LAUREL BEELER, Magistrate Judge.
Petitioner KVEN OJSC, a Russian Federation company, moves to confirm an international arbitration award under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307) ("FAA") and, more specifically, under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517 (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08) (hereinafter "New York Convention"). The award was issued in February 2012 in KVEN's favor against the respondent, Thunderbolt Enterprises, Ltd. (ECF No. 1-2 at 11-18 (arbitral decision) (English-language version).)
KVEN served Thunderbolt with the petition that started this suit, a summons, and other docket material. (ECF Nos. 12, 12-1, 18.) Thunderbolt has not opposed the petition or otherwise appeared in this action, and thus has not consented to the undersigned's jurisdiction. The clerk of court entered Thunderbolt's default on August 28, 2015. (ECF No. 16.) KVEN then moved for a final default judgment to confirm the arbitral award. (ECF Nos. 17 (motion), 18 (affidavit).) Thunderbolt has not opposed that motion.
The court held a hearing on December 10, 2015. The court now
KVEN and Thunderbolt entered into a contract for the sale of seafood. (See ECF No. 1-2 at 12) (arbitration decision). According to KVEN, Thunderbolt failed to deliver the agreed goods, and did not refund an advance payment that KVEN had made under the contract. (See ECF No. 1 at 4:5-7; ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3 (contract); ECF No. 1-2 at 12-13 (arbitral decision).) The parties' contract called for disputes under the agreement to be resolved under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the International Commercial Arbitration Court of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry ("ICAC"). (ECF No. 1 at 3.) That body conducted an arbitration in which KVEN participated but Thunderbolt did not. (E.g., ECF No. 1-2 at 11.) On February 2, 2012, ICAC issued its decision. (Id., passim). It determined that Thunderbolt owed KVEN USD $30,380 to refund KVEN's advance payment, and USD $4638 for the costs of the arbitration. (Id. at 15.) Thunderbolt has paid no part of the award.
On May 21, 2015, KVEN filed a petition in this court to confirm the ICAC award. (ECF No. 1.) Attached to the petition are certified copies of the parties' underlying contract (ECF No. 1-1 at 2-10) and of ICAC's arbitral decision and award (ECF No. 1-2 at 2-18). On August 19, KVEN confirmed that it had served Thunderbolt with the petition, summons, and other docket material. (ECF Nos. 12, 12-1 (process server's affidavit); ECF No. 18.) Thunderbolt has not answered the petition or otherwise appeared in this suit. On August 28, following KVEN's supported motion (ECF Nos. 13-15), the clerk of court entered Thunderbolt's default (ECF No. 16). Then, on October 27, KVEN moved for a final default judgment confirming the ICAC award. (ECF Nos. 17-18.) KVEN served its motion on Thunderbolt. (ECF No. 17 at 3-4.) Thunderbolt has not opposed that motion.
The court held a hearing on KVEN's motion on December 10, 2015. (See ECF No. 23 (minute entry).) KVEN appeared; Thunderbolt did not. KVEN told the court that it had not any response from Thunderbolt in connection with the petition, generally, or the default-judgment motion, specifically.
This court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 203 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This is an action to confirm an international arbitral award under the New York Convention, which is a treaty and law of the United States (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08), and thus presents a federal question (9 U.S.C. § 203).
This court is the proper venue for this case under 9 U.S.C. § 204. This is a "court in which save for the arbitration agreement an action or proceeding with respect to the controversy between the parties could be brought": Thunderbolt is a California corporation with its principal place of business in Novato, California and so, "save for the arbitration agreement," could be sued in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c); (ECF No. 1 at 2).
The New York Convention — which, again, is codified as part of the FAA at 9 U.S.C. § 201-08 — provides the following basic rule on confirming international arbitral awards:
9 U.S.C. § 207.
There is no question that KVEN applied to confirm the ICAC award within three years of its issuance. (See generally ECF Nos. 1 to 1-2.) The New York Convention provides the following grounds for refusing to recognize arbitral awards:
New York Convention, supra, art. V; Admart AG v. Stephen & Mary Birch Found., Inc., 457 F.3d 302, 307-08 (3rd Cir. 2006).
"To carry out the policy favoring enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, courts have strictly applied [these] Article V defenses and generally view them narrowly." Id. at 308. "The mandatory language of the Convention itself and of the FAA" indeed "leaves the district courts with `little discretion'" in this area. See Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing jurisdictional aspects of New York Convention) (citing Ministry of Def. of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc., 969 F.2d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 1992)). The party resisting confirmation has the burden of establishing these defenses to enforcement. See, e.g., Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Bogota, S.A. E.S.P. v. Mercury Telco Grp., Inc., 670 F.Supp.2d 1357, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
Thunderbolt has offered no proof that enforcement of the ICAC award should be refused or delayed for any of these reasons. Nor has the court seen, in the material that it has before it, any enumerated ground for refusing to confirm that award. The court must therefore confirm the award. E.g., 9 U.S.C. § 207 ("The court shall confirm the award . . . .").
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), a plaintiff may apply to the district court for — and the court may grant — a default judgment against a defendant who has failed to plead or otherwise defend an action. See Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 925 (9th Cir. 1986). The factors set out in Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986), favor granting KVEN's motion for default judgment. Given the deferential FAA standard (which impacts "the merits of [the petitioner's] substantive claim"), the amount at stake, the unlikelihood "of a dispute concerning material facts," and the lack of circumstances showing that "the default was due to excusable neglect," the undersigned concludes that the court should enter the requested default judgment. See id. at 1471-72.
Because Thunderbolt has not appeared in this suit, and thus has not consented to magistrate-judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the court
Any party may serve and file specific written objections to this recommendation within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); Civil L.R. 72-3. Failure to file written objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order.
KVEN must serve this Report and Recommendation on Thunderbolt.