JANIS L. SAMMARTINO, District Judge.
Plaintiff Roy Mason filed an action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("Compl.," ECF No. 1), and a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), (IFP Mot., ECF No. 2).
All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400.
In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit of his financial status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and Civil Local Rule 3.2. These statements show that Plaintiff receives $867.00 in monthly disability benefits, is not employed or married, and has no assets. (IFP Mot. 1-3.)
The Court must screen every civil action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and dismiss any case it finds "frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners."); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) "not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim").
As amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of § 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing the Marshal to effect service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); Navarette v. Pioneer Med. Ctr., No. 12-cv-0629-WQH (DHB), 2013 WL 139925, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2013).
All complaints must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). "[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663-64 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
"When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Andrews v. King, 393 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).").
"While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not." Hoagland v. Astrue, No. 1:12-cv-00973-SMS, 2012 WL 2521753, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Courts cannot accept legal conclusions set forth in a complaint if the plaintiff has not supported her contentions with facts. Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
A prima facie claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) requires a plaintiff to show: (1) he is disabled; (2) the defendant's business is a place of public accommodation; and (3) plaintiff was denied access because of his disability. Hernandez v. Polanco Enter., Inc., 19 F.Supp.3d 918, 930 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he is mobility impaired and uses a wheelchair. (Compl. ¶ 10.) He alleges that Defendants' business is open to the public and does not have a table that would fit his wheelchair. (Id. ¶ 11.) He further alleges that Defendants' business has not cured its failure to provide full and equal access. (Id. ¶ 12.) The Court finds Plaintiff's complaint sufficient to survive the "low threshold" for proceeding past the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Good cause appearing, the Court:
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3. Upon receipt, the Court
4. Defendants are thereafter
5. Plaintiff