STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ) BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF ) GENERAL REGULATION, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. )
)
HOMER (GLEN) LEONARD WADE, d/b/a ) CASE NO. 79-910 AMERICAN COLLECTION SYSTEMS, )
INC., License Permit No. 22013, )
)
and )
)
HOMER (GLEN) LEONARD WADE, d/b/a ) CASE NO. 79-911 AMERICAN COLLECTION SYSTEMS, )
INC., License Permit No. 22037, )
)
and )
)
HOMER (GLEN) LEONARD WADE, d/b/a ) CASE NO. 78-2428 AMERICAN COLLECTION SYSTEMS, )
INC., License Permit No. 18448, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its duly designated Hearing Officer, James E. Bradwell, held a public hearing in this case on June 26 and 27, 1979, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Pursuant to leave, the briefing period was extended through September 2, 1979.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Francis Bayley, Esquire
Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
For Respondent: Emerson Allsworth, Esquire and
Charles L. Curtis, Esquire Allsworth, Doomar, Schuler,
Padula & Laystrom, P.A.
1177 Southeast Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33310
ISSUE
The issue posed herein is whether or not the Certificate of Qualification and License issued to Respondent, Homer (Glen) Leonard, d/b/a American Collection Systems, Inc., to operate a collection agency should be suspended or revoked for conduct, set forth hereinafter in detail, which is allegedly violative of Chapter 559, Florida Statutes.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel, and the briefs submitted by the parties, the following relevant facts are found.
During times materiel herein, Homer (Glen) Leonard Wade, d/b/a American Collection Systems, Inc., has been continuously issued a Certificate of Qualification to operate a collection agency in this State pursuant to Chapter 559, Florida Statutes.
At the outset of the hearing, Respondent's counsel contested the Petitioner's jurisdiction to take administrative action to suspend or revoke the Respondent's Certificate of Qualification or license issued pursuant to Chapter 559, Florida Statutes, Part IV, on the basis that Section 559.79, Florida Statutes (1977), provides in pertinent part that only a circuit court and not an administrative agency has the express statutory authority to suspend or revoke certificates of qualification or licenses issued pursuant to Chapter 559, Florida Statutes. After reviewing the arguments and the citations of authorities, the undersigned concludes that the Petitioner is vested with the implied authority to specify conditions under which such certificates (licenses) shall be held and revoked, and such appears to be in keeping and necessarily implied from the power to issue a certificate and thus is in keeping with the necessary and broad power granted to Petitioner to issue certificates. It is thus concluded that the power to issue certificates in this instance carries with it the power to specify the terms and conditions of the issuance, as well as terms and conditions upon which the same may be held or revoked. See, for example, State Board of Education v. Nelson, So.2d 1979, Florida Law Weekly, 880 (1st DCA 1979), and 1 FIa.Jur.Prud., 2nd Adm.Law, 21.
In Case No. 78-2428, the Petitioner, in support of its Notice to Show Cause, alleges that the Respondent engaged in the following:
On or about January 15, 1976, the Respondent/Licensee or an agent of the Respondent/Licensee, did violate Subsection 559.72(7), Florida Statutes, by willfully communicating with Debtor David Gottlieb or a member of his family with such frequency as to harass the debtor or his family and willfully engaged in other conduct which could reasonably be expected to abuse or harass the debtor or a member of his family during the course of collection agency activity.
On or about January 21, 1976, the Respondent/Licensee or an agent of the Respondent/Licensee, did violate Subsection 559.72(5), Florida Statutes, by disclosing to a person other than David Gottlieb or his family information affecting the reputation of Mr. Gottlieb whether or not for credit worthiness, with knowledge or reason to know that the other person did not have a legitimate business need for the information.
On or about July 12, 1970, Respondent, American Collection Systems, Inc., by or through its agent, servant or employee did communicate or threaten to communicate with the employer of Mr. Donald Terry, a consumer, prior to obtaining final judgement against Mr. Terry without Mr. Terry having given his permission in writing to contact his employer or having acknowledged in writing the existence of the debt after that debt had been placed for collection in violation of Subsection 559.72(4), Florida Statutes.
On or about April 9, 1976, Respondent, American Collection Systems, Inc., by or through its agent, servant or employee did communicate or threaten to communicate with the employer of Mr. James T. Redington, a consumer, prior to obtaining final judgement against Mr. Redington and without Mr. Redington having acknowledged in writing the existence of the debt after that debt had been placed for collection in violation of Subsection 559.72(4), Florida Statutes.
On or about April 9, 1976, Respondent, American Collection Systems, Inc., by or through its agent, servant or employee did orally communicate with a consumer, Mr. James T. Redington, in such a manner as to give the false impression or appearance that its agent, servant or employee was associated with an attorney in violation of Subsection 559.72(12), Florida Statutes.
On or about August 24, 1976, Respondent, American Collection Systems, Inc., did claim, attempt or threaten to enforce a consumer claim against Ms. Patricia M. Tracey when it, its agents, servant or employee knew the claim was not legitimate or that the right to collect the consumer claim did not exist in violation of Subsection 559.72(9), Florida Statutes.
Thereafter, in Cases Nos. 79-910 and 79-911, the parties stipulated that the controversy involves a legal question as to whether or not the Respondent is authorized to exact a fee, an amount agreed to be computed at the rate of 6 percent simple interest, which amount was added to the amount Respondent attempted to collect from each of the debtors cited in the Notice to Show Cause herein is permissible under Subsection 559.75(5), Florida Statutes.
J. Lymon Babcock, Jr., is Petitioner's investigator who conducts background investigations for collection agency applications. He has custody of the license end records and is familiar with the Respondent's licensing entity, American Collection Systems, Inc. Babcock testified that Respondent was first licensed on or about January 26, 1973, and has continued to hold a license since that time. Respondent's certificate has been renewed annually and audit numbers are changed when the annual renewal is furnished. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 composites.)
On or about August 10, 1976, Respondent, by letter of the same date, advised John and Patricia Tracey of Coral Springs, Florida, that they owed a Dr. Jorge $149.60 and requested payment in the full amount at his office within five days to avoid the exaction of additional court costs and other legal expenses. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4 composite.) Ms. Tracey appeared at the hearing and testified that she spoke to an unidentified female employee of Respondent and a Mr. Hawk and a Mr. Richards, who also requested payment of the $149.00 as set forth in the demand letter of August 10, 1976. At that time, the Tracey's testimony was that they had also been contacted by Respondent and Broward Adjustment Bureau for the same indebtedness to Dr. Jorge which, according to their records, reflected an amount owing of $136.00. The Traceys received a second letter from Respondent on September 8, 1976, from Mr. Richards, the
General Manager, and Bruce L. Glaskin, attorney for Respondent. (Petitioner's Exhibits 6 and 7.) Both letters also requested payment within five days of the date of the letters. The Traceys testified that they had made arrangements with Broward Adjustment to pay the indebtedness in two monthly installments of $68.00 each. The Traceys contacted Consumer Affairs prior to the time that they received the last demand letter from Respondent and it appears that the indebtedness had been paid by October 12, 1976. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.)
On cross-examination, the Traceys acknowledged that the debt was a legitimate debt which was due and owing and that they never notified the Respondent in writing that the debt had been paid to either Dr. Jorge or the Respondent.
Maxine Hughey is employed by Rolando Jorge, M.D., P.A., in the collection department primarily in the workmen's compensation collection section. Ms. Hughey testified that she turned the Tracey account over to Respondent sometime during 1970. It appears that after the Traceys advised Respondent that they had been contacted by another collection service for payment of the same indebtedness to Dr. Jorge, Mr. Godette of Respondent's office advised Ms. Hughey that Respondent was still working the Tracey account for Dr. Jorge. Ms. Hughey advised Respondent by letter dated August 11, 1976, that the accounts for Dr. Jorge had been withdrawn from the Respondent verbally during mid-September, 1974. Ms. Hughey testified that she withdrew the collection accounts of Dr. Jorge from Respondent due to the slow recovery on collections. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 9 and 10.) Ms. Hughey spoke to Respondent, Homer (Glen) Leonard Wade, during August or September, 1976, and inquired of Respondent why he was working the Tracey account. Respondent replied that Dr. Jorge had not withdrawn the accounts that had been assigned to him and that for him (Dr. Jorge) to assign the accounts to anyone without prior contact and arrangement with Respondent would subject Dr. Jorge to a legal suit.
On cross-examination, Ms. Hughey testified that the Tracey account was turned over to Respondent during December, 1973, and that Broward adjustment received two payments from the Traceys account on September 15, 1976, and October 26, 1976. She also testified that she formally notified Respondent that Dr. Jorge was withdrawing the accounts assigned to Respondent during 1974. In this regard, no written evidence was offered establishing that any attempt at withdrawal of accounts was sent to Respondent until the letter dated August 11, 1975, was mailed by Ms. Hughey allegedly per instructions from Dr. Jorge. Ms. Hughey forwarded a copy of the letter to Mr. Godette of Consumer Services on or about August 25, 1976, when she received inquiry from the Traceys referencing the demand letters the Traceys had received from the Respondent.
In this regard, Respondent introduced a copy of its collection procedures which was submitted to all its clients and prospects. Respecting Respondent's collection procedures, paragraph 2A provides in pertinent part that:
We will close any account to you upon your request after listing, with these exceptions:
(1) Those paying (2) Those promised to pay (3) Forwarded accounts (4) Those accounts in law or hands of attorney and of course, those we have reduced to judgements for you. (Respondent's Exhibit 1.)
James Redington, an engineer for Motorola, appeared and testified that he received demand letters requesting collections from Respondent during January, 1976. Mr. Redington acknowledged a past-due account with Dr. Jacobsen. Mr. Redington testified that "Bob Cash", one of the Respondent's aliases, called him at work and inquired when his delinquent bill would be paid. According to Redington, after receiving two calls from "Bob Cash", he was advised by "Cash" that Respondent was holding a check payable to Dr. Jacobsen which was returned for insufficient funds. Thereafter, in April, 1976, Redington received another call from a Mr. Richardson, who was then Respondent's General Manager, who advised Mr. Redington that there was an outstanding warrant which had been issued due to the outstanding sufficient insufficient funds check made payable to their client, Dr. Jacobsen, and requested that payment be made immediately or the Sheriff would serve the warrant. Redington immediately went to Respondent's office and spoke to "Bob Cash", who advised that Richardson, Respondent's General Manager, had called. Redington tendered "Cash" a money order for the indebtedness and requested that the returned check be given to him. Redington had no further contact with Respondent, although the Sheriff did serve the warrant on him at work.
Donald Terry, an instructor at Plantation High School, received a demand letter from Respondent during the summer of 1976 for a $48.00 indebtedness he owed a Dr. Segal. Mr. Terry received a phone call from a representative of Respondent advising him that if he did not make arrangements to pay the indebtedness owed Dr. Segal, the Respondent would "take him to court." Terry testified that within two days he received another call from an employee of Respondent who advised that if he did not pay his indebtedness, his employer would be contacted. Terry received a copy of the letter which, in his opinion, had been mailed to his employer. The letter was received from Respondent at Plantation High School. (Petitioner's Exhibits 12 and 13.) Additionally, Mr. Terry received another demand letter inquiring of the Segal's indebtedness in the mail. (Petitioner's Exhibit 14.)
On cross-examination, Terry testified that the letter was not distributed at the school and that he paid the indebtedness in full the following year, which was a legitimate debt owed to Dr. Segal.
Derrick Costa, Respondent's manager, was first employed during 1974 and since 1976, has served as a quasi-manager. Costa testified that the name changed from American Collection Service to American Collection Systems, Inc., during September or October of 1976. He testified that at all times material, Wade had ultimate responsibility and authority for the operation of both American Collection Service and American Collection Systems, Inc. Costa expressed familiarity with the Redington account and testified that he worked the account, which was due for Dr. Jacobsen. Costa testified that he never threatened to contact Mr. Redington's employer nor had he violated in any manner Chapter 559, Florida Statutes.
On redirect examination, Costa testified that true names were never used when dealing with debtors and that the aliases such as "Richards", "Cash", etc., are used extensively in a collection business.
Petitioner also introduced into evidence copies of a letter which had been forwarded to Irving Weislander of Sunrise, Florida, and Jeanette Mims of Boca Raton, Florida. According to Petitioner, these letters were intended as a threat and mailed to the above-named debtors' employers. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 15 and 16.) Another letter of the same type was mailed to James Fannin of Lauderdale Lakes, Florida. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 17.)
Homer (Glen) Leonard Wade, Respondent, appeared and testified in his own behalf. Wade heard Costa's testimony and adopted it in all respects. Respondent testified that he never threatened Redington or Terry, nor did be indicate to them that he would contact their employers. He testified that he never held himself out as an attorney with Redington. Respondent testified that he has a collections manual which is given to all employees and that that manual sets forth in vivid detail, the practices and procedures utilized in collecting accounts assigned to him. He testified that new employees are oriented respecting the do's and don'ts of the collection business for approximately four days and they are administered a test on the fifth day. The employees are assigned collection tasks only if they pass the examination. Respondent stressed that he apprises new employees that both the "spirit" and "letter" of the law must be adhered to rigidly.
Respondent testified that he uses the "gag" of long distance calls on occasion as the situation dictates. He testified that it is not improper to engage in such gags in the collection business. He testified that the gag of making a long distance telephone call was used in the case wherein the James T. Redington account was serviced because, in his personal opinion, a review of Redington's credit history file revealed that his account was in fact collectible.
Respondent has serviced the collection accounts for Dr. Jorge since approximately 1973. A problem in the servicing of Dr. Jorge's accounts when he was unable to pick up same accounts that Dr. Jorge wanted serviced one day during 1973. According to Respondent, there was never any conversations with Dr. Jorge respecting termination of his contract with him, nor did Dr. Jorge ever write him a letter advising that he wanted to terminate his contract with Respondent. Respondent has been engaged in business since 1951.
CASE NOS. 79-910; 79-911
The Petitioner has alleged that the Respondent violated Subsections 559.72(4) and 559.72(5), Florida Statutes, by its allegation dent Respondent has either communicated or threatened to communicate with the employers of debtors without first obtaining the debtors' written permission to do so and by sending certain demand letters to debtors demanding payment of sums which are in excess of the original amount of the debt.
Respecting the allegation that the Respondent has attempted to collect a fee violative of Subsection 599.75(5), Florida Statutes, the parties stipulate that the method of calculating the amount set forth in the demand letter is based on an amount less than 6 percent simple interest. The uncontroverted evidence clearly indicates that in every instance Respondent's letters to the debtors are for an amount in excess of the original obligation. However, the difference between the original amount of the debt and the amount sought to be collected, in each instance, falls below the permissible interest rate allowed by Section 687.01, Florida Statutes. Respondent gave sworn testimony that the excess amounts demanded represented interest and was not a collection fee.
Both Subsections 559.75(1) and 687.01, Florida Statutes, provide for the calculation and collection of interest.
Subsection 559.75(1), Florida Statutes, states in applicable part:
Any payment made by a debtor to a collection agency shall be deemed to be made to the creditor and such payment shall be made in the following order:
Court costs and attorney fees;
Principal amount of the consumer claim and incurred interest; and
Other legally chargeable fees.
Additionally, Section 687.01, Florida Statutes, states:
In all cases where interest shall accrue without a special contract for the rate thereof, the rate shall be 6 percent per annum, but parties may contract for a lesser or greater rate by contract in writing.
Inasmuch as the language of Subsection 559.75(1), Florida Statutes, provides that a collection entity such as Respondent is permitted to charge interest at the legal rate for all debts collected and inasmuch as all of the requested sums fall within the prescribed rate of interest, it can only be concluded that such was a legally chargeable rate of interest and not a fee for the collection of the debt which is passed on to the debtor. This is especially true in view of the sworn testimony of Respondent and/or its employees.
Respecting the allegations that the Respondent either communicated or threatened to communicate with the employers of the debtors without first obtaining the debtors' written permission, the evidence reveals that Respondent's employees sent to the employee-debtor carbon copies of letters addressed to the employee's employer. The contents of the letters are demands to assist the Respondent in collecting a lawful debt owed by the debtor- employee. In all instances, the debtors acknowledged that the debts were in fact legal debts which had not been paid. The evidence also reveals that the original of the letters were never sent to the employers or anyone else and at no time did the debtors' employers ever receive the letter. It view thereof, it is impossible for the Respondent to have violated the cited statutes under its terms concerning "communication" with the debtors' employers.
The remaining portion of the above allegation is to the effect that the Respondent "threatened to communicate with the debtor's employer. . .,". Under the above-referred to facts, it is impossible to "threaten" to do the act which the statutes proscribes. The Respondent's action herein is clearly not a "declaration of intention. . .to do an unlawful act." An intent to do an act evidences the accomplishment of it sometime in the future. Under the circumstances herein, any act in the mind of the debtor was clearly consummated. Nothing remained to be done and hence no threat was possible at the time the debtors received the communication from the Respondent. Although the debtor could only believe in his mind after reading the letter that the employer had already been contacted, which if said act had occurred, would be a violation of the statute, it cannot operate to take away the debtor's voluntary consent to allow Respondent to contact his employer. No such request or demand was made by the letter and, in fact, it never happened. In view thereof, and inasmuch as no future action remains to be done, the letter can in no way be interpreted as a threat in violation of Subsection 559.72(4), Florida Statutes.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this action.
The parties were duly noticed pursuant to the notice provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
The authority of the Petitioner is derived from Chapter 559, Florida Statutes.
Insufficient evidence was offered to establish that the Respondent's Certificate of Qualification and License to operate a collection agency should be revoked based on the above referred to allegations.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby,
RECOMMENDED:
That the allegations contained in the Notice to Show Cause filed herein be DISMISSED.
RECOMMENDED this 26th day of September, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida.
JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(904) 488-9675
COPIES FURNISHED:
Francis Bayley, Esquire Division of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Emerson Allsworth, Esquire and Charles L. Curtis, Esquire Allsworth, Doomar, Schuler,
Padula & Laystrom, P.A.
1177 Southeast Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33310
================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER
=================================================================
STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF GENERAL REGULATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
HOMER (GLEN) LEONARD WADE, d/b/a CASE NO. 79-910 AMERICAN COLLECTION SYSTEMS,
INC., License Permit No. 22013, and
HOMER (GLEN) LEONARD WADE, d/b/a
AMERICAN COLLECTION SYSTEMS, CASE NO. 79-911
INC., License Permit No. 22037, and
HOMER (GLEN) LEONARD WADE, d/b/a
AMERICAN COLLECTION SYSTEMS, CASE NO. 78-2428
INC., License Permit No. 18448,
Respondent.
/
FINAL ORDER
This matter came on for hearing in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, before the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its duly designated hearing officer, JAMES E. BRADWELL, on June 26 and 27, 1979. The parties were represented by counsel:
For Petitioner: Francis Bayley, Esquire
Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
For Respondent: Emerson Allsworth, Esquire
Charles L. Curtis, Esquire Allsworth, Doomar, Schuler, Padula
and Laystrom, P.A.
1177 Southeast Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316
ISSUES
By a Notice to Show Cause filed in the above-styled cases, the Petitioner seeks to suspend or revoke the Certificate of Qualification and license issued to Homer (Glen) Leonard Wade, d/b/a American Collection Systems, Inc.,
Respondent to operate a collection agency for conduct of violative of provisions of provisions of Chapter 559, Florida Statutes; namely --
Threatening to communicate or communicating with a debtor's employer prior to obtaining a final judgment against the debtor or without securing the debtor's written permission in violation of section 559.72(4), Florida Statutes.
Collecting or attempting to collect from a debtor or debtors a fee for collection services without authorization to do so in violation of Section 559.75(5), Florida Statutes.
Communicating orally or in writing, with a debtor in such a manner as to give the false impression or appearance that the licensee or his agent was an attorney or was associated with an attorney in violation of Section 559.72(12), Florida Statutes.
Claiming, attempting or threatening to enforce a consumer claim when knowing the right to collect such claim did not exist in violation of Section 559.72(9), Florida Statutes.
While not part of Petitioner's Notice to Show Cause, the issue of Petitioner's jurisdictional authority to revoke or suspend Respondent's license and certificate was raised by its Motion to Dismiss filed herein.
NOTICE
In that a recommended order was submitted by the hearing officer who conducted the hearing in the instant case and upon consideration of said recommended order the agency intends to reject certain findings of fact and reject or modify certain conclusions of law, it states that such was done only after reviewing the entire record consisting of the specific documents required under Section 120.57(1)(b)(5).
FINDINGS OF FACT
During times material herein, Respondent, Homer (Glen) Leonard Wade, d/b/a American Collection Systems, Inc., has been continuously issued a Certificate of Qualification to operate a collection agency in this State pursuant to Chapter 559, Part V, Florida Statutes. While not made part of the findings by the hearing officer, said Respondent had also been continuously issued a license for his collection agency (American Collection Systems, Inc.) during the times material herein. These facts are supported by the record through the testimony of J. Lymon Babcock, Jr., Petitioner's investigator on pages 18-24; and 33-34 of the hearing transcript and Petitioners Exhibits 1 and 2.
At the outset of the hearing, Respondent's counsel contested the Petitioner's jurisdiction to take administrative action to suspend or revoke Respondent's Certificate of Qualification and/or license issued pursuant Chapter 559, Florida Statutes, Part V, on the basis that Section 559.78, Part V, Florida Statutes (1977), provides in pertinent part that only a circuit court and not the agency has the express statutory authority to suspend or revoke certificates of qualification or licenses issued pursuant to Chapter 559, Part V, Florida Statutes. After reviewing the arguments and the citations of authorities, it is concluded that the Petitioner is vested with the implied authority to specify conditions under which such certificates and licenses shall be held and suspended or revoked and such appears to be in keeping and necessarily implied from the power to issue a certificate or license and thus is in keeping with the
necessary and broad power granted to Petitioner to issue the same. It is thus concluded that the power to issue certificates and licenses in this instant carries with it the power to specify the terms and conditions of the issuance, as well as terms and conditions upon which the same may be held, revoked or suspended. As grounds for this finding, see the case of State Board of Education, So 2d, 1979, Florida Law Weekly, 880 (1st DCA), and 1 Fla. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, 21.
Conforming with the recommended order's outline, the findings are addressed in the order of case numbers as presented at the hearing. While the hearing officer found and listed six allegations contained in Case No. 78-2428, this finding is specifically rejected by the agency after a review of the record shows that such was not supported by competent evidence.
The record reflects that the Notice to Show Cause as filed therein contained seven allegations, the first three of which were disposed of prior to the hearing by a Notice of Partial Voluntary Dismissal. The remaining four allegations are as follows:
On or about April 9, 1976, the licensee or an agent of the licensee, did violate Section 559.75(4), Florida Statutes, by communicating or threatening to communicate with Mr. Donald Terry's employer prior to obtaining final judgment against Mr. Terry, without Mr. Terry having given his employer or having acknowledged in writing the existence of the debt after the debt had been placed for collection.
On or about April 9, 1976, the licensee or an agent of the licensee did violate Section 559.72(4), Florida Statutes by communicating or threatening to communicate with Mr. James
T. Redington's employer prior to obtaining final judgment against Mr. Redington, and without Mr. Redington having given his permission in writing to contact his employer or acknowledged in writing the existence of the debt after the debt had been placed for collection.
On or about April 9, 1976, the licensee or an agent of the licensee, did violate Section 559.72(12), Florida Statutes, by orally communicating with Mr. James T. Redington, in such a manner as to give the false impression or appearance that the licensee or the agent
of the licensee was associated with an attorney.
On or about August 24, 1976, the licensee or an agent of the licensee, did violate Section 559.72(9), Florida Statutes, by claiming, attempting or threatening to enforce a consumer claim against Ms. Patricia M. Tracy, when the licensee knew the claim was not
legitimate or when the licensee knew that his right to collect did not exist.
Lymon Babcock, Jr., is Petitioner's investigator who conducts background investigations for collection agency applications. He has custody of the licenses, certificates and records. While the recommended order found that Respondent's business was first licensed on January 26, 1973 and Respondent's certificate was renewed annually since that time, the agency's review of the record forces it to reject this finding as being without competent evidence to support it. The record would show that the Respondent was initially issued a Certificate of Qualification on January 26, 1973 and has renewed said certificate each year as required. See Page 24; Petitioner's Exhibit 1. As to Respondent's agency license under the name of American Collection Systems, Inc., the record reflects the initial license was obtained on December 15, 1976 and renewed annually as required. See P. 33, hearing transcript; Petitioner's Exhibit 2. While the above certificates and licenses are renewed annually under the same names the audit numbers assigned the respective documents are changed when the annual renewal is furnished.
In regards to the allegations within Case No. 78-2428 concerning the "Tracey" situation the hearing officer set forth the following facts: That on or about August 10, 1976 Respondent, by letter of same date, advised John and Patricia Tracey that they owed a Dr. Jorge $149.60 and requested payment in the full amount within five days (Petitioner's Exhibit 4). Mrs. Tracey testified that she spoke to an unidentified female employee of Respondent, a Mr. Hawk and a Mr. Richards who also requested payment of the same sum as set forth in the demand letter of August 10, 1976. The Traceys further testified that they had also been contacted by the Respondent and the Broward Adjustment Bureau for the same debt. However, Broward reflected the sum as being $136.00. The Traceys received a second letter from Respondent dated September 8, 1976 from a Mr.
Richards, General Manager, and one from Bruce L. Glaskin, attorney for Respondent, of the same date, both letters demanding payment. The Traceys further testified that they made arrangements to repay said debt through Broward Adjustment in two monthly installments of $68.00. The Traceys contacted Consumer Affairs prior to the time they received the last demand letter from Respondent and it appears that the indebtedness had been paid by October 12, 1976. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8).
While competent evidence exists in the record to support the above findings the agency's review of the record disclosed several additional facts in regards to the Traceys that have a direct bearing on the allegations. Mrs. Tracey testified at the hearing that Dr. Jorge's bill was discovered through her contacting the local credit bureau on or about August 9th or 10th, 1976. (Pages 39-40, hearing transcript). Until this time neither she nor her husband knew of Respondent's possession of Dr. Jorge's bill. An examination of Petitioner's Exhibits 3 - 8 reveal that Respondent's first contact with the Traceys was by way of returning Mrs. Traceys letter of August 9, 1976 with a request for payment, and was postmarked August 11, 1976 (Exhibit 3). Respondent's first demand letter (Exhibit 4) bears a date of August 10, 1979 but was not postmarked until August 16, 1976. Respondent's last contact with the Traceys was a demand letter dated October 12, 1976 (Petitioner's Exhibit 6).
On Cross-examination, the Tracey's acknowledged that the questioned debt was due and owing and that they never notified the Respondent in writing that the debt had been paid to either Dr. Jorge or Broward Adjustment.
Maxine Hughey is employed by Dr. Rolando Jorge, M.D., P.A., processing workmen's compensation and collections (Page 89, hearing transcript). While the hearing officer found that the Tracey account was turned over to Respondent sometime during 1976, the agency specifically rejects this finding as unsupported by competent evidence in that the record reflects Mrs. Hughey testified the account was given Respondent on December 3, 1973 (Page 91, hearing transcript) and was verified by Respondent in his testimony at the hearing (Page 191, hearing transcript). It appears that after the Traceys advised Respondent that they had been contacted by another collection agency for payment of same indebtedness to Dr. Jorge, a Mr. Godette of the Consumer Affairs Office advised Mrs. Hughey that Respondent was still working the Tracey account for Dr. Jorge. Ms. Hughey advised Respondent by August 11, 1976 that the accounts of Dr. Jorge had been withdrawn from the Respondent verbally during mid-September, 1974. Ms. Hughey testified that she withdrew the collection accounts of Dr. Jorge from Respondent due to slow recovery of collections. (Petitioner's Exhibits 9 & 10). Respondent replied that Dr. Jorge had not withdrawn the accounts that had been assigned to him and that for Dr. Jorge to assign the accounts to anyone without prior contact and arrangement with Respondent would subject Dr. Jorge to a legal suit.
On cross-examination, Ms. Hughey testified that the Tracey account was turned over to Respondent during December, 1973, and that Broward Adjustment received two payments from the Traceys account on September 15, 1976, and October 26, 1976. She also testified that she formally notified Respondent that Dr. Jorge was withdrawing the accounts assigned to Respondent during 1974. In this regard, no written evidence was offered establishing that any attempt at withdrawal of accounts was sent to Respondent until the letter dated August 11, 1976, was mailed by Ms. Hughey allegedly per instructions from Dr. Jorge. Ms.
Hughey forwarded a copy of the letter to Mr. Godette of Consumer Services on or about August 25, 1976, when she received inquiry from the Traceys referencing the demand letters the Traceys had received from the Respondent.
In this regard, Respondent introduced a copy of its collection procedures which was submitted to all its clients and prospects. Respecting Respondent's collection procedures, paragraph 2A provides in pertinent part that:
We will close any account to you upon your request after listing, with these exceptions:
Those paying (2) Those promised to pay (3) Forwarded accounts (4) Those accounts in law or hands of attorney and of course, those we have reduced to judgments for you. (Respondent's Exhibit 1.)
James Redington, an engineer for Motorola, appeared and testified that he received demand letters requesting collections from Respondent during January, 1976. Mr. Redington acknowledged a past-due account with Dr. Jacobsen. Mr.
Redington testified that "Bob Cash", one of the Respondent's aliases, called him at work and inquired when his delinquent bill would be paid. According to Redington, after receiving two calls from "Bob Cash", he was advised by "Cash" that Respondent was holding a check payable to Dr. Jacobsen which was returned for insufficient funds. Thereafter, in April, 1976, Redington received another call from a Mr. Richardson, who was then Respondent's General Manager, who advised Mr. Redington that there was an outstanding warrant which had been issued due to the outstanding insufficient funds check made payable to their client, Dr. Jacobsen, and requested that payment be made immediately or the Sheriff would serve the warrant. Redington immediately went to Respondent's
office and spoke to "Bob Cash", who advised that Richardson, Respondent's General Manager, had called. Redington tendered "Cash" a money order for the indebtedness and requested that the returned check be given to him. Redington had no further contact with Respondent, although the Sheriff did serve the warrant on him at work.
Donald Terry, an instructor at Plantation High School, received a demand letter from Respondent during the summer of 1976 for a $48.00 indebtedness he owed a Dr. Segal. Mr. Terry received a phone call from a representative of Respondent advising him that if he did not make arrangements to pay the indebtedness owed Dr. Segal, the Respondent would "take him to court." Terry testified that within two days he received another call from an employee of Respondent who advised that if he did not pay his indebtedness, his employer would be contacted. Terry received a copy of the letter which, in his opinion, had been mailed to his employer. The letter was received from Respondent at Plantation High School. (Petitioner's 12 and 13.) Additionally, Mr. Terry received another demand letter inquiring of the Segal indebtedness in the mail. (Petitioner's Exhibit 14.)
On cross-examination, Terry testified that the letter was not distributed at the school and that he paid the indebtedness in full the following year, which was a legitimate debt owed to Dr. Segal.
Derrick Costa, Respondent's manager, was first employed during 1974 and since 1976, has served as a quasi-manager. Costa testified that the name changed from American Collection Service to American Collection Systems, Inc., during September or October of 1976. He testified that at all times material, Wade had ultimate responsibility and authority for the operation of both American Collection Service and American Collection Systems, Inc. Costa expressed familiarity with the Redington Account and testified that he worked the account, which was due for Dr. Jacobsen. Costa testified that he never threatened to contact Mr. Redington's employer nor had he violated in any manner Chapter 559, Florida Statutes.
On redirect examination, Costa testified that true names were never used when dealing with debtors and that the aliases such as "Richards", "Cash", etc., are used extensively in a collection business.
Petitioner also introduced into evidence copies of a letter which had been forwarded to Irving Weislander of Sunrise, Florida, and Jeanette Mims of Boca Raton, Florida. According to Petitioner, these letters were intended as a threat and mailed to the above-named debtor's employers. (See Petitioner's Exhibits 15 and 16.) Another letter of the same type was mailed to James Fanin of Lauderdale Lakes, Florida. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 17.)
Homer (Glen) Leonard Wade, Respondent, appeared and testified in his own behalf. Wade heard Costa's testimony and adopted it in all respects.
Respondent testified that he never threatened Redington or Terry, nor did he indicate to them that he would contact their employers. He testified that he never held himself out as an attorney with Redington. Respondent testified that he has a collections manual which is given to all employees and that that manual sets forth in vivid detail, the practices and procedures utilized in collecting accounts assigned to him. He testified that new employees are oriented respecting the do's and don'ts of the collection business for approximately four days and they are administered a test on the fifth day. The employees are assigned collection tasks only if they pass the examination. Respondent
stressed that he apprises new employees that both the "Spirit" and "letter" of the law must be adhered to rigidly.
Respondent testified that he uses the "gag" of long distance calls on occasion as the situation dictates. He testified that it is not improper to engage in such gags in the collection business. He testified that the gag of making a long distance telephone call was used in the case wherein the James T. Redington account was serviced because, in his personal opinion, a review of Redington's credit history file revealed that his account was in fact collectible.
Respondent has serviced the collection account for Dr. Jorge since approximately 1973. A problem surfaced in the servicing of Dr. Jorge's account when he was unable to pick up some accounts that Dr. Jorge wanted serviced one day during 1973. According to Respondent, there was never any conversations with Dr. Jorge respecting termination of his contract with him, nor did Dr.
Jorge ever write him a letter advising that he wanted to terminate his contract with Respondent. Respondent has been engaged in business since 1951.
The Respondent's statement regarding the absence of any conversation with Dr. Jorge respecting termination of his contract with Respondent is contradicted by the record and is not supported by more than what can be considered self- serving testimony and is therefore specifically rejected. The agency sets out that through the prior referenced testimony of Dr. Jorge's collection employee, Ms. Hughey, and Petitioner's Exhibit 9, Respondent's letter acknowledging Dr.
Jorge's withdrawal of his accounts in October, 1978 and Petitioner's Exhibit 10, a written notification on August 11, 1976 again stating that Dr. Jorge no longer wanted to do business with Respondent and reconfirming the September, 1974 withdrawal, that there had been a communication between Dr. Jorge and Respondent respecting termination of their business dealings.
CASE NOS. 79-910; 79-911
The Petitioner has alleged that the Respondent violated Subsections 559.72(4) and 559.72(5), Florida Statutes, by its allegation that Respondent has either communicated or threatened to communicate with the employers of debtors without first obtaining the debtors' written permission to do so and by sending certain demand letters to debtors demanding payment of sums which are in excess of the original amount of the debt. By reference to the Notices to Show Cause in the above cases the dates and specifics of each allegation are incorporated herein.
Respecting the allegation that the respondent has attempted to collect a fee violative of Subsection 599.75(5), Florida Statutes, the recommended order states that the parties stipulated that the method of calculating the amount set for in the demand letters is based on an amount less than 6 percent simple interest. A review of the record in the instant case would require the agency to reject, in part, the above finding. The parties did enter into a stipulation concerning the allegations of charging a collection fee based on an interest charge but the context of the stipulation was that the parties agreed that the method used by Respondent for figuring the extra charge above the principal was computed as if it was interest at the statutory rate (see page 174 of hearing transcript). The uncontroverted evidence clearly indicates that in every instance Respondent's letters to the debtors are for an amount in excess of the original obligation; however, the difference between the original amount of the debt and the amount sought to be collected, in each instance, falls below the permissible rate allowed by Section 687.01, Florida Statutes. Respondent gave
sworn testimony that the excess amounts demanded represented interest and was not a collection fee.
The recommended order goes on to the state that both Subsections 559.75(1) and 687.01, Florida Statutes, provide for the calculation and collection of interest. After reviewing the records and the cited subsections this finding is rejected by the agency as being entered without being based on substantial competent evidence. The agency finds that while the question of interest is addressed by these two subsections they are not in and of themselves, addressed to the particular issue herein: namely, can a collection agency charge interest on a consumer claim without authorization from the creditor. Section 559.75(1), Florida Statutes, as correctly set out in the recommended order, is a statutory guideline as to how any payment received by a collection agency on a consumer claim shall be disbursed upon receipt. In reading this particular subsection there are no provisions addressing the question or providing for the calculation and collection of interest.
Section 687.01, Florida Statutes, is correctly set forth in the recommended order; however, the agency finds that this particular section merely provides for a particular rate of interest where interest is allowed to be accrued without a special contract of the rate but fails to address itself to the particular nature of the instant cases.
The recommended order addressed itself to the effect of 559.75(1), Florida Statutes on the allegations of the agency herein and held as a finding that this section provides that a collection entity such as the Respondent is permitted to charge interest at the legal rate for all debts collected and inasmuch as all of the requested sums fall within the prescribed rate of interest are not a fee for the collection of the debt which is passed on to the debtor.
The agency would reject this finding, be it a finding of fact or a conclusion of law, for its failure to be based on a showing of substantial competent evidence in support of this view. Upon its review of the record the agency finds that while all the amounts questioned were within the guidelines of the method stipulated to by the parties, the lack of evidence or testimony as to the particular nature of each consumer claim and whether or not the claims were of such a nature that would allow for collection of interest and whether or not there had been an agreement between debtor and creditor not to charge interest would preclude a finding that this amount was a collection fee or legally chargeable interest. Inasmuch as this lack of evidence precludes the proof of the specific allegations it would also preclude the proof that the amounts were interest and not a fee.
Respecting the allegations that the Respondent either communicated or threatened to communicate with the employers of the debtors without first obtaining the debtor's written permission, the evidence reveals that Respondent's employees sent to the employee-debtors carbon copies of letters addressed to the employee-debtor's employers. The contents of the letters are demands to assist the Respondent in collecting a lawful debt owed by the debtor- employee. In all instances, the debtors acknowledged that the debts were in fact legal debts which had not been paid. The evidence also reveals that the original of the letters were never sent to the employers or anyone else and at no time did the debtor's employers ever receive the letter. The Recommended order states that it is impossible for the Respondent to have violated the cited statutes under its terms concerning "communication" with the debtor's employers.
The remaining portion of the above allegation is to the effect that the Respondent "threatened to communicate with the debtors' employer. . ." Under the above-referenced facts, the Recommended Order states that it is impossible to "threaten" to do the act which the statute proscribes. The Respondent's act ion herein is clearly not a "declaration of intention. . .to do an unlawful act." An intent to do an act evidences the accomplishment of it sometime in the future. Under the circumstances herein, any act in the mind of the debtor was clearly consummated. Nothing remained to be done and hence no threat was possible at the time the debtors received the communication from the Respondent. Although the debtor could only believe in his mind after reading the letter that the employer had already been contacted, which if said act had occurred, would be a violation of the statute, it cannot operate to take away the debtor's voluntary consent to allow Respondent to contact his employer. No such request or demand was made by the letter and, in fact, it never happened. In view thereof, and inasmuch as no future action remains to be done, the letter can in no way be interpreted as a threat in violation of Subsection 559.72(4), Florida Statutes.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this action.
The parties were duly noticed pursuant to the notice provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
Adopting the Recommended Order's finding that the agency has jurisdictional authority to suspend or revoke Respondent's Certificate of Qualification and license, it's found that such authority does arise from Chapter 559, Part V, Florida Statutes.
After reviewing the entire record as required by law before entering the final order herein and applying the evidence from the record to the allegations contained in Cases 78-2428, 79-910 and 79-911, the following conclusions in respect to those allegations are set forth hereafter in the order as they appear in the issue section of this final order.
First, in regards to Respondent's alleged violation of Section 559.72(4), Florida Statutes concerning communicating or threatening to communicate with a debtor's employer, the cited section prohibits a collection agency to communicate or threaten to communicate with a debtor's employer prior to judgment without the debtor's written permission. While the Respondent's practice of sending carbon copies of letters to debtor's employers to the debtor/employees without mailing the originals to the employers can be viewed as technically permissible within the bounds of 559.72(4) and such letters in and of themselves cannot be viewed as a legally definable threat under the same section, such action by Respondent is not to be accepted as legally permissible under other provisions of Chapter 559, Part V, Florida Statutes.
The word communicate" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as meaning to bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of information, to talk over, to transmit information. Under the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act Subchapter V entitled Debt Collection Practices, 15 USCA 1692a(2) "Communication" is defined as the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.
As the record reflects such a letter or its contents was communicated indirectly to the employer of one of the complainant's (Donald R. Terry) which the agency views as a communication under 559.72(4) Florida Statutes. However, the lack of direct competent substantial evidence as to the facts of this communication prevents a finding the Respondent violated the above provisions in this instance.
The theory and purpose behind this particular division can be illustrated by the holding of the Federal Trade Commission in its finding in FTC File No. 7323348, July 21, 1976. In the Matter of Nosoma Systems, Inc. wherein the Commission said that this practice (communicating with a debtor's employer) causes debtors to fear loss of their jobs or promotion opportunities and to pay debts because of pressure from employers and other parties. A major part of this statement deals with the fear which the practice causes the debtor and the same can be seen to be a direct result of the Respondent's instant practice. In this light such practice by the Respondent can be viewed to be of such a harassing nature that it can fall within other prohibited practices as set for in Chapter 559, Florida Statutes, V, however, in the instant case, under the alleged violation, the evidence does not support a finding that Respondent violated the provisions of 559.72(4).
Second, in regard to Respondents alleged violation of Section 559.75(5), Florida Statutes prohibiting a collection agency from collecting a fee from debtors, the evidence from the record shows that in each of the pertinent violations, an amount larger than the creditor's forwarded consumer claim was collected or attempted to be collected. While Respondent argues that this is permissible under Chapters 559, Part V and 687.01, Florida Statutes, this specific issue is not addressed in either of the above sections. The Respondent's Exhibit # 1, which is purported to be the contract used by Respondent and his clients, is void of any mention of the collection agency charging interest on forwarded consumer claims. Said exhibit is also void of how the interest, if allowable, would be calculated or repaid to the creditors. The review of the record shows an absence of any substantial, competent evidence as to whether the subject debts were of a type which would allow the charging of interest, whether the creditor had agreed to such a charging of interest, whether there had been an agreement between creditor and debtor not to charge interest, or whether the instant creditors had actually received the extra amount collected as "interest." Due to the absence of evidence on the above questions, the allegations as to the Respondent's violation of 559.75(5) Florida Statutes, are found to be unsupported.
Third, in regards to the Respondents alleged violation of Section 559.72(12), Florida Statutes prohibiting communication with a debtor in such a manner so as to give the false impression or appearance that the collection agency's representative was or was associated with an attorney, the record reveals an absence of substantial competent evidence to prove Respondent violated the provisions of this section in the instant cases.
Fourth, in regards to Respondent's violation of Section 559.72(9), Florida Statutes which prohibits a collection agency from collecting or attempting to collect a consumer claim where the claim or right did not exist, a review of the evidence of record mandates that the recommended order's conclusion that Respondent did not violate this provision be specifically rejected. As the evidence contained within the record shows the Respondent received a forwarded consumer claim from a Dr. Jorge in September, 1973. This was verified through the testimony of Respondent and an employee of Dr. Jorge. Dr. Jorge's account were withdrawn verbally by the doctor's office in 1974 and this was verified by
the Respondent in his letter to Dr. Jorge on October 2, 1974 (Petitioner's Exhibit 9).
Respondent argues that Dr. Jorge had entered into a contract in 1973 with Respondent which only allowed the withdrawal of a creditor's accounted under certain conditions. Respondent entered into evidence a document (Respondent's Exhibit 1) which he purports to be a copy of Dr. Jorges contract.
Upon examining this document its found to be titled "Collection Agency Proposal" and nowhere within the document does it state this to be a mutual contract. The document contains no mention of a specific date of commencement, bears no signature of Dr. Jorge or even his name, and in fact has no place where the doctor would sign to acknowledge acceptance. At best this document can be looked upon as what it is, a mere proposal or offer. The record is void of the fact that Dr. Jorge ever signed such a document.
A review of the proposal shows that the Respondent would close an account except for: "(1) Those paying (2) Those promised to pay (3) Forwarded accounts
(4) Those accounts in law or hands of attorney and of course, those we have reduced to judgments for you."
At the time of this proposal, the pertinent provisions of Chapter 559, Part V, namely 559.72(9) and 559.75(3)(b), were in effect and controlled such relationships between creditors and collection agencies. These provisions hold that a collection agency shall not collect or attempt to collect a claim it has no right to and that there shall be only one collection agency at any one time engaged by a creditor to collect a consumer claim.
Respondent has argued that by the doctor withdrawing the Tracey account he was breaking the parties' "contract" and was being denied compensation on an account he had worked and received "a promise to pay."
Addressing the Respondent's contention that the withdrawal of the Tracey's account was a breach of the "contract", the proposal itself provided for such action by the creditor and the Respondent even acknowledged the withdrawal by his letter. The specific provision allowing the withdrawal of accounts also lists certain exceptions where the accounts cannot be withdrawn. (Page 2, Section B, 2A, Respondent's Exhibit 1). The effect of these exceptions, especially subsection 2 of the above-referenced provision is that it would for all purposes keep the creditor from withdrawing its accounts from Respondent and engaging another agency.
In the Tracey situation the Respondent argues that the "contract" or proposal's provision as to those who had promised to pay would apply and another agency could not be engaged. Such a provision can be seen to be in conflict with 559.75(3)(b) and its general policy and spirit. As a general rule where such is the situation the agreement will not be enforced even though there may be no literal conflict between the agreement and the statute. 17 Am. Jur., "Contracts", 168, P. 526. There is also the rule in Florida which holds that when it appears from a contract or its operation or results that in its terms or in its full operation it is unlawful, whether so intended by the parties thereto, the contract in general will not be enforced. 7 Fla. Jur., "Contracts" 68, P. 131.
In that Respondent's proposed exception to the Tracey account would work to bar Dr. Jorge from engaging another collection agency after notifying the Respondent of his intent as he is allowed to do under 559.75(3)(b).; such
provision is in contravention of the statute and is thus invalid and unenforceable. Atlantic Coastline Railroad Company v. Beazley, 54 Fla. 311, 45 So. 761 (Fla., 1907).
The exception provision of Respondent's proposal is the basis for his argument that Dr. Jorge could not withdraw the Tracey's account. This provision is illegal since it would prohibit Dr. Jorge from doing what 559.75(3)(b) allows him to do, therefore it cannot be enforced so as to allow Respondent to collect an account that had been withdrawn from his collection agency by Dr. Jorge.
Respondent has also argued that to allow Dr. Jorge to withdraw the Tracey account would deny Respondent compensation for the account. The Respondent's proposal allows for such a situation under Section B(6) which provides for a "small processing fee of 10 percent if closing an account is requested by client if no payment is made." If the proposal was an enforceable contract as alleged by Respondent his recourse would have been to charge Dr. Jorge ten percent (10 percent) of the Tracey's account or $13.60 at the time Dr. Jorge withdrew the account in 1974.
While it may be argued that Dr. Jorge's withdrawal was not in accordance with the statutory requirements in 1974 since the request was not in writing, the letter of August 11, 1976 again requesting Respondent to cease work on the Dr. Jorge's accounts would comply with the statutory requirements for terminating the engagement of a collection agency. (Petitioner's Exhibit 10).
Taking into account the above aspects of Respondent's actions in connection with the Tracey account, the evidence is clearly sufficient to show that by continuing to attempt to collect the Tracey account through October 12, 1976 when all authority to do so had been withdrawn by Dr. Jorge's office, the Respondent violated the provisions of Section 559.72(9), Florida Statutes.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED:
That Respondent's Certificate of Qualification and License be suspended for a period of seven days; said suspension shall commence thirty (30) days from the receipt of this final order.
DONE AND ORDERED this 21st day of December, 1979, at Tallahassee, Florida.
ELIZABETH W. WILLIS, DIRECTOR
Division of General Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was sent by Certified U. S. Mail to: Emerson Allsworth, Esquire and Charles L. Curtis, Esquire, Allsworth, Doomar, Schuler, Padula & Laystrom, P.A. 1177 Southeast Third Avenue, Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida, this 21st day of December, 1979.
ELIZABETH W. WILLIS
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Dec. 26, 1979 | Final Order filed. |
| Sep. 21, 1979 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Dec. 21, 1979 | Agency Final Order | |
| Sep. 21, 1979 | Recommended Order | Insufficient evidence was presented that petitioner's certificate as collections agent should be revoked for threats or other alleged abuses. |
