensively.
At IBM, Plaintiff reported directly to Inhi Cho Suh ("Ms. Suh"), who at that time served as Vice President, Product Management & Strategy. Suh Decl. at ¶ 2. In turn, Ms. Suh reported to Bob Picciano ("Mr. Picciano") who served as Senior Vice President of Information Management.
On January 27, 2013, Plaintiff emailed Mr. Picciano expressing discontent with his current role at IBM, and wishing to discuss a potential exit strategy to something else within IBM, or from IBM. Pl. Dep. at 56, Def.'s Ex. 1. Plaintiff also raised this issue with Ms. Suh, and explained that he would be interested in a role within IBM where he could spend time with clients and sales teams in India and serve as a trusted advisor to big clients in India. Pl. Dep. at 68-69, 71. On March 13th, Ms. Suh emailed Ms. Picciano referencing a discussion she had with Plaintiff about moving Plaintiff from a product management role to a different role that included monthly travels to India. Pl. Decl., Ex. F; Suh Decl., Ex. C. Mr. Picciano seemingly approved this proposition.
Also in March 2013, Plaintiff visited his physician to tend to his back problems. Pl. Dep. at 108. His physician advised that Plaintiff fly on business class when making business trips, and prescribed a sit/stand desk.
As to the ergonomic furniture, Plaintiff submitted this request to IBM on March 14th. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 21. At around this time, Plaintiff's physical therapist discussed the benefits of short-term disability leave, but Plaintiff was not interested in pursuing that option at the time because he did not want to take the extended time off.
While Plaintiff was on a business trip abroad, Ms. Suh communicated with Plaintiff to discuss a reduction in force, or "resource action," IBM would be undertaking. Pl. Dep. at 76; Suh Decl. at ¶ 12. Ms. Suh told Plaintiff that she needed to lay people off from product management, which was Plaintiff's former group, and she needed his suggestions on who should be laid off given that he knew the members of that group very well.
On May 29th, IBM's ergonomic expert completed an ergonomic evaluation and recommended Plaintiff receive ergonomic furniture. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 22. On June 3rd, IBM Nurse Mary Temo ("Nurse Temo") entered Plaintiff's ergonomic furniture request into the system, and by early June, Ms. Suh was aware of this request.
At around that time, in mid-June, IBM announced its resource action. Decl. of Edward Matchak ("Matchak Decl.") at ¶ 4. The resource action was broad and resulted in layoffs across much of IBM's software group in order to reduce costs.
On June 19th, Ms. Suh communicated with Plaintiff and told him she was "going to take him up on his suggestion" and select him for layoff. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 25; Pl. Dep. at 74-75, 78; Suh Decl. at ¶ 14. Ms. Suh further stated that IBM was going to retire Plaintiff given his combined 15 years of service, which would be more advantageous for him. Pl. Dep. at 78; Suh Decl. at ¶ 14.
On the same day, Plaintiff initiated an Instant Messenger conversation with Edward Matchak ("Mr. Matchak"), who served as IBM's Human Resources Partner. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 48; Matchak Decl. at ¶¶ 2, 8, Ex. M. The conversation focused on the intersection between short-term disability and separation with IBM, and Plaintiff stated he was interested in going on short-term disability but not returning to IBM. Matchak Decl., Ex. M.
As to Plaintiff's ergonomic furniture request, Mei Yee Sam ("Ms. Sam") from IBM was handling the request. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 26. On June 26th, Ms. Sam emailed Ms. Suh a third reminder to approve Plaintiff's request for ergonomic furniture.
Concurrently, Plaintiff was planning a final business trip to India, which he considered to be a very important trip for IBM. Pl. Dep. at 90. Due to the importance of the trip, Plaintiff talked to Ms. Suh about extending his last day with IBM from July 31st to August 15th.
On July 19th, Nurse Temo emailed Plaintiff notifying him that his short-term disability request had been approved for July 10th through August 18th, 2013. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 43, Ex. O; Pl. Dep. at 91, 150-51. Upon realizing that the short-term disability leave would conflict with his business trip to India, Plaintiff spoke to Nurse Temo about delaying the leave. Pl. Dep. at 91; Pl. Decl., Ex. O. Nurse Temo informed Plaintiff that the only way to change the short-term disability arrangement was for Plaintiff's physician to approve the change.
On July 25th, Plaintiff had a second Instant Messenger conversation with Mr. Matchak inquiring about retirement, and then followed with a telephone conversation. Gupta Decl. at ¶ 53, Ex. L. The next day, Plaintiff received documents pertaining to his separation package, and two days later, he departed to India for his final business trip. Pl. Dep. at 81, 83, 176; Suh Decl., Ex. G. While Plaintiff was in India, on July 29th, an IBM employee emailed Plaintiff and Ms. Sam notifying them that the ergonomic furniture request had been cancelled because IBM does not order equipment for retiring employees, only active employees. Pl. Dep. at 129; Pl. Decl., Ex. M.
Plaintiff spent his last date of employment, August 15th, in India and extended his stay to take a personal vacation at the end. Pl. Dep. at 96-97; Suh Decl. at ¶ 19. Thus, when Plaintiff returned to the United States on August 18th, he was no longer an active employee. Pl. Dep. at 97; Suh Decl., Ex. G. On August 22nd, Mr. Matchak conducted Plaintiff's exit interview where they discussed the benefits Plaintiff was entitled to, and Plaintiff ultimately declined to sign his separation agreement. Pl. Dep. at 80-81, 83, 97; Matchak Decl. at ¶ 6.
On September 8th, Plaintiff emailed Ms. Suh requesting additional time to review the separation documents and consult with an attorney. Suh Decl., Ex. G. In response, Ms. Suh provided Plaintiff with a deadline of September 19th.
In February 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing and obtained a right-to-sue letter, thereby exhausting his administrative remedies.
In June 2015, IBM filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, Summary Adjudication.
A motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment should be granted if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
If the moving party does not satisfy its initial burden, the nonmoving party has no obligation to produce anything and summary judgment must be denied.
Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.
IBM moves for summary judgment on each of Plaintiff's five claims and prayer for punitive damages. Mot. at 1. Each claim will be addressed in turn.
As his first claim, Plaintiff alleges that his disability was a motivating factor in IBM's termination of his employment. Compl. at ¶ 24. IBM moves for summary judgment contending that Plaintiff's claim lacks merit. Mot. at 9.
"When entertaining motions for summary judgment in employment discrimination cases arising under state law, federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the
Under California law, "[a] prima facie case of disability discrimination under FEHA requires the employee to show he or she (1) suffered from a disability, (2) was otherwise qualified to do his or her job, and (3) was subjected to adverse employment action because of the disability."
Since it is Plaintiff's burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Plaintiff's argument is considered first. Plaintiff, however, offers no argument discussing how his termination was due to his disability. An examination of the record shows that Plaintiff was able to work from home, his request to fly on business class was approved, his request to obtain ergonomic furniture for his home office was also approved even though it was cancelled because of his termination, his stay with IBM was extended in order to accommodate his final business trip to India, and his termination was considered a retirement recognizing his 15 years of service to the company. Further, Plaintiff testified at his deposition that nobody at IBM treated him unprofessionally or in a manner that was insensitive to his physical condition, and that he was unaware of any facts causing him to believe that his termination was due to his back problems.
Assuming Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts to IBM to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. To do this, the employer must show that the procedure it used to terminate the employee was "validly and fairly devised and administered to serve a legitimate business purpose."
In this instance, IBM offers two arguments. IBM first contends that Plaintiff was laid off as part of a broad reduction in force consistent with its ongoing efforts to streamline operations, reduce costs, and improve productivity. Mot. at 10;
IBM argues that Plaintiff was selected for layoff because he volunteered himself. Mot. at 10;
Lastly, the burden shifts to the employee to "demonstrate either that the defendant's showing was in fact insufficient or that there was a triable issue of fact material to the defendant's showing."
Plaintiff argues that IBM's purported legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual for three reasons. First, he contends that IBM's reduction-in-force rationale, by itself, is not sufficient to defeat Plaintiff's discrimination claims. Opp'n at 12. As noted above, the court agrees.
Second, Plaintiff argues that when he volunteered himself for the layoff, he was making a spontaneous remark. Opp'n at 11-12. In his declaration, he states that in the heat of the moment and in a reflexive effort to protect his colleagues, he volunteered himself but was relieved when Ms. Suh responded with "[n]ice try, that's not going to happen." Pl. Decl. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff considered his spontaneous remark to be in the past and off the table, and he believed that neither he nor Ms. Suh took it seriously.
Third, Plaintiff argues that the proximity of time between the date Plaintiff's requests for accommodation became more insistent and the date IBM decided to lay him off is itself evidence of pretext. Opp'n at 13. Specifically, Plaintiff relies on the following timeline: on March 14th, Plaintiff submitted his ergonomic furniture request; by early April, the request was being processed; on May 29th, IBM's ergonomic expert completed an evaluation and recommended Plaintiff receive the ergonomic furniture; on June 3rd, Nurse Temo entered the request into the system; and on June 19th, Plaintiff was selected for layoff.
In sum, there is an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff's claim that he was terminated because of his disability. Accordingly, IBM's motion as to this claim is granted.
As his second claim, Plaintiff alleges that IBM failed to engage in a timely, good faith interactive process with Plaintiff to accommodate his known disability, and instead terminated Plaintiff because of his disability. Compl. at ¶ 29. IBM moves for summary judgment contending that Plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to support this claim. Mot. at 13.
California Government Code § 12940(n) requires that an employer engage in a "timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee . . . to determine effective reasonable accommodations." The statute "requires an informal process with the employee to attempt to identify reasonable accommodations, not necessarily ritualized discussions."
Plaintiff disputes the manner in which IBM handled the ergonomic furniture request. Opp'n at 14. He argues that it took over 3½ months for his request to be reviewed and approved by Ms. Suh, and when Ms. Suh finally approved the request, the ergonomic furniture order was cancelled because Plaintiff had already been selected for layoff.
It is undisputed that Plaintiff submitted his ergonomic furniture request on March 14th, IBM's ergonomic expert completed an evaluation on May 29th, and Nurse Temo entered the request into the system on June 3rd. It is also undisputed that after Plaintiff was notified of his layoff, on June 26th, Ms. Sam emailed Ms. Suh a third reminder to approve the ergonomic furniture request.
Based on the record, it appears that it took 3½ months—and three reminders—for Ms. Suh to approve Plaintiff's request for ergonomic furniture request. In addition, Ms. Suh approved the request while knowing that Plaintiff was already selected for layoff, and there is no indication that Ms. Suh alerted Plaintiff that he would be ineligible to receive the ergonomic furniture due to the layoff. As such, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether IBM participated in a timely, good faith interactive process.
Accordingly, IBM's motion as to this claim is denied.
As his third claim, Plaintiff alleges that IBM failed to provide him with a reasonable accommodation. Compl. at ¶ 33. IBM moves for summary judgment contending that this claim lacks merit. Mot. at 14.
Under California Government Code § 12940(m), an employer is required to provide reasonable accommodations. "A reasonable accommodation is any modification or adjustment to the workplace that enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired."
Plaintiff argues that IBM failed to meet its obligations to accommodate Plaintiff's disability when it granted the ergonomic furniture request, but ultimately never delivered the furniture to Plaintiff. Opp'n at 16. In essence, Plaintiff appears to argue that IBM failed to provide a reasonable accommodation—the ergonomic furniture—because by the time the request was approved, his separation date with IBM was nearing, thus making him ineligible to obtain the ergonomic furniture. Consequently, Plaintiff never received the ergonomic furniture. As discussed above, it is undisputed that Ms. Suh approved Plaintiff's ergonomic furniture request 3½ months after he first submitted it to IBM, and IBM then cancelled the ergonomic furniture order in light of Plaintiff's separation with IBM.
"An employer cannot prevail on summary judgment on a claim of failure to reasonably accommodate unless it establishes through undisputed facts that reasonable accommodation was offered and refused . . . [or] that the employer did everything in its power to find a reasonable accommodation, but the informal interactive process broke down because the employee failed to engage in discussions in good faith."
First, IBM has not been able to establish through undisputed facts that Plaintiff refused the ergonomic furniture. In fact, though he may not have been entitled to it by then, Plaintiff continued to inquire about the ergonomic furniture even after the date of separation.
Furthermore, the court cannot determine whether the 3½ month delay in approving the ergonomic furniture request is "reasonable." The record does not provide information on how long IBM typically takes to approve such request, nor was IBM able to offer that information at oral argument. Given that this delay could have impeded Plaintiff's ability to obtain a reasonable accommodation, there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether IBM fulfilled its duty to provide a reasonable accommodation.
On this record, there is a dispute as to whether IBM provided Plaintiff a reasonable accommodation. Therefore, IBM's motion as to this claim is denied.
As his fourth claim, Plaintiff alleges that IBM made certain misrepresentations regarding short-term disability benefits that induced Plaintiff not to pursue such benefits, under the belief that he would lose the benefits when IBM terminated his employment. Compl. at ¶¶ 41-42. IBM moves for summary judgment contending that Plaintiff cannot establish the elements of fraud. Mot. at 14.
The elements giving rise to a claim for fraud are: (1) misrepresentation; (2) knowledge of falsity, or "scienter;" (3) intent to defraud; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.
Plaintiff contends that Mr. Matchak, from IBM's human resources, made certain statements about the intersection between short-term disability benefits and termination that constitutes a misrepresentation. Pl. Decl. at ¶ 37. Specifically, Plaintiff refers to an Instant Messenger conversation between him and Mr. Matchak that took place on June 19, 2013—the same date Plaintiff was notified he was being laid off.
In evaluating the Instant Messenger conversation, there is no indication Mr. Matchak made the misrepresentation that an employee on short-term disability could not be affected by the layoff. First, Mr. Matchak's statements were general responses to Plaintiff's general inquiries. There was no misstatement of fact.
Even assuming Plaintiff could establish a misrepresentation based on the Instant Messenger conversation or other conversations, the court considers whether Plaintiff would be able to establish that Mr. Matchak knew his statements were false. Plaintiff offers no argument on that issue. Moreover, in examining the Instant Messenger conversation, there is no indication that Mr. Matchak had knowledge of falsity; on the contrary, he offered to schedule a phone call between Plaintiff and IBM Medical to obtain the necessary information to Plaintiff's inquiry. As such, Plaintiff cannot establish that Mr. Matchak had knowledge of falsity.
Even assuming Plaintiff could establish knowledge of falsity, the court considers whether Plaintiff would be able to establish an intent to defraud. Plaintiff, again, offers no argument. Based on the Instant Messenger conversation, and as noted above, there is no indication that Mr. Matchak had any intent to defraud Plaintiff.
Lastly, assuming that Plaintiff could establish misrepresentation, knowledge of falsity, and intent to defraud, the court considers whether Plaintiff would be able to establish justifiable reliance. The undisputed evidence shows that he cannot.
Plaintiff argues that he relied on IBM's misrepresentations and did not apply for short-term disability because he was led to believe that he would lose his short-term disability benefits when his employment became terminated. Opp'n at 17. This argument, however, is belied by the evidence on the record. First, Plaintiff has stated that he applied for short-term disability, and the paperwork was submitted to IBM on July 2, 2013.
In sum, there is an absence of evidence to support Plaintiff's claim that IBM committed fraud in the inducement. Accordingly, IBM's motion as to this claim is granted.
As his fifth claim, Plaintiff alleges that IBM violated his statutory rights when it terminated Plaintiff because of his disability. Compl. at ¶ 49. IBM moves for summary judgment contending that this claim fails because Plaintiff cannot establish a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine based on disability discrimination or other FEHA violation. Mot. at 17.
In California, an employer can terminate an at-will employee for any reason "so long as it is not grounded on a prohibited bias."
In this instance, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was an at-will employee and that he was terminated from his employment with IBM.
Pursuant to California Civil Code § 3294(a), "the jury may award punitive damages where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice."
For the foregoing reasons, IBM's Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, Summary Adjudication is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
The motion is GRANTED as to the following claims: (1) first claim alleging disability discrimination in violation of FEHA; (2) fourth claim alleging fraud in the inducement; (3) fifth claim alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (4) Plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages.
The motion is DENIED as to the following claims: (1) second claim alleging failure to engage in timely, good faith interactive process; and (2) third claim alleging a failure to provide disability discrimination.
