MADSEN, C.J.
¶ 1 RCW 59.18.085 of the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973 (RLTA), which is intended to provide relocation assistance to tenants, does not allow recovery for emotional distress. The statute's plain language and its stated purpose compel this result. The trial court and the Court of Appeals were correct in so determining. We affirm.
¶ 2 Rogaciano and Raquel Cabrera bought a house in Pasco, Washington, in 2007. In 2011, they obtained a license from the city to rent the house as a single residential unit. Contrary to the license, the Cabreras rented the upstairs and the basement as separate apartments.
¶ 3 On July 3, 2011, the Cabreras leased the basement to Jose Segura and Tabetha Gonzalez (collectively Segura) for a year's term. Segura paid $600 for the first month's rent, $600 for a rental security deposit, and $150 as a deposit for electric utility service. Five days later, the city of Pasco Code Enforcement Office inspected the property and found that the Cabreras had converted the single family dwelling into a duplex without a permit and that the basement unit was uninhabitable. Accordingly, the city ordered Segura to vacate the premises within 20 days.
¶ 4 Segura sought compensation from the Cabreras. On July 14, Segura gave the Cabreras a written demand for refund of prepaid deposits and rent and for monetary relocation assistance, as provided by RCW 59.18.085(3). The Cabreras did not respond to the letter. Mr. Cabrera later stated in a deposition that he ignored it because an attorney told him "there was no problem."
¶ 5 On July 19, the Cabreras gave Segura a notice to vacate by August 7, 2011. Segura claimed that after sending the demand letter but before this move-out deadline, Mr. Cabrera entered the unit without notice, changed the locks, removed some of Segura's personal property, and tried to have Segura's car towed from the property.
¶ 6 Segura sued the Cabreras on July 26 for damages under the RLTA. The Cabreras filed an answer, alleging, as the only affirmative defense, that "[d]efendant had no knowledge it was illegal." CP at 199.
¶ 7 On June 22, 2012, Segura moved for summary judgment, seeking $1,200.00 for the first month's prepaid rent and the security deposit, $150.00 for the utility deposit, $2,000.00 in relocation assistance, $200.00 in gas expenses related to moving into a new home, $1,000.00 in emotional distress damages,
¶ 8 The trial court granted Segura's motion for summary judgment but rejected the request for emotional distress damages, concluding they were not recoverable under RCW 59.18.085(3). The court denied Segura's motion for reconsideration, reasoning, "The relationship of the parties arises from a contract to lease real property. The misconduct on the part of the landlord was intentional but it is not an intentional tort. The
¶ 9 The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of emotional distress damages in a published, split decision. Segura v. Cabrera, 179 Wn.App. 630, 319 P.3d 98, review granted, 181 Wn.2d 1006, 332 P.3d 985 (2014). Relying on this court's opinion in White River Estates, the majority in the Court of Appeals held that emotional distress damages were not recoverable because a landlord could violate RCW 59.18.085(3)(a) "`by conduct not amounting to an intentional tort.'" Id. at 637, 319 P.3d 98 (quoting White River Estates v. Hiltbruner, 134 Wn.2d 761, 769, 953 P.2d 796 (1998)). The Court of Appeals also reasoned that the language of RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) "implies out of pocket or financial damages incurred by relocation. . . . This interpretation better suits the statute's purpose, which suggests the `actual damages' provided in RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) are limited to reasonable moving expenses." Id.
¶ 10 This court granted Segura's petition for review.
¶ 11 Statutory interpretation resolves whether the RLTA allows displaced tenants to recover emotional distress damages. See White River Estates, 134 Wash.2d at 765, 953 P.2d 796. The purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine the legislature's intent and to apply it. State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 192, 298 P.3d 724 (2013). When possible, we derive the legislature's intent solely from the statute's plain language, considering the text of the provision at issue, the context of the statute, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Id.
¶ 12 "Whether emotional distress damages are available following a statutory violation will depend on the language of the particular statute at issue." Hiltbruner, 134 Wash.2d at 765, 953 P.2d 796. Reading RCW 59.18.085's provisions together reveals that the statute's purpose is to provide assistance to relocate displaced tenants, make the landlord responsible for such assistance, authorize the city to step in as needed to facilitate such relocation, and provide a means for the city to seek reimbursement from the landlord where the city has stepped in to provide such assistance.
¶ 13 Here, RCW 59.18.085 provides that a landlord shall not rent a unit that does not meet applicable codes. RCW 59.18.085(1). If the landlord knowingly does so, the tenant shall recover the greater of three months' rent or treble the actual damages sustained as a result of the violation. RCW 59.18.085(2). If the appropriate government agency requires that the tenant vacate the premises, the tenant shall also recover any prepaid deposit and rent. Id. Additionally, the tenant may be entitled to relocation assistance as follows:
RCW 59.18.085(3)(a). The statute sets the amount of relocation assistance ($2,000 or three times the monthly rent, whichever is greater), notes other damages the tenant is entitled to from the landlord, specifies how payment to the tenant is to be made, sets a time frame for such payments, and authorizes the governmental entity to step in and advance the relocation assistance to the displaced tenant if the landlord fails to meet the statutory time schedule for such payments.
¶ 14 Notably, subsection (3)(e) sets the parameters of the damages available to a tenant under the statute.
RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) (emphasis added). In giving effect to the legislature's intent, we look to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning, reading the enactment as a whole, harmonizing its provisions by reading them in context with related provisions. Quadrant Corp. v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr'gs Bd., 154 Wn.2d 224, 239-40, 110 P.3d 1132 (2005). Reading the provisions of the statute together, the plain language provides that the tenant is entitled to receive the relocation assistance amounts as calculated in subsection (3)(b) but may also seek, via legal action against the landlord, the tenant's actual costs of relocation that exceed the relocation assistance amount as calculated in subsection (3)(b). The statute provides relocation assistance; it simply does not address or encompass emotional distress damages.
¶ 15 Further, if there were any doubt as to the statute's purpose, the legislature expressly spelled it out. The statute's stated purpose is twofold: First, "to establish a process by which displaced tenants would receive funds for relocation from landlords who fail to provide safe and sanitary housing after due notice of building code or health code violations." LAWS OF 2005, ch. 364, § 1 (emphasis added). And second, "to provide enforcement mechanisms to cities, towns, counties, or municipal corporations including the ability to advance relocation funds to tenants who are displaced as a result of a landlord's failure to remedy building code or health code violations and later to collect the full amounts of these relocation funds, along with interest and penalties, from landlords." Id. The statute's plain language and the legislature's express provision of "funds for relocation" cannot legitimately be stretched to include emotional distress damages.
¶ 16 Segura cites Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wn.2d 516, 554 P.2d 1041 (1976), and Martini v. Boeing Co., 137 Wn.2d 357, 971 P.2d 45 (1999), for the proposition that actual damages includes damages for emotional distress. But Rasor concerned damages available under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x, whose purpose is "`to protect an individual
¶ 17 For the same reason, Segura's citation to Ellingson v. Spokane Mortgage Co., 19 Wn.App. 48, 573 P.2d 389 (1978), and Conrad v. Alderwood Manor, 119 Wn.App. 275, 78 P.3d 177 (2003), as support is also unavailing. Ellingson addressed claims of discrimination under the WLAD, and Conrad addressed claims under the abuse of vulnerable adults statute (chapter 74.34 RCW). See Ellingson, 19 Wash.App. at 54, 573 P.2d 389; Conrad, 119 Wash.App. at 280, 78 P.3d 177. These cases too are distinguishable, as they addressed statutes and circumstances that are not present here.
¶ 18 We have never adopted a single definition of the term "actual damages." Indeed, in the appropriate case, we have limited "actual damages" to include only recovery for pecuniary harm. For example, the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA) allows a person harmed under the statute "to recover the actual damages sustained by him or her... together with the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." RCW 19.86.090. As in this case, the statute included language allowing recovery for "actual damages." Nevertheless, after analyzing the language in context, we held that the CPA does not allow recovery for emotional distress. Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wn.2d 299, 318, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). We examined the purpose of the statute at issue, reasoning that the CPA concerns injuries to "`business or property,'" not personal injuries. Id. Therefore, "actual damages" did not include emotional distress. Id.
¶ 19 Similarly, as the Supreme Court recently observed, "actual damages" has a "chameleon-like quality" because "the precise meaning of the term `changes with the specific statute in which it is found.'" Fed. Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1441, 1450, 1449, 182 L.Ed.2d 497 (2012) (quoting Cooper v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 622 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir.2010) (holding "actual damages" does not include emotional distress damages as used in the Privacy Act of 1974, codified in part at 5 U.S.C. § 552a)). As the Court noted, sometimes the term includes emotional distress damages, while in other contexts it includes only pecuniary harm. Id. at 1449.
¶ 20 As discussed, in this case, the statute provides for the recovery of financial losses caused by displacement; it simply does not address or reasonably encompass emotional distress damages.
¶ 21 We hold that RCW 59.18.085 of the RLTA provides relocation assistance to tenants. Recovery for emotional distress damages is not available under this statute. We affirm.
WE CONCUR: JOHNSON, OWENS, FAIRHURST and YU, JJ.
GORDON McCLOUD, J. (concurring in result).
¶ 23 But the legislature's use of the broad, inclusive adjective "any" to modify "actual damages," along with its specification that such damages are recoverable "in addition" to relocation costs, compels the opposite conclusion. In addition, we presume that the legislature, when it enacted the RLTA, was aware of our decisions in Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wn.2d 516, 529, 554 P.2d 1041 (1976), and Martini v. Boeing Co., 137 Wn.2d 357, 368, 370, 971 P.2d 45 (1999), recognizing that actual damages include emotional distress damages.
¶ 24 I therefore respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that the RLTA bars displaced tenants from recovering emotional distress damages. But I concur in the majority's result that Jose Segura and Tabetha Gonzalez (collectively Segura) cannot recover emotional distress damages here. The statute allows recovery of such actual damages only when they exceed the statutory $2,000 of relocation assistance. RCW 59.18.085(3)(b), (e). Segura's request for $1,200 in actual damages does not exceed that $2,000 amount. Therefore, the RLTA prohibits them from recovering actual damages, including emotional distress damages, in this case.
¶ 25 We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. O.S.T. v. Regence BlueShield, 181 Wn.2d 691, 696, 335 P.3d 416 (2014). We begin with the statute's plain language, considering the text of the provision in question, the statute's context, and the statutory scheme as a whole. State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 192, 298 P.3d 724 (2013). Our objective is to determine and to apply the legislature's intent. O.S.T., 181 Wash.2d at 696, 335 P.3d 416.
¶ 26 This case requires us to construe the statutory term "actual damages" as used in RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) and to decide if the right to recover such "actual damages" includes a right to recover emotional distress damages.
¶ 27 RCW 59.18.085 states, in relevant part,
(Emphasis added.) As the majority notes, the RLTA contains no definition of "actual
¶ 28 The plain statutory language of the RLTA gives displaced tenants the right to recover "any actual damages sustained by them as a result of the . . . displacement," "[i]n addition" to economic damages specifically enumerated in the statute ("relocation assistance, prepaid deposits, and prepaid rent"). RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) (emphasis added). By limiting the recovery under this statute to economic damages only, and by further limiting these damages to "relocation assistance," majority at 1282, the majority's holding conflicts with both statutory phrases italicized immediately above.
¶ 29 First, the statutory word "any" is a broad modifier. See State v. Sutherby, 165 Wn.2d 870, 880-82, 204 P.3d 916 (2009); State v. Westling, 145 Wn.2d 607, 611-12, 40 P.3d 669 (2002). This broad language supports an expansive reading of the statute.
¶ 30 Second, we must give full effect to the language "in addition" to. The statute specifies that "any" actual damages are available not as part of, but "in addition" to the enumerated damages, including damages that "exceed the amount of relocation assistance that is payable." RCW 59.18.085(3)(e). Thus, the statute's context, in addition to its express language, reveals the legislature's intent to permit the recovery of emotional distress damages; a contrary interpretation would render the legislature's use of this broad language meaningless.
¶ 31 The majority relies on an argument that no party has made: that the language "that exceed the amount of relocation assistance that is payable" shows an intent to limit the amount of available damages to relocation damages only. Majority at 1281. But this interpretation is problematic for two reasons. First, it treats the concluding language as a limit on both the amount and the nature of damages that a displaced tenant is entitled to recover. The statute's plain language defies such a reading. The statute says "that exceed," which refers to an amount, not a type of damages. Second, this interpretation treats the language "that is payable" as a limit on "actual damages" when, grammatically, it can be read only as modifying the immediately preceding phrase "relocation assistance."
¶ 32 In addition to failing to recognize the broad nature of the statutory language, the majority rejects the definition of "actual damages" established by our prior decisions. Majority at 1281-82. In Rasor, we interpreted the term "actual damages" as used in the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o. 87 Wash.2d at 529, 554 P.2d 1041. This statute permits a plaintiff to recover "an amount equal to . . . any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure" of a credit reporting agency to comply with the statutory requirements. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o. The plaintiff in Rasor alleged that a credit report stating she had a reputation of living with more than one man out of wedlock "damaged her personally and in her business reputation in the small community, and that she suffered emotionally from the experience." 87 Wash.2d at 531, 554 P.2d 1041. We explained that Congress's intent in enacting "this remedial legislation" was "`to protect
Id. at 529, 554 P.2d 1041 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974)). Noting that "actual damages" denotes both the type of damage award and the nature of injury for which a plaintiff may recover damages, we also stated in Rasor, "In this sense, the term has a second, consonant and established meaning, "`actual" damages are synonymous with compensatory damages'. Thus, actual damages, flowing from injury in fact, are to be distinguished from damages which are `nominal,' `exemplary' or `punitive.'" Id. at 530 n. 3, 554 P.2d 1041 (citations omitted) (quoting Weider v. Hoffman, 238 F.Supp. 437, 445 (M.D.Pa. 1965)). We therefore held that "actual damages" under the FCRA includes all of the elements of compensatory awards generally, including harm to business reputation and emotional suffering. Id. at 530, 554 P.2d 1041.
¶ 33 In Martini, we again construed the term "actual damages" and reached the same conclusion. 137 Wash.2d at 364, 971 P.2d 45. Martini discussed "actual damages" as used in Washington's Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.60 RCW, which mandates "liberal construction." 137 Wash.2d at 364, 971 P.2d 45; RCW 49.60.020. The plaintiff alleged disability discrimination and sought front and back pay. Martini, 137 Wash.2d at 361, 971 P.2d 45. The WLAD permits the recovery of "the actual damages sustained by the person" but contains no definition of the term "actual damages." RCW 49.60.030(2). Although emotional distress damages were not directly at issue in Martini, we cited Rasor and concluded that RCW 49.60.030(2) authorizes the recovery of full compensatory damages, including "damages for emotional distress," and excluded only nominal, exemplary, or punitive damages. Martini, 137 Wash.2d at 370, 367-68, 971 P.2d 45.
¶ 34 Since 1976, we have consistently stated that this is the established meaning of "actual damages." Rasor, 87 Wash.2d at 530 n. 3, 554 P.2d 1041. We presume that the legislature knew the controlling law in the area in which it was legislating when it passed RCW 59.18.085 in 2005. Wynn v. Earin, 163 Wn.2d 361, 371, 181 P.3d 806 (2008) (citing Price v. Kitsap Transit, 125 Wn.2d 456, 463, 886 P.2d 556 (1994)).
¶ 35 The majority argues that under Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 182 L.Ed.2d 497 (2012), "`the precise meaning of the term ["actual damages"] "changes with the specific statute in which it is found.'" Majority at 1282 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cooper, 132 S.Ct. at 1449). But that case does not control here. The issue presented in Cooper was—seemingly—whether the term "actual damages" in the civil remedies provision of the Privacy Act of 1974 includes compensation for mental and emotional harm. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. But because the Privacy Act of 1974 applied to damages from the government, the question was actually narrower: "because the Privacy Act waives the Federal Government's sovereign immunity, the question we must address is whether it is plausible to read the statute, as the Government does, to authorize only damages for economic loss." Cooper, 132 S.Ct. at 1453 (emphasis added). Given that narrow issue, that Court entered the narrow holding that the civil remedies provision did not waive the United States' sovereign immunity with respect to such recovery. Id. The Court explained, "When waiving the Government's sovereign immunity, Congress must speak unequivocally. Here, we conclude that it did not. As a consequence, we adopt an interpretation of `actual damages' limited to proven pecuniary or economic harm." Id. This case, in contrast, does not involve the scope of sovereign immunity. In addition, this case deals with the interpretation of a Washington, not a federal, statute; the answer to our question is controlled by state, not federal, law.
¶ 36 Although the RLTA permits displaced tenants to recover emotional distress damages as actual damages, I agree with the majority that Segura is entitled to no actual damages in this case. RCW 59.18.085(3)(e) states that displaced tenants can recover "any actual damages sustained by them . . . that exceed the amount of relocation assistance that is payable." (Emphasis added.) The "relocation assistance that is payable" to displaced tenants is "the greater amount of two thousand dollars per dwelling unit or three times the monthly rent." RCW 59.18.085(3)(b).
¶ 37 Here, Segura is entitled only to actual damages that exceed $2,000 because this amount is greater than three times Segura's monthly rent of $600. Segura requested $1,000 for emotional distress and $200 for gasoline expenses—both components of "actual damages." But the $1,200 total that Segura claims as actual damages does not exceed the $2,000 payable to Segura as relocation assistance. Therefore, Segura can recover no actual damages under the RLTA.
¶ 38 The legislature determined that a displaced tenant could recover "actual damages." It placed no limit on these "actual
¶ 39 In this case, however, Segura's requested actual damages do not exceed $2,000. For that reason, Segura may not recover actual damages, including emotional distress damages, in this case. I therefore concur in the result.
GONZÁLEZ, STEPHENS and WIGGINS, JJ.
RCW 59.18.085(3)(b), (c).
