RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge.
Plaintiff The Desa Group, Inc. ("TDG") initiated this action under the Administrative
TDG does not dispute that there are contacts between the two firms. But the company claims that the SBA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in determining that those connections indicate business relationships that cause TDG to be so dependent on DESA that TDG is unable to exercise its own independent business judgment without great economic risk. See, e.g., Pl.'s Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 9 ("Pl.'s Mem. Supp."), ECF No. 14-1. After a thorough review of the record, the Court agrees that the SBA has failed to articulate a rational connection between the evidence in the administrative record and its conclusion that TDG is unduly dependent on DESA. Accordingly, the Court will grant TDG's motion for summary judgment and will deny the SBA's cross-motion for summary judgment.
Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act authorizes the SBA to enter into procurement contracts with the federal government, and then subcontract the SBA's performance of those contracts to a "socially and economically disadvantaged small business." 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A)-(B). The Section 8(a) program is intended "to assist eligible small disadvantaged business concerns [to] compete in the American economy through business development." 13 C.F.R. § 124.1. To administer the Section 8(a) program, the SBA has promulgated regulations which set forth, among other things, the program's eligibility requirements. See generally 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.1 et seq. In order to be eligible for the Section 8(a) program, a business must be "a small business which is unconditionally owned and controlled by one or more
A business that is admitted to the program may participate for a term of nine years. See id. § 124.2. During its participation, the business must "maintain its program eligibility" and "must inform SBA of any changes that would adversely affect its program eligibility." Id. Moreover, a business may be terminated from the program prior to the expiration of the nine-year term "for good cause." Id. § 124.303(a). Among the examples of good cause listed in the SBA's regulations are a business' failure "for any reason ... to maintain ownership, full-time day-to-day management, and control by disadvantaged individuals," or a business' failure "to disclose to SBA the extent to which non-disadvantaged persons or firms participate in the management of the Participant business concern." Id. § 124.303(a)(3), (a)(5).
TDG contracts with federal and state agencies, as well as private corporations, to provide "conference support services." Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1. TDG was certified as a participant in the Section 8(a) program on September 30, 2010, for a nine-year term that was slated to end in September 2019. See A.R. 140; Compl. ¶ 13. TDG was deemed eligible for the program based on the status of the company's President and CEO, Dionne Fleshman, as a "disadvantaged individual" as defined in the Small Business Act. See A.R. 377. Ms. Fleshman's mother, Diane Sumpter, runs a separate, but similarly named, company: DESA Inc. ("DESA"). See id. at 169, 195. Ms. Sumpter and DESA were previously participants in the Section 8(a) program, and DESA graduated from the program in March 1997. See id. at 169. Shortly before TDG was approved as a Section 8(a) participant, the SBA contacted Ms. Fleshman to ask, among other things, whether "any immediate family members own a business and/or have ever participated in the 8(a) program." Id. at 193. Ms. Fleshman responded, via email, explaining that her mother, Ms. Sumpter, "owns the company, DESA, Inc., which graduated from the 8(a) program about 13 years ago in 1997." Id. at 195. Ms. Fleshman further asserted that TDG "has no dependence on DESA, Inc., other than the company being one of my customers," and disclosed that during the 2010 calendar year "revenues from DESA, Inc. amount to slightly less than 25% of my company's revenues," but that TDG and DESA "have no common directors, no common officers, no common shareholders and no common employees" and are located at "separate physical locations." Id.
On October 11, 2012, the SBA's Office of Program Review ("OPR") received a complaint on its tip hotline which alleged that
On February 14, 2013, the SCDO sent a letter to Ms. Fleshman informing her that the SBA intended to terminate TDG's participation in the Section 8(a) program. See generally id. at 428-40. That letter set forth approximately a dozen grounds that the SCDO claimed established good cause to terminate TDG from the Section 8(a) program. See id.; see also 13 C.F.R. § 124.303(a)(1)-(20) (detailing examples of "good cause"). Because several grounds were abandoned by the SBA in its answer to TDG's appeal, see A.R. 379 n.2, rejected by the SBA Office of Hearing Appeals ("OHA") administrative law judge ("ALJ"), or not reached by the ALJ, the Court will detail only on those grounds that remain relevant to this action.
Citing the same regulation, the SCDO also claimed that "[s]everal facts indicate that Ms. Sumpter has control or has the power to control TDG's business relationship such that [Ms. Fleshman] cannot exercise independent business judgment without great economic risk." Id. at 432. The SCDO again pointed to the fact that many of TDG's invoices showed DESA as the subcontractor, and also noted that Ms. Fleshman had listed Ms. Sumpter as a sub-contractor on TDG's 2011 payroll listing. Id.; see also id. at 287. Similarly, the SCDO alleged that TDG had not fully disclosed the extent of Ms. Sumpter's participation with TDG, circumstances which the agency claimed established good cause under 13 C.F.R. § 124.303(a)(5) for failure "to disclose to SBA the extent to which non-disadvantaged persons or firms participate in the management of the Participant business concern." Id. at 433. The SCDO stated that it had "met numerous times with TDG, including the firm's initial 8(a) orientation on 10/26/10," and "[i]n every instance Diane Sumpter has been present and was very active in conversations." Id. at 433-34.
On the basis of these and other grounds detailed in its letter, the SCDO informed Ms. Fleshman that it "intends to terminate The Desa Group, Inc., with good cause from the 8(a) Business Development Program," and that Ms. Fleshman had "30 days from the day of receipt of th[e] Letter of Intent to Terminate to submit a written response." Id. at 439.
On March 19, 2013, Ms. Fleshman responded with a lengthy letter, refuting the SCDO's contentions. In particular, she claimed that the SCDO had mischaracterized the relationship between TDG and DESA when the agency relied on the invoices listing revenues from DESA as grounds to conclude that Ms. Fleshman was not dedicating her full-time employment to TDG. Id. at 105. She explained that DESA "is one of TDG's clients," and therefore, "[a]s head of TDG, I am working on a full-time basis delivering services to all of my clients and fulfilling my contractual obligations." Id. at 105-06. Moreover, she argued that far from listing "many" invoices showing DESA as a subcontractor, Ms. Fleshman asserted that there existed only a "single project where [DESA] is a subcontractor of TDG," and for which DESA "only performs about 16% of the work as a subcontractor." Id. at 106, 108. With respect to the firm's location, Ms. Fleshman noted that TDG had relocated and had not been housed in the same location as DESA "since before it was admitted to the 8(a) Program," and that, even while it was located at the same address, TDG's office was "segregated from [DESA]." Id. at 106-07. Finally, Ms. Fleshman maintained that Ms. Sumpter was listed not as an employee but as "a 1099 independent contractor for the delivery of marketing services." Id. at 108.
TDG did file an appeal, and the ALJ issued his decision on February 5, 2015. As pertinent to this action, the ALJ rejected SBA's claim that Ms. Sumpter controls, or has the ability to control, TDG. See id. at 381-83. As the ALJ explained, "[i]n many instances, the Termination Letter identified a real or perceived business connection between [TDG] and DESA, [and] then made a conclusory statement that the connection was indicative of shared management, improper reliance, or lack of full-time dedication to [TDG]," but had "rarely attempted to explain how the evidence supported the conclusion." Id. at 382. Specific to the SBA's contentions regarding TDG's earnings from DESA, the ALJ found that the SBA's conclusion that "Ms. Fleshman is an employee of DESA" was "contrary to the evidence" because "Ms. Fleshman is not employed directly by DESA," and the invoices merely show payments made to TDG "pursuant to its subcontract with DESA," which were not "Ms. Fleshman's personal income." Id. at 383.
At the same time, however, in the final three paragraphs of his opinion, the ALJ noted that control by a non-disadvantaged individual may be found where "`business relationships exist ... which cause such dependence that the applicant or participant cannot exercise independent business judgment without great economic risk.'" Id. at 383 (quoting 13 C.F.R. § 124.106(g)(4)). The ALJ concluded that, while the "examples cited in [SBA's] Termination Letter may not be persuasive evidence of actual control by Ms. Sumpter,... they are evidence of significant interconnectedness between the two companies." Id. The ALJ then cited several factors which he found demonstrated such interconnectedness, including: (1) that "[b]oth companies act or have acted as subcontractors for the other company"; (2) that TDG "maintains an office in DESA Inc.'s headquarters in order to more effectively manage its contractual obligations to the elder company"; (3) that TDG's "own headquarters is in a building owned by Ms. Sumpter"; (4) that TDG "holds meetings in DESA's building, and Ms. Sumpter is a vocal participant in those meetings"; (5) that, regardless of whether Ms. Sumpter was acting as TDG's "marketing contractor or as its manager," it was "clear that Ms. Sumpter plays a critical role in [TDG's] success"; (6) that "DESA was responsible for almost 40% of [TDG's] revenues in 2010"; and (7) that DESA was paying TDG "between $7,000 and $10,000 per month from 2010 to 2012." Id. at 383-84. Overall, the ALJ concluded that "SBA has provided evidence that rationally supports its ultimate conclusion" that TDG "could not risk its relationship with DESA without substantial harm to its own health." Id. at 384. Therefore, the ALJ found that the SBA had "articulated a reasonable basis" for terminating TDG from the Section 8(a) program. Id.
TDG subsequently filed this action under the APA, challenging the SBA's decision to terminate it from the program. See Compl. ¶¶ 25-30. Count I alleges that the SBA's decision was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. Id. ¶ 27. Count II alleges that the SBA's determination violated
TDG has now moved for summary judgment (ECF No. 14), and the SBA has cross-moved for summary judgment (ECF No. 20).
A court may grant summary judgment when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When assessing a motion for summary judgment in an APA case, however, "the district judge sits as an appellate tribunal." Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C.Cir.2001). In such cases the complaint "actually presents no factual allegations, but rather only arguments about the legal conclusion to be drawn about the agency action." Marshall Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 (D.C.Cir.1993). Therefore, "[t]he entire case on review is a question of law, and only a question of law." Id. The Court's review "is based on the agency record and limited to determining whether the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously," Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 583 F.3d 860, 865 (D.C.Cir.2009), or in violation of another standard set out in section 10(e) of the APA, see 5 U.S.C. § 706.
The scope of a court's "arbitrary and capricious" review "is narrow" and "a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). To satisfy the standard, an agency "must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a `rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.'" Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962)). An agency's action is arbitrary and capricious if it "has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise." Id.
Agency fact finding, even in an informal adjudication, "must be supported by substantial evidence — otherwise it would be arbitrary and capricious." Safe Extensions, Inc. v. FAA, 509 F.3d 593, 604 (D.C.Cir.2007); accord Ardmore Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Contreras-Sweet, 118 F.Supp.3d 388, 394 (D.D.C.2015) (applying the substantial evidence standard in a case reviewing a Small Business Association decision where the plaintiff "seeks to overturn several of the SBA's factual findings"). "When the arbitrary or capricious standard is performing that function of assuring factual support, there is no substantive difference between what it requires and what would be required by the substantial evidence test, since it is impossible to conceive of a `nonarbitrary' factual judgment supported only by evidence that is not substantial in the APA sense." Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C.Cir.1984) (emphasis omitted). Substantial evidence is "such relevant
The SBA's letter of intent to terminate TDG from the Section 8(a) program raised approximately a dozen grounds for terminating the firm. Yet, by virtue of the ALJ's rejection of several grounds on appeal, and the fact that the ALJ only upheld the decision on one ground, the issue now before this Court is exceedingly narrow: whether the SBA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in concluding that "[b]usiness relationships exist" between TDG and "non-disadvantaged individuals or entities which cause such dependence that" TDG "cannot exercise independent business judgment without great economic risk." 13 C.F.R. § 124.106(g)(4).
The ALJ listed various circumstances that, in his view, established "significant interconnectedness" between TDG and DESA. See A.R. 383-84. The SBA relies on these circumstances, but also invokes several additional connections that the ALJ did not rely upon, but that the agency had raised in its termination letters. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Opp'n Pl.'s Mot. at 14 ("Def.'s Mem. Supp."), ECF No. 20; see also A.R. 51, 402-03, 434. After a thorough review of the administrative record, however, the Court concludes that both the ALJ and the SBA have failed to articulate or explain how those connections — even if significant or substantial — demonstrate such a high level of dependence that TDG "cannot exercise independent business judgment without great economic risk." 13 C.F.R. § 124.106(g)(4). Therefore, the Court finds that the agency has failed to articulate "`a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,'" and has also "failed to consider an important aspect of the problem." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 168, 83 S.Ct. 239). The Court will discuss each putative connection in turn.
First, the ALJ asserted that TDG "maintains an office in DESA Inc.'s headquarters in order to more effectively manage its contractual obligations to the elder company." A.R. 383. This assertion is problematic in two ways. As the Court will explain, there is considerable dispute in the record concerning whether TDG continues
In its initial letter of intent to terminate, the SBA had claimed that before the firm relocated to its current location — 1515 Richland Street — TDG "was housed within [DESA]'s headquarters at 400 Percival Street," in a private office "not segregated from" DESA and where the firms appeared to share a receptionist. Id. at 431. Ms. Fleshman responded by asserting that TDG has not had its corporate office located at 400 Percival Street ... since before it was admitted to the 8(a) program," and that the company never had a receptionist. Id. at 106-07. Ms. Fleshman did note that TDG's own headquarters at 1515 Richland Street was housed in a building owned by Ms. Sumpter or DESA, but claimed that the arrangement was intended to facilitate TDG's performance of human resource management services for DESA and to protect "the very sensitive nature of the personnel records involved." Id. at 111. In its subsequent response, the SBA amended its allegation to assert that, although TDG does maintain its own headquarters at 1515 Richland Street, it "appears that TDG has an office at 400 Percival Street." A.R. 395. In doing so, the agency seems to have erroneously read Ms. Fleshman's response as admitting that TDG continued to maintain an office at DESA's headquarters. See id.
Thus, it appears that the ALJ may have misread the record when he concluded that TDG kept an office at DESA's headquarters "in order to more effectively manage its contractual obligations" to DESA. Id. at 383. Neither party made that exact claim. The SBA made no allegation beyond the existence of the office, and TDG claimed that its own headquarters in a DESA-owned building was intended to facilitate its human resource responsibilities for DESA. Oddly, however, in its briefing before this Court TDG now appears to accept — or at least does not definitively dispute — that TDG "maintains an office in DESA Inc.'s headquarters," even though TDG cites to its response to the SBA's letter in which Ms. Fleshman was clearly
Regardless of whether TDG in fact maintains an office at DESA's headquarters, however, TDG contends that the SBA and ALJ failed to explain why having an office in DESA's headquarters caused "such dependence on TDG that it cannot exercise independent business judgment without great economic risk." Pl.'s Mem. Supp. at 12 (quoting 13 C.F.R. § 124.106(g)(4)). The SBA does little to answer this contention. Indeed, the agency simply contends that TDG's office locations "were not considered in isolation but were among several other factors that establish an unusual closeness between these two companies." Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 16. But, in doing so, the agency wholly fails to explain how any closeness demonstrated by TDG's location indicates that TDG is unable to exercise independent business judgment without risk to its success.
The ALJ also relied on the fact that TDG's own headquarters were located in "a building owned by Ms. Sumpter." A.R. 383. In a footnote of TDG's memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, TDG argues that "OHA overlooked the fact that TDG has a commercial lease for its space and is paying a market rate," and claims that "OHA gave no reason why this fact would make TDG dependent on DESA." Pl.'s Mem. Supp. at 18 n.4. Beyond again referring to this fact as simply one, among several, that the ALJ relied upon (and without explaining how the fact rationally supports its ultimate conclusion), see Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 13, 15-16, the SBA does not respond to this argument, contest TDG's claim that it pays a market rate for rent, or further explain why the location of TDG's headquarters in a DESA-owned building indicates that TDG is unable to exercise independent business judgment. Indeed, the agency seems to now urge that any economic benefit TDG receives from the location is irrelevant. See Def.'s Reply Supp. Cross-Mot. Summ. J. at 9 ("Def.'s Reply"), ECF No. 28 ("The issue raised, however, is not the amount being paid but the co-location itself that indicated that TDG could not risk its relationship with DESA. The location of TDG was presented as one of several examples to show the unusual interconnectedness of the two businesses and the opportunity for the assertion
Second, the ALJ concluded that TDG "holds meetings in DESA's building, and Ms. Sumpter is a vocal participant in these meetings," noting that the parties "debate whether Ms. Sumpter's presence in these meetings is as [TDG]'s marketing contractor or as its manager."
When pressed during the appeal to the OHA, the SBA was only able to produce three records of such meetings — two field visit reports and an e-mail from a DESA employee requesting a meeting between TDG, DESA, and the SBA to discuss a possible joint venture between the firms. See id. at 341, 348-62. Although SBA claims it "satisfactorily addressed these concerns prior to OHA's decision," Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 17, the documents the SBA provided do little to corroborate the SBA's putative evidence.
For one thing, the first field visit report lists the "date of visit" as December 8, 2011, not the October 25 date the SBA alleged. See A.R. 348. And if one were to think this might be a typographical error, the signatures at the end of the report each date from December 2011, as well. See id. at 353. In addition, the report states that it was the "[f]irst official site visit" to TDG, id. at 352, which either casts doubt on the SBA's contention that a prior October 2011 site visit took place, or at least leaves the record without any first-hand evidence of such a meeting. Finally, the report itself makes no mention of Ms. Sumpter dominating the conversation or appearing to direct the firm. Quite to the contrary: the report indicated that the firm
In fact, nowhere in the record — beyond the termination letter and its response — are the details concerning Ms. Sumpter's "`take charge' actions," "authority and influence in the meetings," or heavy "involve[ment] in discussions" documented. Id. at 399, 434. And the termination letter and the SBA's subsequent response relating those characterizations of Ms. Sumpter's actions were both signed by officials who had not attended these two field visits, so far as the record indicates.
In addition, the e-mail the SBA added to the record shows that the message was simply a precursor to the second meeting, held on February 4, 2013, which was requested jointly by TDG and DESA to discuss a possible joint venture between the two firms. See A.R. 362 (January 31, 2013 e-mail requesting meeting "to discuss Joint Venture Agreement [the firms] wish to submit to the SBA for consideration"); id. at 355, 359 (September 4, 2013 field report noting that the SBA was "requested to visit to discuss a possible Joint Venture Agreement between the two firms"). Thus, this e-mail and field visit report together only establish a single, second meeting at which Ms. Sumpter was present, not two additional meetings. Moreover, because the meeting was called to discuss a joint venture between DESA and TDG, it is unsurprising that Ms. Sumpter, as the owner of DESA, was an active member in the meeting — and the agency fails to explain why it concluded otherwise.
While the ALJ did not rely on it, the SBA also references its own discussion of Ms. Sumpter's marketing activities, on behalf of TDG, as an indication that Ms. Sumpter exercised influence over the firm. See Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 14; see also A.R. 434. Specifically, the SBA contended that Ms. Sumpter has "contacted the SCDO about marketing opportunities" on numerous occasions, that she indicated at one point that she would travel to Washington, D.C. to market TDG to agencies, and that she was "very active in marketing and arranging for a contract with the South Carolina National Guard" which TDG was eventually awarded. Id. at 434. TDG contested some of this evidence, but also noted that "Ms. Sumpter has a contract to provide marketing services for TDG," which the company contended explains some of the marketing activities.
The SBA also notes that it cautioned Ms. Sumpter on at least one occasion that her actions on behalf of TDG were creating an appearance that she owned the company. Id. at 434. That instance arose when a Marketing Specialist for the Minority Business Development Agency ("MBDA") Business Center sent an e-mail to an employee of Fort Jackson military base thanking the employee for "taking your time to speak recently with Ms. Diane Sumpter regarding The DESA Group's (TDG) ground maintenance services." Id. at 319. At least at the time, DESA in fact operated the MBDA Business Center in Columbia, South Carolina. See id. at 320 (signature block stating "operated by DESA, Inc.").
Given the numerous apparent discrepancies in the record and the vague, conclusory nature of much of the evidence the SBA has offered, the Court has serious doubts that this factual record suffices to provide the substantial evidence necessary to support the SBA's conclusion that Ms. Sumpter played an outsized role in TDG's marketing activities. See AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc. v. FCC, 270 F.3d 959, 968 (D.C.Cir.2001) ("Conclusory explanations for matters involving a central factual dispute where there is considerable evidence in conflict do not suffice to meet the deferential standards of our review."); see also Lakeland Bus Lines, 347 F.3d at 962 (explaining that substantial evidence review must "take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the evidence's] weight," and that a court "may not find substantial evidence `merely on the basis of evidence which in and of itself justified [the agency's decision], without taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn'" (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951))).
In any event, even accepting that Ms. Sumpter attended TDG's meetings with the SBA, was active in those conversations, and performed marketing services for TDG — whether as a contractor or, in some cases, in her capacity through the MBDA — the SBA has failed to connect those facts to its conclusion that Ms. Fleshman was unable to exercise independent business judgment over TDG without "great economic risk." 13 C.F.R. § 124.106(g)(4). Perhaps the firm's ability
Third, the ALJ noted that "DESA was responsible for almost 40% of [TDG's] revenues in 2010." Id. at 384. As already explained, TDG provides human resource consulting services for DESA, and therefore brings in revenue from DESA pursuant to that contractual arrangement. TDG contends that this figure has fallen to 16% in 2012 and, therefore, that the 2010 figure is "entirely of no relevance."
Yet, while the Court agrees with the SBA that the level of revenue TDG receives from a company controlled by Ms. Sumpter might support a finding of dependence that prohibited TDG from exercising its own independent business judgment without great economic risk, the agency has again failed to explain how those facts support its conclusion. For one thing, the mere fact that DESA pays for TDG's services does not necessarily indicate that it is able to assert control over how TDG runs its business or the business judgments TDG or Ms. Fleshman make in doing so. The regulation the SBA has invoked, itself, does not state that all "business relationships" are indicative of control. Instead, it
In addition, although the ALJ relied upon the fact that "[b]oth companies act or have acted as subcontractors for the other company," A.R. 383, the SBA has not responded in its briefing here to TDG's claim that there is nothing inherently problematic with TDG contracting with DESA, see Pl.'s Opp'n & Reply at 23 n.7, ECF No. 26-2 (noting the SBA's failure to contest this point).
Finally, the ALJ concluded that, although TDG and the SBA debated whether Ms. Sumpter was acting as a marketing contractor for TDG or one of its managers, regardless of the answer "it is clear that Ms. Sumpter plays a critical role in [TDG]'s success." A.R. 383-84. TDG claims that this rationale is conclusory, and runs counter to the evidence in the record — reiterating many of its responses to the other factors cited above. See Pl.'s Mem. Supp. at 15-16. The SBA does not rely on this factor as a stand-alone argument, but simply claims that it "is supported by all of the factors identified in the Termination Letter and cited in the OHA decision." Def.'s Mem. Supp. at 18. Therefore, this factor simply collapses back into the parties' other arguments recited above.
As the ALJ stated when rejecting the SBA's conclusion that Ms. Fleshman failed to maintain full-time day-to-day control of TDG: "[i]n many instances, the Termination Letter identified a real or perceived business connection between [TDG] and DESA, then made a conclusory statement that the connection was indicative of shared management, improper reliance, or lack of full-time dedication to [TDG]. It rarely attempted to explain how the evidence supported the conclusion." A.R. 382. In the Court's view, the SBA and ALJ's determination that the connection between TDG and DESA was indicative of such dependence that TDG was unable to exercise independent business judgment without great economic risk suffers from the very same infirmity. The agency has identified several contacts or connections between TDG and DESA. But under the regulation the SBA has invoked here, mere contacts or business relationships alone are insufficient to show control; the agency must establish that those relationships "cause such dependence" that TDG "cannot exercise independent business judgment without great economic risk." 13 C.F.R. § 124.106(g)(4). The SBA has done no more than conclusorily state that the contacts here equate to the level of dependence necessary to show that Ms. Sumpter or DESA controls TDG. Therefore, the Court finds the SBA's determination arbitrary and capricious because the agency has not articulated "`a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,'" and has "failed to consider an important aspect of the problem." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 168, 83 S.Ct. 239).
In its memorandum, TDG requests that the Court "order the SBA to immediately accept TDG back into the 8(a) Program" and add additional time to compensate for the time, if any, it was precluded from the program. See Pl.'s Mem. Supp. at 19. Yet, if "the record before the agency does not support the agency action, if the agency has not considered all relevant factors, or if the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record before it, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation." Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985); see also Amerijet Int'l, Inc. v. Pistole, 753 F.3d 1343, 1353 (D.C.Cir.2014) (noting that remand is the "usual remedy"). The Court sees no reason to depart from that typical remedy in this case. Given the numerous connections between TDG and DESA, and the hotline complaint that the SBA received, the agency had reason to be suspicious that TDG was dependent on DESA or Ms. Sumpter. The agency's investigation relied on numerous erroneous assumptions, however, and the portions of the agency's determination presented to this Court rest on unsupported conclusions, not substantial evidence. But the Court does not conclude that the agency will be unable to make an appropriate case that the connections between TDG and DESA indicate inter-dependence. Thus, the Court will not prejudge the merits of any decision the SBA makes on remand based on a different record.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 14) is
