RYLES t/a RYLES PLACE, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its duly designated Hearing Officer, K. N. Ayers, held a public hearing in the above styled case on June 30, 1977 at Tallahassee, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Charles T. Collett, Esquire and
Richard Gentry, Esquire Staff Attorneys Division of Beverage Johns Building
725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304
For Respondent: represented herself
By Notice to Show Cause served January 19, 1977 the State of Florida, Division of Beverage, Petitioner, seeks to revoke, suspend or assess a civil penalty against the beverage license of Cressie Ryles t/a Ryles Place, Tallahassee, Florida. As grounds therefor it is alleged that on December 5, 1976 Cressie Ryles on the licensed premises sold one half pint of Taaka vodka, an alcoholic beverage not authorized to be sold under her license, to Guy Williams; and that, on December 12, 1976 Cressie Ryles possessed 36 half pints of liquor at the licensed premises with intent to sell.
Two witnesses were called by Petitioner and two exhibits were admitted into evidence. After her rights were fully explained by the Hearing Officer to Respondent she declined to testify or present any evidence.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Cressie Ryles, t/a Ryles Place, holds a 1-COP beverage license which authorizes the sale of beer only for consumption on the licensed premises.
On December 6, 1976 a beverage agent in company with an officer of the Tallahassee Police Department went to the vicinity of Ryles Place with one Guy
Williams who entered Ryles Place while the officers watched from a vantage point across the street.
Williams entered Ryles Place and asked Cressie Ryles for a half pint bottle of vodka. Shortly after Williams entered the licensed premises the officer saw Ms. Ryles come out of the premises, go to a car parked nearby, remove therefrom a small item and reenter the licensed premises. Williams then paid Ms. Ryles $2.50 for a half pint bottle of Taaka vodka with which he departed the licensed premises. Upon leaving Ryles Place Williams proceeded directly to the officers and delivered the bottle of vodka to them. The bottle was immediately marked for future identification and was duly produced and identified at the hearing.
Having observed the location of the illicit liquor cache the officers proceeded back to their respective places of operation and on December 12, 1976, armed with a search warrant, returned to Ryles Place. On this occasion the premises and car were searched and in the car were found some 36 assorted half pints of Smirnoff vodka, Taaka vodka, and Canadian Club whiskey, which was seized, marked for identification and duly produced as evidence at the hearing. These beverages were admitted into evidence, described in the record and returned to the Division of Beverage.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Section 562.02 F. S. provides:
"It is unlawful for a licensee under the beverage law or his agent to have in his possession, or permit anyone else to have
in his possession at or in the place of such licensee, alcoholic beverages not authorized by law to be sold by such licensee."
Section 561.29 F. S. provides in pertinent part:
"(1) The Division of Beverage is given full power and authority to revoke or suspend the license of any person holding a license under the beverage law when it is determined or found by the division upon sufficient cause appearing of:
"(a) Violation by licensee, his or its agents, officers, servants or employees, on the licensed premises... of any of the laws of this state... "
"(4) The Division may impose a civil penalty against a licensee for any violation mentioned in the beverage law, or any rule issued pur- suant thereto, not to exceed $1000 for viola- tions arising out of a single transaction. If the licensee fails to pay the civil penalty, his license shall be suspended for such period of time as the division may specify."
Here the evidence clearly establishes that the licensee was actively engaged in the sale of alcoholic beverages contrary to the provisions of her license. The foregoing Findings of Fact clearly establish that the licensee is guilty as alleged. It is therefore,
