RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge.
Defendant Shantia Hassanshahi is charged with one count of conspiracy to
The Government has provided notice of its intent to introduce certain evidence of prior bad acts against the defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and has moved to introduce such evidence. Specifically, the Government intends to elicit evidence that Mr. Hassanshahi had knowledge that a license from OFAC was required to do business in Iran. See Gov't's Mot. & Notice Intention Introduce Evid. Prior Bad Acts, ECF No. 94 [hereinafter "Gov't's Mot."]. Separately, Mr. Hassanshahi has moved to exclude certain documentary evidence that the Government anticipates seeking to introduce at trial. See Def.'s Corr. Mot. Exclude Docs. Evidentiary Grounds, ECF No. 102 [hereinafter "Def.'s Mot."].
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Government's motion to introduce evidence of prior bad acts and deny Defendant's motion to exclude evidence.
Shantia Hassanshahi is a dual citizen of Iran and the United States. On January 9, 2013, following an investigation of over a year, the Government filed a Criminal Complaint in this Court against Mr. Hassanshahi and a warrant was issued for his arrest. See Criminal Compl., ECF No. 1. On September 16, 2013, Mr. Hassanshahi was arrested at Los Angeles International Airport ("LAX"), and on September 26, 2013, a Grand Jury returned an Indictment in this Court against him and co-defendant Hasston, Inc., a company that Mr. Hassanshahi owns. See Indictment, ECF No. 7. The Indictment alleges that, beginning in or around March 2009, Mr. Hassanshahi engaged in a conspiracy to export and cause the exportation of goods and technology from Canada to Iran, as well as related services from the United States to Iran, without first obtaining the requisite license from OFAC, located in the District of Columbia, and therefore in violation of federal law. See id. ¶ 1. Specifically, the Government alleges that Mr. Hassanshahi and Hasston, Inc. conspired to export "protection relays" — a type of circuit breaker for use in electrical power grids — from Canada to Armenia or Iraq. From those countries, the relays would then be transported to customers in Iran. See, e.g., Aff. Supp. Criminal Compl. ¶¶ 22, 26, ECF No. 1-1 [hereinafter "Akronowitz Aff."].
As part of the Government's investigation, and prior to Mr. Hassanshahi's arrest, the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Investigations division ("HSI") was alerted that Mr. Hassanshahi would be returning to the United States through Los Angeles International Airport ("LAX") on January 12, 2012. See id. ¶ 18. When he arrived, Mr. Hassanshahi was referred for a secondary screening. Id. ¶ 19. During that secondary screening, United States Customs and Border Protection officers seized several electronic devices in Mr. Hassanshahi's possession — including a laptop computer, multimedia cards, thumb drives, a camcorder, SIM cards, and a cell phone. Id.
Since that time, the Government has also obtained e-mails sent by or to Mr. Hassanshahi, or among his alleged co-conspirators. In one e-mail, dated October 26, 2009, an individual named "Mark Babaei" writes to a man identified as "Shantia Haas," the latter of whom has an e-mail address listed as "shantia34@gmail.com." See Def.'s Mot. Attach., Ex. C, ECF No. 101-1. The Government contends that Mr. Hassanshahi used that e-mail account during the time period relevant to this case. See Revised Aff. of Joshua J. Akronowitz ¶¶ 15, 18, ECF No. 42-1. In the e-mail, Mr. Babaei indicates that he has "talked with jabber, he is good and is working to solve the problems and we hope up to tomorrow night the goods will be in [sic] Iran border." Def.'s Mot. Attach., Ex. C. A second e-mail, dated February 2, 2012, was sent from Mark Babaei to individuals identified as "Aoub Shaban" and "Arash Zandi," but not Mr. Hassanshahi. Id. Ex. E. In that e-mail, Mr. Babaei states that he traveled to Armenia to deal with a shipment of goods that was seized at the Armenian border. Id. The e-mail states: "Please tell Shantia that we didn't let anything be traced back to Canada and they didn't even track this to Canada." Id.
By letter, the Government has informed Mr. Hassanshahi's counsel that it anticipates introducing at trial the letter to the Iranian Minister of Energy and these e-mails, and that the documents are, overall, "representative of the types of documents the government will seek to admit at trial."
The Government has also provided notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) that it will seek to elicit evidence that "defendant Hassanshahi previously attempted to do business in Iran without the required license from the government" and that he was "made aware that his attempt to do business in Iran ... violated [the] laws of the United States." Gov't's Mot. at 1. The Government contends that Mr. Hassanshahi obtained this knowledge after a California court ruled against him and two other plaintiffs in a lawsuit in which the plaintiffs sought to enforce a contract with a Chinese company. See Gov't's Mot. at 2-3. In that case, the plaintiffs alleged that the company, Tsann Kuen Enterprise Co., Ltd. ("Tsann"), had granted them the exclusive right to manufacture and sell Tsann's computers in Iran. See generally Kashani v. Tsann Kuen China Enter. Co., Ltd., 118 Cal.App.4th 531, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 174 (2004); see also id. at 536, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 174
Tsann asserted that the contract was unenforceable as contrary to public policy because it violated the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. Id. at 539, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 174. The trial court agreed, and the California Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 537, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 174. The appellate court explained that, under the regulations, there exist "only two ways to avoid the prohibitions on dealing with Iran: coverage under a general license authorizing certain categories of transactions and issuance of a specific license." Id. at 546, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 174 (citations omitted). The court noted that the plaintiffs were United States citizens residing in California and that the "express purposes of the agreement were to supply goods, technology, and services to Iran and even to sell products to the Government of Iran." Id. at 547, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 174. Furthermore, the court stated that the plaintiffs "d[id] not contend that they had obtained authorization for their activities pursuant to any specific license." Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiffs' anticipated performance was "in clear violation" of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations and, therefore, the International Economic Emergency Powers Act.
Mr. Hassanshahi's motion to exclude evidence raised several "preliminary" grounds for excluding the Rule 404(b) evidence. See Def.'s Mot. at 20. He has since filed a formal opposition opposing the introduction of any evidence under Rule 404(b). See generally Def.'s Opp'n to Gov't's Mot. at 1, 4 ("Def.'s Opp'n"), ECF No. 114.
The Court will analyze each item of challenged evidence in turn.
The Government seeks to introduce evidence that Mr. Hassanshahi previously
Up front, the Court notes that the precision of its analysis is somewhat frustrated by the Government's failure to articulate the specific evidence it seeks to introduce under Rule 404(b)(1). The Government attached a certified copy of the Kashani opinion to its notice, but did not indicate whether it would seek to introduce the opinion in whole or in part.
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) provides that "[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Yet, such evidence "may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). As a result, although the rule is "stated as a restriction," in actuality it is "one of `inclusion rather than exclusion.'" United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 792 (D.C.Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 929 (D.C.Cir.2000)). Rule 404(b)(1) "does not prohibit character evidence generally, only that which lacks any purpose but proving character." Bowie, 232 F.3d at 930; see also United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 523 (D.C.Cir.1980) (explaining that evidence of prior bad acts "is excluded when its sole tendency is to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character and
To assess whether proffered evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), the Court must first determine "whether the evidence is probative of some issue other than character." Cassell, 292 F.3d at 792. If it is, then the evidence will be admitted "unless it is otherwise prohibited under any of the other `general strictures limiting admissibility,' such as Rule 403." Id. (quoting United States v. Washington, 969 F.2d 1073, 1080 (D.C.Cir.1992)).
On the first step, the Government asserts that the Kashani opinion, and the fact that Mr. Hassanshahi previously was informed that his attempt to do business in Iran without the required license violated the law, show his "knowledge, intent, motive, and lack of mistake or accident." Gov't's Mot. at 1; see also id. at 5-6. This assertion indicates that the Government does not offer the evidence to show Mr. Hassanshahi's character as the type of individual who would export goods and services unlawfully to Iran; rather, the Government seeks to demonstrate that Mr. Hassanshahi and his company "had actual knowledge of the OFAC licensing requirement, but they knowingly and intentionally ignored the laws," and that their export activities to Iran was "no mistake or accident."
The Court agrees that the evidence is highly probative of these issues. The Kashani opinion shows that Mr. Hassanshahi was informed that efforts to export goods or services to Iran without the license required by OFAC contravene the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. This fact alone is highly probative of an absence of mistake, even though the underlying circumstances bear a strong similarity to the conduct charged in this case. See, e.g., Bowie, 232 F.3d at 930 (finding evidence that the defendant "possessed and passed counterfeit notes on a prior occasion was relevant because it decreased the likelihood that [he] accidentally or innocently possessed the counterfeit notes on [the day of the later crime]"); United States v. Rogers, 918 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C.Cir.1990) (finding that prior bad acts evidence of similar crimes "indicated that [the defendant] was familiar with crack distribution near the St. Thomas More School"); see also 2 Jack B. Weinstein, et
In response, Mr. Hassanshahi claims that the opinion cannot show knowledge because the Government does not explain how it intends to prove that the defendant named Shantia Hassanshahi who was a plaintiff in the Kashani case is the same person as the defendant in this case, see Def.'s Opp'n at 2 n.1, or how it will show that Mr. Hassanshahi became aware of the court's holding, see id. at 7-8; Def.'s Mot. at 20. Before admitting the evidence, the Government will have to lay a foundation to show that a reasonable jury could conclude that Mr. Hassanshahi and the plaintiff in the Kashani case are one in the same. The Court defers that issue for trial. On the second point, however, a jury could rationally infer from the fact that Mr. Hassanshahi was a named plaintiff in the Kashani lawsuit that he obtained knowledge of the court's ultimate ruling. If anything, his arguments to the contrary merely challenge the weight to give the opinion, not its admissibility. The argument that Mr. Hassanshahi never became aware of the court's ruling remains open to him, should he choose to make it before the jury.
The Court therefore concludes that the evidence "is probative of some issue other than character," Cassell, 292 F.3d at 792, and moves on to assess the proffered evidence under Rule 403. Rule 403 provides that a court "may exclude relevant evidence if [that evidence's] probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403. Unfair prejudice is "not to be equated with testimony simply adverse to the opposing party," because "[v]irtually all evidence is prejudicial or it isn't material." Cassell, 292 F.3d at 796 (quoting Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir.1977)). Any prejudice posed by the evidence must be "unfair"; that is, the term must have "`an undue tendency to suggest [a] decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.'" United States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C.Cir.1998) (quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997)). Because Rule 403 "`tilts, as do the rules as a whole, toward the admission of evidence in close cases,' even when other crimes evidence is involved," the D.C. Circuit has instructed that when a court "perform[s] the balancing test required under Rule 403, `it is a sound rule that the balance should generally be struck in favor of admission when the evidence indicates a close relationship to the event charged.'" Cassell, 292 F.3d at 795 (quoting United States v. Moore, 732 F.2d 983, 989 (D.C.Cir.1984)).
As the Court just explained, the proffered evidence here is highly probative. But Mr. Hassanshahi makes three assertions that the Court construes as arguments that a risk of undue prejudice, undue delay, or waste of time outweigh the evidence's probative value.
First, he claims that the acts described in the Kashani opinion are too removed in time to be admitted as prior bad acts
And, regardless, temporal proximity is not dispositive. For one thing, some courts have observed that "to the extent such prior acts are relevant to the matter of knowledge, rather than being relevant only to intent, remoteness may be less of a factor in determining the probative value of the evidence." United States v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d 1067, 1075 (5th Cir. 1982); see United States v. Fields, 871 F.2d 188, 198 (1st Cir.1989) (quoting Rubio-Gonzalez and noting that remoteness is a particular concern when prior acts evidence is offered to show intent). This observation flows from an acknowledgement that "[t]he passage of time and changing circumstances are more likely to significantly change one's intent than they are to obliterate knowledge once gained." Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d at 1075. Here, as already discussed, the government seeks to introduce evidence of the prior act to show Mr. Hassanshahi's knowledge of the licensing requirements — not his intent in committing the present offense. Mr. Hassanshahi does not explain how the passage of time may have changed his recollection of those requirements.
In addition, when assessing whether to admit evidence of prior acts, courts consider both the prior act's age as well as its similarity to the charged conduct. See United States v. Cheadle, No. 92-3117, 1992 WL 380140, at *1 (D.C.Cir. Dec. 18, 1992) ("There is no mechanical test for determining whether evidence of a prior offense is too remote to be admissible, and admissibility depends on whether the prior act is probative with respect to the accused's intent."); accord United States v. Pollock, 926 F.2d 1044, 1048 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that "decisions as to impermissible remoteness are so fact-specific that a generally applicable litmus test would be of dubious value"). Where the degree of similarity between the acts is
Second, Mr. Hassanshahi argues that there is a considerable risk of prejudice where the evidence proffered comes from a judicial opinion because a jury may place undue weight on the factual findings of another court. See Def.'s Opp'n at 10-12; see also Moore v. Hartman, 102 F.Supp.3d 35, 43-45 (D.D.C.2015). In light of the Government's concession that it intends only to introduce the first and last pages of the Kashani opinion, however, the Court is not persuaded that a similar risk is inherent under the circumstances of this case. The Government has proposed to excise much, if not all, of the substantive discussion of the opinion or the prior act, generally, and to focus closely on the fact of the prior lawsuit and the outcome. To the extent that certain details contained on the relevant page remain, any prejudice can be lessened by an appropriate limiting instruction or, perhaps, even redactions if necessary. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 328 F.3d 655, 662 (D.C.Cir.2003) (explaining that "limiting instructions ordinarily suffice to protect the defendant's interests"). But the Court does not believe that the introduction of evidence showing that Mr. Hassanshahi previously filed a lawsuit to enforce a contract, and was informed that the contract was unenforceable because he lacked the requisite license, presents a risk of unfair prejudice akin to the type that might flow from the introduction of judicial findings of fact without limitation.
Third, Mr. Hassanshahi contends that admission of evidence about the prior events will result in a "mini-trial," and he argues that there was evidence in the Kashani case indicating that Mr. Hassanshahi and the other plaintiffs "intended to seek an OFAC license for the proposed transaction, but did not do so when the Chinese counterparty terminated discussions." Def.'s Mot. at 20; see also Def.'s Opp'n at 12-15. He claims that this series of events shows that there was no "wrongdoing," and that "[a]ll such facts" would have to be considered at trial. Def.'s Mot. at 20. Given the Government's concession, however, there will be a more limited subset of issues to rebut. Still, it may be that Mr. Hassanshahi's clarifications will require the presentation of additional evidence. Regardless, the Court does not believe that any testimony concerning the plaintiffs' efforts to seek a license, or any other rebuttal evidence Mr. Hassanshahi presents, will result in undue delay or waste of time that would outweigh the probative force of the evidence. That Mr. Hassanshahi may have intended to seek an OFAC license but had yet to do so when Tsann terminated discussions does not undercut the prior acts' probative value in assessing Mr. Hassanshahi's knowledge of the licensing requirements. If anything, Mr. Hassanshahi's contention strengthens it, because it shows that he was already aware of the licensing requirements even
Because evidence concerning Mr. Hassanshahi's prior acts will not be introduced into evidence to prove his character, the evidence complies with Rule 404(b). Furthermore, particularly in light of the Government's representation that it anticipates introducing quite limited information about these prior transactions, its probative value outweighs any unfair prejudice or delay that might result from its admission. At trial, the Court will consider any more specific objections to the particular pieces of evidence the Government seeks to admit.
Next, Mr. Hassanshahi seeks to exclude the letter on Hasston letterhead, and addressed from Shantia Hassanshahi to the Iranian Minister of Energy, in which Mr. Hassanshahi asks the Iranian government for payment for "protective relays for transmission lines." Def.'s Mot. Attach., Ex. D (reproducing translation of letter). In its letter to Mr. Hassanshahi's counsel, the Government indicated that it anticipates seeking to introduce the letter as a non-hearsay statement of a party opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A). See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) (defining the statement of an opposing party "made by the party in an individual or representative capacity" as non-hearsay). Mr. Hassanshahi does not appear to dispute that, if the letter was written by him, it is admissible against him as the statement of a party opponent. Instead, he argues that the document "lacks authentication" and therefore cannot be attributed to him.
As the Government points out, Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) governs the authentication or identification of evidence. That rule requires that the proponent "produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is." Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). Rule 901(a) applies even when the proponent seeks to invoke Rule 801 and claims that a particular individual, or her agent, made the statement in question.
Here, the Government's proffer indicates that it will be able to produce sufficient evidence at trial to lay the necessary
In light of this showing, Mr. Hassanshahi's counter evidence is not persuasive. While Mr. Hassanshahi claims that there is no evidence the document was written by him or on the seized computer, see Def.'s Mot. at 5, the surrounding circumstances could rationally lead the jury to conclude otherwise. He also points out that the letter bears no signature, claims that, as a PDF, there is no indication the letter was actually drafted or generated on the laptop from which it was recovered,
Nor do the cases Mr. Hassanshahi cites direct otherwise. He places considerable weight on the Third Circuit's decision in Nicola v. United States, decided in 1934 — decades before the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted — in which that circuit concluded that a typewritten letter, bearing the name "F. F. Nicola" and purportedly found among the defendant's company's books, was inadmissible. 72 F.2d 780, 782-83 (3d Cir.1934). That case is distinguishable, even putting aside the fact that the case predated, and therefore was not decided under, Rule 901(a) and that the decision contains an antiquated view of written communications that is out of step with documents prepared in the twenty-first century.
The other cases Mr. Hassanshalli relies on are similarly inapposite. Both Coughlin v. Capitol Cement Co., 571 F.2d 290 (5th Cir.1978) and Hageman v. Corporation EG, S.A. de C.V., No. 14-cv-976, 2015 WL 1510009 (W.D.Tex. Mar. 31, 2015) considered parties' efforts to introduce agendas of business meetings under the hearsay exception for business records and where, among other things, the agenda's authorship was uncertain. Rule 803(6), at issue in each case, details several showings the proponent must make, through the testimony of a custodian or other qualified witness, to authenticate a document as a business record. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(A)-(E). Each court concluded that the proponents had not met the strictures of that rule. See Coughlin, 571 F.2d at 307; Hageman, 2015 WL 1510009, at *8. Here, however, the Government is not seeking to admit the letter as a business record, so those cases are not applicable. Moreover, there is ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that the letter was written by Mr. Hassanshalli, which suffices for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(A). And, contrary to Mr. Hassanshalli's citation to United States v. Mouzin, the evidence stretches further than Mr. Hassanshalli's mere possession of the document. See 785 F.2d 682, 692 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that the mere presence of a ledger in a co-conspirator's residence could not "constitute an adoption of its contents," and rejecting the proposition that "possession of a document is tantamount to an adoption of its contents").
Accordingly, the Court denies Mr. Hassanshalli's motion to exclude the letter.
Finally, Mr. Hassanshalli seeks to exclude the two e-mails sent by "Mark Babaei," which the Government asserts it will seek to admit at trial as the statements of a co-conspirator. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement offered against an opposing party that "was made by the party's coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy" is admissible as non-hearsay. Fed R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). To admit a statement under this rule, the Court "must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the person making the statement was a co-conspirator and that the statement was made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy." United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1520 (D.C.Cir.1996) (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144
As explained above, one of the e-mails was sent by Mark Babaei to "Shantia Haas," whose e-mail address is listed as "shantia34@gmail.com," and who the Government contends is Mr. Hassanshalli. See Def.'s Mot. Attach, Ex. C; see also Akronowitz Aff. ¶¶ 16, 20. In that e-mail, Mr. Babaei indicates that he has "talked with jabber, he is good and is working to solve the problems and we hope up to tomorrow night the goods will be in [sic] Iran border." Def.'s Mot. Attach., Ex. C. The second e-mail, dated February 2, 2012, was sent by Mark Babaei to Aoub Shaban and Arash Zandi (but not Mr. Hassanshalli), and represents that Mr. Babaei had traveled to Armenia to deal with a shipment of goods that was seized at the Armenian border, and states: "Please tell Shantia that we didn't let anything be traced back to Canada and they didn't even track this to Canada." Id. Ex. E.
Mr. Hassanshalli claims that there is no evidence beyond the e-mails themselves that "Mark Babaei" exists or was a member of the conspiracy. He notes that anyone can establish an e-mail account, and contends that "[t]he basic requirement of a person with whom to conspire, is not met." Def.'s Mot. at 18 (emphasis in original). In addition, with respect to the second e-mail, he claims that there is no evidence the recipient of the e-mail, Aoub Shaban, was a member of the conspiracy.
At present, the Court will defer a final ruling on the admissibility of these e-mails for trial. See United States v. Gewin, 471 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C.Cir.2006) (explaining that "[a] court can preliminarily admit hearsay statements of co-conspirators, subject to connection through proof of conspiracy"); see also United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1218 (D.C.Cir. 1980) (describing and approving procedure). The only independent evidence of the conspiracy the Government currently offers is a separate e-mail purportedly sent from Mr. Hassanshalli to Mr. Babaei, see Def.'s Mot. Attach., Ex. B, which the Government anticipates seeking to introduce as the statement of a party opponent under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), see Def.'s Mot. Attach. But Mr. Hassanshalli asserts he has been unable to locate that e-mail in the Government's production, and states he will defer any objections until a foundation is laid at trial. See Def.'s Mot. at 13. If that e-mail is admissible, it would likely supply the independent evidence of the conspiracy and Mr. Babaei's participation (or the participation of the user of "mark.babaei@gmail.com," whether an alias or otherwise), necessary to support the admission of the Mark Babaei e-mails. See United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 505 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that even documents for which declarant is anonymous "is not fatal to admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)... if the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the statement indicate that the speaker is the member of the conspiracy or joint venture"); accord United States v. Breitkreutz, 977 F.2d 214, 219 (6th Cir.1992). The e-mail was purportedly
For the foregoing reasons, the Government's motion to introduce evidence of prior bad acts is
Separate and apart from the Rule 404(b) issues, Mr. Hassanshahi also claims that the opinion is inadmissible hearsay and is being introduced for the truth of the matter asserted. He notes that courts have held that judicial findings of fact do not fall within Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)'s exception for "factual findings from a legally authorized investigation." Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(iii); Def.'s Opp'n at 4-6; see also, e.g., Hairston v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. Civ. 93-2127, 1997 WL 411946, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Apr. 10, 1997) (rejecting effort to introduce an opinion's factual findings under then-current Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C)). Here, however, the Government seeks to introduce the opinion to show Mr. Hassanshahi's knowledge of the licensing requirements — and thus for a non-hearsay purpose. Moreover, the Government has now represented that it will not seek to introduce the bulk of the opinion, including the portions that discuss the factual background of the case. Cf. Hairston, 1997 WL 411946, at *1 (noting that prior cases had held that the fact of a prior case's existence may be admissible). Any concerns about the jury's use of the evidence to consider the truth of the matter asserted can be accommodated through an appropriate limiting instruction.
