Findings Of Fact The parties have agreed that there are no issues of fact to be determined in this matter, and that the relevant facts are set out in Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition which was received in evidence at the hearing as Hearing Officer's Exhibit 1. This matter involves a determination for Florida corporate income tax purposes of the net income derived by the Petitioner in connection with the purchase, development, and sale of certain property in Dade County, Florida. Petitioner purchased the property prior to January 1, 1972, the date upon which the Florida Income Tax Code became effective. Petitioner expended, through a subsidiary corporation, $369,058 in developing the property. These expenditures also occurred prior to January 1, 1972. For Federal income tax purposes the Petitioner had deducted these expenditures as business expenses during the years that they were incurred. Petitioner sold the property during 1972. Because the Petitioner had deducted the expenditures as business expenses, the expenditures could not properly have been included in the base price of the property for Federal income tax purposes, and the net income for Federal tax purposes was computed by subtracting the original purchase price from the sale price. Since the Florida Income Tax Code was not in effect at the time the expenditures were made, the Petitioner received no Florida tax benefit for the expenditures. In computing the net income for Florida tax purposes derived from the sale, the Petitioner included the expenditures in the base price of the property, and calculated its net income by subtracting the sum of the purchase price of the property and the expenditures from the sale price. The Department, contending that the $369,058 should not have been included in the base price of the property, issued a deficiency assessment which reflected the net income from the sale of property as the difference between the sale price and the purchase price. Petitioner originally contended that it was entitled to add the amount that the property appreciated prior to January 1, 1972 to the base price of the property. Petitioner is no longer contesting the deficiency assessment based upon a disallowance of that addition to the base price of the property. The Department was originally contending that it was entitled to interest at 12 percent per annum calculated retrospectively from the due date of the alleged deficiency. The Department has agreed to abandon its effort to impose that rate of interest. The issue raised in this case is whether the development expenses incurred by the Petitioner and deducted for Federal income tax purposes as business expenses prior to 1972 can be subtracted from Federal taxable income for the purpose of determining taxable income derived from the sale for Florida tax purposes.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner owes State of Florida use tax and local government infrastructure tax on the alleged use of three airplanes.
Findings Of Fact Charles and Dorothy Tolbert own and operate American Aircraft International, Inc. (American). American is in the business primarily of selling and brokering aircraft sales. Most of American's business involves brokering in which American earns a commission or fee for putting together a seller and buyer and bringing the transaction to a conclusion. On a much less frequent basis, American will purchase an airplane for resale. American advertises the availability of its airplanes, both brokered and American-owned, for either sale or lease. However, American has not had occasion to lease one of its own aircraft except as part of a lease-purchase agreement. American does not make any other use of airplanes it offers for sale or lease, except as necessary for maintenance and repairs and for demonstration to prospective purchasers or lessees. Such use would be cost-prohibitive. Fuel, crew, and insurance costs would be well in excess of the cost of a ticket on a commercial airline. American's insurance policy only covers the use of the planes for demonstration and maintenance purposes. On February 6, 1990, American traded for a King Air 200, N56GR, serial number 059, at an acquisition value of $650,000. The King Air 200 was delivered to American from Carlisle, Kentucky, and held by American for resale purposes only and was flown only for purposes of maintenance and repairs and for demonstration to prospective purchasers. When it was sold in 1991 to an English company, BC Aviation, Ltd., American had flown the aircraft only 7 hours. The aircraft was delivered out-of- state in May 1991. In July 1991, American bought a kit for a home-built aircraft called the Renegade, serial number 445. The kit was manufactured and sold by a company in British Columbia, Canada. American's intent in purchasing the kit was to build the airplane and decide whether to become a dealer. It took a year and a half to build, and by the time it was completed, American decided not to pursue the dealership. In September of 1991, American sold the Renegage to the Tolberts. The Tolberts registered the Renegade in September 1994, under N493CT. At first, the Tolberts did not pay sales tax on their purchase of the Renegade. They thought that, since they owned American, no sales tax was due. When the Department audited American and pointed out that sales tax was due, the Tolberts paid the tax in December 1994. In 1991, American also purchased a King Air B90, N988SL, serial number LJ438, for $175,000. The King Air B90 was held by American for resale purposes only and was flown only for purposes of maintenance and repairs and for demonstration to prospective purchasers. In July 1991, American sold the aircraft to Deal Aviation of Chicago, Illinois. However, Deal could not qualify for its own financing, so American agreed to lease-sell the aircraft to Deal. Under the lease-purchase agreement entered into on July 21, 1991, the purchase price was $269,000, payable $4,747.85 a month until paid in full. (The agreement actually said payments would be made for 84 months, but that would amount to total payments well in excess of the purchase price; the evidence did not explain this discrepancy.) American continued to hold title to the aircraft and continued to make payments due to the bank on American's financing for the aircraft. The lease- purchase agreement must have been modified, or payments accelerated, because American transferred title to the aircraft in April 1993. The Department asserted that a Dolphin Aviation ramp rental invoice on the King Air B90 issued in August for the month of September 1991 reflected that the aircraft was parked at the Sarasota-Bradenton Airport at the time of the invoice, which would have been inconsistent with American's testimony and evidence. But the invoice contained the handwritten notation of Dorothy Tolbert that the airplane was "gone," and her testimony was uncontradicted that she telephoned Dolphin when she got the invoice and to inform Dolphin that the invoice was in error since the plane had not been at the ramp since Deal removed it to Illinois on July 21, 1991. As a result, no ramp rent was paid after July 1991. Indeed, the Department's own audit schedules reflect that no ramp rent was paid on the King Air B90 after July 1991. The Department also presented an invoice dated September 16, 1991, in the amount of $3400 for engine repairs done on the King Air B90 by Hangar One Aviation in Tampa, Florida. The invoice reflects that the repairs were done for American and that they were paid in full on September 19, 1991, including Florida sales tax. The Department contended that the invoice was inconsistent with American's testimony and evidence. But although American paid for these repairs, together with Florida sales tax, Mrs. Tolbert explained that the repairs were made under warranty after the lease-purchase of the airplane by Deal. A minor engine problem arose soon after Deal removed the airplane to Illinois. Deal agreed to fly the plane to Hangar One for the repairs, and American agreed to pay for the repairs. After the repairs were made, Hangar One telephoned Mrs. Tolbert with the total, and she gave Hangar One American's credit card number in payment. She did not receive American's copy of the invoice until later. She does not recall if she: noticed the Florida sales tax and did not think to question it; noticed it and decided it was not enough money ($179) to be worth disputing; or just did not notice the Florida sales tax. When American's certified public accountant (CPA), Allan Shaw, prepared American's federal income tax return for 1990, he included the King Air 200 as a fixed capital asset on the company's book depreciation schedule and booked $26,146 of depreciation on the aircraft for 1990 on a cost basis of $650,000. For federal tax purposes, he took the maximum allowable depreciation deduction on the aircraft ($92,857) by attributing a seven-year life to the aircraft and using the double declining balance method of calculating depreciation. The next year, 1991, Shaw included the both the King Air B90 and the Renegade as fixed capital assets on the company's book depreciation schedule. He booked $9,378 of depreciation on the B90 on a cost basis of $175,000 and $1,872 on the Renegade on a cost basis of $25,922 for part of the year 1991. For federal tax purposes, he took the maximum allowable depreciation deduction on the B90 ($12,507) by attributing a seven-year life to the aircraft and using the double declining balance method of calculating depreciation. This depreciation was subtracted from the "gross income from other rental activities" on Schedule K of the return in the amount of $22,796, which represented the payments from Deal under the lease-purchase agreement. The Renegade was depreciated for the same amount as its book depreciation, and no income was recorded as having been generated from use of the Renegade. The next year, 1992, Shaw again included the both the King Air B90 and the Renegade as fixed capital assets on the company's book depreciation schedule. He booked $35,613 of depreciation on the B90 and $5,555 on the Renegade. For federal tax purposes, he took the maximum allowable depreciation deduction on the B90 ($25,014) by attributing a seven-year life to the aircraft and using the double declining balance method of calculating depreciation. This depreciation was subtracted from the "gross income from other rental activities" on Schedule K of the return in the amount of $51,737, which again represented the payments from Deal under the lease-purchase agreement. The Renegade was depreciated for the same amount as its book depreciation, and no income was recorded as having been generated from use of the Renegade. It is not clear from the evidence why American's CPA decided American was entitled to claim depreciation on the three aircraft in question. (Shaw also depreciated another airplane in 1989 which was before the period covered by the Department's audit.) Shaw's final hearing and deposition testimony was confusing as to whether he recalled discussing the question with the Tolberts. He may have; if he did, he probably discussed it with Mrs. Tolbert. Meanwhile, Mrs. Tolbert does not recall ever discussing the question of depreciation with Shaw. In all likelihood, Shaw probably made his own decision that American could depreciate the airplanes to minimize income taxes by claiming that they were fixed capital assets used in the business and not just inventory items being held for resale. For the King Air B90, there were lease payments Shaw could use to justify his decision; but there were no lease payments for the King Air 200 or the Renegade. The evidence was not clear whether there were lease payments for the airplane Shaw depreciated in 1989. For the next year, 1993, Shaw included the Renegade as a fixed capital asset on the company's book depreciation schedule and booked $7,712 of depreciation on the Renegade. For federal tax purposes, the Renegade was depreciated for the same amount as its book depreciation, and no income was recorded as having been generated from use of the Renegade. When the Department audited American starting in July 1994, tax auditor William Berger saw the depreciation schedules and tax returns, both of which indicated to him that the three airplanes in question were used by the company, but no sales or use tax was paid on them. (He also pointed out the Tolberts' failure to pay sales tax on the purchase of the Renegade from American, and the Tolberts later paid the tax, as previously mentioned.) As a result, on July 26, 1995, the Department issued two notices of intent. One was to make sales and use tax audit changes which sought to assess American $56,097.77 in use taxes, together with delinquent penalties of $14,657.36 and interest through July 26, 1995, in the amount of $31,752.61, for a total of $102,507.74, with subsequent interest accruing at the rate of $18.44 per day. The second was to make local government infrastructure surtax audit changes which sought to assess American $609.99 in the surtax, together with delinquent penalties of $163.14 and interest through July 26, 1995, in the amount of $256.33, for a total of $1,029.46, with subsequent interest accruing at the rate of $.20 per day. It is not clear from the record how the Department arrived at the use tax and surtax figures. The alleged use tax assessment should have been calculated as $51,061.32 (six percent of the acquisition costs of the airplanes), and the alleged surtax assessment should have been calculated at the statutory maximum of $50 per item, for a total of $150. On August 28, 1995, American made a partial payment of $5,496.44 on the Department's use tax and surtax audit change assessments, intending to leave a disputed assessed amount of $51,061.32 in use tax and $150 in surtax. It is not clear from the record what American intended the $5,496.44 to apply towards. American filed an Informal Protest of the use tax and surtax audit change assessments on February 26, 1996. The Informal Protest contended that the use tax and surtax were not due and that the federal income tax depreciation schedules were "not determinative." On October 6, 1996, the Department issued a Notice of Decision denying American's protest primarily on the ground that the depreciation of the aircraft for federal income tax purposes constituted using them for use tax purposes. After receiving the Notice of Decision, on November 4, 1996, American filed amended tax returns to remove the depreciation of the airplanes (together with the "gross income from other rental activities" on Schedule K of the 1991 return). (Although CPA Shaw refused to admit it, it is clear that American's federal income tax returns were amended in order to improve its defense against the Department's use tax and surtax assessments.) As a result of the amended returns, American had to pay an additional $15,878 in federal income tax on the 1990 return; there was no change in the tax owed on any of the other returns. On November 6, 1996, American filed a Petition for Reconsideration on the ground that the returns had been amended and the additional federal income tax paid. On January 10, 1997, the Department issued a Notice of Reconsideration denying American's Petition for Reconsideration on the ground that "subsequent modifications made to the federal income tax returns will have no affect [sic] upon" the use tax and surtax assessments.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order withdrawing the assessment of use tax and local government infrastructure surtax, delinquent penalties, and interest against American. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of October, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax FILING (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 Albert J. Wollermann, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Is the Respondent's assessment for corporate income tax and interest for the tax years ending 12/31/78, 12/31/79, and 12/31/80 appropriate, and may it be properly imposed upon Petitioner?
Findings Of Fact The instant dispute between the parties arose out of how the substantial business interests of Petitioner Murray Kramer Corp. are to be defined and by what accounting method its corporate income tax assessments are to be made. Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A., is Petitioner's accountant and qualified representative for purposes of this proceeding. He is neither an internal bookkeeper for the corporation nor a corporate officer thereof. At all times material, Petitioner was conducting business, deriving income, or existing within the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 220, F.S. Petitioner invests primarily through partnerships. Among Petitioner's holdings and investments is ownership of an orange grove in the State of Florida from which it derived income by way of the sales of citrus fruit grown in Florida during the taxable years at issue: 1978, 1979, and 1980. The orange grove constitutes real and tangible property in Florida for purposes of Florida's corporate income tax. Petitioner has consistently filed Florida corporate income tax returns on a "separate accounting" basis since the inception of Florida's Corporate Income Tax Law on January 1, 1972. Petitioner used this method for the years at issue: 1978, 1979, and 1980. It did so without petitioning the Respondent Department of Revenue for permission at or before the filing of the returns to use the "separate accounting" method to determine the Florida tax base. Accordingly, Petitioner did not receive prior written permission from the Department to use the "separate accounting" method for those years, and the Department did not require that the Petitioner use the "separate accounting" method in those years. Nonetheless, Petitioner asserts that its pattern of using the "separate accounting" method for six years put the Department on sufficient notice that the corporate taxpayer would continue to use that method indefinitely and further asserts that it was therefore entitled to use such a "separate accounting" method on the basis of its prior consistent usage. Petitioner's Florida corporate returns declare investment income from dividends, interest, gains from securities, partnership income, and income from its orange grove located in Florida. In each of the disputed tax years, Petitioner entered its federal taxable income on Line 1 of the Florida Corporation Income Tax Return, FORM F-1120. This amount is not at issue and is accepted as a "given" by both parties. However, in each of the disputed tax years, Petitioner did not complete the apportionment schedule on Page 3 of the respective returns. Instead of using the apportionment method, Petitioner computed what it characterized as "Florida Profit" or "Florida Income" on a schedule it attached, based totally on the profits it derived from the Florida orange grove and then inserted that amount on Line 6, Florida Portion of Adjusted Federal Income, of the "Computation of Florida Tax Liability" on the Florida return. This entry did not relate computationally to the amount of federal taxable income reported federally on Line 1. All gross receipts from the sale of citrus fruit by Petitioner were derived from sales made to Zellwood Fruit Distributors. This dollar amount is also undisputed. Petitioner received payment from its Florida orange grove operation in the form of checks drawn by Zellwood. Approximately June 20, 1983, Respondent Department of Revenue made an initial audit of Petitioner's books and records for the taxable years in question. Respondent's auditor assigned at that time had full and free access to Petitioner's books and records. He and his supervisor memorialized their view that the "separate accounting" method employed by Petitioner was proper, but this judgment call (by the auditor on June 29, 1983 and by his supervisor on July 1, 1983) was in the nature of free-form agency action and was neither accepted nor formalized by their superiors within the agency who ultimately determined that the Petitioner should have employed the "apportionment" method and that the burden was upon the Petitioner even under the apportionment method to establish that one hundred percent of its income was not derived in Florida. The Respondent Department therefore determined the tax owed by Petitioner upon the basis of 100% of Petitioner's income as opposed to the yearly percentages that Petitioner had unilaterally assigned to its orange grove, and issued its Revised Notice of Intent to Make Corporate Income Tax Audit Changes on November 7, 1983. Florida's apportionment formula is a three-factor function which takes selected business activities of the taxpayer and computes the portion of that activity attributable to Florida, divided by that activity everywhere. A composite of the subtotal of those three measures (payroll, sales, and property) of business activity are used to compute Florida's share of the "everywhere" base that would be available under the adjusted federal taxable income base. See, Section 214.71(1), F.S. The Department calculated the tax using the three statutorily recognized apportionment factors of payroll, sales, and property. Concerning the first apportionment factor, payroll, Petitioner had federally reported no amount of payroll, and therefore this factor was determined by the Department to be zero, and pursuant to Section 220.15, F.S., the payroll factor was eliminated and the other two factors were used exclusively. Concerning the sales factor, all gross receipts of the orange grove were considered to be derived within the State of Florida, and all gross income attributable to intangible personal property was excluded from the sales factor, pursuant to Section 220.15(1), F.S. Concerning the property factor, the Department determined that all real and tangible personal property was within the State of Florida. The situs of the intangible property was not established by the taxpayer. Therefore, because Section 214.71, F.S. limits the construction of the property factor to include only "real and tangible personal property," it was thus determined to exclude intangible property. The Respondent Department of Revenue issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment on November 16, 1983, showing a balance of $10,596.00 ($7308.00 tax, $275.00 penalty, and $3,013.00 interest computed through October 31, 1983, plus notice of daily interest of $2.40 per day from November 1, 1983 until paid.) Petitioner timely availed itself of informal protest procedures, and the Department issued its Notice of Decision on March 15, 1985. By its June 21, 1988 Notice of Reconsideration, the Department concluded its informal proceedings and denied Petitioner's assertion of the right to use a "separate accounting" method and further denied Petitioner's challenge to the Department's assessment by the "apportionment" method, which in this instance had not made any apportionment for "outside Florida" activities. The situs of intangible personal property was not sufficiently demonstrated by the Petitioner at formal hearing. The Petitioner also did not establish that it owns real or tangible personal property outside Florida. Zellwood Fruit Distributors provided Petitioner Murray Kramer with letters attesting that, based upon information received from Winter Gardens Citrus Products Cooperative, Winter Gardens' sales percentages in the State of Florida were as follows: 1979 1980 18.60% 21.07% Zellwood provided no such figures to Petitioner for the year 1978. Petitioner contends, on the basis of the after the fact Zellwood letters, that Zellwood was a member of Winter Gardens, a cooperative, and Murray Kramer was an associate grower of Zellwood. At formal hearing, no one from Zellwood or Winter Gardens testified; no contract between Petitioner Murray Kramer and either Zellwood or Winter Gardens was introduced to prove agency; no bills of lading, sales slips, corporate documents, or other connective link among the three entities was offered in evidence; nor was any primary, direct, non-hearsay evidence of sales amounts or situs of Winter Gardens' sales offered by Petitioner. Milton Weiss, Petitioner's accountant, asserted that if a straight "apportionment" (not "separate accounting") calculation had been made for the income derived in Florida by Petitioner, percentages would be: 1978 1979 1980 24.03% 15.31% 15.01% These percentages rely in part on what are clearly the out-of-court statements of Zellwood's correspondent, relaying further out-of-court statements from Winter Gardens Citrus. (See the immediately preceding Finding of Fact). Neither of these out-of-court hearsay statements is such as may be used to supplement or explain direct evidence, since no direct, primary source evidence of these sales or income has been presented before the undersigned in this de novo proceeding. See, Section 120.58(1), F.S. Petitioner has not directly paid wages during the tax years at issue. Petitioner has not produced any federal partnership tax returns nor other persuasive proof to account for the return on its investments through partnership channels. During the tax years at issue, Petitioner was not a member of a Florida cooperative, as that term, "cooperative," is used in Section 214.71(3)(a)2, F.S. (See Finding of Fact 15). Petitioner was unable, by evidence of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs, to establish that all amounts other than the percentages of gross income Petitioner had assigned by either of the alternative accounting methods was generated outside of the State of Florida. In so finding, the undersigned specifically rejects Petitioner's assertion that the initial audit report of June 1983 could, by itself alone, legally or factually establish that only the orange grove income was Florida income, that Petitioner's Florida income was solely from the orange grove, that the interest, dividends, and gains on securities sales were not derived in Florida, that the Petitioner taxpayer received rent income from partnerships, that the partnership real estate which gave rise to the rent income was 100% outside Florida, or that the Respondent's initial audit "verified" the figures needed to compute the sales factor, the figures for the property factor, and the figures for the payroll factor of the "apportionment" method for the following reasons: In addition to the first auditor's report being free-form agency action which was ultimately rejected by the agency, and in addition to the failure of either the first auditor or his supervisor to testify in the instant Section 120.57(1) de novo proceeding as to the accuracy of the underlying primary documentation which Petitioner Murray Kramer claimed the first auditor had apparently reviewed, Petitioner did not offer in evidence at formal hearing any such direct evidence documentation which it claimed had been reviewed by the auditors. Further, Respondent's successive auditor, Mr. Siska, testified that it is auditor practice to only examine those books and records individual auditors believe to be necessary to complete the audit. This discretionary element eliminates any guarantee of what the initial auditor relied upon. For the same reasons, Petitioner's assertion that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit of its books and records for the year 1979 "verifies" that the Petitioner's books and records accurately reflect the transactions that took place, is rejected. Petitioner Murray Kramer had admitted a letter (P-10) notifying the corporation that the IRS' "examination of ... tax returns for the above periods shows no change as required in the tax reported. The returns are accepted as filed." The tax period indicated on this exhibit is "7912", which is not helpful, and even if it means, as Mr. Weiss testified, that the 1979 federal tax return which is part of the Florida Corporate Tax Return is accurate under federal law, this IRS letter alone does not verify all the underlying documentation for all three years in question. Also, specifically with regard to investments made through other entities, Mr. Weiss' testimony suggests that the wages paid and partnership returns of these other entities never were in the possession of, nor accessible by, this Petitioner. Petitioner's reliance on its federal returns is apparently based, in part, at least, upon its assertion that it is a "financial institution" as defined in Sections 214.71(3)(b) and 220.15(2), F.S., but the presentation quality of evidence in this case does not permit of such a finding, either. Petitioner has paid no portion of the assessed taxes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order which dismisses the Petition and affirms the assessment. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-4100 The following constitute rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1, 6. Accepted. 2, 9, 10, 11, 17, 19. Rejected for the reasons set out in the Recommended Order. 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 16. Accepted but not dispositive of any material issue for the reasons set forth in the Recommended Order. With regard to item 8, specifically, this determination is non-binding in the de novo proceeding. 4. Rejected upon the citation given as not proved or applicable as stated. 13. Accepted in part and rejected in part as not proved or applicable as stated. See Conclusions of Law 11-12. 15, 18. Rejected as out of context and misleading upon the record as a whole, and as not dispositive of any material issue, and as subordinate and unnecessary to the facts as found. Respondent's PFOF: 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18. Accepted. 4, 5. Accepted in part; what is not adopted is subordinate or unnecessary to the facts as found. 17. Accepted, but by itself is not dispositive of any material issue at bar, for the reasons set out in the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A. 686 Hampstead Avenue West Hampstead, New York 11552 Jeffrey M. Dikman, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Tax Section Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Sharon A. Zahner, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Revenue Room 204, Carlton Building Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 William D. Townsend, Esquire General Counsel 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Katie D. Tucker, Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Milton P. Weiss, C.P.A. 3091 North Course Drive Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 =================================================================
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner is liable for sales tax, together with interest and penalties on the purported unpaid tax amount, as referenced in the assessment and the Respondent agency's notice of decision issued on October 18, 1994.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the sole proprietor of a marina and restaurant business located in Pensacola Beach, Florida. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing pertinent statutes and rules providing for the collection of sales and use taxes, as well as penalties and interest for tax amounts determined to be due and payable but not timely paid to the Department and the State of Florida. Included within the Department's regulatory authority over the assessment and collection of sales and use taxes is the authority to conduct audits of taxpayers to determine amounts of tax due and owing to the State, as well as whether such taxes have been timely and properly remitted and otherwise accounted for. The relevant audit period involved in this proceeding extended from October 1, 1987 through December 31, 1992. The Petitioner's marina and restaurant business operated during the audit period was operated on property owned by the Santa Rosa Island Authority (Authority) and the State of Florida Department of Natural Resources (now Department of Environmental Protection, DEP). The property was leased to the Petitioner for the purpose of operation of this business. The property leased by the Petitioner from the Authority consisted of certain land above the mean high water mark and five boat slips. These five boat slips will be referred to sometimes hereafter as the "Santa Rosa boat slips". During the audit period, the Petitioner operated the restaurant business on the property leased from the Authority and rented the five boat slips to various boating customers. The Petitioner also rented 70 other boat slips to customers during the audit period. These slips were built by the Petitioner in 1977 on submerged land which had been leased from the State of Florida, Department of Natural Resources, Bureau of Land Management. This property adjoined the property leased from the Authority. On November 16, 1992, the Department sent to the Petitioner a notice of intent to audit its books and records. As part of the audit, the Department requested that the Petitioner produce various records, including but not limited to, the Petitioner's federal tax returns, Florida corporation income tax returns, Florida sales and use tax returns, depreciation schedules, general ledgers, property records, cash receipts journals, cash disbursement journals, purchase journals, general journals, sales journals, sales invoices, shipping documents, purchase invoices, intangible property records, sales tax exemption certificates and lease agreements for the real or tangible property involved in the Petitioner's business. The Petitioner basically was able to provide few records to support his restaurant sales and boat slip rental receipts, except for Florida sales tax returns and federal income tax returns. There were no sales control documentation records, such as general ledgers and general journals provided to the Department's auditor for review, except for a cash register tape for the night of December 1, 1992, representing that night's restaurant gross receipts activity. The Petitioner's method of record keeping essentially consisted of his writing down the gross sales each evening from the cash register tapes, totaling those figures at the end of the month, and reporting this total on his Florida sales tax returns as the gross receipts from the restaurant business. However, the Petitioner did not keep the cash register tapes or maintain other documents to support the information reported to the Respondent on the monthly sales tax returns. The Petitioner reported as, "exempt income," the rental from the boat slips for the five Santa Rosa boat slips on the monthly sales tax returns filed with the Respondent. He did not report his monthly rental income from the remaining 70 boat slips on his sales tax returns filed with the Respondent. He did report a great deal more gross receipts on his federal income tax returns than on his Florida sales tax returns. The Department compared the Petitioner's federal income tax returns during the audit period with his Florida sales tax returns and determined that the gross receipts reported to the federal government were substantially larger than the gross receipts reported to the Department. It determined that the primary difference in the gross receipts was attributable to rental revenues from the boat slips, which were not accounted for by the Petitioner in his Florida monthly sales tax returns. The auditor determined that four percent of the recorded restaurant gross receipts were attributable to alcohol sales and 96 percent to food sales. The Department calculated the sales tax due on the undisclosed income through the audit, which represented gross receipts from the restaurant business and the boat-slip rental business, which was not reported by the Petitioner on his Florida sales tax returns. It calculated the sales tax due during the audit period on the rentals of the five boat slips, which were improperly listed as exempt sales on the Petitioner's monthly sales tax returns filed with the Respondent. It was also revealed that during the audit period, the Petitioner had sub-leased a portion of the Santa Rosa property to his former wife for $5,000.00 per year. The Department calculated that the Petitioner owed $300.00 in taxes based upon the sub-lease to his former wife. The Department additionally calculated that the Petitioner owed an additional $314.00 for use taxes, based upon non-exempt purchases of tangible personal property. The Department assessed the Petitioner's sales taxes based upon the estimated boat-slip rental receipts, although it did not assess the lease payments made by the Petitioner to the Authority or to the State of Florida, Department of Natural Resources. On February 12, 1993, the Department assessed the Petitioner a total of $71,308.30 for the audit period, representing $45,694.90 of sales tax due, $14,093.37 of interest due thereon, $11,041.36 of penalties, and $314.98 of use tax, together with $91.02 of interest due on use taxes unpaid, and $72.67 of penalties due thereon. Daily interest of $15.13 commencing on February 13, 1993 was also assessed. Additionally, on February 12, 1993, the Department assessed the Petitioner $1,060.97 for the audit period, including penalties and interest, for local government infrastructure surtax due. Daily interest of $.29, commencing on February 13, 1993, was assessed on that amount. The Petitioner, in essence, does not dispute the Department's calculation of the assessed amount. The Petitioner, rather, contends that he believes that he reported all income and paid all sales taxes which were due and that his certified public accountant failed to account properly for his gross receipts and income to the federal internal revenue service, without the Petitioner's knowledge, during the audit period. He maintains, therefore, that the method of calculation of the Department's tax assessment, based upon the difference between the gross receipts depicted on the federal income tax returns and on the sales tax returns filed with the Department, is inaccurate, apparently because of the CPA's errors. Additionally, the Petitioner maintains that he was of the belief that the boat-slip rentals were not taxable and reportable for sales tax purposes to the Department because he believes, citing Rule 12A-1.061(5)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code. He bases this view on his assertion that the persons residing in the boat slips were "95 percent" live-aboard-type tenants, residing on their boats and that, essentially, they treated their boats as beach homes or condominiums, etc., for purposes of that rule, by residing for longer periods than six months. He thus contends that the rental revenues from such residents were tax exempt. The Department, however, established through its auditor's testimony and the Department's Composite Exhibit 2, that the Petitioner's CPA, through information he generated, did not establish that the difference between the gross receipts reported to the internal revenue service on the federal tax returns and the gross receipts reported on the Florida sales tax returns was not taxable. The Petitioner's proof does not show the factual elements necessary to establish that the 75 boat slips meet the rule's standard for exempt revenues from non-taxable residences.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Respondent assessing the taxes, penalties, and accumulated interest in the above-found amounts. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 94-7256 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Accepted, based upon the Petitioner's testimony in this regard, but immaterial. 3-4. Rejected, as not established by preponderant evidence. The Petitioner did not show that all or even most of the tenants are on annual rentals and, moreover, if they were, the rule cited by the Petitioner himself requires that such lease agreements or contracts be written. The Petitioner has simply failed to establish that the boat-slip rental arrangements were exempt transactions. Rejected, as incorrect as a matter of law and as immaterial and irrelevant. Rejected, as immaterial and irrelevant to the issues in this proceeding. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and as not probative by a preponderance of evidence that the assessment is incorrect. Rejected, as immaterial to the issues in this proceeding. The Department is not seeking to establish fraudulent intent. 9-27. These constitute argument and enunciation of the Petitioner's and the Respondent's perceived legal positions, and attempted equitable arguments concerning justification for the Petitioner's lack of relevant records, including a description of his financial difficulties related to destruction of his business by fire and by two hurricanes. While this is understandable and regrettable, these arguments and positions asserted by the Petitioner are immaterial and irrelevant to the issues in this case. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-26. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard E. Wells 715 Pensacola Beach Boulevard Post Office Box 505 Pensacola Beach, FL 32562-0505 Jarrell L. Murchison, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol - Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Having listened to the testimony and considered the evidence presented in this cause, it is found as follows: Petitioner is a domestic corporation. Petitioner provided medicare services to patients in the 1969-70 fiscal year. An on-site audit by the medicare auditing team was concluded in December of 1971, and petitioner received $56,131.00 of medicare reimbursements in January of 1972, for the services provided in the 1969-70 fiscal year. The petitioner did not file an amended federal income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1979. The adjusted federal income reported on petitioner's federal income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1972, included the $56,131.00 of medicare reimbursements received by petitioner in January of 1972. On petitioner's Florida income tax return for its fiscal year ending September 30, 1972, petitioner did not include the $56,131.00 figure in its adjusted federal income. On March 31, 1975, the respondent notified petitioner of a proposed deficiency in the amount of $2,100.99 arising from the petitioner's omission of the medicare reimbursements from its adjusted federal income as shown on its Florida corporate income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1972. Further correspondence ensued between the petitioner and the Corporate Income Tax Bureau of the respondent and the petitioner filed the present petition requesting a hearing on the issue. The respondent requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is my recommendation that there is no legal basis for affording the petitioner any relief from the proposed deficiency and that said deficiency in the amount of $2,100.00 be sustained. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of September, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Homer E. Ward, N.H.A. Administrator/President University Park Convalescent Center 1818 E. Fletcher Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612
The Issue Whether the Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in her employment based on her gender or race in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Janet Cartwright is a white female who formerly worked at the Department of Revenue (DOR or the Department) as a tax auditor. Ms. Cartwright began employment with the Department of Revenue May 1, 2000, as a tax auditor at the Atlanta Service Center. During her employment with DOR, she had four supervisors: Emmanuel Minta, Ron Lee-Owen, Glynn Walters and Evonne Jones Schultz. The function of a tax auditor is to audit all pertinent books and records of taxpayers assigned to them. Auditors are required to maintain a working knowledge of the taxes within their area of responsibility; to travel to the site of the taxpayer's books to perform their audit duties; to review all records during an audit for potential non-compliance with Florida tax statutes; to gather pertinent tax records to support their findings; and to prepare supporting work papers. Ms. Cartwright went on medical leave in September 2003 and did not return to work. On January 2, 2004, she notified her supervisor that she would be applying for early retirement based on a disability, and requested that her medical leave without pay status be extended until her retirement date was established. On or about March 29, 2004, her request for disability retirement benefits was denied. On April 19, 2004, a recommendation was made to terminate her employment based on Petitioner's inability to perform her duties. On July 13, 2004, Petitioner was advised by certified letter that the Department was proposing to terminate her from the position as Tax Auditor II, effective August 31, 2004. Ms. Cartwright acknowledged receiving the July 13, 2004, letter. The July 13, 2004, letter stated: You began employment with the Department of Revenue effective May 1, 2000, as a Tax Auditor I, and on July 12, 2000, you were promoted to a TA II position. You are currently a TA II, which is a field audit position that requires the auditor to independently travel to the taxpayer's location to audit the company's information for Florida taxes. You have been on Leave Without Pay (LWOP) status since September 18, 2003. Further, in a letter dated September 29, 2003, from your physician, Dr. Daniel Goodman, M.D., he indicates that due to your medical condition of narcolepsy, cataplexy and sleep apnea, you are chronically exhausted and always at a risk of falling asleep at any time and have difficulty operating a car at all times. Additionally, Dr. Goodman recommended that you look into getting long-term disability. On January 2, 2004, you provided a letter to your supervisor, Eve Jones, Process Group Manager, requesting that your LWOP status be extended until your retirement benefits are established. However, on March 29, 2004, you were denied disability benefits. The July 13, 2004 letter identified the disciplinary standard upon which the Department relied and the documents considered by the Department in making its decision. It concluded: Your continuing inability to perform your duties has caused not only a concern for your well being, but has also imposed a hardship on the other staff that have had to handle your job duties and responsibilities in addition to their regular duties. Your Program Director and I agree that because of your continuing inability to perform the duties of your position, with no indication of when you might be able to begin performing your normal work duties, dismissal for inability to perform assigned job duties [is] the only appropriate action in your case. No evidence was presented that Ms. Cartwright's termination was based upon her race or gender. The letter contained a notification of Petitioner's right to appeal the action to the Public Employees Relations Commission or to file a grievance pursuant to Section 447.401, Florida Statutes. Ms. Cartwright did not pursue either remedy. Instead she continued to pursue approval of her request for disability retirement, which was successful. On August 30, 2004, the day before her termination would be effective, she faxed to the Department a letter which stated: Last week I received the "Order of Remand," the final document necessary to process my disability retirement effective September 1, 2004. Therefore, after what was an extraordinary amount of time to apply for, and be approved for, disability retirement, I will be terminating employment as a Tax Auditor II effective August 31, 2004. I thank the Department for allowing me to remain on a leave of absence without pay during this process. On August 30, 2005, she filed a complaint against the Department with the Florida Commission on Human Relations alleging racial and gender discrimination. Ms. Cartwright claimed that she was denied training essential to her position; that she was denied a flex schedule; that she was asked to perform clerical and janitorial duties not required of her male counterparts; and that she was not allowed to drive her own car to field audit locations. The more credible evidence indicates that Ms. Cartwright received formal training in Tallahassee a few months after she was hired, received computer based training and on-the-job training. No credible evidence was received that other similarly situated employees received training denied to Ms. Cartwright. Her claim that she was denied training involved events occurring before she began medical leave without pay, well over a year before she filed her complaint with the Commission. Ms. Cartwright claimed that she was denied a flex time schedule. To the contrary, while there was a delay in approval of flex time during part of her tenure, Ms. Cartwright was approved for flex time schedules on May 2, 2000 (the day after beginning work with the Department) and on August 13, 2002. Ms. Cartwright admitted that the issue regarding flex time was resolved over three years before she filed her complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Ms. Cartwright, along with other members of the staff, was asked to perform clerical duties when the office was short- handed. Ms. Cartwright did not identify any person on the staff who was not asked to perform such functions. Likewise, members of the staff were asked to take shifts on a volunteer basis with respect to "coffee duty." Ms. Cartwright claimed that she was asked to clean out the refrigerator, but did not testify when this request was made. As she did not return to work after September 18, 2003, it would have been well over a year before she filed her complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations August 30, 2005. Finally, Ms. Cartwright claimed that she was not allowed to drive her own car to field audits. The more credible evidence indicates that Ms. Cartwright was never prohibited from driving her own car, but that office policy provided that when more than one auditor went to an audit location, only the senior auditor would be paid for mileage when using a personally owned vehicle. Ms. Cartwright did not identify any other employee who was not a senior auditor who was paid mileage when accompanying a senior auditor in the field. Moreover, the trips for which mileage was not approved occurred during the period covering September through December 2002. These trips occurred well over two years before Ms. Cartwright filed her complaint with the Commission on Human Relations. The issues raised in her complaint, i.e., lack of training, denial of flex schedule, performance of clerical or janitorial duties and not being compensated for driving her own car, are separate incidents and do not constitute a continuing violation tied to her proposed termination. All of the incidents identified in her complaint, including the proposed termination, occurred more than 365 days before Petitioner filed her complaint with the Commission on Human Relations.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of January, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January, 2007.
Findings Of Fact The parties executed and filed a Prehearing Stipulation in this proceeding stipulating to the facts and agreeing that there were no issues of fact which remain to be litigated. Based upon the stipulation of facts, the facts found relevant to the issues in this rule challenge proceeding are as follows: Petitioner, American Telephone and Telegraph Company, is the parent corporation of the "Bell System," a group of corporations consisting of twenty- three associated operating telephone companies and other related corporations. For the 1972, 1973 and 1974 tax years, petitioner and its qualified subsidiaries filed a consolidated return for federal income tax purposes. Having made a valid election of the 100 percent dividend received deduction under Section 243 of the Internal Revenue Code, the Internal Revenue Service did not tax dividends received by petitioner from its affiliates. Petitioner's federal income tax returns were audited by the Internal Revenue Service and the respective tax liabilities were determined and paid for each of the years in question. For the same 1972, 1973 and 1974 tax years, petitioner filed Florida income tax returns on a separate unconsolidated basis. Petitioner did not elect and was not required to file a Florida consolidated income tax return under Section 220.131, Florida Statutes. Having timely made a valid election of the 100 percent dividend received deduction under Section 243 of the Internal Revenue Code for the 1972, 1973 and 1974 tax years, such dividends were excluded from taxable income on petitioner's Florida income tax returns. For each of the tax years in question, petitioner reported on line 1 -- "federal taxable income (line 30, Form 1120 or corresponding line on related form in 1120 series, 990C or 990T)" -- of its Florida corporation income tax return (Form F-1120) its taxable income for federal income tax purposes computed as if petitioner had filed a separate federal income tax return for each of the years in question and for each preceding taxable year for which it was a member of an affiliated group. Petitioner, on its Florida corporation income tax return for each of the years in question, made the additions and subtractions required by the return in computing "adjusted federal income" and apportioned this amount of the prescribed three-factor formula to obtain "Florida net income." The Department of Revenue adjusted the amount of "federal taxable income" and hence "Florida net income" of petitioner for each of the years in question by adding thereto 15 percent of the dividends received from petitioner's affiliates which were deductible for federal income tax purposes under Section 243(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The income which the respondent seeks to tax is derived from dividends received by petitioner primarily from earnings generated by the property and employees of petitioner's affiliates which are devoted to furnishing intrastate and inter- state telecommunications services in their operating territories in states other than the State of Florida. These earnings are subject to income taxes in all states in which the petitioner's affiliates provide telecommunications services that impose income taxes on corporations. On April 10, 1978, the Department of Revenue issued a notice of proposed deficiency for petitioner's tax years ended December 31, 1972, December 31, 1973 and December 31, 1974, representing a potential tax liability to the petitioner in the amount of $304,103 for 1972, $387,429 for 1973, and $439,626 for 1974, plus accrued interest on each proposed deficiency. Petitioner timely filed a protest to the proposed deficiencies, an informal conference was held and, on April 16, 1981, the respondent Department of Revenue issued a final notice of proposed deficiency. This document applied the policies which are being challenged in this proceeding so as to add back to petitioner's taxable income an amount equal to 15 percent of the dividends received by petitioner from affiliated corporations which were not incorporated, located or engaged in business in the State of Florida. Stated differently, the respondent's policy is to allow the 100 percent dividend received deduction for those dividends received from subsidiaries or affiliates subject to the Florida tax, but to allow only an 85 percent deduction on those dividends received from subsidiaries which are not subject to the Florida tax. This policy has been applied to other similarly situated taxpayers in Florida and it has not been promulgated as a rule. The Florida corporate income tax forms in use for 1972, 1973 and 1974 did not require taxpayers to add back any amount of dividends received from affiliates. There is no existing statute or rule which specifically imposes such a requirement.
The Issue Whether the "Additional Payment" made by Hernando HMA, Inc., d/b/a Brooksville Regional Hospital to Hernando County pursuant to a document entitled Lease Agreement, as amended, constitutes "rent" subject to sales tax under section 212.031, Florida Statutes.1/
Findings Of Fact Hernando HMA, Inc. (HMA) is a for-profit entity which operates Brooksville Regional Hospital, Spring Hill Regional Hospital, and other entities, as successor to an entity that was in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings from 1993 to 1998, Regional Healthcare, Inc. (RHI). The Department is an agency of the State of Florida that has been delegated the responsibility to collect sales and use taxes imposed by chapter 212, Florida Statutes. In 1998, as part of RHI's bankruptcy plan, HMA and the County entered into various agreements, including a lease agreement (1998 Lease), regarding the use and operation of several RHI hospital properties and improvements owned by the County, and leased back to RHI. Under the 1998 Lease and other agreements, HMA agreed to continue to operate the hospital facilities for 30 years with possession of the real property and improvements to be returned to the County at the end of the lease term. Section 1.2W. of the 1998 Lease defined "Rental Payment" as follows: "Rental Payment" means all payments due from Lessee to Lessor or otherwise required to be paid by Lessee pursuant to the terms of this lease. The 1998 Lease further provided in section 3.3 under the heading "Rent": The annual rental payment of the Leased Premises for each year of the Lease Term (the "Rental Payment") shall be in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($300,000). This Rental Payment shall be paid to Lessor by Lessee on the Commencement Date and on each anniversary date of the Commencement Date during the Lease Term. The 1998 Lease also provided that HMA, as Lessee, would pay "all taxes, if any, prior to delinquency." Under the 1998 Lease, the County agreed to lease the premises in consideration of HMA’s timely payment of rent and timely performance of the other covenants and agreements required under the lease. It was an “event of default” under the lease if HMA failed to observe and perform any covenant, condition, or agreement on its part which could be cured by a payment of money. Remedies for default under the 1998 Lease included termination of the lease by the County and exclusion of HMA from possession of the leased premises. Even though the leased premises under the 1998 Lease were not subject to ad valorem taxes because they were owned by the County, during public discussions of the proposed 1998 Lease, an issue arose about HMA's responsibility for payment of fire assessments that would have been paid if the property was not immune or exempt from ad valorem taxes. HMA agreed, by separate agreement, to pay the fire assessments and buy a new ambulance to serve the community. The fire assessment agreement was by separate document that was included as part of the closing of the 1998 Lease and other agreements involving the hospital facilities in June 1998. The 1998 Lease was dated June 1, 1998. The 1998 Lease terms included a merger clause in section 15.6 entitled “ENTIRE AGREEMENT,” which provided: This lease may not be modified, amended or otherwise changed orally, but may only be modified, amended or otherwise changed by an agreement in writing signed by both parties. This Lease Agreement and its accompanying guaranty constitute the entire agreement between the parties affecting this Lease. This Lease Agreement supersedes and cancels any and all previous negotiations, arrangements, agreements, and understandings between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter thereof, and no such outside or prior agreements shall be used to interpret or to construe this Lease. There are no promises, covenants, representations or inducements in addition to, or at variance with any of the terms of this Lease Agreement except the Guaranty. In 2001, the County and HMA began negotiations for relocation of the Brooksville Regional Hospital which was part of the leased premises described in the 1998 Lease. During the negotiations, HMA, through its attorney, Steven Mitchell, prepared a proposed comprehensive relocation agreement in consultation with former County Attorney Bruce Snow. Section 7.3 of the proposed relocation agreement contemplated revising the 1998 Lease and suggested the following preliminarily negotiated language for rental payments under a revised 1998 Lease: Rental Payments The Lessee shall pay to Lessor on the due date therefore as set forth in the Lease Agreement, the sum of Three Hundred Thousand and no/100 Dollars ($300,000.00) per annum. The Lessee shall pay to Lessor on an annual basis, either as rent or by virtue of a payment to Hernando County of the same sum to be used by Hernando County as it deems appropriate, an amount equal to the ad valorem taxes that would have been paid on the New Facility Site as improved with the New Facility if the New Facility Site were not owned by Hernando County but owned by a for-profit entity. In the event the New Facility Site and the New Facility located thereon are subsequently required by law to pay ad valorem taxes then the obligation to pay the amount described in Section 7.3(b) herein shall immediately terminate and Lessee shall be responsible for the payment of the appropriate ad valorem tax. The proposed comprehensive relocation agreement was discussed at public meetings held by the Hernando County Board of Commissioners on September 17 and September 25, 2001. The minutes of the September 25, 2001, meeting indicate that the County Administrator advised that the proposed relocation agreement contemplated that HMA would continue to pay $300,000 annually as rent, and “would make a payment-in-lieu of taxes annually to the County . . . .” The minutes also reflect that, in responding to a question from a commissioner regarding whether there should be language in the agreement that would protect the “payment-in-lieu of taxes” provision in the event the law changed: [Former County Attorney] Snow replied that it was his recommendation that there should be a provision that to the extent that the organic law of the State provided that facilities, such as the new hospital or other hospital under the lease, were taxable for ad valorem tax purposes, that that provision of the organic law would apply to ensure that that provision superseded. He explained that the lease provision to provide for an ad valorem tax payment was only to the extent that the organic law did not otherwise compel it so that the County would be receiving ad valorem tax under either scenario. The minutes from the September 25, 2001, meeting further state: Mr. Snow replied to County Attorney Garth Coller that there had been recent Supreme Court decisions which may have a bearing on the organic law to the extent that a decision of that nature indicated that the facilities were subject to ad valorem tax, notwithstanding the ownership issue, then they were subject to ad valorem tax and the lease would need to clarify that. He suggested that if the FS or Constitution should change, even in the absence of an interpretation of the Supreme Court decision, the change would obligate the payment of ad valorem taxes pursuant to the constitutional or statutory provisions. He explained that organic law pertained to provisions of FS or the Constitution as opposed to a Court decision. Mr. Snow’s reported reference to recent “Supreme Court decisions” regarding ad valorem taxes undoubtedly was referring the decision, among others, in Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 718 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1998). In that decision, rendered a few months after the County entered into the 1998 Lease, the Supreme Court of Florida stated with regard to municipal (as opposed to county) property: [T]here is nothing in article VII, section 3 that allows the legislature to exempt from ad valorem taxation municipally owned property or any other property that is being used primarily for a proprietary purpose or for any purpose other than a governmental, municipal or public purpose. To the extent section 196.012(6) attempts to exempt from taxation municipal property used for a proprietary purpose, the statute is unconstitutional. Id. at 298. The Sebring case did not address tax immunity of county property as distinguished from the issue of tax exemptions for the proprietary use of municipal property. The proposed “Rental Payments” language for revisions to the 1998 Lease, however, demonstrates that the drafters of the comprehensive relocation agreement were aware of the possibility that the Sebring rationale could be expanded and applied to county property. The comprehensive relocation agreement was approved by the County, and executed in late 2001. Attached as to that relocation agreement as Schedule C was an unsigned document entitled “First Amendment to Lease Agreement” that was not to be executed until the new facility was completed and transferred to the County. Subsection 3.3 of the First Amendment to Lease Agreement entitled “Rental Payments” provided: Rental Payments The Lessee shall pay to the Lessor on the due date therefore as set forth in the Lease Agreement, the sum of Three Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($300,000.00) per annum. The Lessee shall pay to the Lessor on an annual basis, either as rent or by virtue of a payment to Hernando County of an amount (“Additional Payment”) equal to the sum of the following: An amount equal to that portion of the ad valorem taxes that would have been paid to Hernando County on the Leased Premises (as modified by the substitution of the New Facility Site for the Current Hospital Site) if the Leased Premises were not owned by Hernando County but owned by a for profit entity; and An amount equal to that portion of the ad valorem taxes that would have been paid to the Spring Hill Fire and Rescue District, the Township 22 Fire District and/or any other special taxing district that may be established pursuant to law; and An amount equal to all special assessments levied by Hernando County through any Municipal Service Benefit Unit created by Hernando County pursuant to the provisions of Section 125.01, Florida Statutes; and An amount equal to all ad valorem tax levied by Hernando County through any Municipal Service Taxing Unit created by Hernando County pursuant to the provisions of Section 125.01, Florida Statutes. In no event shall the Additional Payments exceed an amount equal to a full ad valorem tax assessment on the New Facility Site as determined annually by the Hernando County Property Appraiser. In the event the Lessee and/or Lessor is required by law to pay ad valorem taxes on the Leased Premises or any portion thereof, the obligation to pay to Lessor the Additional Payment described in this Section 3.3 shall immediately terminate (and/or be adjusted, whichever is applicable), and Lessee shall be responsible for payment of the appropriate ad valorem tax. The First Amendment to Lease Agreement further provided, “[e]xcept as expressly modified herein, all other terms and conditions set forth in the [1998] Lease Agreement are hereby ratified and confirmed.” The new hospital facility was completed and transferred to the County in 2005. On November 15, 2005, the County commission approved documents related to the transfer, including the First Amendment to Lease Agreement in the precise form as attached to the relocation agreement approved in 2001. The approval was obtained on a consent agenda, and the minutes reflect no further discussion by the commission or the public on the documents that were approved. In 2009, the Hernando County School District sued the County Property Appraiser, alleging that the properties subject to the 1998 Lease as amended by the First Amendment to Lease Agreement should not be exempt from ad valorem taxation. In a 13-page Order dismissing the School District’s action, Circuit Judge Daniel B. Merritt, Jr., distinguished the cases disallowing statutory ad valorem tax exemptions for properties owned by special tax districts or cities from the sovereign immunity against ad valorem taxes enjoyed by real estate owned by the State of Florida and its counties. In his ruling, Judge Merritt noted that Florida law specifically makes leasehold interests in governmental property subject to taxation, noting: The Legislature defines leasehold interests as intangible personal property and, hence, assessed by the Florida Department of Revenue, when: (1) rent is due; (2) the property is used for commercial purposes; (3) is not used for agriculture; (4) not financed with revenue bonds, and; (5) the lease is for an initial term of less than 100 years; §§196.199(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), 199.023(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), specifically preserved in Chapter 2006-312, Laws of Florida (2006). However, see below for further analysis with regard to presumed ownership of property leased for 100 years or more as set forth in §196.199(7), Florida Statutes. Judge Merritt also discussed those instances where “leased” property might not qualify as State or county property where lessees are the “equitable owners,” such as leaseholds of 100 years or more or where properties do not revert to the State until the end of a lease term. In his order, however, Judge Merritt noted that the tax immunity of the County was a fundamental attribute of county property and held that “under the terms of the Lease Agreements the Court concludes that HMA has merely the right to use and possession and is not the beneficial owner as a matter of law Hernando County’s immune property and improvements.” Judge Merritt’s Order was affirmed on appeal. School Board of Hernando County v. Mazourek, Case No. H-27-CA-2009-549 (5th Cir. 2009), per curiam aff’d, 2010 WL 4323055 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) In December, 2010, the Department notified the County it had been selected for a tax compliance audit under chapter 212, Florida Statutes, Sales and Use Tax. The audit period was from January 1, 2007, through December 31, 2009. The County’s personnel were cordial and receptive during the audit process and the Department’s auditor determined that the books and records kept by the County had adequate internal accounting controls in place and sufficient data integrity. Out of the approximately 19 tax registration accounts the County has with the Department, the Department’s auditor found exception with only tax account #12445797, the tax collected and remitted under its lease with HMA. In her record review, the Department’s auditor noticed invoices and worksheets from the County to HMA, titled “Payment in lieu of taxes.” In examining the First Amendment to the Lease Agreement, Section 3.3 “Rental Payments,” the Department’s auditor determined that the County was not collecting sales tax on a portion of the rent received under that section. The monthly tax return filed by the County under account # 12445797 reflected that it was collecting and remitting the sales tax calculated on the $300,000.00 annual rent payment, but was not collecting and remitting sales tax calculated on the additional payments in lieu of taxes. The Department’s auditor determined the additional payments, required under the lease and made as a condition of occupancy, constituted a taxable transaction as additional rent consideration. The amount of the additional payments, made January 2007 and March 2008, as revealed on the County’s “Payment in lieu of taxes worksheets,” was multiplied by 6.5 percent to arrive at the additional tax amount due of $78,710.17. On December 9, 2010, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, Form DR 1215, advising the County of its audit findings, which included $78,710.17 in taxes due, $14,526.37 in accrued interest through December 9, 2010, and a $19,677.55 late payment penalty. On December 21, 2010, the Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment, Form DR 831, showing an assessment of $78,710.17 in tax and $14,707.51 in accrued interest, for a total of $93,417.68 through December 21, 2010, with interest accruing thereafter at the rate of $15.10 per diem. All penalty amounts were waived. At the final hearing, the County argued that the additional payments from HMA under the First Amendment to Lease Agreement were not rent, but rather separate payments to pay for County services. While the actual language used in the First Amendment to Lease Agreement appears to unambiguously indicate that the additional payments were rent, the County offered additional evidence of facts and circumstances beyond the terms of the lease itself in support of its argument that the additional payments were not rent. That evidence was admitted, without objection, and has been considered in determining the intention of the parties to the lease with regard to the additional payments. In addition to evidence that the lease drafters were aware of certain cases decided on the issue of whether the leased premises would be subject to ad valorem taxes, the County offered the testimony of Mr. Mitchell regarding the “Rental Payments” language found in the First Amendment to Lease Agreement. When asked whether there had been much negotiation over the format or wording of the First Amendment to Lease Agreement, Mr. Mitchell recalled: No, there really wasn’t other than, you know, the concept – what this amendment does is what we had agreed to pay rental payment. The rental payment was $300,000. And then, we also had agreed independently just to go ahead and pay the County for certain services that they were providing to us. And then we specified those. Those were independent payments, not part of the rental payment. Mr. Mitchell further testified: [B]asically, this property is free of ad valorem tax. That is why the school board filed their lawsuit because, of course, they were not getting any of the ad valorem taxes. So, the property is free of payment of ad valorem taxes. We’re paying our 300,000. It was very, very clear. However, HMA felt that the County was providing certain services, the fire districts and whatnot. So, independent of the rent, we paid this amount. If you read the section dealing – it’s 3.3.[2], or whatever it is, which I’ll read it to you, it talks about, at the very end – and they did it for whatever reason the property became taxable, you know, it effectively became taxable and we had to pay full ad valorem taxes on the property, then the specialties – these additional payments we called, you know, would go away and they, effectively, be part of rent. That's why it talks about it as such, and it was either additional payment and/or rent. Contrary to Mr. Mitchell’s recollection, section 3.3.2 of the First Amendment to Lease Agreement does not speak in terms of “additional payment and/or rent” but rather states that another payment would be made “either as rent or by virtue of a payment to Hernando County of an amount ('Additional Payment') . . .". Mr. Mitchell makes a valid point regarding the fact that HMA was concerned about having to pay both the additional payment and ad valorem taxes. Consistent with this concern, the lease amendment made it clear that HMA would not have to pay the additional amount if the property ever became subject to ad valorem taxes. Mr. Mitchell’s testimony in support of the County’s contention that HMA’s payment in lieu of taxes under the First Amendment to Lease Agreement was not rent, however, is unpersuasive. Considering the extrinsic evidence offered by the County, especially evidence of the parties concern that the subject County property might someday be subject to ad valorem taxes, together with the 1998 Lease, language negotiated for the proposed relocation agreement, and the actual terms of the First Amendment to Lease Agreement, it is found that the parties intended the language under the "Rental Payments" section to assure that HMA did not have to pay the additional amount twice. The extrinsic evidence offered by the County, however, was insufficient to support a finding that the parties intended to differentiate between “rent” and the “additional payment” or that, however characterized, the payment in lieu of taxes was not rent subject to assessment by the Department. If the parties had wanted to provide language that designated the payment in lieu of taxes as a payment for services instead of rent they could have, as they did in the Second Amendment to Lease Agreement entered into on September 13, 2011, just ten days prior to the final hearing in this case.2/ That Second Amendment to Lease Agreement changed the name of section 3.3 from “Rental Payments,” as found in the First Amendment, to “Rent and Additional Payment for County Services.” Pertinent subsections of the Second Amendment further provided: 3.3.2 Additional Payment for County Services. The Lessee shall pay to Lessor on an annual basis, as an additional payment (“Additional Payment”) for services provided by Hernando County [in its role as a service provider and local taxing authority], . . . * * * The Additional Payment is not intended to constitute “rent” and is not intended to create an event subject to Florida sales tax – but rather is intended to constitute a separate payment for the provision of services, payable to the local taxing authority, as provided in § 212.031(1)(c), Florida Statutes (which allow parties by contractual arrangement to distinguish between payments which are intended to be taxable and payments which are intended to be nontaxable), as this section may be amended or renumbered from time to time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that, consistent with the Notice of Proposed Assessment dated December 21, 2010, and this Recommended Order, the Department of Revenue enter a final order finding that Petitioner owes tax and interest due totaling $93,417.68 through December 21, 2010, with interest accruing thereafter at the rate of $15.10 per diem, without penalties. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2011.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Associated Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Inc., is a Delaware corporation duly authorized to transact business in the State of Florida, having an office in Daytona, Florida, and doing business in Florida itself, or through its wholly owned subsidiaries. (Petition) Petitioner, on a consolidated basis with its subsidiaries, duly filed its Florida corporation income tax returns for the fiscal years ending December 31, 1977, and December 31, 1978. (Petition) The Florida Department of Revenue, after audit of these returns, alleged a deficiency in both years totaling $1,247.00. In both fiscal years in question and pursuant to Section 220.13(1)(b) 3, Florida Statutes, a "New Jobs Credit" of 100,000 was taken by Petitioner for each year. During each of such years the amount of wages and salaries paid or incurred by Petitioner within the State of Florida for each of the taxable years in question exceeded $100,000, but the maximum credit applicable pursuant to the U. S. Internal Revenue Code is $100,000, such limitation being adopted in Section 220.13(1)(b)3, Florida Statutes. (Petition, Exhibit 1) Respondent's audit of Petitioner's returns resulted in adjustments producing the alleged tax deficiency by reducing Petitioner's deductions for "New Jobs Credit" under Section 220.13(1)(b)3, Florida Statutes, to $92,396.00 in 1977 and $51,742.00 in 1978. The reduction of these deductions was based upon application of Respondent's Rule 12C-1.13(1)(b)3, Florida Administrative Code, which limits the deduction for salaries and wages paid in creating new jobs in Florida to a prorata amount of the total expended in all states for which credit is given under Section 280C of the Federal Internal Revenue Code. Since Petitioner expended $222,437.00 in such wages and salaries in Florida in 1977, with a total of $240,759.00 being expended by it everywhere, it was allowed only some ninety-two percent of the federal maximum of $100,000 for New Jobs Credit as a deduction on its tax return. Similarly, in 1978, it was allowed about fifty-one percent since its Florida expenditures amounted to $221,656.00 for new jobs, and a total everywhere, of $428,386.09. (Exhibit 1)
Recommendation That the petition herein be DISMISSED and that the tax deficiency against Petitioner be appropriately enforced. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David C. Latham, Esquire Post Office Box 17711 Orlando, Florida 32860 Randy Miller, Executive Director Department of Revenue 102 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue's ("Department") assessment for sales and use tax, penalty, and interest is valid, correct, and should be upheld.
Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of relevant and material fact: The Department is the agency responsible for administering Florida's revenue laws, including the imposition and collection of state sales and use taxes. §§ 20.21 and 213.05, Fla. Stat. Cellular is a Florida S-corporation, having a principal address and mailing address of 11050 Pembroke Road, Miramar, Florida 33025. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped p. 031. Cellular is a "dealer" as defined under section 212.06(2), Florida Statutes, and is required to collect and remit sales and use taxes to the State. § 212.06(2), (3)(a), Fla. Stat. The Department notified Cellular of its intent to conduct an audit by written notice and the request for specific records mailed on or about October 3, 2014. Resp. Ex. 2. The audit period is September 1, 2011, to August 31, 2014. Resp. Ex. 2, Bates stamped p. 279. Cellular has several locations in Florida where it sells cellular phones, accessories, phone repair services, and minutes for international calling cards to its customers. Cellular also provides services such as money transfers and accepts payments on behalf of Metro PCS. Store locations are in neighborhood business centers and in malls. During the audit period, Cellular had 11 store locations operating in Florida. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped p. 031. Julia Morales is a tax auditor for the Department. She has been employed with the Department for 11 years. Initially, Morales worked as a tax collector. She has held the position of tax auditor since 2011. Morales has a bachelor's degree in finance and also engages in ongoing training with the Department in order to stay current with Florida Statutes and Department rules. Morales performed the audit and prepared the assessment in this case. Early in the audit, Cellular informed the Department that most of its sales were exempt from Florida's sales tax. Morales explained that insufficient sales records were supplied by Cellular to enable the Department to establish the exempt nature of sales transactions, and, therefore, exempt sales were disallowed by the Department. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped p. 033. On September 3, 2015, the Department issued an initial Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes ("DR-1215") in the total sum due, as of that date, of $463,677.61 (i.e., $327,257.39 tax, $81,814.34 penalty, and $54,605.88 interest). After receiving the DR-1215, Cellular requested a conference with Morales to review the assessment. The conference was held on November 9, 2015. Resp. Ex. 1, Bates stamped pp. 007-008; Resp. Ex. 4, p. 030; Resp. Ex. 15, Bates stamped p. 131; Resp. Ex. 16, Bates stamped pp. 130-189. After the November 9, 2015, conference, Cellular provided Morales with sales invoices and detailed sales reports for the audit period. Morales explained that the supplemental records established that Cellular's reported tax exempt sales were properly exempt from sales tax, and, therefore, audit assessment Exhibits A01 to A11 were deactivated. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped pp. 029-031; Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped pp. 058- 068. Audit assessment Exhibit A12 was also deactivated because Cellular provided records needed to reconcile the difference between gross sales reported on its 2012 federal tax return and gross sales reported on the sales and use tax returns for the same period. Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped p. 069. Among the supplemental records supplied by Cellular to establish the tax-exempt basis for some of its sales, its monthly Sales Transaction Detail reports showed that six of Cellular's 11 stores did not remit to the Department all the sales tax they collected during the audit period. Consequently, Morales added audit assessment Exhibits A13 through A18 to document the sales tax collected but not remitted, detailed by store. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped pp. 029-030; Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped pp. 070- 110. Morales testified that one of Cellular's stores that under-remitted sales tax, namely the Northwest Store, was operating but not registered with the Department for the entire audit period. Morales discovered that the Northwest Store collected sales tax on its sales and did not start to remit collected tax to the Department until September 2014, which was after the audit period. Of the remaining five stores, Cellular remitted to the Department approximately 50 percent of the sales tax it collected from July 2012 to August 2014. Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped pp. 075, 082, 088, 095, 102, and 109. As to consumable purchases (audit assessment Exhibit B01) during the audit, Cellular failed to provide records to establish that it paid use tax on consumable purchases. The sums expensed in Cellular's federal tax returns, which could have a sales tax implication, were relied upon by the auditor to create Exhibit B01. Resp. Ex. 4, Bates stamped p. 034; Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped pp. 111-125. Based upon the supplemental records supplied after the November 2015 conference, on February 4, 2016, the Department issued a revised Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes ("DR-1215"), reducing the total sum due, as of that date, to $277,211.42 (i.e., $194,346.98 tax, $48,586.76 penalty, and $34,277.68 interest). Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped p. 053. Penalty considerations were reviewed by the Department. Resp. Ex. 19. Due to Cellular's failure to remit to the State collected sales tax, penalty was not waived by the Department. In addition, accrued statutory interest was also imposed as required by section 213.235, Florida Statutes. Resp. Ex. 18, Bates stamped pp. 054-056; Resp. Ex. 29, Bates stamped p. 2. On February 15, 2016, the Department issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment ("NOPA") in the total sum due, as of that date, of $277,620.29 (i.e., $194,346.98 tax, $48,586.76 penalty, and $34,686.55 interest). Resp. Ex. 23. On March 18, 2016, Cellular submitted a timely protest letter to the Department's Technical Assistance and Dispute Resolution ("TADR"). Resp. Ex. 25. Martha Gregory also testified for the Department. She has been employed with the Department for 20 years. Gregory currently holds the position of taxpayer services process manager in TADR. Gregory holds a bachelor's degree in accounting and has also taken master's level courses. TADR manages an assessment after a taxpayer submits a protest of a NOPA with the Department. Gregory is familiar with TADR's involvement in Cellular's case. Gregory testified that despite repeated efforts by TADR during the protest period, Cellular submitted no new information to the Department for review. Consequently, on April 17, 2017, TADR issued a Notice of Decision ("NOD"), sustaining the assessment in its totality. Because of accruing interest, the total sum due, as of that date, increased to $293,353.77. Resp. Ex. 24. On June 16, 2017, Cellular timely filed its petition for a chapter 120, Florida Statutes, hearing. In its petition, Cellular contests all taxes, penalty, and interest that have been assessed. (See petition filed with the Division on December 5, 2017.) After receiving the petition, the Department made repeated attempts to obtain information from Cellular to support the claims raised in their petition. Resp. Ex. 28. Because no additional information was submitted by Cellular, the petition was referred to the Division on December 5, 2017. Prior to this final hearing of June 28, 2018, Cellular provided additional records relevant to the sales tax assessed on consumable purchases (audit assessment Exhibit B01). Based upon the newly supplied supplemental records, the Department also deactivated Exhibit B01 from the assessment and issued a revised reduced assessment. As a result, on June 12, 2018, the Department issued a revised assessment, which reduced the additional sales and use tax owed to $158,290.02, plus $39,572.50 for a penalty and $55,040.52 in interest, for a total sum owed, as of that date, of $252,903.04. Resp. Ex. 29, Bates stamped p. 2. Erica Torres appeared at the hearing as Cellular's corporate representative and testified on Cellular's behalf. Torres is employed by Cellular as a manager in charge of sales personnel, commissions, schedules, and bookkeeping. She has been employed by Cellular since 2001. Torres admitted that the reports relied upon by the Department in determining that Cellular collected and failed to remit sales tax were correct. Cellular introduced no credible or persuasive evidence to support that the assessment was incorrect. The undersigned finds that more credible and reliable evidence is in favor of the Department. Cellular failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the assessment or proposed penalty and interest proven by the Department are incorrect.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying Cellular's requests for relief and sustaining the assessment in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark S. Hamilton, General Counsel Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 (eServed) Randi Ellen Dincher, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Bureau The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Carlos M. Samlut, CPA Samlut and Company 550 Biltmore Way, Suite 200 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (eServed) Leon M. Biegalski, Executive Director Department of Revenue Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 (eServed)
