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TRIPLE M PACKING, INC. vs. FAIR CHESTER TOMATO, 85-000410 (1985)

Court: Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000410 Visitors: 13
Judges: P. MICHAEL RUFF
Agency: Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
Latest Update: Sep. 16, 1985
Summary: Respondent owes Petitioner the full amount of balance. Petitioner's employee who signed composition agreement had no authority to bind.
85-0410.PDF


STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS


TRIPLE M PACKING, INC., )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 85-0410A

) FAIR CHESTER TOMATO PACKERS, INC. ) and HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND )

INDEMNITY COMPANY, )

)

Respondents. )

)


RECOMMENDED ORDER


Pursuant to notice this cause came on for formal hearing before P. Michael Ruff, duly designated Hearing Officer on April 19, 1985 in Quincy, Florida. The appearances were as follows:


APPEARANCES


For Petitioner: Mr. Kent Manley, Jr.

Post Office Box 1358 Quincy, Florida 32351


For Respondents: Arthur Slavin, Esquire

270 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10016


This cause arose upon Petitioner Triple M Packing, Inc.'s complaint filed against the above Respondents with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, wherein it is alleged that the Respondent, Fair Chester Tomato Packers, Inc. (Fair Chester) had incurred a debt to the Petitioner in the amount of $12,276 due to Respondent's receiving shipments of tomatoes from the Petitioner without making proper accounting and payment as required by Section

    1. through 604.30, Florida Statutes. The sale of the tomatoes at issue occurred June 13, 1984. The actual delivery date is unclear but was on or shortly after that

      date. Payment not being forthcoming, the instant complaint was filed on October 29, 1984, was responded to and the cause was duly transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings. The Respondent, Fair Chester Tomato Packers, Inc. made a partial payment of the claim by check for $4,092 dated November 9, 1984, contending that, due to its belief that Petitioner had entered into a composition of creditor's agreement allowing for a one-third payment of all claims, that that was all that was owed. On December 11, 1984 the answer to the complaint was filed by that Respondent.

      Inasmuch as Fair Chester had been required to post a surety bond, the surety company, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company is a Co-Respondent in this action.


      At the hearing, Petitioner called one witness, the Petitioner's president and presented and had admitted one exhibit. The Respondent called Arnold Rosenthal, president of Fair Chester Tomato Packers Inc. and additionally presented seven exhibits which were admitted into evidence.


      Memoranda of Law have been submitted subsequent to the hearing and the filing of the transcript and have been considered by the undersigned in the rendition of this Recommended Order.


      The issue to be resolved concerns whether Respondents are indebted to the Petitioner in the amount of $12,276 less the $4,090 already paid or whether the Petitioner has legitimately accepted and agreed to the composition of creditors agreement and therefore been paid fully for the agreed upon thirty-three and one-third percent of the total, original indebtedness.


      FINDINGS OF FACT


      1. The Petitioner, Triple M Packing, Inc. (Triple M) is in the business of selling produce, particularly tomatoes from its principal business address of Post Office Box 1358, Quincy, Florida.


      2. The Respondent, Fair Chester Tomato Packers, Inc. (Fair Chester), is primarily engaged in the business of packaging, distributing and brokering tomatoes in the New York City metropolitan area. It purchases produce from various sellers around the country in tomato-producing areas for resale at markets in the New York City area.

        Since it is a licensed agricultural dealer, the Respondent is required under the pertinent provisions of Chapter 604, Florida Statutes, to file a surety bond with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department), designed to guarantee payment of any indebtedness to persons selling agricultural products to the bonded dealer to whom the dealer fails to make accounting and payment. Fair Chester has thus obtained a 50,000 surety bond which is underwritten by its Co-Respondent, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (Hartford).


      3. During the 1984 growing season, the Petitioner sold certain shipments of tomatoes to the Respondent for a price of $12,276. Thereafter, curing middle-to-late 1984, the Respondent Fair Chester, found itself in straitened financial circumstances such that it was unable to pay its various trade creditors, including the Petitioner. In view of this, various creditors at the behest of a lawyer retained by Fair Chester, eventually entered into a composition agreement, whereby the unsecured trade creditors agreed to settle, release and discharge in full their claims against Fair Chester on the condition that each creditor signing that agreement be paid thirty-three and one-third percent of its claim. It was determined that the composition agreement would be operative if the trade creditors representing 95 percent or more in dollar amount of all unsecured debts accepted the terms and provisions of that composition agreement on or before November 13, 1984.


      4. All the Respondent's unsecured trade creditors were contacted and ultimately those representing more than

        95 percent of the outstanding creditor claims against Respondent accepted the terms and provisions of the composition agreement by the deadline. A document indicating acceptance by the Petitioner was signed by one Robert Elliott, purportedly on behalf of the Petitioner, Triple M Packing, Inc.


      5. In this connection, by letter of November 13, 1984 (Respondent's Exhibit 4) Attorney Howard of the firm of Glass and Howard, representing the Respondent, wrote each trade creditor advising them that the required acceptance by 95 percent of the creditors had been achieved, including the acceptance of the agreement signed and stamped "received November 8, 1984" by Robert Elliott, sales manager of Triple M. In conjunction with its letter of November 13, 1984, Glass and Howard transmitted Fair

        Chester's check for one-third of the indebtedness due Triple M or $4,092. The Petitioner's principal officer, its president, Kent Manley, who testified at hearing, acknowledged that he received that letter and check, but he retained it without depositing it or otherwise negotiating it.


      6. In the meantime, on October 29, 1984 a complaint was executed and filed by Triple M Packing, Inc. by its president, Kent Manley, alleging that $12,276 worth of tomatoes had been sold to Respondent on June 13, 1984 and that payment had not been received. The purported acceptance of the composition agreement executed by Robert Elliott, sales manager, was not executed until November 8, 1984 and the check for $4,092 in partial payment of the Triple M claim was not posted until November 13, 1984.


      7. Mr. Manley's testimony was unrefuted and established that indeed Mr. Elliott was a commissioned salesman for Triple M, was not an officer or director of the company and had no authority to bind the company by his execution of the composition of creditors agreement. Mr. Manley acted in a manner consistent with Elliott's status as a commissioned salesman without authority to bind the Petitioner corporation since, upon his receipt of the "one- third settlement" check with its accompanying letter, he did not negotiate it, but rather pursued his complaint before the Department. In fact, in response to the Department's letter of December 20, 1984 inquiring why the complaint was being prosecuted in view of the purported settlement agreement, Mr. Manley on behalf of Triple M Packing, Inc. by letter of December 28, 1984, responded to Mr. Bissett, of the Department, that he continued to hold the check and was not accepting it as a final settlement.


      8. Thus, in view of the fact that the complaint was filed and served before notice that 95 percent of the creditors had entered into the composition agreement and never withdrawn, in view of the fact that on the face of the complaint Robert C. Elliott is represented as a salesman indeed, for an entity known as "Garguilo, Inc.," and in view of the fact that Mr. Manley as president of Triple M, retained the check without negotiating it and availing himself of its proceeds, rather indicating to the Department his wish to pursue the complaint without accepting the check as settlement, it has not been established that the Respondent, Fair Chester, was ever the

        recipient of any representation by Manley, or any other officer or director of the Petitioner corporation, that it would accept and enter into the above-referenced composition of creditors agreement. It was not proven that Triple M Packing, Inc. nor Mr. Manley or any other officer and director either signed or executed the composition agreement or authorized its execution by Robert C. Elliott. Respondent's position that Mr. Manley and Triple M acquiesced in the execution of the settlement agreement by Elliott and the payment of the one-third settlement amount by the subject check has not been established, especially in view of the fact that the complaint was filed after Attorney Howard notified Triple M of Respondent's settlement offer and prior to notice to Triple M that the settlement agreement had been consummated by 95 percent of the creditors and prior to the sending of the subject check to Triple M. Mr. Manley then within a reasonable time thereafter, on December 28, 1984, affirmed his earlier position that the entire indebtedness was due and that the settlement had not been accepted.


        CONCLUSIONS OF LAW


      9. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject matter of and the parties to this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1983).


      10. Respondent contends that the Petitioner executed a valid composition agreement which served to discharge both the Respondent and its surety from the admitted original debt owed to the Petitioner. A composition agreement has been defined as "an agreement between an insolvent or embarrassed debtor and two or more of his creditors, whereby the creditors, for some consideration, such as an immediate payment, agree to the discharge of their effective claims on the receipt of payment which is in a lesser amount than the amount actually owing on the claim." 13 Fla. Juris. 2d, Creditors Rights and Remedies, Section 25. There is no dispute that the agreement involved in this proceeding clearly constitutes a composition of creditors agreement. It is equally clear that once such a composition agreement is executed voluntarily by a creditor that that creditor becomes bound by the agreement. Town of Dundee v. Pressgrove, 153 Fla. 671, 15 So.2d 488 (1943). Thus, if the Petitioner validly executed the composition agreement as one of the creditors

        of Fair Chester, then the debt owed to Triple M by Fair Chester would be discharged and fully satisfied by the payment of one-third of the original debt owed. Welles- Kahn Co. V. Klein, 81 Fla. 524, 88 50.315, on reh., 81 Fla. 527, 88 So.3l6 (1920). It is also true that if such a common-law composition agreement is properly executed, operating as a total discharge of claims against the debtor, that it is equally a discharge of all claim against the surety of that debtor. 13 Fla. Juris. 2d, Creditors Rights and Remedies, Section 27. See also, 15A Am. Jr.

        2d, Composition with Creditors, Section 7 (and cases cited therein.) Thus, Respondent's position would be a correct one if indeed the composition agreement were validly executed by Triple M Packing, Inc. by and through its president, Mr. Manley, or other properly authorized officer, director or agent.


      11. The unrefuted evidence of record reveals however, that indeed Mr. Elliott, who executed the composition agreement, was merely a commission salesman and was never authorized by proper resolution of the corporate board of directors, to enter into any composition agreement liquidating and accepting discharge of its claim against Fair Chester. It is illogical to think that such a composition agreement was executed by the Petitioner, or by Elliott upon Petitioner's authority, since the complaint had already been filed after Petitioner was made aware of Attorney Howard's settlement efforts and especially since no action was taken thereafter to withdraw or voluntarily dismiss the complaint filed with the Department. Indeed, Manley's conduct is inconsistent with the corporate Petitioner accepting the composition of creditors agreement because the complaint was filed and pursued by the Petitioner, was never withdrawn and even after the Respondent, Fair Chester sent the one-third partial payment check to Triple M, Mr. Manley retained the check without negotiating it and continued to pursue his claim, as evidenced by his letter of December 28, 1984 to Mr. Bissett of the Department of Agriculture. Surely he would not have continued to press his claim had he intended and believed that he and his company had entered into a valid composition of creditors agreement.


      12. Respondent's evidence that Manley and Triple M never communicated with the Respondent after it received the November 13 letter and check concerning the composition of creditors does not constitute proof that Manley and

        Triple M had acquiesced in the composition of creditors agreement. Mr. Manley's unrefuted testimony establishing his conduct from the filing of the complaint forward, clearly demonstrates otherwise. He filed a complaint, it was answered by the Respondents, the composition of creditors agreement was signed by the unauthorized salesman Elliott and sent to the Respondents, whereupon they were prompted to issue the settlement check. At this point Mr. Manley was already in communication with the Department of Agriculture and considered that that was the forum to address any comments or statements of position concerning his claim and did so in response to a Department inquiry concerning the necessity for his complaint in view of the purported entry into the settlement agreement. Within a reasonable time after this inquiry of December 20, he responded on December 28, 1984 indicating that he did not believe the claim to be settled and was not accepting the tendered check. This establishes that indeed, the Petitioner never accepted the purported composition agreement and never authorized Mr. Elliott to execute such an agreement.


      13. The Respondent asserts that Manley and Triple M wrongfully failed to inform the Respondent that Elliott was not authorized to enter into the agreement, and by this inaction or silence, caused the Respondent to incur a detriment in reliance upon the state of affairs it believed to exist, that is, the existence of a valid composition agreement with Triple M. Thus, the Respondent asserts that Triple M is equitably estopped to deny its acceptance of the settlement of its claim. In its brief, the Respondent cites a number of cases which support a finding of equitable estoppel against a party who remains silent and fails to take reasonable steps to notify an injured or potentially injured party of the facts in a situation, when such a person knows the signature on a bill note or other document is forged or unauthorized and yet fails to report the lack of authorization to the other, resultantly injured party. Respondent relies upon Exhibit 1 which was the letter from Attorney Howard explaining the terms of the proposed composition of creditors agreement and also Exhibit 4 which is the letter from that attorney with the enclosed settlement check which stated that the check was being sent to the Respondent as a consenting creditor. The Respondent contends that Manley thus knew his firm had executed the settlement agreement, or at least should have known.


      14. The three elements of equitable estoppel, all of which are required to be proved by the party asserting it, are:


        1. Words, admissions or conduct, acts and acquiescence, or all combined, causing another person to believe in the existence of a certain state of things;

        2. In which the person so speaking, admitting, acting and acquiescing did so wilfully, culpably or negligently; and

        3. By which such other person is or may be induced to act so as to change his own previous position injuriously.


      15. See Ennis v. Warm Mineral Springs, Inc., 203 So.2d 514 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1967). The burden of proving equitable estoppel rests upon the party invoking it and every fact essential to that estoppel must be clearly and satisfactorily proved. See Boulevard National Bank v. Gulf American Land Corporation, 179 So.2d 584, Quashed, 189 So.2d 628; On Remand 190 So.2d 67 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1966); State v. Hadden, 370 So.2d 849 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979).


      16. The first of the above elements of equitable estoppel has not been proven. It has not been shown that the party Triple M Packing, Inc. nor its president, Mr. Manley, engaged in conduct, acts, acquiescence or silence which caused the Respondents to reasonably believe in the existence of a valid composition of creditors agreement between them. The act which caused them to have that belief was the act of Mr. Elliott, an unauthorized salesman who signed the agreement on November 8, 1984, and Manley, for Petitioner, timely repudiated that purported settlement. The Petitioner and Manley never, by any conduct, acts, words, admissions or acquiescence gave reasonable cause to Respondent to believe that a valid composition of creditors agreement existed between them since the complaint was filed after Triple M was informed by Respondent's agent of the composition effort and before the agreement was said to have been entered into. Respondent knew during this time period of October 29 to December 28, 1984, that the complaint was active inasmuch as the Department's letter of inquiry of December 20 referred to the Respondent's answer to the complaint which it had already received. Inasmuch as Manley, as president

        of the Petitioner, responded in a reasonable time on December 28, 1984 indicating that the settlement had indeed not been validly entered into by his corporation, it cannot be deemed that the Petitioner acquiesced and was silent for an unreasonable period of time; thus wilfully, culpably or negligently misleading the Respondent into a wrong belief about the true state of affairs between them as to the claim and the existence of a settlement. In short, the corporation filed its complaint for the full amount of the debt and never acted by words, admission, conduct or acquiescence to make Respondent validly believe otherwise and within a reasonable time repudiated Elliott's unauthorized execution of the agreement and re-affirmed its position that it was seeking payment of the entire amount of the debt. Elliott's purported entry into the settlement agreement on behalf of the Petitioner was clearly shown to be unauthorized.


      17. Finally, it has not been proven that the Respondent was induced by Petitioner's conduct or silence to change its position to its detriment. It is difficult to conceive how the Respondent corporation or its president Mr. Rosenthal who apparently paid the funds involved in the check out of his own pocket, incurred any detriment, financial or otherwise, by acting on the state of facts they believed to exist, that is that a composition of creditors agreement had validly been executed by Triple M. If that state of affairs had existed, as they contend the Petitioner led them to believe, then they would have avoided two-thirds of the debt they had never disputed was originally owed in the first place. It simply has not been demonstrated that any conduct or acquiescence by Petitioner caused any detriment to the Respondent it would not have been subject to anyway, had it not relied on its belief concerning the Petitioner's position with regard to the claim. Thus, the signature of Mr. Elliott on the composition of creditors agreement was shown to be unauthorized and not the act of the Petitioner, nor its president, Mr. Manley. Likewise, the necessary elements of equitable estoppel against the Petitioner have not been proven so that it cannot be concluded that the Petitioner is bound by Elliott's execution of that agreement. The parties never disputed that $12,276 was originally owed and both Fair Chester and Hartford remain indebted to Triple M in that amount. Should Fair Chester fail to make payment, that surety company must pay that indebtedness out of the

posted bond pursuant to Subsection 604.20(A), Florida Statutes.


RECOMMENDATION


Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, the evidence of record and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore


RECOMMENDED:


That Fair Chester Tomato Packers, Inc. pay Triple M Packing Company, Inc. $12,276. In the event that principal fails to or is unable to pay that indebtedness, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company should pay that amount out of the surety bond posted with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services.


DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of September, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida.




Hearings


Hearings 1985.


COPIES FURNISHED:


Mr. Kent Manley, Jr. Post Office Box 1358 Quincy, Florida 32351

P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative


The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(904) 488-9675


Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative


this 16th day of September,

Arthur Slavin, Esquire

BLUM, HAIMOFF, GERSEN, LIPSON, GARLEY & NIEDERGANG

270 Madison Avenue

New York, New York 10016


Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol

Tallahassee, Florida 32301


Mr. Joe W. Kight

Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture Mayo Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

===========================================================

======

AGENCY FINAL ORDER

===========================================================

======


STATE OF FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES


EARL DICKS,


Petitioner,


vs. DOAH CASE NO. 85-0055A

LB CASE NO. 86-0028

  1. R. SALES, INC., and AETNA INSURANCE CO.,


    Respondents.

    /


    FINAL ORDER


    On October 14, 1985, the Division of Administrative Hearings hearing officer in the above-styled case submitted his Recommended Order to me. A copy of that Recommended Order is attached as Exhibit "A". Pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)8, Florida Statutes, and Rule 28-5.404, Florida Administrative Code, all parties were allowed twenty days in which to submit written exceptions to the Recommended Order. Petitioner, Earl Dicks, submitted timely exceptions to the Recommended Order, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B". Respondent, J. R. Sales, Inc., submitted a reply to Petitioner's exceptions, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "C".


    BACKGROUND


    Petitioner is a producer of farm commodities in Columbia County, Florida. In 1984, Petitioner grew watermelons.


    On or about June 21, 1984, Petitioner met with Carr Hussey, representing Respondent, to discuss the sale and

    purchase of Petitioner's watermelons. Petitioner has alleged that the Respondent in the person of its representative, Carr Hussey, had agreed to pay a fixed price of four cents per pound for large grey watermelons and 3.5 cents per pound for medium grey watermelons and that four cents per pound was due to Petitioner for the delivery of large jubilee watermelons.


    The issue for determination at the hearing was whether Respondent was obligated to pay Petitioner an additional

    $5,576.00.


    The hearing officer recommended that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's claim of underpayment in the amount of $5,576.00 for watermelons purchased by Respondent and dismissed the complaint.


    RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS


    In ruling on these exceptions, I specifically note the standard of review contained in Chapter 120. Section 120.57(1)(b)9, Florida Statutes, provides that an agency may reject findings of fact contained in a recommended order only if it concludes, after a review of the complete record, that there is no competent substantial evidence in the record to support those findings.


    The agency may, however, reject or modify the conclusions of law and interpretations of administrative rules.


    PETITIONER'S EXCEPTIONS


    1. Petitioner's first exception is to the hearing officer's conclusion of law that "there being no written contract or agreement and the price of the sale of goods exceeding $500.00, Petitioner's claim of entitlement to 3.5 cents per pound for mediums and four cents per pound for large watermelons could not be enforced, even if those claims were found to be factually correct."


      Section 672.201 provides, in relevant part, as follows:


      1. Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not

enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.

  1. A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable:

    1. If the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testi- mony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond

      the quantity of goods admitted; or

    2. With respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have

been received and accepted. . .


The facts of this case falls within the statute of frauds, exceptions to Section 672.201, Florida Statutes. Even though the price of the goods exceeded $500.00, the contract between the parties is enforceable because the Respondent admitted in his testimony that a contract existed between the parties for the Petitioner to sell and for the Respondent to purchase Petitioner's watermelons.

There was also written documentation, entered into evidence, between the parties as to the quantity of watermelons purchased


The hearing officer also received into evidence checks issued and signed by Carr Hussey, President of Respondent. It has been held that evidence in the form of a check which had been written on the Defendant's account and made out to the Plaintiff and which had been accepted by the Plaintiff and deposited into Plaintiff's account is enough to take the sales agreement between the parties out of the statute of frauds. Lea Industries, Inc. v. Raelayn International, Inc.,, 363 So.2d 49 (3rd DCA 1978). Petitioner's first exception is accepted.


The only disputed issue was the agreed upon price per pound. There is competent and substantial evidence in the record supporting the hearing officer's conclusion that since there was no agreement as to price, that price must be a fair market value.


Petitioner's second exception is to the hearing officer's findings of fact as to the fair market value of the watermelons. The fair market value of watermelons is established by what growers are willing to sell watermelons for and what purchasers are willing to buy them for on any given day.


Sherrod Keen, a grower and watermelon buyer in the area, testified as to what he was paying area farmers. He testified that his watermelon prices to local farmers range from a minimum of 3.5 to four cents per pound for medium and four to 4.5 cents per pound for large grays and other watermelons including jubilees. On July 2, 1984, Keen was paying 3.5 to four cents for large watermelons.


The hearing officer disregarded this testimony because Keen sells in places such as Florida, Maine, and Wisconsin while the Respondent was selling in places such as New York, New England, and Canada. This is a distinction without a difference since both watermelon buyers were buying melons at the same f.o.b. shipping point market price without regards to where they were being sold.


Petitioner contends that the hearing officer committed reversible error in denying Petitioner's exhibit tendered for the purpose of showing fair market values in 1984 as published by the Southeastern Fruit and Vegetable Reporting Service from Orlando, Florida.


Section 672.724, Florida Statutes provides that:


Whenever the prevailing price or value of any goods regularly bought and sold in any estab- lished commodity market is in issue, reports in official publications or trade journals or in newspapers or periodicals of general circu- lation published as the reports of such market shall be admissible in evidence. The circum- stances of the preparation of such a report may be shown to affect its weight but not its admissibility.


Thus, Petitioner's exception is accepted. However, this does not change the result. The Southeastern Fruit and Vegetable Reporting Service is only a guideline in establishing prices for various commodities in the industry. Without additional evidence of market prices, it cannot be used as conclusive evidence of what market prices are on any give day.


CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Having considered the Recommended Order, the exceptions filed by Petitioner, the reply filed by Respondent, and the record it is


ORDERED THAT


  1. The Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are hereby adopted as modified by this Final Order.


  2. Respondent pay the Petitioner the amount of

$5,576.00 within fifteen (15) days after the Order becomes final. This Order is final and effective on the date filed with the clerk of the Department.


Any party to the Order has the right to seek judicial review of the Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, by the filing of a Notice of Appeal pursuant to rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, with the clerk of the Department in the Office of General Counsel,

515 Mayo Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32301; and by filing a copy of the Notice of Appeal accompanied by the applicable filing fees with the appropriate District Court of Appeal. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days from the date this Final Order is filed with the clerk of the Department.


DONE AND ORDERED this 31st day of July, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida.



Doyle Conner, Commissioner Department of Agriculture

and Consumer Services


COPIES FURNISHED TO:


Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services

Clerk's Office

Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida


Earl Dicks

Route 3, Box 357

Lake City, Florida 32055


J. R. Sales, Inc. Post Office Box 267

Fairfield, Maine 04937


Marlin M. Feagle, Esquire Post Office Box 1653

Lake City, Florida 32056-1653


Robert L. Stinson, Esquire Post Office Box 1739

Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1739


Aetna Insurance Company

Attention: Mr. F. B. Schroeder, Jr. Three Center Plaza

Post Office Box 1793 Boston, Massachusetts 02205

James Maynard, Field Representative James Brooks, Field Representative Thomas Martino, Field Representative Brenda Hyatt, Field Representative Joe W. Kight, Chief

Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services

Room 418, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301


Charles C. Adams, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building

2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32301


William C. Harris, Esquire Department of Agriculture

and Consumer Services Room 513, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301


Docket for Case No: 85-000410
Issue Date Proceedings
Sep. 16, 1985 Recommended Order (hearing held , 2013). CASE CLOSED.

Orders for Case No: 85-000410
Issue Date Document Summary
Oct. 08, 1985 Agency Final Order
Sep. 16, 1985 Recommended Order Respondent owes Petitioner the full amount of balance. Petitioner's employee who signed composition agreement had no authority to bind.
Source:  Florida - Division of Administrative Hearings

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