STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
ST. JOE PAPER COMPANY, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 83-2798
)
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
This cause came before the undersigned after the parties waived their right to a formal hearing and submitted memoranda in support of their respective positions on October 14, 1983. A stipulation of facts and exhibits A, B and C were also submitted by the parties' the same date.
The issue herein is whether petitioner's application for a refund of
$12,067.40 from respondent should be granted. This amount represents interest which petitioner claims is due from respondent for an overpayment of state corporate income made for calendar year 1976. Based upon the stipulated record and filings in this cause, the following findings of fact are determined:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Petitioner, St. Joe Paper Company, is a taxpayer subject to the requirements of the Florida Corporate Income Tax. Its principal offices are located at 803 Florida National Bank Building, Jacksonville, Florida.
Petitioner filed its 1976 calendar year tax return with respondent, Department of Revenue (Department), on September 23, 1977. Although filings are normally due on April 1, the filing was made pursuant to an extension of time to and including October 1, 1977 which was granted by the Department.
Petitioner was subsequently audited by the Internal Revenue Services (IRS) for calendar years 1972 through 1977. Thereafter, petitioner and IRS entered into a settlement in 1982 wherein they agreed that certain adjustments were required for each of the audited tax years. The adjustments resulted in an overpayment of the Florida Income Tax for 1976.
Subsection 220.23(2) , Florida Statutes, requires that a taxpayer notify the Department whenever an IRS audit results in adjustments to the taxpayer's net income subject to the Florida corporate income tax for any taxable year. Because the IRS sett1enent affected the years 1972 through 1977, petitioner filed amended returns for those years with the Department on October 8, 1982.
According to the amended returns, petitioner owed additional taxes for all years except 1976, when it had made an overpayment. It added these
deficiencies, totaling $82,003.03, and subtracted the overpayment for 1976 ($18,174.10), resulting in a net tax owed the Department of $63,828.94.
Petitioner also computed interest owed on its deficiencies for the years 1972-1975 and 1977 to be $39,956.58 and offset this amount with a
$12,067.40 credit which it claimed was interest owed it by the Department for its overpayment of taxes for calendar year 1976. When the interest was added to the $63,828.94, the total liability was $91,718.42. The record is unclear whether petitioner calculated its 1976 interest using a 12 percent or 6 percent rate. The proper rate to be used is 6 percent.
On August 5, 1983 the Department directed petitioner to appear at its Jacksonville office on August 11 to pay $12,067.40 and if it failed to do so, a tax warrant would be issued. Thereafter, on August 9 petitioner paid the deficiency.
On August 15, 1983 petitioner filed an Application for Refund Form DR-
26 requesting a refund of its August 9 payment. In its application, it stated chat "(i)nterest computed on the tax refund for 1976 was offset against interest due for other years", and that the Department's refusal to allow this offset was error.
On August 19, 1983 the Department's classification officer, audit classification, issued a letter denying the application on the following grounds:
Florida Statutes 214.14 requires that interest be paid should the Department take longer than nine (9) months to refund an overpayment of tax.
When computing interest, the Department does so under the theory that each year stands alone. Consequently, offsetting of deficiencies and overpayments is not recognized when computing interest.
Your letter of October 8, 1982, shows that check number 2400 was sent, with the Amended Florida returns, to pay the net additional tax and interest. Consequently, the 1976 refund would be deemed to have been made within the nine-month period required under Florida Statute 214.14.
This letter prompted the instant proceeding.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties thereto pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Crucial to the resolution of the issue herein is a proper interpretation of Section 214.14, Florida Statutes. It provides in pertinent part as follows:
214.14 Overpayments; interest. Interest shall be allowed and paid at the rate of
6 percent per year upon any overpayment in respect of a tax made subject to this
chapter, except that if any overpayment is refunded within 9 months after the last date prescribed for filing the return of such tax, including any extension thereof, or within 9 months after the return was filed, whichever is later, no interest shall be allowed on such overpayment. . . .
In general terms, the statute requires the Department to credit interest on any overpayments of taxes at a rate of 6 percent per year. However, if the overpayment is refunded within nine months after the return is due or filed, no interest on the overpayment is required.
Petitioner contends that the notification of federal audit adjustments filed with the Department on October 8, 1982 was not a "return" within the meaning of the foregoing statute, and that its actual filing date was September 23, 1977, when the intial 1976 return was filed. Because credit on its 1976 overpayment was not made until October 15, 1982, or long after nine months had expired, it claims it is entitled to interest on the overpayment.
In response, respondent In brief argues that when reference to a "return" is made in Section 214.14, the term refers not only to the original or initial return required on April 1 of each year, but also any amended returns subsequently required by Subsection 220.23(2)(a), Florida Statutes. In short, it claims that the statute in question provides for more than one return date from which the nine month period runs.
The question presented herein is apparently one of first impression for neither party has cited any rule, final agency order, or decisional law in support of its respective position.
Two reasons lead the undersigned to conclude that petitioner should prevail. First, the statute in question on its face does not comport with the construction suggested by respondent. Section 214.14 refers only to "return", and if the Legislature had intended for it to include amended returns, it could have done so by simply adding those words to its provisions. Second, even if the statute is susceptible to respondent's interpretation, such emerging nonrule policy is not recorded in agency rules or discoverable precedents. As such, the Department was required to establish a sufficient record foundation by conventional proof methods to support this emerging policy. Here there was no factual explanation whatsoever of this nonrule interpretation, and no indication that notice of this "policy" had even been previously disseminated to taxpayers. See, for example, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Department of Business Regulation, 393 So.2d 1177(Fla. 1st DCA 1981). "Lacking a record foundation for this policy, the view that the word "return" refers to more than the" initial return must fail. This conclusion produces an equitable result, for if respondent's reasoning were to prevail, it would require taxpayers to pay interest where amended returns resulted in deficiencies, but they would receive no interest where such a return evidenced an overpayment.
The record does not reflect what interest rate petitioner used in calculating its 1976 interest. When the refund is made, it should be calculated
using a 6 percent rate, and then from October 1, 1977 rather than September 23, 1977 since Section 214.14 prescribes that rate and date.
It is concluded that petitioner is entitled to be credited with appropriate interest on the overpayment of income taxes made for the year 1976 and that its application for a refund should accordingly be granted.
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED:
that petitioner's application for a refund be GRANTED and that it be computed at a 6 percent rate to run from October 1, 1977.
DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida.
DONALD R. ALEXANDER
Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building
2009 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1983.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Mr. W. W. Carlson Assistant Vice-President St. Joe Paper Co.
803 Florida National Bank Building Jacksonville, Florida 3220
Barbara Staros Harmon, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, LL04
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Mr. Randy Miller Executive Director Department of Revenue
Carlton Building, Room 102 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
=================================================================
AGENCY FINAL ORDER
=================================================================
STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA
ST. JOE PAPER COMPANY,
Petitioner,
CASE NO. 83-2798
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Respondent.
/
FINAL ORDER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
This Cause came on to be heard before Randy Miller, Executive Director of the Department of Revenue, on February 15, 1984, at 10:00 A.M. in 103 Carlton Building, Tallahassee, Florida. The Executive Director, acting on behalf of the Governor and Cabinet, considered the Recommended Order of the Division of Administrative Hearings, the Respondent's Exceptions to the Recommended Order and the Respondent's Proposed Substituted Order and issued the Final Order of the Department of Revenue as follows:
This cause came before Donald R. Alexander, Hearing Officer, of the Division of Administrative Hearings, after the parties waived their right to a formal hearing and submitted memoranda in support of their respective positions on October 14, 1983. A stipulation of facts and exhibits A, B and C were also submitted by the parties the same date.
The issue herein is whether petitioner's application for a refund of
$12,067.40 from respondent should be granted. This amount represents interest which petitioner claims is due from respondent for an overpayment of state corporate income tax made for calendar year 1976.
Based upon the stipulated record and filings in this cause, the following findings of fact are determined:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Petitioner, St. Joe Paper Company, is a taxpayer subject to the requirements of the Florida Corporate Income Tax. Its principal offices are located at 803 Florida National Bank Building, Jacksonville, Florida.
Petitioner filed its 1976 calendar year tax return with respondent Department of Revenue (Department), on September 23, 1977. Although filings are normally due on April 1, the filing was made pursuant to an extension of time to and including October 1, 1977 which was granted by the Department.
Petitioner was subsequently audited by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for calendar years 1972 through 1977. Thereafter, Petitioner and IRS entered into a settlement in 1982 wherein they agreed that certain adjustments were required for each of the audited tax years. The adjustments resulted in an overpayment of the Florida Income Tax for 1976.
Subsection 220.23(2), Florida Statutes, requires that a taxpayer notify the Department whenever an IRS audit results in adjustments to the taxpayer's net income subject to the Florida corporate income tax for any taxable year. Because the IRS settlement affected the years 1972 through 1977, Petitioner filed amended returns for those years with the Department on October 8, 1982.
According to the amended returns, petitioner owed additional taxes for all years except 1976, when it had made an overpayment. It added these deficiencies, totaling $82,003.03, and subtracted the overpayment for 1976 ($18,174.10), resulting in a net tax owed the Department of $63,828.94.
Petitioner also computed interest owed on its deficiencies for the years 1972-1975 and 1977 to be $39,956.58 and offset this amount with a
$12,067.40 credit which it claimed was interest owed it by the Department for its overpayment of taxes for calendar year 1976. When the interest was added to the $63,828.94, the total liability was $91,718.42. The record is unclear whether petitioner calculated its 1976 interest using 12 percent or 6 percent rate. The proper rate to be used is 6 percent.
On August 5, 1983, the Department directed petitioner to appear in its Jacksonville office on August 11 to pay $12,067.40, and if it failed to do so, a tax warrant would be issued. Thereafter, on August 9 petitioner paid the deficiency.
On August 15, 1983 petitioner filed an Application for Refund For DR-26 requesting a refund of its August 9 payment. In its application, it stated that "(i)nterest computed on the tax refund for 1976 was offset against interest due for other years", and that the Department's refusal to allow this offset was error.
On August 19, 1983 the Department's classification officer, audit classification, issued a letter denying the application on the following grounds:
Florida Statutes 214.14 requires that interest be paid should the Department take longer than nine (9) months to refund an overpayment of tax.
When computing interest, the Department does so under the theory that each year stands alone.
Consequently, offsetting of deficiencies and overpayments is not recognized when computing interest.
Your letter of October 8, 1982, shows that check number 2400 was sent, with the amended Florida returns, to pay the net additional tax and interest. Consequently, the 176 refund would be deemed to have been made within the nine-month period required under Florida Statutes 214.14.
This letter prompted the instant proceeding.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Department of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties thereto pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Essentially the argument urged by Petitioner is that the word "return" as used in s. 214.14, F.S., can only refer to the first or original corporate income tax return filed by a taxpayer for a given year, and the date of the filing of that return is the date form which interest allowed under that statute must run. Petitioner urges upon the Department an argument which would relate all refunds for overpayments back to the date of the filing of this original return and disregard the dates for any amended return or of any changes made in the original return as a result of audits by the Department or the Federal Government.
Petitioner's argument requires a highly restrictive meaning to be placed upon the word "return" as used in s. 214.14, F.S., which in the view of this officer is not the intent of the Legislature. Ergo, crucial to any determination of the issues presented in this case is the interpretation of the statutes involved with overpayment, refund and interest under Chs. 214 and 220, F.S.
As with any review and construction of the statutes, the goal to be sought is the determination of the intent of the Legislature. Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1963). In order to arrive at the correct interpretation, a review must be made of every part of the statutes involved in the issue under scrutiny and from a review of the whole law in pari materia the legislative intent must be determined. State v. Gale Distributors, Inc., 349 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1977).
The statutes which must be construed in this case as ss. 214.14, 214.15, and 214.16, F.S., as well as certain sections of Ch. 220, F.S. These statutes provide in pertinent part as follows:
Overpayments, interest.-- Interest shall
be allowed and paid at the rate of 6 percent per year upon any overpayment in respect of a tax made subject to this chapter, except that if any overpayment is refunded within 9 months after the last date prescribed for filing the return of such tax, including any extension thereof, or within 9 months after the
return was filed, whichever is later, no interest shall be allowed on such overpayment. For purposes of this section, no amount of tax for any taxable year shall be treated as having been paid before the date on which the tax return for such year was due under applicable law, without regard to any extension of time for filing such return.
Overpayments; refund.--
Every claim for refund shall be filed with the department in writing, in such form as the department may be regulation prescribe, and shall state the amount claimed, the specific grounds upon which the
claim is founded and the taxable years or periods involved.
As soon as practicable after a claim for refund is filed, the department shall examine the claim and either issue a notice of refund, abatement, or credit to the claimant or issue a notice of denial.
Limitations on claims for refund.--
Except as otherwise provided in this section:
A claim for refund shall be filed not later than
3 years after the date the return was filed or 1 year after the date the tax was paid, whichever is the later, and
No credit or refund shall be allowed or made with respect to the taxable year for which a claim was filed unless such claim is filed within such period.
If before the expiration of the time prescribed in this section for filing a claim for refund, both the department and the claimant shall have consented in writing to its filing after such time, such claim may be filed at any time prior to the expiration of the period agreed upon. The period so agreed upon may be extended by subsequent agreements in writing made before the expiration of the period previously agreed upon.
The amount of any credit or refund resulting from a claim for refund shall be limited as follows:
If the claim was filed during the 3-year period prescribed in subsection (1), the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of tax paid within the period, equal to 3 years plus the period of any extension of time for filing the
return, immediately preceding the filing of the claim.
If the claim was not filed within such 3-year period, the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax paid during the year immediately preceding the filing of the claim
For purposes of this section, a tax return filed on or before the last day prescribed by law for the filing of such return, determined without regard to any extension thereof, shall be deemed to have been filed on such last day.
In general, where the Legislature has not by law waived the state's immunity, a state is not liable for payment of interest. This arises as an attribute of sovereignty and does not rest upon organic or statutory law.
Treadway v. Terrell, 117 Fla. 838, 158 So. 512 (Fla. 1935); Broward County Port Authority v. Arundel Corp., 206 F.2d 220 (U.S.C.A. 5th Cir. 1953); Mailman v.
Green, 11 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1959; Hansen v. Port Everglades Steel Corp., 155 So.2d
387 (2 DCA Fla. 1963); State ex rel. Four-Fifty Two-Thirty Corp. v. Dickinson, 322 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1975).
Pursuant to the foregoing general rules recognized by the Courts in the cases cited, it is apparent that the Legislature sought to provide for the payment of interest on corporate income taxes only under certain limited circumstances. These circumstances are crucial to the resolution of the matter
at hand because the clear wording of Section 214.14, F.S., provides for interest only when the Department of Revenue has been dilatory in making a refund for a period of nine (9) months after it receives notice of the overpayment. See, R.
J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Department of Revenue and Office of the Comptroller, Case No. 83-3183 (D.O.A.H., November 16, 1983).
As noted above, there are several situations which may result in an overpayment of the corporate income tax and thus trigger the need for the Departmental review within nine (9) months.
The first situation which may give rise to a payment of interest is that expressly mentioned in s. 214.14, F.S., which clearly provides for a return being filed by the taxpayer which return shows an overpayment of the tax. This is "the return of such tax" which is referred to in s. 214.14, F.S., and in s. 214.13, F.S., which states in pertinent parts:
Overpayments; interest.--Interest shall be allowed and paid at the rate of 6 percent per year upon any overpayment in respect of a tax made subject to this chapter, except that if any overpayment is refunded within 9 months after the last date prescribed for filing the return of such tax, including any extension thereof, or within 9
months after the return was filed, whichever is later, no interest shall be allowed on such overpayment. For purposes of this section, no amount of tax for any taxable year shall be treated as having been paid before the date on which the tax return for such year was due under applicable law, without regard to any extension of the time for filing such return.
214.13 Overpayments; credits.--
If, after a return has been filed, the department finds that the tax paid with the return is more than the correct amount, it shall credit or refund the overpayment as is appropriate.
In the case of any overpayment, the department may within the applicable period
of limitations credit the amount of such over- payment, including any interest allowed thereon, against any part of the liability in respect of the tax giving rise to the overpayment of the taxpayer who made the overpayment, refunding any balance to such taxpayer.
It is obvious from the reading of these statutes that a review of the return by the Department is essential to the determination that an overpayment exists.
Interest on this overpayment only arises by the clear wording of s. 214.14, F.S., when this Departmental review takes more than nine (9) months, and an overpayment is found to have been made.
Pursuant to ss. 220.222 and 220.23, F.S., extensions of time for filing returns and amendments to returns are allowed under certain circumstances. As with any return filed pursuant to Chs. 214 and 220, F.S., the Department has, pursuant to s. 214.06, F.S., the authority and duty to examine the return and determine the correctness of the amount of tax paid. Thus, if an amended return
is filed pursuant to s. 220.23, F.S., that amendment may create an overpayment or an underpayment. The amended return is frequently not filed under well after the date of the original return, as was the situation in the case at bar.
Assuming the amended return is filed more than nine months after the original return, and an overpayment is found to have occurred, it would be absurd to argue, as Petitioner does, that the interest must run from the date of the original return when the filing of the two returns was not contemporaneous.
Statutes must be construed in a manner which will not yield an absurd result. McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (Fla. 1926); State ex rel. Florida Industrial Commission v. Willis, 124 So.2d 48 (1 DCA Fla. 1960); Foley v. State,
50 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1950); Agrico Chemical Co. v. State, Dept. of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759 (1 DCA Fla. 1978); State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1981). The absurdity of the argument that the interest must relate back to the date of the filing of the original return becomes evident when it is realized that without an amended return being filed no overpayment would have resulted or been noticed by the Department or the taxpayer.
A third situation which may give rise to a determination that an overpayment has occurred is based upon the conducting of an audit either by the Department of Revenue or by the Federal Government. Such an event may arise pursuant to s. 214.06, F.S., or s. 214.03, F.S., when a Department audit is conducted, or pursuant to the taxpayer's duty to advise the Department when a federal audit is conducted. See, ss. 220.23(2) and 220.43, F.S., in regard to federal audits and determinations. Audits by the Department of Revenue and/or the Internal Revenue Service do not occur contemporaneously with the filing of the original return. In fact, it should be noted that the state has a three (3) year period within which to audit returns (s. 214.09, F.S.) and the I.R.S. may also audit within a three (3) year period (IRC s. 6501). To adopt the reasoning urged by Petitioner in this case would require that the state pay interest from
9 months after the original return was filed even if three years after that date an audit by either the state or the federal auditors determines that an overpayment occurred. Again an absurd result would obtain in derogation of the principles of law enunciated in the cases cited hereinabove. Further, such an interpretation would produce a windfall to taxpayers.
The final situation which may give rise to a determination that an overpayment has occurred is based upon the conducting of an audit either by the Department of Revenue or by the Federal Government. Such an event may arise pursuant to s. 214.06, F.S., or s. 214.03, F.S., when a Department audit is conducted, or pursuant to the taxpayer's duty to advise the Department when a federal audit is conducted. See, ss. 220.23(2) and 220.43, F.S., in regard to federal audits and determinations. Audits by the Department of Revenue and/or the Internal Revenue Service do not occur contemporaneously with the filing of the original return. In fact, it should be noted that the state has a three (3) year period within which to audit returns (s. 214.09, F.S.,) and the I.R.S. may also audit within a three (3) year period (IRC s. 6501). To adopt the reasoning urged by Petitioner in this case would require that the state pay interest from
9 months after the original return was filed even if three years after that date an audit by either the state or the federal audits determines that an overpayment occurred. Again an absurd result would obtain in derogation of the principles of law enunciated in the cases cited hereinabove. Further, such an interpretation would produce a windfall to taxpayers.
The final situation which could occur and trigger the overpayment refund and interest statutes, is the situation under s. 214.15, F.S., where a taxpayer alleges an overpayment within three years and requests a refund pursuant to s..
and 214.16, F.S. If the refund is due, after determination by the
Department, to relate that refund back to the original return, as would be required under Petitioner's reasons, the state would be required to pay interest even if the claim was not made until two years and eleven months after the return was filed, thus the absurd result of the state being obligated to pay interest for two years and two months would again occur.
It can readily be seen from the foregoing examples of events which could give rise to an overpayment that many of these events are beyond the control of the Respondent because they arise from determination of claims made by the taxpayer itself or by determinations made by the federal government. To apply the reasoning urged by the Petitioner herein would lead to dramatic inequities clearly not intended by the Legislature in these events.
A second reason the Petitioner's argument must fail is that to apply the reasoning urged by the Petitioner would require that the Department literally interpret s. 214.14, F.S., and only allow interest on overpayment where the overpayment is clearly evident on the face of the original return. Thus, no emandation of "the return" whether by federal audit, amended return or state audit would ever give rise to an overpayment requiring action by the Department within 9 months and further would never allow for interest after amendment.
Accordingly, all of the portions of Ch. 220 relating to 1) federal adjustments after audit by the I.R.S. or 2) adjustments after audit by the Department or 3) amendment of an original return by a taxpayer would be ineffectual to ever create an overpayment situation resulting in the payment of interest if the overpayment is not refunded or credited within 9 months. Thus, there would never be a situation which would allow the payment of interest and these other provisions of the Florida Code would be rendered a nullity. Under the rule of statutory construction legislation is presumed to be effectual and should not be construed in a manner which would result in a nullity. Sharer v. Hotel Corp. of America, 144 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1962).
A third reason exists for the failure of Petitioner's argument. The payment of interest by the state, as noted above, is a matter which can only be established by act of the Legislature. Such a grant is thus, like a refund, a matter of legislative grace and all events giving rise to such payment must, as in the case of refunds, be strictly complied with and are generally construed against the person claiming the right to such payments. See, Wanda Marine corp.
v. Department of Revenue. 305 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1 DCA 1974); Robert N. Anderson v. Department of Revenue. 403 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1 DCA 1981).
In the case at bar, there have been no facts established which indicate that the original return filed by the taxpayer demonstrated an overpayment. Rather that overpayment only became evident after audit by the Internal Revenue Service. Thus, if the right to interest is strictly construed against the taxpayer claiming that right, then under the plain reasoning of the Wanda Marine and Anderson cases, because no overpayment appeared on the return, the amended return not being provided for in s. 214.14, F.S., interest can be claimed by the Petitioner. Moreover, Petitioner did not make a claim for refund as required under s. 214.15, F.S., for refunds of overpayments. Rather, Petitioner granted himself a credit for that overpayment against taxes due for other years. There does not appear a provision under Florida's Code to allow such a willful act by the taxpayer. In fact, under the clear wording of s. 214.15, F.S., "the department...shall credit...the overpayment."
Additionally, credits of overpayment must be filed within a specified period of time as set forth in s. 214.16, F.S. The maximum period for this filing is three years from the date the return was filed. The Stipulation of
Facts shows that although the overpayment claimed was made as a result of federal audit for tax year 1976, the Department was not notified until 1982, thus the three year period had elapsed by that time so no refund could have been permitted under the statute. Thus, to apply the Petitioner's reasoning that "return" in s. 214.14 means only the first "return" not an "amended return" as the Department's interpretation would allow, would foreclose any claim the Petitioner would have if the rules announced in the Wanda Marine and Anderson cases are applied.
Finally, the action by the taxpayer in claiming and granting unilaterally a return of the overpayment extinguishes its right to any interest on that overpayment.
This result obtains for the following reasons. If an amended return allowed to give rise to an overpayment, then it is the overpayment refund claim which triggers the beginning of the interest, and the act of the taxpayer in claiming and taking credit for the refund at the same time extinguishes the running of the interest. By its voluntary act of taking credit for the overpayment, St. Joe never placed the Department in a position of having to act, under s. 214.14, F.S., within 9 months, thus, its voluntary usurpation of the Department's authority under s. 214.13, F.S., clearly extinguished any right it may have had under s. 214.14, F.S., to interest.
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, it is concluded that the refund claimed by the Petitioner should not be granted.
DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
RANDY MILLER EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE STATE OF FLORIDA
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above Final Order was entered in the official records of the Department of Revenue this 16th day of February, 1984.
Agency Clerk
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| May 13, 1984 | Final Order filed. |
| Nov. 18, 1983 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Feb. 16, 1984 | Agency Final Order | |
| Nov. 18, 1983 | Recommended Order | Application for refund with interest granted. Recommended Order reversed by agency; appellate court reversed agency Final Order. |
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