STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

BARBARA S. DUNFORD )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 83-826

)

HOLIDAY INNS, INC., )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

This case was heard on July 25, 1984, by R. L. Caleen, Jr., hearing officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings, in Orlando, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Howard L. Garrett, Esquire

518 Tampa Street, Suite 202 Tampa, Florida 33602

For Respondent: Mark T. Wade, Esquire

3742 Lamar Avenue

Memphis, Tennessee 38195

ISSUE

What affirmative relief, if any, should be granted petitioner for an unlawful (sexually discriminatory) employment practice engaged in by respondent, her employer?

Background

On March 8, 1983, after probable cause was found and efforts to conciliate were unsuccessful, Barbara S. Dunford ("petitioner") filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("Commission") a petition for relief from an unlawful employment practice allegedly engaged in by respondent Holiday Inns, Inc. ("Holiday Inn") , her former employer.

On March 18, 1983, the Commission mailed a notice to Holiday Inn notifying it that the petition had been filed. The notice referred to the Commission's procedural rules and advised that an answer to the petition must be filed within

20 days of the date the notice was mailed. No answer to the petition has been filed.

On March 18, 1983, this case was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of a hearing officer to conduct Section 120.57 proceedings. Hearing was set by Hearing Officer Marvin Chavis for March 4, 1983, then--on petitioner's unopposed motion, reset for July 20, 1983.

Subsequently, Holiday Inn filed an unopposed motion for continuance, and hearing

was reset for October 10, 1983. In October, both parties requested a continuance to allow for further settlement negotiations. The case was thus continued, again, and reset for December 27, 1983. At hearing on December 27, 1983, petitioner failed to appear, due to an apparent misunderstanding. The hearing was then continued and, ultimately, reset for July 25, 1984. In the meantime, Hearing Officer Chavis ended his employment with the Division of Administrative Hearings, and this case was transferred to the undersigned.

At the outset of hearing on July 25, 1984, Holiday Inn stipulated that respondent was terminated from her employment in November, 1981, and that her termination constituted an unlawful employment practice under the Human Rights Act of 1977, now codified as Sections 760.01-760.10, Florida Statutes (1983). Thus the sole issue for the determination is what affirmative relief, if any, petitioner is entitled to under the statute. Both parties presented evidence on this issue. Petitioner testified in her own behalf and Petitioner's Exhibit No.

1 was received into evidence. Holiday Inn presented the testimony of Tom Davis, who, in 1981 was the Director of Human Resources for Holiday Inn's Orlando Region.

No transcript of the hearing has been filed. The parties filed proposed findings of fact by August 28, 1984. Those proposed findings incorporated in this recommended order are adopted; otherwise they are rejected as unsupported by the weight of the evidence or as unnecessary to resolution of the issue presented.

Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, the following facts are determined:

FINDINGS OF FACT I.

Underlying Facts of Unlawful Employment Practice

1. Holiday Inn stipulates that it unlawfully terminated petitioner on November 17, 1981, and that her termination constituted an unlawful employment practice under the Human Rights Act of 1977. In effect, Holiday Inn has admitted the truth of the underlying material allegations of fact contained in the Petition for Relief filed by petitioner in March, 1983.

   
   

2. This same result would have been compelled in any event. Commission Rule 22T-9.08(4), Florida Administrative Code, requires the filing of an answer within 20 days of service of the petition. Holiday Inn failed to file an answer to the petition. By operation of this rule, failure to file a timely answer is "deemed to constitute an admission to the material facts alleged in the petition." 22T-9.08(4)(d), Fla.Admin.Code.

   
   

3. Those allegations of material fact, contained in the petition for relief, now deemed, admitted, are set forth below:

   
   

   1. Complainant [petitioner] began employment in the position of Maid with Respondent [Holiday Inn] in May, 1981 [at the Holiday Inn at 626 Lee Road and I-4, Orlando, Florida].

   2. Mr. Stephen Holmes began employment in the position of Houseman, in July, 1981.

   3. Both Complainant and Mr. Holmes were supervised by Ms. Helen Gilboy, Respondent's Executive Housekeeper.

   4. Ms. Gilboy was delegated the authority to take disciplinary action against her sub- ordinates.

   5. Complainant reported to Ms. Gilboy that Mr. Holmes was sexually [sic] harassing her by continuously making unwelcome sexual advances, placing his hands on her, showing her sexually lews [sic] pictures, and telling her sexually offensive jokes.

   6. No action was taken by Respondent or its agent, Ms. Gilboy, prior to Complainant's termination, to investigate these allegations or to ensure in the future that the work

      environment would be free from sexual harassment.

   7. Two co-workers of Complainant, Ms. Mary Morse and Ms. Brenda Foster, substantiated Complainant's allegations regarding sexual harassment by Mr. Holmes during working hours, and Ms. Morse substantiated Complainant's state- ment that Complainant reported such incidents to

      Ms. Gilboy but that no corrective action was taken.

   8. On November 15, 1981, Complainant requested that she be permitted to leave work early

      because she was upset by Mr. Holmes' sexually offensive conduct towards her.

   9. The assistant Housekeeper, Ms. Terri Longhorn, granted Complainant's request to leave work early.

   10. complainant was not scheduled to work on November 16, 1981.

   11. When Complainant reported for work on November 17, 1981, Ms. Gilboy informed Complainant [sic] that she voluntarily terminated her employment when she left work early on November 15, 1981, without permission.

   12. Respondent's policy provides that an employee who is absent three consecutive days without permission is subject to immediate dismissal for cause.

   13. According to Respondent's policy, even

       if Complainant left work early without permission Complainant's actions would not provide sufficient cause for dismissal.

   14. Complainant would not have left work early on November 15, 1981, but for the fact that Mr. Holmes had created a hostile working environment for Complainant and Complainant's requests for corrective action went unheeded by Respondent.

   15. Complainant's actions in leaving work early were reasonable under the circumstances.

       
       

       (Petition for Relief, dated March 8, 1983)

       II

       Affirmative Relief

       
       

4. In November and December, 1981, Tom Davis, in his capacity as Regional (Orlando) Human Resources Director for Holiday Inn, investigated petitioner's complaint of sexual discrimination and wrongful termination. On or about December 7, 1981, and January 5 or 9, 1982, he met petitioner at his office to discuss her accusations.

   
   

5. Holiday Inn contends that, on both occasions, Mr. Davis--based on his existing knowledge of petitioner's work environment or his investigation of her allegations--admitted the validity of her complaint and offered to reinstate her to her position, pay her full back pay and benefits, and discipline the two offending male employees. Holiday Inn asserts that she, on both occasions, rejected the offer. This contention is rejected as self serving, uncorroborated, and inconsistent with the tone and content of Mr. Davis' letter to the petitioner, dated January 8, 1982.

   
   

6. In that letter, Mr. Davis states that he had investigated petitioner's complaint and contacted the witnesses whom she had listed. His letter is defensive in tone, admits to no wrongdoing by Holiday Inn or its employees, and conveys no offer of restatement. He concludes, in effect, that her recollection of the alleged incidents is uncorroborated and not supported by his findings.

   He downplays the seriousness of the alleged improprieties but indicates that those employees involved were disciplined for their behavior. His assertion--in the letter-- that petitioner's complaint was, essentially, unfounded, conflicts with his later testimony at hearing that, when petitioner filed her initial complaint, he suspected and later confirmed that her allegations were true.

   
   

7. Petitioner filed her complaint of sex discrimination on April 15, 1982. On June 17, 1982, petitioner, Mr. Davis, and Alvin Frasier, an employee of the Commission on Human Relations, met at Mr. Frasier's Orlando office to discuss petitioner's complaint. At that meeting, Mr. Davis offered to reinstate petitioner to her former position, with full back pay and benefits. Petitioner rejected the offer, insisting that the offending employees be fired. Her insistence was based on her desire to retaliate against them and see that they "were punished." Mr. Davis indicated to him that both male employees had been reprimanded and put on "final notice," which meant that if either employee committed a similar offense, he would be fired. (One of them, Steve Holmes, subsequently committed a similar offense and was fired.) Under these circumstances, the disciplinary action taken against the two employees was reasonable and constituted a good faith attempt by Holiday Inn to prevent the reoccurrence of such infractions. Mr. Davis' offer of reinstatement is admitted by petitioner.

   
   

8. Between November 17, 1981 (when petitioner was wrongfully terminated) through June 17, 1982 (when the offer of reinstatement and back pay was made) petitioner attempted to secure and hold other employment. During that period, she received $750.00 in unemployment compensation and earned $100.00 delivering trucks for Don Mealey Chevrolet, an automobile dealer in Orlando. At the time she was fired by Holiday Inn, she was receiving a salary of $140.00 a week based on a 40-hour work week. Accordingly, between November 17, 1981, and June 17, 1982, petitioner suffered a net loss of salary--due to her unlawful termination-

   -of $3,070.00. (28 weeks X $140.00 $3,920.00; $3,920.00 - $850.00 $3,070.00)

   
   

9. Petitioner is obligated to pay her attorney, Howard L. Garrett, a reasonable attorney's fee for his representation throughout this proceeding.

   CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

   
   

10. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this pro-ceeding. 120.57(1), Fla.Stat. (1983).

    
    

11. Section 760.10(1) , Florida Statutes (1983) , among other things, makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an individual because of such individual's sex. As admitted by the Holiday Inn, its treatment and termination of petitioner, con-stituted a violation of this statute.

    
    

12. Section 760.10(13) provides that if the Commission finds an unlawful employment practice has occurred, "it shall issue an order prohibiting the practice and providing affirmative relief from the effect of the practice, including reasonable attorney's fees."

    
    

13. In construing the statute, federal cases construing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g), the federal counterpart to the Human Rights Act of 1977, offer interpretative guidance. See, Pasco County School Board v. Florida Public Employees' Relations Commission, 353 So.2d 108,

116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

14. In Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 102 S. Ct. 3057 (1982) rev'g. 645 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981), the U.S. Supreme Court held that, under Title VII, when an employer charged with discrimination makes an unconditional offer to reinstate the complainant to his or her job, the offer will terminate the running of back pay. 102 S. Ct. at 3070. Accordingly, respondent's liability for back pay terminated on June 17, 1982. Petitioner is entitled, therefore, to back pay of

$3,070.00, together with any fringe benefits which would have accrued on June 17, 1982.

1. In order to provide petitioner with "affirmative relief" from the unlawful employment practice, Holiday Inn must offer to reinstate her to her former position. Furthermore, petitioner is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee, the exact amount to be determined by the Commission by supplementary proceedings convened when it enters its final order. See, Fenesy v. GTE Data Services, Inc. v. Norman Jackson, FCHR No. 214-79, DOAH 80-473, FCHR Order No. 810042, dated August 11, 1981, holding that the amount of any attorney's fee awarded should be determined by supplementary proceedings before the Commission.

   
   

2. Finally, an order must be issued prohibiting Holiday Inn from again engaging in unlawful employment practices of the kind complained of by petitioner.

to:

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED:

That the Commission on Human Relations issue an order requiring Holiday Inn

1. Offer to reinstate petitioner to her former or a substantially

   equivalent position;

2. Pay petitioner $3,070.00 in back pay;

   
   

3. Pay petitioner a reasonable attorney's fee, the amount to be determined in supplementary proceedings;

   
   

4. Cease end desist from again engaging in unlawful employment practices of this nature.

   
   

   DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of September, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida.

   
   

   R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer

   Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building

   2009 Apalachee Parkway

   Tallahassee, Florida 323,01

   (904) 88-9675

   
   

   Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 1984.

   
   

   ENDNOTE

   
   

   1/ Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to Florida Statutes (1983), and all rule references are to the Florida Administrative Code.

   
   

   COPIES FURNISHED:

   
   

   Howard L. Garrett, Esquire

   518 Tampa Street Suite 202

   Tampa, Florida 33602

   
   

   Mark T. Wade, Esquire 3742 Lamar Avenue

   Memphis, Tennessee 38195

   
   

   Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director

   Florida Commission on Human Relations

   325 John Knox Road Building F-Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303

   =================================================================

   AGENCY FINAL ORDER

   =================================================================

   
   

   STATE OF FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS

   
   

   BARBARA S. DUNFORD,

   
   

   Petitioner, EEOC Case No. 046820500 FCHR Case No. 82-1555

   vs. DOAH Case No. 83-826

   FCHR Order No. 85-0012

   HOLIDAY INNS, INC.,

   
   

   Respondent.

   /

   
   

   ORDER FINDING UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE AND

   AWARDING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF

   
   

   1. Panel of Commissioners

      
      

      The following three Commissioners participated in the disposition of this matter:

      
      

      Commissioner Melvin L. Levitt, Panel Chairperson;

      Commissioner Robert L. Billingslea; and Commissioner Learna Ramsey.

      
      

   2. Appearances

      
      

      For Petitioner Barbara S. Dunford: Howard L. Garrett,

      Esquire

      518 Tampa Street Suite 202

      Tampa, Florida 33602-

      4885

      
      

      For Respondent Holiday Inns, Inc.: Mark T. Wade, Esquire

      3742 Lamar Avenue

      Memphis, Tennessee 38195

      
      

   3. Preliminary Matters

      
      

      Barbara S. Dunford, Petitioner herein, filed a complaint of discrimination with this Commission pursuant to the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, Sections 760.01-.10, Florida Statutes (1983) 1 alleging that Holiday Inns, Inc., Respondent herein, unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of sex, by discharging her from its employ.

      In accordance with the Commission's rules, the allegations of discrimination set forth in the complaint of discrimination were investigated and a report of said investigation was submitted to the Executive Director. On January 6, 1983, the Executive Director issued his Determination finding reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred in violation of the Human Rights Act of 1977. On February 9, 1983, a Notice of Failure of Conciliation was mailed to the parties and on March 8, 1983, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice.

      
      

      The petition was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the conduct of a formal proceeding pursuant to Rule 22T-8.16(1). The formal proceeding was held on July 25, 1984, in Orlando, Florida, before R. L. Caleen, Jr., Division of Administrative Hearings Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer entered a Recommended Order in this matter on September 21, 1984.

      
      

      Respondent filed exceptions to the Recommended Order.

      
      

      Pursuant to notice, oral argument was held on January 17, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida, before the aforementioned Panel of Commissioners. After oral argument was presented by counsel for the respective parties, the Panel conducted its deliberation of this matter and determined the action to be taken upon the petition.

      
      

   4. Rulings on Exceptions

      
      

      Respondent excepts to the Hearing Officer's finding of fact number 5 as being contrary to law and unsupported by the substantial evidence in the case. Finding of fact number 5 states:

      
      

5. Holiday Inn contends that, on both occasions. Mr. Davis--based on his existing knowledge of petitioner's work, environment or his investigation of her allegations--admitted the validity of her complaint and offered to reinstate her to her position, pay her full back pay and benefits, and discipline the two offending male employees. Holi-

   day Inn asserts that she, on both occasions, rejected the offer. This contention is rejected as self serv- ing, uncorroborated, and inconsistent with the tone and content of Mr. Davis' letter to the petitioner, dated January 8, 1982.

   
   

   Respondent contends that Petitioner herself corroborated its evidence that Petitioner was offered reinstatement on or about December 7, 1981. Reading the Petitioner's testimony as a whole, we find that Petitioner's testimony reflects that she received an offer of reinstatement on only one occasion, June 17, 1982. We, therefore, reject Respondent's exception.

   
   

   Respondent excepts to the Hearing Officer's finding of fact number 6 as being contrary to the law and unsupported by the substantial evidence in the case. Finding of fact number 6 states:

   
   

6. In that letter, Mr. Davis states that he had in- vestigated petitioner's complaint and contacted the witnesses whom she had listed. His letter is defen- sive in tone, admits to no wrongdoing by Holiday Inn or its employees, and conveys no offer to reinstate-

ment. He concludes, in effect, that her recollec- tion of the alleged incidents is uncorroborated and not supported by his findings. He downplays the se- riousness of the alleged improprieties but indicates that those employees involved were disciplined for their behavior. His assertion--in the letter--that petitioner's complaint was, essentially, unfounded, conflicts with his later testimony at hearing that, when petitioner filed her initial complaint, he suspected and later confirmed that her allegations were true.

The Hearing Officer's finding with respect to the January 8, 1982 letter is a reasonable interpretation of the letter's import. Such finding is neither contrary to the law nor unsupported by competent substantial evidence and, therefore, Respondent's exception is rejected.

Respondent excepts to the Hearing Officer's finding of fact number 8 as being unsupported by substantial evidence. Finding of fact number 8 states:

1. Between November 17, 1981 (when petitioner was wrongfully terminated) through June 17, 1982 (when the offer of reinstatement and back pay was made) petitioner attempted to secure and hold other employ-

   ment. During that period, she received $750.00 in un- employment compensation and earned $100.00 delivering trucks for Don Mealey Chevrolet, an automobile dealer in Orlando. At the time she was fired by Holiday Inn, she was receiving a salary of $140.00 a week based on a 40-hour work week. Accordingly, between November 17, 1981, and June 17, 1982, petitioner suffered a net

   loss of salary--due to her unlawful termination--of

   $3,070.00. (28 weeks X $140.00 $3,920.00; $3,920.00

   - $850.00 = $3,070.00)

   
   

   There is competent substantial evidence in the record to support the Hearing Officer's finding and, therefore, we reject Respondent's exception.

   
   

   The Hearing Officer based Petitioner's back pay award on salary less interim earnings and the unemployment compensation award. Unemployment compensation awards have been deducted from back pay awards in cases where the employer is a public or nonprofit employer.2 In cases where the employer is a private, nonreimburseable employer, we believe it better policy to require individuals receiving a back pay award to return the monies obtained from the unemployment compensation award to the Unemployment Compensation Trust Fund, which in turn will result in a downward adjustment of the private employer's benefit ratio. Sections 443.131, 443.151(6), Fla. Stat. (1983). Such policy is consistent with Florida case law concerning the collateral source rule.3

   
   

   Inasmuch as neither party 4/ excepted to the deduction of the unemployment compensation award from the back pay award and considering that the Commission has not previously set forth its policy with respect to such awards, we will not disturb the Hearing Officer's finding and conclusion regarding the deduction.

   
   

   Respondent excepts to the Hearing Officer's finding of fact number 9 as being contrary to law. Finding of fact number 9 states:

2. Petitioner is obligated to pay her attorney,

Howard L. Garrett, a reasonable attorney's fee

for his representation throughout this proceeding.

We accept Respondent's factual exception. There is no evidence in the record to support this finding. The Hearing Officer's finding of fact number 9 is hereby stricken.

Respondent excepts to the fourth and fifth paragraph of the Hearing Officer's conclusion of law number 2 as being contrary to law and unsupported by substantial evidence.

That portion of conclusion of law number 2 states:

In Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 102 S. Ct. 3057 (1982),

rev'g. 645 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981), the U.S. Supreme Court held that, under Title VII, when an employer charged with discrimination makes an unconditional offer to reinstate the complainant to his or her job, the offer will terminate the running of back pay.

102 S. Ct. at 3070. Accordingly, respondent's lia- bility for back pay terminated on June 17, 1982. Petitioner is entitled, therefore, to back pay of

$3,070.00, together with any fringe benefits which would have accrued on June 17, 1982.

In order to provide petitioner with "affirmative relief" from the unlawful employment practice, Holiday Inn must offer to reinstate her to her former position. Furthermore, petitioner is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee, the exact amount to be determined by the Commission by supplementary proceedings convened when it enters its final order. See, Fenesy v. GTE Data Services, Inc. v. Norman Jackson, FCHR No. 214- 79, DOAH 80-473, FCHR Order No, 810042, dated August 11, 1981, holding that the amount of any attorney's

fee awarded should be determined by supplementary proceedings before the Commission.

Based on our rejection of Respondent's factual exceptions, we reject Respondent's legal exceptions regarding the ending date of the back pay award.

Furthermore, despite our striking the Hearing' Officer's findings of fact number 9 with respect to Petitioner's obligation to pay her attorney a reasonable attorney's fee, we reject Respondent's legal exception regarding attorney's fees. An attorney/client contact for payment of fees is not a requisite to statutorily allowed fees. Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Wong, 421 So.2d 657,658 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

Section 760.10(13), Florida Statutes (1983), provides in pertinent part:

In the event that the Commission, in the case of

a complaint under subsection (10), or the court, in the case of a civil action under subsection (12), finds that an unlawful employment practice has occurred, it shall issue an order prohibiting the

practice and providing affirmative relief from the effects of the practice, including reasonable attorney's fees.

(Emphasis supplied).

We interpret this statutory provision as mandating attorney's fees whenever the Commission finds that an unlawful employment practice has occurred. Cf.

Villa Sorrento, Inc. v Elden, 458 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (where the court held that the statutory language, "[t]he prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees," is mandatory).

1. Findings of Fact

   
   

   Having considered the Recommended Order and Exceptions thereto, and being particularly mindful of the record in this proceeding, the Panel finds that the Hearing Officer's findings of fact, as modified in the preceding section, are supported by competent substantial evidence. The Hearing Officer's findings of fact, as modified in the preceding section, are hereby adopted.

   
   

2. Conclusions of Law

   
   

   The Hearing Officer's conclusions of law, based upon the aforementioned findings, are a correct application of law. The Hearing Officer's conclusions of law are hereby adopted.

   
   

3. Remedy

The Hearing Officer's recommendation is adopted. His Recommended Order is incorporated herein by reference.

It is therefore ORDERED:

1. That Respondent cease and desist from again engaging in unlawful employment practices of this nature:

   
   

2. That Respondent offer to reinstate Petitioner to her former or a substantially equivalent position;

   
   

3. That Respondent pay Petitioner $3,070.00 in back pay, together with any fringe benefits which would have accrued on June 17, 1982; and

   
   

4. That Respondent pay Petitioner a reasonable attorney's fee.

The Commission reserves jurisdiction over the amount of attorney's fees.

If the parties have reached a proposed settlement regarding the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded within 30 calendar days from the date of this Order, the parties shall prepare and submit a Joint Stipulation of Settlement for Amount of Attorney's Fees for consideration by the Commission. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement regarding the amount to be awarded within 30 calendar days from the date of this Order, the parties shall file a Notice of Failure of Settlement for Amount of Attorney's Fees with the Clerk of the Commission.

The parties are advised of the right to petition the appropriate District Court of Appeal for review of this Order within 30 days of the date that this

Order is filed with the Clerk of the Commission. Section 120.68, Fla. Stat. (1983); Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b). *

* NOTE: Page 8 of the Agency Final Order on file with DOAH is missing and therefore not available in this ACCESS document. For ACCESS indexing, the filing date has been entered.

ENDNOTE

1/ Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to Florida Statutes (1983), and rule references are to the Florida Administrative Code.

2/ Lee v. Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 8 F.L.W. 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Columbia County Board of Public Instruction v. Public Employees Relations Commission, 353 So.2d 127 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).

3/ O'Neal v. Ray, 213 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968); Florida Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police v Town of Pembroke Park, 10 F.P.E.R. 15001, at 7 (1983); De Marios v. Military Park Fire Control District No. 4, 9 F.P.E.R. 14074 (1983). See also, NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951).

4/ Petitioner explicitly waived any such remaining opportunity to except to such deduction at the oral argument before the Panel.

Docket for Case No: 83-000826

Orders for Case No: 83-000826