RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HAIGHT, Senior District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Roderick Jackson (herein "plaintiff" or "Jackson") is a black African-American who brings this civil rights action against his former employer, defendant Post University ("defendant," "Post," or "the University"), alleging in his complaint that on March 2, 2007, Post unlawfully terminated his employment on the basis of his race and color in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (first cause of action) and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act ("CFEPA") (second cause of action).1 See Doc. # 1. After exhausting state administrative remedies with respect to his CFEPA claim and thereby receiving a "Release of Jurisdiction" from the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (see Part II.A, "Jurisdiction," infra),2 plaintiff filed his complaint in this Court on December 1, 2008.3

Defendant has moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 56(a)(1) for summary judgment on both causes of action alleged in the complaint. Doc. # 20. Specifically, defendant maintains that there is no genuine issue of material fact that prevents entry of judgment on its behalf as a matter of law because plaintiff has failed to provide evidence of racial bias. Moreover, defendant argues that there is a presumption against the existence of discriminatory intent in plaintiff's discharge because the Post employee who participated in hiring plaintiff is the same person who made the decision to terminate his employment less than eleven months later. Doc. # 21, p. 17-18.

II. JURISDICTION & VENUE

A. Jurisdiction

This Court has "federal question" subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's Section 1981 claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 13314 and 1343(a)(4).5 Plaintiff's section 1981 claim patently arises under federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq., and also seeks to recover damages for the violation of civil rights.6

Moreover, this Court has discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's CFEPA claim, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-60 et seq., pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).7 Plaintiff's CFEPA claim, based on racial discrimination with respect to the termination of his employment by Post, is "so related to" his federal Section 1981 claim "that they form part of the same case or controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Specifically, both claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. See Dixon v. Int'l Fed'n of Accountants, 416 Fed.Appx. 107, 111 (2d Cir.2011) ("Claims form part of the same case or controversy when they `derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.'")(quoting City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165, 118 S.Ct. 523, 139 L.Ed.2d 525 (1997)). Accordingly, it is within the Court's discretion to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff's state CFEPA claim, and I do so.

Furthermore, plaintiff asserts that he has exhausted all administrative remedies required as a precondition to commence a court action on his CFEPA claim, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-60(a)(1). Namely, plaintiff filed a charge of employment discrimination on the basis of race or color with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CCHRO") on May 4, 2007, within the requisite 180-day period following his termination. He thereafter received a "Release of Jurisdiction" from the CCHRO, issued on September 3, 2008.8 Doc. # 1, p. 12-13 (Ex. 1). Plaintiff then filed the present action in United States District Court on December 1, 2008, within 90 days of receiving the release. Doc. # 1. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-101(e) ("Any action brought by the complainant in accordance with section 46a-100 shall be brought within ninety days of the receipt of the release from the commission."). Plaintiff has thus followed the requisite state administrative procedures to allow this court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over his CFEPA claim. See, e.g., Collins v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 781 F.Supp.2d 59, 62 (D.Conn. 2011) ("To maintain an action for discriminatory practices under Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 46a-58 through 46a-81, a plaintiff must first exhaust her administrative remedies."); Anderson v. Derby Bd. of Educ., 718 F.Supp.2d 258, 271-72 (D.Conn.2010). Post does not contend that Jackson did not comply with these statutory requirements.

B. Venue

Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Section 1391(b) provides that "[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship" may only be brought in three specified judicial districts:

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). In the present action, plaintiff contends, without dispute, that Connecticut is the judicial district in which the events giving rise to the claim occurred. Plaintiff was employed in Connecticut and all events leading to his discharge occurred within that state.

III. FACTS

The facts established by the record are as follows.

A. Hiring of Plaintiff

In March of 2006, Edmond Lizotte, Post's Director of Human Resources, and Cheryl Gatling, Post's Office Manager of Admissions, participated in a job fair for the purpose of hiring an individual to fill a newly created position of field admissions representative. Plaintiff Jackson attended the fair.9 Jackson Depo., p. 114, l. 10-13; Lizotte Depo., p. 13, l.7-20.10 Lizotte observed plaintiff walk by the recruiting table four times before intercepting him to query whether he was interested in obtaining a position with Post. Lizotte Dep., p. 11, l. 21 to p. 12, l. 13. Lizotte interviewed plaintiff and asked him what he was "looking to do." Id., p. 12, l. 3-9; see also Jackson Dep., p. 116, l. 22 to p. 117, p. 2. In the process of the interview, Lizotte examined plaintiff's resume and determined that he had prior experience in sales but none in college recruitment.11 Lizotte Dep., p. 12, l. 9-10. Lizotte had an overall favorable impression of the way plaintiff conducted himself during the interview so he suggested that plaintiff attend a follow up interview with Dominick Miciotta, who was at that time Post's Vice President of Enrollment Management.12 Id., p. 12, l. 14-20.

Lizotte thereafter discussed plaintiff's application with Miciotta, recommending plaintiff as a candidate for the field admissions representative position. Id., p. 12, l. 14-20; Jackson Dep., p. 121, l. 22 to p. 122, l. 3. Two weeks after the job fair, Miciotta phoned plaintiff and set up an on-campus interview. Lizotte Dep., p. 12, l. 14-20; Jackson Dep., p. 121, l. 22 to p. 122, l. 3.

On the day of the interview with Miciotta, plaintiff also spoke with various other management-level employees at Post, including Lizotte and the outgoing President, Jon Jay DeTemple. Jackson Dep., p. 126, l. 19-23; l. 153, l. 2-6; p. 154, l. 7-11.

Miciotta made the determinative decision to hire plaintiff to work directly under him. Lizotte Dep., p. 16, l. 7-14. While Miciotta did not need clearance to make this decision, Lizotte acquiesced in it.13 Id. Lizotte telephoned plaintiff and offered him the position of field admissions representative. Jackson Dep., p. 154, l. 19-24; p. 155, l. 7-20. Plaintiff accepted the offer during that phone conversation with Lizotte. Id., p. 159, l. 1-15. On March 30, 2006, Post's then President DeTemple wrote plaintiff a letter to confirm plaintiff's agreement to accept the field admissions representative position, with an effective start date of April 17, 2006. Lizotte, Dep., Ex. B; Jackson Dep., p. 155, l. 21-25, p. 158, l. 5-10. On April 17, 2006, Miciotta sent an "Organizational Announcement" email to all Post staff, welcoming plaintiff to Post. Lizotte Dep., Ex. C.

B. April 17, 2006 to June 5, 2006 — Field Admissions Representative

During the initial term of his employment, Jackson worked primarily from his home in West Hartford and was responsible for "in person" recruitment of high school students in Connecticut. In this field admissions capacity, he traveled to high schools and career fairs to meet and encourage students to apply for admission to Post. Jackson Dep., p. 177, l. 16 to p. 181, l. 17. To assist plaintiff in attaining his objectives, Miciotta, as his direct supervisor, provided plaintiff with marketing materials, databases of high schools and adult education centers, and the mandatory number of high schools for plaintiff to contact each day.14 Id.; see also id., p. 181, l. 16-23.

Plaintiff testified that, from April 17, 2006, to June 5, 2006, he got along "okay" and "fine" with his direct supervisor, Miciotta. Id., p. 186, l. 21-25 He also agreed that everyone in the various Post departments was "cordial" with him during the initial weeks of his employment. Id., p. 170, l. 2-4.

C. June 5, 2006 — Online Enrollment Representative

On June 5, 2006, Miciotta met with plaintiff to inform him that his job duties were modified to incorporate those of an online enrollment representative. Jackson Dep., p. 176, l. 18 to p. 177, l. 18; 187, l. 11-22; p. 193, l. 13-19. In that altered position, plaintiff retained his field admissions representative title and salary but was also responsible for online recruiting. Lizotte Dep., Ex. D (Memo from Miciotta to Jackson re: Restructure of Job Duties, dated 6/12/2006). After four initial weeks of on-campus training with his new supervisor, Veronica Marrero, Assistant Director of Online Admissions, plaintiff resumed working from home.15 Id. Miciotta provided plaintiff with a list of various daily and weekly recruiting goals, all of which plaintiff considered "doable."16 Jackson Dep., p. 188, l. 7-11.

D. June 22, 2006 — Erroneous Notice of Termination/Miscommunication by Lizotte

On June 22, 2006, Lizotte mistakenly notified plaintiff that his employment with Post was terminated. Lizotte Dep., p. 30, l. 11-18. Lizotte explained in his deposition that plaintiff's former field admissions position was eliminated "because of the expense involved with going out and doing things." Id., p. 28, l. 12-21. According to Lizotte, Post's "decision-makers" did not feel that they were getting an adequate return on their investment in the position — i.e., "it didn't seem like the results that Rod [Jackson] was doing in the position were panning out."17 Id. When management decided to eliminate the position, Lizotte erroneously believed that Jackson himself was terminated and so informed him.18 Id., p. 30, l. 19 to p. 31, l. 22. Miciotta had, however, as stated supra, already informed plaintiff that, although his exclusively field-based position was eliminated, he would retain his employment with Post and take on online enrollment duties under the direct supervision of Veronica Marrero. Moreover, plaintiff would retain his salary level, which was higher than that of the other current online enrollment representatives.19 Jackson Dep., p. 195, l. 17-21.

When Lizotte informed plaintiff that he was terminated, plaintiff protested, asserting that Miciotta had already offered him an online enrollment position. Id., p. 205, l. 13-15 13-15. Plaintiff thus stated, "Dominick offered me the position. He didn't tell you?" Id., p. 205, l. 13-15; see also Lizotte Dep., Ex. G. Lizotte consulted Miciotta about the situation and discovered that plaintiff was indeed correct. Lizotte Dep., p. 30, l. 19-21. Lizotte then both phoned and emailed plaintiff to apologize for his "BIG miscommunication." Id., Ex. H (Email from Lizotte to Jackson, 6/22/2006, at 1:04 p.m.); see also id., p. 30, l. 19-25; p. 32, l. 12-16. He explained, "[w]e have had some major high level changes and things got screwed up."20 Id. Ex. H. He apologized for his previous, erroneous phone call, acknowledging that it "must have been upsetting." Id. Lizotte testified that he took it "personally" that he had upset Jackson because he "doesn't like to do harm to people." Id., p. 33, l. 16-18.

Plaintiff responded to Lizotte's apology by email, generously assuring Lizotte that there was "[n]o problem" and that he would see Lizotte and Miciotta at work the next morning. Lizotte Dep., Ex. H (Email from Jackson to Lizotte, 6/22/2006, at 5:22 p.m.). Plaintiff acknowledges that, as far as he knew, the "miscommunication" from Lizotte was a misunderstanding. Jackson Dep., p. 206, l. 16-18.

Plaintiff testified that he did not, however, believe that the field admissions representative position was actually eliminated because it "wasn't in the budget," as he was told. Id., p. 205, l. 5-11. He reasoned that this could not be true because he was "just offered ... a job as an online rep for the same amount of money." Id., l. 13-15. Furthermore, plaintiff was not pleased about his newly assigned position in general. He testified that he had a "gut feeling" that he was being demoted because he was a black person.21 Id., p. 188, l. 13-17.

In June of 2006, during plaintiff's on-campus training, his new supervisor, Marrero, reported that plaintiff exhibited outward signs of disinterest in his new position. Lizotte Dep., Ex. F (Email from Marrero to Miciotta, cc: Lizotte, 6/12/2006, at 7:05 p.m.). Marrero voiced concerns about plaintiff's attitude regarding the new role he would play because "he was really not sure of his role at all." Id., para. 1. She thus wrote to Miciotta and Lizotte on June 12, 2006, describing plaintiff's demeanor as follows:

Id., para. 2.22 Marrero further described plaintiff as noticeably surprised when he was told of the "preference to working 11-8, every day" and "he [even] tried to imply that he'd be `leaving in 15 minutes'" when it was only 5:00 p.m. Id.

Marrero summarized her disappointment in Jackson's attitude regarding his online enrollment position as follows:

Id., para. 3.23

Similarly, in describing a meeting with plaintiff and Marrero regarding the restructuring of plaintiff's position, Miciotta emailed Lizotte as follows:

Lizotte Dep., Ex. E (Email from Miciotta to Lizotte, 6/12/2006, 4:06 p.m.), para. 2, 7.

Lizotte summarized in his testimony that there were issues with Jackson's performance when his position became focused on online admissions:

Lizotte Dep., p. 37, l. 4-10.

E. August 2006 — Revival of field admissions position

In July of 2006, the Post Board of Trustees held a meeting and decided to give Miciotta "marching orders" to revive field admissions. Lizotte Dep., p. 37, l. 11-21. Specifically, the trustees determined that field admissions were necessary for "growth and expansion." Id., p. 36, l. 14-25. In late July or early August, Miciotta was informed that he would "have a total of three field people" and be given a budget to sustain these positions. Id., p. 40, l. 16 to p. 41, l. 3. According to Lizotte, Miciotta needed someone with field experience "to manage field people" because his own background was in a "call center environment." Id. p. 39, l. 16-25. Miciotta thus sought someone with experience in "break[ing] into the high school market." Id., p. 37, l. 19 to p. 38, l. 7. Lizotte recommended Ron Silva, a former National Guard recruiting supervisor and expert in such field work, to personally supervise and conduct field recruitment operations. Id., p. 38, l. 4-5, 11-25. Silva had been an area supervisor under Lizotte when Lizotte was a "recruit and retention battalion commander [in the National Guard] for the State of Massachusetts."24 Id., l. 14-18. According to Lizotte, at one time, Silva received the award for "Chief's 50 Winner," the number one recruiter for Massachusetts.25 Id., l. 22-25.

When Lizotte recommended Silva to Miciotta, Silva was working as a bank manager at the Bank of America in Newport, Rhode Island. Id., p. 39, l. 2-12. Lizotte described Silva as bored and anxious to return to "get out and meet with young men and women to talk about their future, work with guidance counselors on different things." Id., l. 9-12. Miciotta interviewed and then ultimately hired Silva to be Director of Field Admissions, starting in October or November of 2006. Id., p. 41, l. 8-16; Jackson Dep., p. 229, l. 9-14, l. 17-22, and l. 23-25.

For the other two field positions, with the title of "field admissions representative," Miciotta retained plaintiff to fill one position and, in October of 2006, hired a new employee named Jared Swerzenski to fill the other 226 Lizotte Dep., p. 40, l. 16 to p. 41, l. 7; p. 54, l. 5-6, 12-15. Lizotte testified that Swerzenski received a significantly lower salary than plaintiff because he had less sales experience. Id., p. 42, l. 16-24. Miciotta was nonetheless reportedly impressed with Swerzenski's ability to perform a mock sales presentation as part of the interview process. Id., p. 42, l. 24 to p. 43, l. 12. Lizotte explained that Swerzenski possessed the ability to overcome objections and close a sale. Id.

In August of 2006, at the time when Miciotta was directed to revive field admissions, he provided plaintiff with a work plan to "help [him] in his position ... [and] to give him focus." Lizotte Dep., Ex. I & J, and p. 50, l. 6-16. This work plan was a compromise in that it incorporated both field duties and online enrollment. Jackson Dep., p. 213, l. 6-12 and p. 214, l. 16-25. In particular, the plan explained plaintiff's responsibilities and mapped out his territory for recruitment. Lizotte Dep., p. 50, l. 16-24.

Plaintiff recalls that, from June 2006 until Miciotta addressed the "work plan for the coming year," plaintiff continued to voice discontentment with his position in a number of conversations with Miciotta. Jackson Dep., p. 215, l. 19-24; & p. 216, l. 5-8 (Plaintiff informed Miciotta, "I don't feel comfortable doing the online thing. I'm a field guy."). With respect to Miciotta and the other Post employees he encountered at this time, plaintiff testified that he got along "okay" with them. Id., p. 226, l. 8-16.

F. Marijuana Incident

On one occasion when Silva held a lunch meeting in the Post cafeteria with plaintiff and Swerzenski, plaintiff alleges that he was the target of a racially motivated insult by Silva.27 Plaintiff deemed the event the "infamous marijuana incident" and described it as follows:

Jackson Dep., p. 251, l. 2 to p. 252, l. 6.

Plaintiff clarified that he considered Silva's comment about marijuana to be racially motivated because "there is some stereotype out there that African-Americans smoke marijuana." Id., p. 252, l. 12-18. When asked where he had heard about this stereotype, plaintiff replied, "everywhere."28 Id., l. 19-25.

Plaintiff testified that he believes that Silva said he was "just playing" because "apparently" Silva "did not want [him] to be offended." Id., p. 254, l. 7-16. Nonetheless, plaintiff remained offended because it was "too late" to take back such an insult. Id., l. 14-16. "That's like shooting somebody and saying I'm sorry." Id.

Despite this incident, plaintiff testified that Silva treated him "okay" when the two of them drove together to various schools to perform their recruiting duties. Id., p. 265, l. 1-11. He also conceded that they "got along together." Id., l. 12-15. Plaintiff further conceded that, apart from Silva's gratuitous and unfortunate remark during the lunch meeting about Jackson's supposed marijuana consumption, neither Silva, nor Miciotta, nor anyone else at Post ever directed an epithet or slur toward Jackson which he interpreted as racial in nature. Id., p. 265, l. 16 to p. 266, l. 6. The qualification of Jackson's interpretation is necessary because, as noted infra, Silva's "marijuana" remark is capable of non-racial interpretations.

G. Personal Day on Date of Mandatory Meeting, February 21, 2007

On February 17, 2007, Lizotte emailed all members of Day Admissions and Field Admissions that there would be a mandatory meeting at 10:00 a.m. on February 21, 2007, at the Torrance Conference Room of the Post campus. Lizotte Dep., Ex. K (Email from Lizotte to admissions employees, including, inter alia, Silva, Jackson, & Swerzenski, 2/27/2007, at 11:23 a.m.). Lizotte instructed anyone who would be unable to attend to "please email me and let me know the reason why you will not be able to attend." Id., para. 1. Three days later, on Tuesday, February 20, 2007, i.e., one day before the meeting, plaintiff emailed one line to Lizotte: "I am taking a personal day on Wed.," without providing further explanation. Id. (Email from Jackson to Lizotte, 2/20/2007, at 9:11 a.m.). Lizotte responded to plaintiff, asking him specifically, "What is the purpose of the personal day?" Id., Ex. L (Email from Lizotte to Jackson, 2/20/2007, at 10:03 a.m.). Plaintiff did not respond. Jackson Dep., p. 278, l. 11-24.

The next day, Lizotte followed up with a second email, noting, "I did not get a response back from you on this. I did not see an approved PTO request anywhere about this. This meeting was important, important enough to have the President attend." Lizotte Dep., Ex. L (email from Lizotte to Jackson, cc: Silva, 2/21/2007, at 11:12 p.m.). Lizotte then instructed Jackson that "[b]y the end of business on Thursday, you will provide me with the reason why you could not attend the meeting." Id. Moreover, "[a]n email will not suffice" so "please come to campus on Thursday" to meet at 4:00 p.m. Id. Lizotte concluded with a line addressed to Silva: "Ron, Sorry to be going over your head, but this needs to be addressed now." Id.

Plaintiff neither responded to Lizotte's email nor traveled to campus to attend the requested 4:00 p.m. meeting because, in plaintiff's opinion, "Ron Silva took care of it" — i.e., Silva had confirmed that "Rod did have an approved day off." Jackson Dep., p. 284, l. 25 to p. 285, l. 25. Specifically, plaintiff contends that he "was already cleared [by Silva] for [his] personal day" before February 17. Id., p. 279, l. 4-10. He thus concedes that he did not respond to Lizotte's query (via email on February 20, 2007) regarding the "purpose of the personal day" because he "talked to Ron about it." Id., p. 280, l.1. Plaintiff explained at his deposition that he spoke to Silva and Silva spoke to Lizotte. Id., p. 281, l. 8-12; p. 282, l. 7-12. "I didn't have to tell him why I was taking a personal day." Id., p. 279, l. 1-20.

Lizotte, however, remained upset that Jackson chose to take a personal day on the date of the mandatory meeting with the University president. He thus testified:

Lizotte Dep., p. 55, l. 6-13. Lizotte clarified that when he later chose to terminate plaintiff, the failure to attend the meeting was not "the reason" for termination, but was one factor that he considered. Id., p. 55, l. 16-22 ("it was part of a number of things"). At his deposition, plaintiff did not recall having "any other issues" (than the "personal day" incident) with Lizotte. Jackson Dep., p. 286, l. 1-3.

H. February 2007 — Budgetary Cuts

In February of 2007, Miciotta's position was terminated by Post's Board of Trustees due to necessary drastic cuts to the budget. Lizotte Dep., p. 43, l. 16-24. The field admissions department "had not yet hit [its] fall enrollment numbers and had not hit a series of the online modular numbers or site numbers." Id. As described by Lizotte, the department's "budget was not being met."29 Id.

The decision was thus made to "make some ... `Jacobian [sic] cuts' and [Miciotta's] position was one of the ones cut."30 Id., p. 43, l. 19-24.

Lizotte was then asked to fill in as Interim Director of Admissions until Post could find a viable candidate.31 Id., p. 44, l.13-22. Lizotte simultaneously retained his title of Director of Human Resources, "wearing two hats at the [same] time" for a period of six to seven months. Id., p. 9, l. 11-15; p. 10, l. 2-17.

In late February 2007, the senior management at Post decided that one of the field admissions representative positions must be cut; and Lizotte was directed to determine which representative should be terminated. Id., p. 56, l. 9 to p. 57, l. 8, & l. 17-22. Lizotte thus testified that he was informed that henceforth Post would have only two field admissions positions due to budgetary cuts.32 He was instructed to eliminate one position. Id., p. 55, l. 22 to p. 57, l. 16. In addition to the field position, Post also eliminated an enrollment coordinator position and a data entry position.33 Post thus eliminated a total of three "admissions or enrollment" positions at the same time. Id., p. 59, l. 9-15.

Lizotte stated that, in deciding whom to terminate, he primarily examined the production rates of the employees and the amount of initiative being shown. Id., p. 55, l. 22. In addition to his own knowledge of the field admissions employees, he considered evaluations and assessments by plaintiff's supervisors. For example, he requested that Ron Silva, as Director of Field Admissions and plaintiff's direct supervisor, prepare a memorandum, containing an assessment of plaintiff's performance of his duties.34 Id., Ex. M (Memorandum for Record from Silva to Lizotte, "Subject: Roderick Jackson," 5/25/2007); see also Lizotte Dep., p. 59, l. 21 to p. 60, l. 6.

I. Silva's Assessment of Plaintiff's Performance — Memo dated 2/25/2007

In his memorandum, dated February 25, 2007, Silva described plaintiff's attitude during his first two weeks of Silva's supervision as "very resistant to any ... instructions and guidelines" during training. Lizotte Dep., Ex. M, para. 2. "He seemed to be confrontational and overfly] sensitive on many occasions when discussing the team's work policies and procedures." Id. Next, Silva documented plaintiff's failure to attend a mandatory work session with Marrero on Nov. 17, 2006. Id., para. 3. Silva stated that plaintiff "did not even call to say why," ironically after having insisted on receiving a special Outlook invitation. Rather, on the day of the meeting, Jackson called the "front desk representative ... to say he had put in for a personal day." Id. Silva concluded that Jackson's behavior with respect to this meeting was "unprofessional and negligent." Id.

Silva then described a training session he held on Nov. 29, 2006, with plaintiff and Swerzenski. Silva stated that he instructed his team on the proper use of their Post AMEX credit cards, "looking out for [them] ... regarding making bad decisions for card use." Id., p. 2, para. 1. Silva noted, "Rod was offended and without my knowledge went to Dominick [Miciotta] to discuss my warnings on fraudulent use of the card." Id.

Silva went on to discuss the "personal day" incident regarding the mandatory meeting with Post's President on February 21, 2007. Silva wrote that he called plaintiff on February 14 to inform him of a "very important meeting for the Admissions Staff being held by Ed Lizotte on 21 February, 2007." Id., para. 2. Silva was unable to reach plaintiff and thus left him a voicemail. Id. Plaintiff allegedly responded by saying that "he had that day off." Id. Silva replied that he had no formal record of such a day; and Jackson "responded by saying that he had mentioned it to [Silva] 2 weeks ago but forgot to give [him] the request." Id. Silva ultimately received the formal request and spoke to Lizotte "over the weekend." Id. Silva then documented that "[a]gain I spoke to Rod [Jackson] about planning ahead and being prompt on requests," suggesting that, in essence, plaintiff should have planned ahead so as not to miss the meeting or, at the very least, have promptly turned in his personal day request. Id.

Finally, Silva recounted his disappointment "[l]ast week [when he] called Rod to check in on his progress and his plan for the week." Id., para. 3. When Silva asked plaintiff about his "back-up plan" to get work done on a day when it was snowing, plaintiff had no such plan, merely stating, that "all the schools were closed." Id. Similarly, plaintiff could not describe to Silva what he had planned for the week because he "couldn't find his planner." Id.

Silva concluded that he had "concerns regarding some of the issues and observations" stated in the memo. Id., para. 4. He closed by stating, "Rod at times seems to be detached from the real sense of the mission at hand and lacks the drive to be a self starter."35 Id.

J. March 2, 2007 — Plaintiff's termination

On March 2, 2007, Lizotte informed plaintiff that his employment was terminated in a meeting at Lizotte's Interim Director of Admissions office. Lizotte Dep., p. 63, l. 16-22. Lizotte described the encounter as follows:

Lizotte Dep., p. 64, l. 17 to p. 65, l. 4.

At this meeting, Lizotte went through a series of issues with plaintiff's performance, including plaintiff being "upset" with being supervised by Silva, not accounting for his time in the field and/or not being a "self-motivator," e.g., not making recruiting calls from home when Post is closed.36 Id., p. 65, l. 5 to p. 66, l. 4. Despite these discussions regarding performance, Lizotte indicated on plaintiff's "Unemployment Notice," provided at the time of separation, that the sole "reason for unemployment" was "Position Elimination/Re-Structure."37 See Lizotte Dep., Ex. N ("Unemployment Notice re: Roderick Jackson," signed by Lizotte on 3/2/2007).

In April or May of 2007, an admissions position opened up at Post. The position was entitled, "day admissions representative." Lizotte Dep., p. 69, l. 25. Lizotte phoned and rehired Randy Sanders, an African-American who had previously worked in the admissions department. Id., p. 68, l. 7 to p. 69, l. 21. Sanders was familiar with the University, "knew the systems, was a proven entity or commodity with regards to bringing in enrollments." Id., l. 3-7. "He had left the university for personal reasons." Id., l. 7-8.

According to Lizotte, the position was created as a "backfill" for Michelle Salvador, an admissions department employee who was about to go out on maternity leave. Id., p. 68, l. 16 to p. 69, l. 25. Lizotte said that, due to the timing of Salvador's prospective leave, he needed an "overlap of time so that [Sanders could] transition Michelle's workload and caseload." Id., l. 12-16. Lizotte obtained the board's approval to hire Sanders right away. Id., l. 16-21. There is no indication in the record whether the day admissions position in any way replaced the field admissions representative position formerly held by, or encompassed the duties once performed by, plaintiff.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Standards for Summary Judgment

I begin this Discussion with the observation that most, if not all, pre-trial discovery has been completed. The individuals central to the case, plaintiff Jackson and the key Post administrator Lizotte, have been deposed. It would seem that all relevant documents have been produced by both parties. It is generally held that in fact-intensive cases such as this one, a trial court should not entertain or adjudicate motions by either party for summary judgment until all discovery has been completed. See, e.g., Hellstrom v. U.S. Dept. Of Veterans Affairs, 201 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2000): "[S]ummary judgment should only be granted if after all discovery, the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof.... Only in the rarest of cases may summary judgment be granted against a plaintiff who has not been afforded the opportunity to conduct discovery." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). In the case at bar, the voluminous record created by discovery allows the Court to consider the merits of Post's motion for summary judgment dismissing Jackson's complaint.

The criteria for granting or denying summary judgment are well established. The district court may not resolve issues of fact, but rather "must determine (a) whether there is a `genuine issue as to any material fact,' and (b) whether, in light of the undisputed facts, `the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); O'Hara v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 642 F.3d 110, 115-16 (2d Cir.2011); Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir.2011).38

Summary judgment is proper when, after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant, no reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). It thus follows that "[s]ummary judgment is improper if there is any evidence in the record that could reasonably support the jury's verdict for the non-moving party.'" Ford v. Reynolds, 316 F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Marvel Characters v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280, 285-86 (2d Cir. 2002)).

The party who seeks summary judgment bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to it, on the facts and the law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Specifically, the moving party must establish that there exists no genuine issue of material fact to warrant a trial, and that movant "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c)(2); see, e.g., Ford, 316 F.3d at 354; Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir.2005); Gummo v. Village of Depew, 75 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir.1996); Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1060-61 (2d Cir.1995). In determining whether that burden has been met, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and credit all factual inferences that could be drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

"It is not the province of the court itself to decide what inferences should be drawn...; if there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment is improper...." Vivenzio, 611 F.3d at 106 (quoting Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir.2000)).

Once the moving party has met his or her burden, the opposing party must present sufficient evidence to show that a factfinder could reasonably find genuine issues of fact. There must be more than a "scintilla of evidence" in the non-movant's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Moreover, "conclusory allegations," "bald assertions," and "metaphysical doubt" will not suffice. See, e.g., BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 77 F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir.1996) (it is insufficient for a party opposing summary judgment "merely to assert a conclusion without supplying supporting arguments or facts"); Shannon v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir.2003) ("Conclusory allegations, conjecture, and speculation... are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact.") (internal quotation marks omitted).39 Rather, "the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348); see also R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir.1984) (nonmoving party must set forth "concrete particulars" showing that a trial is needed).

If the evidence is "merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Moreover, "`the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties' alone will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment." Id. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

B. Standard for Federal Discrimination Claim — Section 1981

Plaintiff brings the present discrimination action against his former employer, alleging that Post unlawfully discharged him on the basis of his race and color in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981") and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act ("CFEPA"), Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-60. Because federal law guides analysis of Connecticut's anti-discrimination statutes, including CFEPA, Levy v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 96, 103, 671 A.2d 349, 355 (1996), plaintiff's federal and state discrimination claims will be analyzed together.40

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) provides that "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).41 The phrase "make and enforce contracts" is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) to include "the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." "Accordingly, it is now well established that an employee may sue his employer under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for racially discriminatory termination." Anderson v. Hertz Corp., 507 F.Supp.2d 320, 326 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (citing Lauture v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 216 F.3d 258, 260 (2d Cir.2000)). See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-460, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975) ("§ 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race").

To establish a claim under Section 1981, the plaintiff must show that (1) he is a member of a racial minority group, (2) defendant intended to discriminate against him on the basis of race, and (3) this discrimination concerned one of the activities enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Jenkins v. NYC Transit Authority, 201 Fed. Appx. 44, 45-46 (2d Cir.2006) (citing Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir.1993) (per curiam)). Accord Baker v. McDonald's Corp., 686 F.Supp. 1474, 1481 (S.D.Fla. 1987), aff'd, 865 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989).

"A plaintiff's efforts to establish the second element of a § 1981 claim [i.e., to establish defendant's discriminatory intent] are subject to the same burden-shifting analysis as intentional discrimination claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq." Jenkins, 201 Fed.Appx. at 45-46 (citing Gant ex rel. Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134, 146 (2d Cir. 1999)). Specifically, the Second Circuit assesses Section 1981 claims under the familiar burden-shifting framework articulated by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See, e.g., Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir.2010) (applying McDonnell Douglas analysis to section 1981 claim because "[t]he substantive standards applicable to claims of employment discrimination under Title VII... are also generally applicable to claims of employment discrimination brought under § 1981").42 See also Anderson v. Hertz Corp., 507 F.Supp.2d 320, 326-27 (S.D.N.Y.2007) ("Although it was initially established for Title VII claims, the burden-shifting framework described in McDonnell Douglas ... also applies to claims arising under § 1981") (citing Hudson v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 620 F.2d 351, 354 (2d Cir.1980)).

"Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case [by demonstrating] the following: (1) she was within the protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.'" U.S. v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 93 (2d Cir.2011)43 (quoting Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 498 (2d Cir.2009)); accord Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir.2010).

Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d at 92-94. Accord Vivenzio, 611 F.3d at 106. The defendant "must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) ("Hicks") (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). Accord Hongyan Lu v. Chase Inv. Services Corp., 412 Fed.Appx. 413, 415-16 (2d Cir. 2011); Bernard v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, 408 Fed.Appx. 465, 467-68 (2d Cir. 2011).

If the employer articulates such a nondiscriminatory reason, "[t]he burden then shifts back to the plaintiff `to show that [the defendant's] stated reason for [the adverse employment action] was in fact pretext.'" Brennan, 650 F.3d at 93 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817); accord Vivenzio, 611 F.3d at 106; Leibowitz, 584 F.3d at 499.44 Specifically, the plaintiff "is given an opportunity to adduce admissible evidence that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that the employer's proffered reason is pretext for an impermissible motivation." Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir.2000); accord Vivenzio, 611 F.3d at 106.45

"The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Texas Dep't of Comty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); accord Vivenzio, 611 F.3d at 106; Hargett v. Nat'l Westminster Bank, USA, 78 F.3d 836, 838 (2d Cir.1996). Moreover, "a reason cannot be proved to be a `pretext for discrimination' unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (emphasis in original); accord Hongyan Lu, 412 Fed.Appx. at 416.

C. Application of These Standards and Criteria to the Evidence in This Case

On the record in this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff has met his evidentiary burden with respect to the first and third McDonnell Douglas elements. Specifically, as a black African-American Mr. Jackson is a member of a racial minority group, whose employment contract was terminated on March 2, 2007, within the statutory meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).

With respect to the second element — i.e., that plaintiff was qualified for his position — plaintiff "need not demonstrate that his performance was flawless or superior." de la Cruz v. New York City Human Resources Admin. Dept. of Soc. Services, 82 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir.1996). "Rather, he need only demonstrate that he `possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of [the] job.'" Id. (quoting Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1155 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984, 99 S.Ct. 576, 58 L.Ed.2d 656 (1978)); see also Owens v. New York City Housing Authority, 934 F.2d 405, 409 (2d Cir.1991) ("McDonnell Douglas requires only a minimal showing of qualification to establish a prima facie claim").

The record reflects that, although Jackson had no college recruitment experience, plaintiff possessed a background in sales, which was considered by Post to be useful in plaintiff's position. Lizotte Dep., p. 17, l. 17 to p. 18, l. 6. Moreover, despite expressions of concern at various times by his supervisors, Miciotta, Marrero, Silva, and Lizotte, regarding plaintiff's disinterested attitude toward his position, plaintiff was never officially disciplined during his employment. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it is thus plausible to conclude that he was at the very least minimally "qualified" for his position: this element requires no more.

As to the fourth element, whether plaintiff's termination arose under circumstances which give rise to an inference of discrimination, the record is more complex. It is clear enough that at the pertinent times, Post was undergoing internal financial reassessments and some reductions in its work force. In cases involving a reduction in force, the inquiry as to whether discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination is highly fact specific. Burger v. New York Inst. of Tech., 94 F.3d 830, 833 (2d Cir.1996). The "[s]imilarity of jobs" between the employee discharged and the employees retained thereafter is one of several non-dispositive factors to be considered. Id. at 834.

In the case at bar, plaintiff was informed that his position of field admissions representative was being eliminated due to budgetary problems, yet two fellow Caucasian employees retained their jobs in field admissions. Swerzenski, in particular, had less seniority with Post but retained a position with the same title and duties as plaintiff. Because plaintiff was the only African American in the field admissions department and was the one chosen for discharge, one might find "circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination."

Assuming arguendo that Jackson has met this less demanding standard of showing circumstances leading to a plausible inference of discrimination, it does not follow that Post is barred from summary relief. The burden of proof simply shifts to the defendant to present evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. In the present case, defendant has clearly met that burden. Lizotte testified that in late February of 2007, the senior management at Post decided that one field admissions representative position must be cut due to the University's budget. Lizotte was directed to determine which representative should be terminated. Lizotte Dep., p. 56, l. 9 to p. 57, l. 8, & l. 17-22. In making the decision of whom to discharge, he examined and compared the production rates and the level of initiative being shown by the field admissions employees.46 Id., p. 55, l. 16-22.

As one source of information, Lizotte reviewed an assessment of plaintiff's performance by Silva, plaintiff's direct supervisor.47 In that memorandum, Silva documented a list of situations in which plaintiff had exhibited problems with his attitude (describing him, for example, as "very resistant" to instructions, "confrontational," "overfly] sensitive," and lacking a sufficient work plan). Lizotte Dep., Ex. M (Memorandum for Record from Ron Silva, Director of Field Admissions, to Ed Lizotte, dated 2/25/2007). Silva concluded, "Rod [Jackson] at times seems to be detached from the real sense of the mission at hand and lacks the drive to be a self starter." Id., p. 2, para. 4.48

Lizotte also took into account previous evaluations of plaintiff by Marrero and Miciotta. For example, Marrero stated that plaintiff had exhibited a negative attitude regarding changes in his job duties (i.e., incorporating online enrollment) in June of 2006. Id., Ex. F (Email form Marrero to Miciotta, cc: Lizotte, dated 6/12/2006, stating that "[d]uring training, Rod seemed very indifferent and honestly un-interested"). Lizotte further noted that from June to August of 2006, Miciotta had expressed concerns about whether plaintiff had the skills necessary to perform adequately as a field person. Lizotte Dep., p. 47, l. 6-24.49

As an additional factor in his analysis, Lizotte credited his own observations of plaintiff's lack of initiative, such as plaintiff's choice to take a personal day rather than attend a mandatory meeting with the President of Post on February 21, 2007. Id., p. 55, l. 16-22. Lizotte recalled with frustration that plaintiff had scheduled a "personal day" for that date and notified him directly by email one day before the meeting. See id., p. 64, l. 17 to p. 65, l. 4 ("You blew off the meeting that the president asked me to call. I understand you had a personal day, but if it was me, I would have changed the personal day, unless it was something, you know, absolutely positively necessary."). Regardless of whether, as plaintiff contends, plaintiff performed the correct procedures to obtain such a personal day, Lizotte's firm belief that Jackson's taking such a day on the date of a mandatory meeting was inappropriate is apparent from the record and untainted by any discernible racial element.

In sum, through Lizotte's testimony, the defendant "has introduced evidence that, `taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason'" for plaintiff's discharge. Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 141 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)). Namely, economic cutbacks led to the termination of one field admissions position and Lizotte's analysis of employee performance and initiative led him to conclude that plaintiff was the least valuable employee in field admissions.50 See, e.g., Jaiyeola v. Carrier Corp., 350 Fed.Appx. 583, 585 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming summary judgment where employer's proffered reason for black male employee's termination, downsizing of department in which he was weakest performer, held to be legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason).

In its defense, Post further contends that under the "same actor" inference, it is entitled to the benefit of a strong presumption that it lacked any discriminatory intent toward plaintiff.51 Post maintains that it is entitled to this presumption because Lizotte, the person who made the decision to terminate plaintiff in March of 2007, is the "same actor" who recruited him less than one year earlier.

D. "Same Actor" Inference

In support of its motion for summary judgment, Post asserts that plaintiff's claim of racial bias "falls squarely within the `same actor' rule, which entitles Post to a strong inference of nondiscrimination." Doc. # 21, p. 17, para. 1. The "same actor inference" is generally applied in the context of claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq., and provides that when the same actor hires and also fires a person in a protected class, there is a presumption against an inference of discrimination. See Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir.1997).52

As the Second Circuit explained in Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir.2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1261, 120 S.Ct. 2718, 147 L.Ed.2d 983 (2000):

Accord Jetter v. Knothe Corp., 324 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir.2003) ("when the person who made the decision to fire was the same person who made the decision to hire, especially when the firing occurred only a short time after the hiring, it is difficult to impute [to the decisionmaker] an invidious firing motivation that would be inconsistent with [the] decision to hire.").53

Likely due to the commonality of discrimination in both civil rights and ADEA claims, the Second Circuit has also "recognized the validity of [the] `same actor' argument" in the context of a Section 1981 claim. See Kim v. Dial Service Intern., Inc., 159 F.3d 1347, 1998 WL 514297 (Table), at *4 (2d Cir.1998) (citing Grady v. Affiliated Central, Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir.1997), to acknowledge the validity of the same actor doctrine but holding that lack of a jury instruction on this issue did not prejudice defendants under the circumstances, "inasmuch as over six years had passed between the time plaintiff was hired and the time he was fired"). See also Portee v. Deutsche Bank, No. 03 Civ. 9380(PKC), 2006 WL 559448, *6, *11 n. 3, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9153, *33 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2006) (noting that discrimination "[c]laims under section 1981 are analyzed under the same framework as claims brought pursuant to Title VII" and applying "same actor" inference in the context of § 1981 claim); Anderson v. Hertz Corp., 507 F.Supp.2d 320, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y.2007) (applying "same actor" inference in § 1981 action for race discrimination to "cast doubt on any potential inference of invidious discrimination in Plaintiff's termination"); Richards v. Calvet, No. 99 Civ. 12172(RJH)(MHD), 2005 WL 743251, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2005) (examining "same actor defense" in discrimination action brought under, inter alia, ADEA and § 1981 to hold that summary judgment was inappropriate because there existed a genuine issue of material fact with respect to who hired plaintiff).

1. Length of Time Between Hire and Discharge

Following the Second Circuit precedent of Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir.1997), district courts within the Circuit explicitly recognize that "[t]he same actor inference applies with greatest force where the act of hiring and firing are not significantly separated in time." Choate v. Transp. Logistics Corp., 234 F.Supp.2d 125, 130-31 (D.Conn.2002). "Conversely, when a longer period of time elapses between the hiring and firing, the inference is `less compelling' and `significantly weaken[ed].'" Id. (citing Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 138 (2d Cir.2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1261, 120 S.Ct. 2718, 147 L.Ed.2d 983 (2000) (seven year time lapse)).

In practical terms, district courts have frequently applied the same actor inference when the hiring and firing of the claimant have both occurred within a three-year period. See, e.g., Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir.2000) (applying inference when hiring and firing three years apart); Shabazz-Allah v. Guard Mgmt. Serv., No. 97 Civ. 8194, 1999 WL 123641, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. March 8, 1999) ("within two years"), aff'd, No. 99-7371, 1999 WL 1012402, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 20, 1999); McKinney v. Lanier Worldwide, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 8139, 1998 WL 677544, at *2, 5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1998) (two years and four months); Dedyo v. Baker Eng'g N.Y., Inc., No. 96 Civ. 7152, 1998 WL 9376, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 1998) ("a mere three years").54

Within this District, the three-year period of Schnabel has been noted as a reference point. Choate v. Transp. Logistics Corp., 234 F.Supp.2d 125, 130-31 (D.Conn. 2002) (finding a strong inference that discrimination was not a motivating factor in plaintiff's termination where termination took place eighteen months after he was hired; noting that "the Second Circuit has applied the inference [in Schnabel, 232 F.3d at 91] even where the hiring and firing occurred three years apart").

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that plaintiff was employed by Post from April 17, 2006, to March 2, 2007, a period of approximately ten and one-half months. This relatively short duration of time between hiring and discharge falls squarely within the period contemplated by the "same actor" inference. It is also undisputed that Lizotte is the person who made the decision to discharge plaintiff in March of 2007. The remaining issue is thus whether Lizotte may be deemed an actor who hired plaintiff.

2. Identity of Person who Hired and Fired

In order for the presumption against discriminatory intent to arise under the same actor doctrine, the defendant must establish the identity of the person or persons who made the decision to hire and then later to discharge the plaintiff. The involvement of multiple decision-makers in either the hiring or termination decision does not automatically preclude application of the same actor inference. See Jones v. Yonkers Pub. Schools, 326 F.Supp.2d 536, 546 (S.D.N.Y.2004) ("the [same actor] inference may be applied even when the supervisor at issue ... is not the only person with input into the hiring and firing decision. The inference `is applicable so long as one management-level employee played a substantial role in both the hiring and firing of the plaintiff.'") (quoting Ramos v. Marriott Int'l, 134 F.Supp.2d 328, 346 (S.D.N.Y.2001)); accord Thomas v. iStar Financial, Inc., 438 F.Supp.2d 348, 361-62 (S.D.N.Y.2006).

From the record, it is undisputed that Lizottte ultimately made the decision to terminate plaintiff. It is thus incumbent on the Court to determine whether Lizotte also played a substantial role in hiring plaintiff. Upon careful review of the evidence presented, I find that he did.

Defendant Post established, and plaintiff concedes, that Lizotte recruited plaintiff at the March 2006 job fair for the position of field admissions representative. Lizotte Dep., p. 11, l. 21 to p. 12, l. 13; Jackson Dep., p. 116, l. 22 to p. 117, p. 2. Lizotte interviewed plaintiff, reviewed his resume, and described the available position to him. Lizotte Dep., p. 12, l. 9-10; see also Doc. # 26, ¶ A.2. Upon forming a favorable opinion of plaintiff, Lizotte recommended plaintiff's application to Miciotta, who was Vice President of Enrollment Management. Lizotte Dep., p. 12, l. 14-20; Jackson Dep., p. 121, l. 22 to p. 122, l. 3. Miciotta then set up on-campus interviews, including interviews with Miciotta, Lizotte, and other members of Post's management. Lizotte Dep., p. 12, l. 14-20; Jackson Dep., p. 121, l. 22 to p. 122, l. 3; p. 126, l. 19-23; l. 153, l. 2-6; p. 154, l. 7-11; Doc. # 26, ¶ A.4. Thereafter, Miciotta made the decision to hire plaintiff. Lizotte Dep., p. 16, l. 7-14. Lizotte phoned plaintiff to offer him the position and plaintiff conveyed his acceptance to Lizotte. Jackson Dep., p. 154, l. 19-24; p. 155, l. 7-20; p. 159, l. 1-15.

Despite Lizotte's efforts in placing plaintiff's application before Miciotta, plaintiff contends that "Lizotte only had a limited role in the defendant's offer of employment to the plaintiff." Doc. # 25, p. 2, para. 2. At his deposition, plaintiff emphasized his interactions with Cheryl Gatling, Post's Office Manager of Admissions, at the career fair, stating that he gave her his resume.55 Jackson Dep., p. 111, l. 9-16, p. 113, l. 17 to p. 114, l. 1. Moreover, he argued that, "other than speaking generically with the plaintiff at the job fair regarding the field admissions representative position, Lizotte had no further role in the plaintiff's employment."56 Doc. # 25, p. 2, para. 2.

Accepting arguendo the accuracy of Jackson's perception that Post administrators Gatling and Miciotta played major roles in hiring him, the end result of his hire does not negate Lizotte's involvement. Plaintiff was not privy to the internal workings of Post's hiring process. Specifically, he was not present when Lizotte discussed plaintiff's job application with Miciotta to set up an on-campus interview.57 See, e.g., Choate v. Transp. Logistics Corp., 234 F.Supp.2d 125, 131 (D.Conn.2002) (with respect to application of same actor inference, "[p]laintiff's view of hiring" was deemed "incomplete," "unsupported," and "conclusory" where he offered no basis for assertion that he was not hired by supervisor other than that he was not interviewed by him).58

Plaintiff contends in his brief at 2 that after their conversation at the job fair, "Lizotte had no further role in the plaintiff's employment with the defendant," an assertion that is belied by Lizotte's personal exchanges with Jackson about the taking of the problematic personal day, and in other respects is beyond the reach of plaintiff's personal knowledge about the Post administrators' internal discussions and conduct on the subject. To the extent that such contentions are not based on personal knowledge, they are unsupported and conclusory and the Court must disregard them.59

Not infrequently, an employer utilizes multiple actors to handle the various stages of the hiring process. In such a case, each actor plays an integral role in the applicant's ultimate hire yet the applicant is generally not privy to the discussions among the actors. Furthermore, the substantial involvement of one actor does not negate that of another.

The record indisputably reflects that Lizotte was one of Post's few interviewers at the March 2006 job fair at which plaintiff was recruited. "Lizotte noticed the Plaintiff and engaged him in conversation regarding his sales background and career objectives, as well as the field representative position." Doc. # 22, ¶ 2; Doc. # 26, ¶ A.2. The parties agree that "Lizotte discussed the Plaintiff with Dominick Miciotta, the University's Vice President of Enrollment Management, and arranged an interview." Doc.# 22, ¶ 4, Doc. # 26, ¶ A.4. "Miciotta then called the Plaintiff, discussed the Plaintiff's resume and scheduled an interview." Doc.# 22, ¶ 5, Doc. # 26, ¶ A.5. After the interview with Miciotta, which also included time spent with Post President DeTemple and Lizotte, "Lizotte and ... Miciotta extended an employment offer to Plaintiff, despite his lack of college recruiting experience." Doc. # 22, ¶ 6-8, Doc. # 26, ¶ A.6-8; see also Jackson Dep., p. 126, l. 19-23; l. 153, l. 2-6; p. 154, l. 7-11. Shortly thereafter, "Lizotte called the Plaintiff with the employment offer, and followed up the call with an email and offer letter." Doc.# 22, ¶ 9, Doc. # 26, ¶ A.9.

In total, the evidence demonstrates that Lizotte's actions were integral to Post's hiring of plaintiff. Granted, Miciotta, as the direct supervisor of the newly created field admissions representative position, made the determinative decision to offer plaintiff employment. Nonetheless, Lizotte recruited plaintiff, recommended him to Miciotta, secured the necessary follow-up interviews on campus, and ultimately phoned him with the job offer. In contrast, plaintiff baldly denigrates Lizotte's participation without being privy to Lizotte's interactions with Miciotta behind the scenes, including discussions that led to Miciotta's on-campus interview of plaintiff.60

Considering the totality of evidence in the record and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor, the Court nonetheless finds that Lizotte played a substantial role in Post's hiring of plaintiff. Because Lizotte was also indisputably the person who terminated plaintiff less than eleven months later, the "same actor inference" arises — i.e., that plaintiff's discharge was made without discriminatory animus.

This "same actor" finding does not, however, end the question. "[T]he same-actor inference is merely plausible and should not be used as a substitute for a thorough factual inquiry." Ramos v. Marriott Int'l, 134 F.Supp.2d 328, 345 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (citing Copeland v. Rosen, 38 F.Supp.2d 298, 305 (S.D.N.Y.1999)); Watt v. New York Botanical Garden, No. 98 Civ. 1095, 2000 WL 193626, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2000) (court must consider all evidence in the record as a whole because "application of the same actor inference is permissible — as opposed to required"). In other words, "[t]he `same actor' inference is not a necessary inference, it is only a plausible one, and decisions in this Circuit addressing it have warned that its use is not to become a substitute for a fact-intensive inquiry into the particular circumstances of the case at hand." Copeland, 38 F.Supp.2d at 305.

It is thus incumbent on the Court to "examine the record as a whole, just as a jury would, to determine whether a jury could reasonably find an invidious discriminatory purpose on the part of the employer." Palmer-Williams v. Yale New Haven Hosp., No. 3:08cv1526 (JBA), 2011 WL 1226022, at *6-7 (D.Conn. Mar. 27, 2011) (quoting Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir.2001)). In other words, the Court must review all of the facts presented to determine whether there exists evidence of racial discrimination.61 Although direct evidence of discrimination is not necessary, there must be sufficient circumstantial evidence for a jury to infer the existence of discrimination. Norton v. Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir.1998). Accord Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 141 (2d Cir. 2008) ("Direct evidence of discrimination, `a smoking gun,' is typically unavailable... It is well settled ... that employment discrimination plaintiffs are entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence."); Lizardo v. Denny's Inc., 270 F.3d 94 (2d Cir.2001) ("a jury cannot infer discrimination from thin air"). The Court must therefore examine whether plaintiff has presented evidence of racial animus.

E. Evidence of Racial Animus — Stray Remark

Because defendant has proffered a nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's discharge, bolstered by the presumption of the "same actor" doctrine, the burden returns finally to plaintiff to show that defendant's stated reason for his discharge was pretextual in that his termination was directly related to his race.62 See, e.g., Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir.2008)(once defendant has provided a nondiscriminatory reason for termination, plaintiff can no longer rely on his prima facie case, but may prevail if he can show that the employer's decision was in fact the result of discrimination). In particular, plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that discrimination was a "substantial or motivating factor for the defendant's actions." See, e.g., Tolbert v. Queens College, 242 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir.2001). In the absence of racial animus, there is no viable Section 1981 action.

In an attempt to prove racial animus, plaintiff points solely to one comment by his direct supervisor, Ron Silva, Director of Field Admissions, during a lunch at which Silva was attempting "to get to know" plaintiff "a little better" and plaintiff "was having an issue with [his] eye." Jackson Dep., p. 251, l. 13-15. According to plaintiff, Silva observed plaintiff's bloodshot eye and commented, "It must be the marijuana." Id., p. 251, l. 13-25. Plaintiff then responded, "All black men don't smoke weed;" and "I don't smoke weed." Id., p. 252, l. 2-4. Silva replied, "I'm just playing." Id., l. 3-5. Plaintiff conceded that Silva did not want him to be offended by the marijuana comment. Id., p. 254, l. 11-15. Nonetheless plaintiff remained offended, concluding that Silva's remark reflected a well-known stereotype that African-Americans smoke marijuana. Id., p. 252, l. 12-18; p. 254, l. 7-16; p. 254, l. 13-14.

From Silva's marijuana comment, plaintiff requests this Court to infer that Silva was racially biased against him. Specifically, plaintiff asks the Court to draw the inference that Silva believed that plaintiff smoked marijuana because he is African American.

Clearly Silva's remark was tasteless and derogatory, but it does not explicitly or specifically reference race. Rather, its meaning and intent remain subject to interpretation. For example, it is possible that Silva was implying that plaintiff has the personality of someone who would smoke marijuana, regardless of his race. In today's national culture, smoking marijuana cuts across all classes, divisions, and groupings, including those of race.

Alternatively, it is possible that Silva was merely making a crude attempt at humor (i.e., merely "playing," as he claimed), with no intent to offend based on race or otherwise. Notably, plaintiff testified at his deposition that he believed that Silva was "just playing" because "apparently" Silva "did not want [him] to be offended." Jackson Dep., p. 254, l. 7-16. Similarly, plaintiff testified that Silva treated him "okay" when the two of them drove together to various schools to perform their recruiting duties, id., p. 265, l. 1-11, and "as far as [he] was concerned," he and Silva "got along well together," id., l. 12-15.

Moreover, even if one were to conclude that Silva's remark was indeed racially motivated, because plaintiff recounted only one such comment from Silva, the Court may consider whether Silva's statement may be regarded as a "stray remark."63 As recently stated in Dixon v. Int'l Fed'n of Accountants, 416 Fed.Appx. 107, 110 (2d Cir.2011), the Second Circuit has "long held that stray comments of this variety do not create an inference of discrimination." See also Danzer v. Norden Systems, Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Stray remarks, even if made by a decision maker, do not constitute sufficient evidence [to support] a case of employment discrimination.").64

In Dixon, the plaintiff, a fifty-one year old woman of Jamaican origin, brought an employment discrimination action, based on age, race, and national origin, against her former employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., ADEA, Section 1981, and New York state law.65 On summary judgment, the district court noted that plaintiff predicated all of her claims of discrimination on one comment by a co-worker at a meeting: "[t]he only overt comment related to Dixon's age, race, or origin came from a co-worker, ... who stated `she can't believe that [defendant] could hire a black Jamaican woman at 48 years of age.'" Dixon v. Inter'l Fed'n of Accountants, No. 09 CV 2839(HB), 2010 WL 1424007, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. April 9, 2010). The district court concluded that, "[s]tray remarks [un]related to Dixon's discharge or neutral remarks unrelated to her protected group status [were] insufficient to demonstrate that she was terminated for discriminatory reasons." Id. Accordingly, the district court entered summary judgment for the defendant.66

On appeal the Second Circuit, affirming summary judgment in the employer's favor, reasoned:

416 Fed.Appx. at 109-10 (emphasis added).

In the case at bar, plaintiff alleges that the derogatory comment regarding marijuana was indicative of racial bias by Silva. As plaintiff's direct supervisor, Silva was later asked to review plaintiff's performance as potential input for Lizotte's decision of whom to terminate. Doc. # 26, p. 8, ¶ 43. Plaintiff thus argues that Silva's discriminatory animus resulted in a negative performance review that ultimately influenced Lizotte to terminate plaintiff.

This argument disregards the Second Circuit's rule that "all comments pertaining to a protected class are not equally probative of discrimination." Tomassi v. Insignia Financial Group, Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir.2007). "[T]he more remote and oblique the remarks are in relation to the employer's adverse action, the less they prove that the action was motivated by discrimination." Henry v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 149 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Tomassi, 478 F.3d at 115). "For example, remarks made by someone other than the person who made the decision adversely affecting the plaintiff may have little tendency to show that the decision-maker was motivated by the discriminatory sentiment expressed in the remark." Tomassi (citing Ostrowski v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir.1992) (labeling remarks as "stray" when made "in the workplace by persons who are not involved in the pertinent decision making process")).67

The Second Circuit recently noted with approval that "[t]he district courts in this circuit have developed a standardized approach for applying [the stray remarks concept] to individual cases." Henry, 616 F.3d at 150. "In determining whether a remark is probative, [the district courts] have considered four factors: (1) who made the remark (i.e., a decision-maker, a supervisor, or a low-level co-worker);68 (2) when the remark was made in relation to the employment decision at issue;69 (3) the content of the remark (i.e., whether a reasonable juror could view the remark as discriminatory); and (4) the context in which the remark was made (i.e., whether it was related to the decision-making process)." Id. (citing, inter alia, McInnis v. Town of Weston, 375 F.Supp.2d 70, 83 (D.Conn.2005)).

Examining these four factors, (1) the alleged remark regarding marijuana was made by Silva, a low-level supervisor who was not the ultimate decision-maker regarding discharge; (2) there is no indication that the remark was made near the time of plaintiff's discharge;70 (3) a reasonable juror might easily interpret the content of the remark to be racially-neutral, albeit derogatory (i.e., a suggestion that plaintiff's character was such that he was likely to smoke marijuana, regardless of his race);71 and (4) the remark was made at lunch and not in relation to any decisionmaking process.

In sum, while Jackson was understandably offended by Silva's gratuitous and boorish remark, his proof falls well short of demonstrating that the remark was probative of racial discrimination on Silva's part, let alone that of the senior Post administrators involved in plaintiff's termination. The identity of the speaker, the remote time from termination, the potential ambiguity of the remark, and the lunch-time context all fail to establish that Silva's stray statement bore a relation to Lizotte's decision to discharge plaintiff.

Furthermore, if one examines the contents of the memorandum Silva prepared to assess plaintiff's performance, one finds no evidence of racial animus. The memorandum, in large part, recounts incidents and attitudes previously described by plaintiff's other supervisors, Marrero, Miciotta and Lizotte, none of whom has been accused by plaintiff of exhibiting racial bias. Lizotte Dep., Ex. M. For example, Silva's memorandum describes the same "resistant" attitude toward instruction that was previously detailed by Marrero. Id., para 2; see also id., Ex. F., para. 2 ("During training, Rod seemed very indifferent and honestly un-interested."). Similarly, Silva recounts the incident in which plaintiff took a personal day on February 21, 2007, in a similar fashion as Lizotte in his deposition. Lizotte Dep., Ex. M, p. 2, para. 2; see also id., Ex. L. Lastly, Silva's comments regarding plaintiff's lack of interest in his position mirror comments by Marrero (Lizotte Dep., Ex. F, para. 3); statements plaintiff concedes he himself made to Miciotta (Jackson Dep., p. 196, l. 2-9); and concerns expressed by Miciotta and Lizotte throughout plaintiff's employment (e.g., Lizotte Dep., p. 47, l. 6-24; p. 62, l. 12 to p. 63, l. 3; see also id., Ex. E). Silva's memorandum is thus patently consistent with the views of plaintiff's other supervisors both in description and assessment of plaintiff's performance and attitude.

Having concluded that Silva's sole derogatory remark is insufficient evidence to establish racial discrimination, the Court must consider whether other facts in the record provide evidence of racial animus toward plaintiff.72 After all, "when `other indicia of discrimination are properly presented, the remarks can no longer be deemed `stray,' and the jury has a right to conclude that they bear a more ominous significance.'" Danzer v. Norden Systems, Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir.1998). Accord Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir.2001) (management representative's numerous comments about the age of the pilot force, referring to them as "contaminated" and "Bad Apples," when "viewed against the background of [defendant airline's] all-consuming interest in the age and projected retirement rates" of pilots, "inescapably" led to conclusion that defendant airline's "actions may indeed have been motivated by age-based animus.").

In the present case, plaintiff's sole evidentiary basis for racial discrimination is Silva's remark. While plaintiff in his testimony described his "gut feeling" that his job responsibilities were changed because of his color, there is no objective evidence to support that wholly subjective impression. I do not question the sincerity of Mr. Jackson's sensibilities, but beliefs or feelings, however sincerely held, cannot support an employee's claim of discrimination if there is no proof or insufficient proof that the employer actually engaged in illegal discrimination; and unsupported subjective impressions are not probative on that issue. Other than Mr. Jackson's "gut feeling" based on his race, and his interpretation of Silva's ambiguous "marijuana" remark, he has presented no facts, circumstances, or indicia to prove illegal discrimination by Post. Rather, plaintiff repeatedly conceded that he got along well with his supervisors and colleagues at Post, including Lizotte, the employee who terminated him. Jackson Dep., p. 286, l. 1-3.

Similarly, there is no evidence that Lizotte was affected by any racial bias in making his decision to discharge plaintiff. Lizotte made no discriminatory comments and exhibited no behavior suggesting that he harbored racial animus toward plaintiff. Rather, plaintiff himself testified that he got along well with Lizotte. Jackson Dep., p. 286, l. 1-3. Furthermore, Lizotte testified that he considered numerous factors beyond Silva's assessment of plaintiff's performance to make the decision to terminate plaintiff. Lizotte Dep., p. 55, l. 6-22 As stated supra, Lizotte made his own observations and received troubling input regarding plaintiff's lack of enthusiasm for his position from both Miciotta and Marrero. Lizotte Dep., p. 47, l. 6-24, and Ex. F. In sum, there is no evidence that racial discrimination was a factor in Lizotte's decision to discharge plaintiff.

Finally, even if plaintiff believes that he was not the weakest field admissions representative at Post, his termination fails to support a Section 1981 claim if the termination was not based on racial animus. In other words, even had Lizotte mistakenly and subjectively undervalued plaintiff's abilities and attitude and/or singled plaintiff out for termination due an incomplete assessment, in the absence of proof that Lizotte acted with racially discriminatory intent, plaintiff's Section 1981 claim must fail. It is "an essential element to [a Section 1981] cause of action that the alleged discrimination took place because of the individual's race." Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1088 (2d Cir.1993) (emphasis added).73

After careful review of the record in its entirety, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the Court finds insufficient evidence of racial animus to support a valid Section 1981 or CFEPA claim. Aside from one stray and ambiguous remark by Silva, there is no indication that any employee, supervisor, or manager of Post exhibited discriminatory intent toward plaintiff. Moreover, the record reflects that there were numerous instances, as described by Marrero, Miciotta and Lizotte, where plaintiff's attitude in performing his work-related duties was perceived as falling below defendant's desired standard.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court is constrained to grant summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the CFEPA.

One can accept the sincerity of Jackson's belief that Post was treating him unfairly, an impression perhaps subconsciously generated or strengthened by Post's earlier, mistaken and quickly rescinded termination of Jackson, an unfortunate and hurtful incident caused by the almost incomprehensible incompetence of two senior Post administrators in failing to understand each other. However, Jackson's claims of racial discrimination must be supported by proof of racial discrimination by Post. The extensive record generated by wide-ranging discovery did not produce that evidence, and there is no reason to believe that a full plenary trial would do so.

With respect to plaintiff's Section 1981 claim, even assuming arguendo that plaintiff is able to make out a prima facie case of race discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas standard — demonstrating that he is African-American, was qualified for his position, and was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination — plaintiff has failed to offer evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason Post offered for his discharge was a pretext for discrimination. Through Lizotte's testimony, Post established that one field admissions representative position was eliminated by Post's Board of Trustees due to budgetary cutbacks. Based on Lizotte's own observations and consistent input from all of plaintiff's supervisors, Lizotte decided to terminate plaintiff as lacking the necessary drive, determination, and initiative to perform adequately in his position.

In contrast, plaintiff demonstrated no facts or circumstances to prove that his discharge was based on racial animus. Rather, plaintiff relied solely on a "stray remark" of questionable meaning made by Silva during a lunch conversation. Plaintiff concedes that Silva was "playing" with him when he made the remark and that, aside from that comment, he and Silva got along well in their work interactions. There is no evidence that Silva's comment, or any alleged sarcasm or prejudice behind it, had any impact on Lizotte's decision to terminate plaintiff.

Furthermore, in addition to demonstrating a nondiscriminatory reason for discharge, Post proved that Lizotte played a substantial role in both hiring and terminating plaintiff within the relatively brief period of ten and one-half months, thereby creating a "same actor" inference against discriminatory bias.

In sum, plaintiff can point to no evidence sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find that his discharge was more likely than not motivated by discriminatory animus based on his race or color. Accordingly, summary judgment is hereby GRANTED to defendant on plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. There is no genuine issue of material fact and defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Connecticut courts look to federal discrimination law for guidance in determining liability under CFEPA. Burbank v. Office of Atty. Gen. of Connecticut, 240 F.Supp.2d 167, 175 (D.Conn.2003). Because federal law mandates the application of the McDonnell Douglas standard, summary judgment is likewise also GRANTED to defendant as to plaintiff's CFEPA claim, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-60. The Clerk is directed to close the file.

It is SO ORDERED.