STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
SCHOOL BOARD OF HERNANDO COUNTY, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 87-2001
)
MURIEL KRUEGER, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its duly designated Hearing Officer, William R. Cave, held a formal hearing on July 29 and 30, 1987, in Brooksville, Florida. The issue for determination is whether Respondent is guilty of the charges alleged in Petitioner's Complaint and thereby subject to the penalties imposed pursuant to Section 231.36(4)(c), Florida Statutes,
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Joseph E. Johnston, Jr., Esquire
29 South Brooksville Avenue Brooksville, Florida 34601
For Respondent: Susan E. Hicks, Esquire
Post Office Drawer 520337 Miami, Florida 33152
BACKGROUND
The Petitioner, School Board of Hernando County, at its regular scheduled meeting on August 5, 1986, temporarily suspended the Respondent, Muriel Krueger, without pay, from her position as a classroom teacher on charges of incompetency, gross insubordination, and willful neglect of duty. At the same meeting, Superintendent James K. Austin was instructed by the Petitioner to advise Respondent of its actions. By letter dated August 6, 1986, Austin notified Petitioner of her suspension and that the charges were gross insubordination and incompetency, but did not set forth the facts upon which the charges were based. On August 19, 1986, Austin notified Respondent again of her suspension on charges of incompetency, gross insubordination and willful neglect of duty, and detailed the facts upon which the charges were based. By letter dated August 29, 1986, Respondent's attorney advised Austin that he anticipated the Petitioner filing a formal Administrative Complaint detailing the facts upon which the charges were based. On September 18, 1986 the Petitioner served the Respondent with a formal complaint charging Respondent with incompetency and ineffectiveness as a teacher in violation of Section 231.36, Florida Statutes and Rule 6B-1.06, Florida Administrative Code, renumbered as Rule 6B- 1.006, Florida Administrative Code, and setting forth in detail the facts upon which the charges were based. Petitioner seeks Respondent`s dismissal.
By order dated April 28, 1987, the Petitioner referred this matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the appointment of a hearing officer and the conduct of a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The matter was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on May 8, 1987 and this hearing ensued.
By Order dated June 27, 1987, Respondent's Motion To Strike was partially granted and paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint were stricken, the date "June 30, 1986" in paragraph 11 was deleted and the date "March 12, 1986" was added, and the language "and failed to disclose her true health problems" was deleted from paragraph 18.
In support of its charges the Petitioner presented the testimony of Louise Ross, Edward S. Poore, Sonia Terrelonge, June Carol Randall, Nancy Hurst, Catherine Winemiller, Elizabeth Heidenreich, Cathleen M. Mills, Maria Wolf, Barbara A. Hall, Alicia Morgan and Jane S. Padgett. Petitioner exhibits numbers
1 through 6 were received into evidence with exhibits 5 and 6 being the depositions of Jacqueline Mitchie and Renee Haney, M.D., respectively. Respondent testified on her own behalf and presented the testimony of Barbara A. Hall, Sonia Terrelonge, June Carroll Randall, Cathy Hogeland, Joanne Knight and Diane Vazquez. Respondent's exhibits number 1 through 8 were received into evidence with exhibit 8 being the deposition of Auturo G. Gonzalez, M.D.
The parties submitted posthearing Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. A ruling on each proposed finding of fact has been made as reflected in the Appendix to this Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found:
At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was employed by Petitioner under a continuing contract.
The Respondent, Muriel Johnson Krueger, holds Florida teaching certificate number #0367469 issued by the Florida Department of Education covering grades K through 6. The Respondent is also certified in Florida for administration and supervision, grades K through 12. She also holds a Wisconsin teaching certificate.
The Respondent taught in Wisconsin for a number of years; she taught in a one-room school house, grades 1 through 5. She began teaching in Florida in 1974 at Brooksville Primary School in Hernando County, where she taught first grade for two years. She next taught first grade at Moton School Center (Moton) also in Hernando County, for four years. She received her continuing contract in 1977.
In 1979, the Respondent was appointed primary specialist at Moton; she held that position until August, 1985. As primary specialist, the Respondent was not assigned to a classroom; she worked primarily with teachers and teachers' aides. She was not responsible for drawing up lesson plans, recording grades, or developing pacing schedules, as those procedures are used in the ordinary classroom.
The Respondent received favorable evaluations throughout her career in the Hernando County school system, until January, 1986. However, Respondent has never received an evaluation of her performance which would support her dismissal.
In March, 1985, the Respondent was diagnosed as having certain physical and psychological problems, including diabetes and atypical psychosis. The Respondent's medical conditions, including the details regarding her psychological illness, were reported to the school system by the Respondent's doctors, Dr. Renee Haney, a psychiatrist and Dr. Joanne Pegg- McNab., a psychologist.
In August, 1985, two days prior to the commencement of the school year, the Respondent was notified by the Petitioner that she would be teaching third grade at Spring Hill Elementary School (Spring Hill) during the 1985-86 school year. Previously, the Respondent had been given to understand, based on representations made to her by school administrators, that she would be teaching second grade in 1985-1986. The Respondent had prepared materials for the teaching of second grade, which she was unable to use in teaching third grade.
Louise Ross, principal of Spring Hill, was aware that Respondent had not been a classroom teacher for at least four years prior to Respondent coming to Spring Hill in August, 1985.
Ross was aware of Respondent's treatment for psychological illness.
Prior to the students' return, the Respondent worked one week at Spring Hill. During that period, Respondent attended general meetings, and although Respondent received a packet of material during this period, it did not contain any specific instruction in regard to preparing lesson plans, grading or pacing. Respondent received specific written instruction regarding the recording of grades and pacing at a later date.
Respondent did not receive any specific verbal or written instructions from Ross or any other person respecting the procedures in effect at Spring Hill in regard to grading and pacing until the memorandums of September 24, 1985 and November 19, 1985 from Ross concerning grades and pacing, and the December 16, 1985 letter to Respondent from Ross setting forth Ross' concerns about Respondent's procedures in grading, pacing, and lesson plan preparation that were covered in the meeting between Ross and Respondent on December 16, 1985.
On September 24, 1985, approximately one month after school opened on August 22, 1985, Ross issued a memorandum regarding the number of grades to be recorded for each subject, and the procedure for recording the grades.
On November 19, 1985 Ross issued a memorandum regarding the Ginn Reading Program (pacing student in reading). Both the memorandum and the chart attached pointed out it was a "guide" and that the primary concern was for the student to master the material. There is insufficient evidence to show that Respondent received this memorandum prior to returning to work on December 16, 1985. No documents concerning the pacing in other subjects were issued to Respondent.
Pacing involves setting a pace for the teacher and the student to cover the required material in a set time and yet allow the student to master the subject matter. The failure to properly pace a class usually results in the student requiring remediation in the subject matter.
Although Ross collected and reviewed Respondent's lesson plan books during the beginning of the school year and prior to Respondent going on sick leave in November, 1985, Ross did not make any suggestions or criticisms concerning pacing because when she checked the lesson plan books Ross found them sufficient.
Respondent was aware of the requirement of preparing lesson plans in advance, but at Moton, where she had previously taught, the requirement was to prepare three days of lesson plans in advance, not five days as was required at Spring Hill. Spring Hill required lesson plans to be ready on the Friday immediately prior to week of the lesson plans, but Ross had allowed teachers to prepare lesson plans over the week-end for the following week.
Respondent was absent from school beginning November 20, 1985 through December 16, 1985 on approved sick leave. Respondent failed to prepare lesson plans and leave them for her substitute. Respondent's illness prevented her from preparing lesson plans for the period beginning November 25, 1985 and up until Respondent returned on December 16, 1985. However, the lesson plans for November 20, 21 and 22, 1985 should have been prepared prior to Respondent's illness.
On December 16, 1985, the day Respondent returned from sick leave, Ross held a meeting with Respondent to advise her of certain changes in performance expected by Ross. The expected changes were the result of Ross reviewing Respondent's grade book and determining that the grades were not recorded in accordance with the September 24, 1985 memorandum, and reviewing Respondent's lesson plan books and determining that Respondent's class (an average class) was ahead of the top class in the third grade in reading and math. Respondent was advised of how to effect the changes and that compliance was expected by the beginning of the second semester.
Although Respondent's third grade class was ahead of other third grade classes during the period of school prior to December 16, 1985, the student's mastery of the subject matter covered during this period was within an acceptable range, and remediation was normal. Subsequent to returning to work on December 16, 1987, and up until the Respondent took leave on March 12, 1987, the Respondent's pacing of her students was in accordance with school policy.
Respondent's grade books may have shed some light on whether Respondent had properly recorded the student's grades but the grade books were not introduced into evidence. Prior to taking sick leave on November 20, 1985, the Respondent had, in addition to those grades recorded in her grade, recorded grades on sheets of paper in the back of her grade book contrary to the instructions given in the September 24, 1985 memorandum from Ross. However, Ross permitted the Respondent to record these grades in her grade book at a later time. Without knowing that it was against school policy, Respondent allowed her aides to record grades in her grade book. Subsequent to returning to work on December 16, 1987, and up until she took leave on March 12, 1986, the Respondent's recording of grades in her grade books was in substantial compliance with school policy.
Although Respondent did not totally comply with the December 16, 1985 memorandum from Ross, her compliance with the memorandum satisfied Sonia Terrelonge, the third grade chairperson, who Ross had assigned the duty of
working with Respondent to bring about compliance with the memorandum. Ross did not check Respondent's plan book or grade book on a regular basis as she had indicated in her memorandum of December 16, 1985 but delegated that responsibility to Terrelonge.
On March 7, 1986, Respondent escorted her students to Terrelonge's portable classroom to see a movie and, since Respondent had detention duty, she picked up the students from other third grade classes on detention and returned to her portable classroom. At lunch time Respondent returned the students on detention to Terrelonge's portable classroom and escorted her students to lunch. After lunch Respondent escorted her students back to Terrelonge's portable classroom for the balance of the movie; again picked up the students on detention, and returned to her classroom. At the time scheduled for the conclusion of the movie, Respondent returned to Terrelonge's portable classroom to escort her students back to her classroom. Upon arrival at Terrelonge's classroom, Respondent discovered that her students had left earlier with either Maria Wolf or Catherine Winemiller or Jacqueline Mitchie, the other teachers having students at the movie. Although one of these three (3) teachers would have been responsible for supervising the return of Respondent's students to her classroom since Respondent was on detention duty, there is insufficient evidence to show which one had that responsibility. Upon return to her classroom Respondent observed some of her students outside the classroom unsupervised. Some of the students were running around and some were standing on a railing attempting to rescue a shoe from the roof. Respondent summoned her students into the classroom. None of the students were injured in any way.
After the movie and the shoe incident the Respondent's children were "hyper". To calm them down, Respondent decided to go to the playground rather than to the scheduled special class. Respondent notified the special class teacher of this change but, without knowledge that she was required to notify Ross, failed to notify Ross of this change. This was the only special class the Respondent's student's missed while under her care during the 1985-86 school year. Other teachers took their students out on unscheduled recess when the children would not settle down. The evidence does not reveal any written policy concerning unscheduled recesses.
Respondent kept blank discipline slips and omni passes in an unlocked desk drawer, and that students had on occasions filled out these slips without Respondent's knowledge. There was insufficient evidence to show that the children were under Respondent's supervision at the time the slips were taken out of the drawer and filled out.
There were a number of disruptive and behavioral problem students in Respondent's class, but the number of disruptive or behavioral problem children in Respondent's class was not shown to be greater than in any other average third grade class.
During the 1985-86 school year, Ross made frequent, unscheduled visits to Respondent's classroom and found Respondent's performance, including her classroom management, satisfactory, except on one (1) occasion, March 12, 1986.
As a result of the shoe incident and skipping the special class, Ross called Respondent to a meeting on March 7, 1986 with Edward Poore, Assistant Superintendent, and Cathy Hogeland, Union Representative being present along with Ross and Respondent. As a result of this meeting, Ross advised Respondent to take the rest of that day off, which was Friday, and March 10, 1986 which was Monday. Respondent complied and returned to work on Tuesday, March 11, 1986.
On March 11, 1986, the day Ross returned to school her students went on a field trip but Respondent was not allowed to accompany them. During the day Respondent worked on grading, grade books and planning.
Also, on March 11, 1986, Ross gave Respondent a handwritten memorandum instructing her in class management, specifically addressing the supervision of students, class discipline, the following of lesson plans and attendance of students at special classes. Additionally, the memorandum instructed Respondent that teachers were not to eat lunch in the classroom and listed those areas where Respondent could eat lunch.
On March 12, 1986, around noon, Respondent met with Ross, with Joanne Knight, being present as Union Representative. This meeting occurred as a result of Ross visiting Respondent's classroom and finding the students particularly disruptive and disorderly. When Respondent indicated that she could resume teaching her class that afternoon, Ross informed Respondent that she must take a leave of absence and have a complete physical examination and psychological evaluation or Ross would recommend her termination to the school board. Respondent was also informed by letter from Ross dated April 8, 1986 that her return to work would be based on the psychologist's report which should be submitted no later than May 31, 1986. Due to Ross' demands, Respondent requested leave and signed the necessary papers which had been filled out by the school board office. Respondent was put on leave without pay for the balance of the school year.
Respondent resumed seeing Dr. Haney in April, 1986 but due to Dr. Haney's, or Respondent's oversight, an evaluation was not submitted until July 30, 1986. However, on July 1, 1986, Ross had recommended Respondent's dismissal to the superintendent based solely on Respondent's failure to provide the evaluation by May 31, 1986 without any further notice to Respondent other than the letter of April 8, 1986. Respondent learned of Ross's recommendation of dismissal sometime around July 16, 1986 when Ross notified her by letter. The letter also informed Respondent that this recommendation would go to the school board on August 5 1986.
During Dr. Haney's treatment of Respondent in 1986, she prescribed medication for her mental condition which had no detrimental side effects on the Respondent.
Dr. Haney's report of July 30, 1986 made no recommendation as to Respondent's ability to return to the classroom but left to the school system the interpretation of her findings.
Dr. Arturo G. Gonzalez, Respondent's treating psychiatrist, began treating Respondent in October, 1986. Dr. Gonzalez's opinion was that while Respondent does have a mental condition, it is treatable with medication and does not affect Respondent's ability to teach. Dr. Gonzalez prescribes the same medication for Respondent as did Dr. Haney. From his observations, the Respondent takes the medication as prescribed. It was also Dr. Gonzalez's opinion that Respondent understands the need for medication. It was the opinion of Dr. Haney that Respondent better understood the need for medication after her second hospitalization in April 1986 then she had after the first hospitalization in 1985.
It was the opinion of both Dr. Haney and Dr. Gonzalez that Respondent's mental condition would not prevent her from being effective in the classroom and that her presence as a teacher would not endanger the welfare of the students.
Respondent was a concerned teacher, interested in her student's welfare.
There is insufficient competent evidence in the record to show that Respondent had emotional outbursts in the presence of her students.
There is insufficient competent evidence in the record to show that, due to Respondent's action, the students in her third grade class were deprived of minimum education experiences.
Respondent substantially performed her duties as prescribed by law.
There is insufficient competent evidence in the record to show that there was a constant or continuing intentional refusal on the part of Respondent to obey a direct order given by proper authority.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to, and the subject matter of, this proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
The alleged misconduct of which Respondent is accused purportedly violates Section 231.36(4)(c), Florida Statutes, and in pertinent part is quoted below:
Any member of the district
administrative or supervisory staff and any member of the instructional staff, including any principal, who is under continuing contract may be suspended or dismissed at any time during the school year; however, the charges against him must be based on...incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty...whenever such charges are made against any such employee of the school board, the school board may suspend such person without pay; but, if the charges are not sustained, he shall be immediately reinstated, and his back salary shall be paid....
Although the term "incompetency, gross insubordination and willful neglect" are not statutorily defined, they have been given meaning by Rule 6A- 4.009(1) and (4) Florida Administrative Code and in pertinent part is quoted below:
Incompetency is defined as inability or lack of fitness to discharge the required duty as a result of inefficiency or incapacity....
Inefficiency: (1) repeated
failure to perform duties prescribed by law
(Section 231.09, Florida Statutes); (2) repeated failure on the part of a teacher to communicate with and relate to children in the classroom, to such an extent that pupils
are deprived of minimum education experiences....
Incapacity: (1) lack of emotional stability; (2) lack of adequate physical ability; (3) lack of general educational background; or (4) lack of adequate command of his or her area of specialization.
* * *
(4) Gross insubordination or willful neglect of duties is defined as a constant or continuing intentional refusal to obey a direct order, reasonable in nature, and given by and with proper authority.
In addition to incompetency, the administrative complaint charges the Respondent with ineffectiveness as a teacher and for violation of Rule 6B-1.006, Florida Administrative Code, remembered as Rule 6B-1.006, Florida Administrative Code. However, ineffectiveness as a teacher is not one of the statutory charges enumerated in Section 231.36(4)(c), Florida Statutes, upon which the local school board may base its dismissal of a teacher under a continuing contract with that school board. Apparently, the Petitioner has confused its statutory authority to dismiss a teacher under a continuing contract with its statutory authority to dismiss a teacher on a professional service contract granted under Section 231.36(6)(a), Florida Statutes or with the statutory authority of the Education Practices Commission to revoke, suspend or otherwise discipline a teacher's certificate granted under Section 231.28, Florida Statutes, specifically Section 231.28(1)(f), Florida Statutes. Likewise, the local school board has no authority to dismiss a teacher on a continuing contract based on a violation of Rule 6B- 1.006, Florida Administrative Code unless such violation would support one of the charges enumerated in Section 23l.36(4)(c), Florida Statutes.
The burden of proof is on the party asserting the affirmative of an issue before an administrative tribunal. Florida Department of Transportation
v. J.W.C. Company, Inc., 396 So.32d 778 (2 DCA Fla. 1981). Petitioner has failed to meet its burden of proof that Respondent was guilty of incompetency, gross insubordination or willful neglect.
Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore
RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, School Board of Hernando County, enter a Final Order dismissing all charges filed against the Respondent, Muriel Krueger. It is further RECOMMENDED Respondent be restored to her position as a continuing contract employee of the Hernando County School Board, and that she receive back pay for the entire period she has been in a non-pay status because of these charges.
Respectfully submitted and entered this 14th day of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
WILLIAM R. CAVE
Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building
2009 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 1987.
APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2001
The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case.
Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner
Adopted in Findings of Fact 1 and 2.
Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 4, and 7.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 10 as clarified.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 16 as clarified.
Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 17 as clarified.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 17 as clarified.
Adopted in Findings of Fact 11 and 12 as clarified.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 20 as clarified.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 20.
11-13. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. There was conflicting testimony in this regard but the more credible evidence was contrary to the facts set forth in paragraphs 11,
12 and 13.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 14.
Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. There was conflicting testimony in this regard but the more credible evidence was contrary to the facts set forth in paragraph 15.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 23 except for the last clause which is rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record.
17-19. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. There was conflicting testimony in this regard but the more credible evidence was contrary to the facts set forth in paragraphs 17,
18 and 19.
Rejected as not supported by substantial
competent evidence in the record, except for the one occasion on March 12, 1986 which would not be described as a chaotic condition.
That classroom management was discussed with Respondent is adopted in Findings of Fact 27 and 29.
Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record.
That students took discipline slips and filled them out is adopted in Finding of Fact 24, the balance of paragraph 23 is rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record.
24-27. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. There was conflicting testimony in this regard but the more credible evidence was contrary to the facts set forth in paragraphs 24, 25, 26, and 27.
Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 31, 32, 33 and 34.
Rejected as not being relevant or material.
Rejected as not being relevant or material because that was Dr. Haney's provisional diagnosis which was changed when she made her final diagnosis.
The first sentence of paragraph 31 is adopted in Findings of Fact 3 and 4. The balance of paragraph 31 is rejected as not being relevant or material in that although Respondent admitted being acquainted with those school board policies there was credible evidence that Respondent was not aware at the beginning of the school year of Ross' or the Superintendent's specific instruction in regard to maintaining attendance records, grade books, etc.
Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent
Adopted in Finding of Fact 2.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 3.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 4.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 5.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 6.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 7.
Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, 10 and 11.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 9 but clarified.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 12.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 15.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 26.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 17 but clarified.
Rejected as not being relevant or material.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 19 but clarified.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 20.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 18.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 21.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 13.
Adopted in Findings of Fact 20 and 21.
20.-21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22 as clarified.
Rejected as not being a finding of fact but only a restatement of testimony.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 24.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. 25.-26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 25 but clarified.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 27 but clarified.
Adopted in Findings of Fact 28 and 29.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 30.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 30 but clarified.
Adopted in Findings of Fact 31 and 32.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 31.
Adopted in Findings of Fact 31 and 33.
Adopted in Findings of Fact 34 and 35 but clarified.
Rejected as not being relevant or material.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 36.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 37 but clarified.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 35 but clarified.
Adopted in Finding of Fact 5.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Joseph E. Johnston, Jr., Esquire
29 South Brooksville Avenue Brooksville, Florida 34601
Susan E. Hicks, Esquire Post Office Drawer 520337 Miami, Florida 33152
Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32300
James K. Austin, Ed.D. Superintendent of Schools Hernando County
919 U.S. Highway 41 North
Brooksville, Florida 33512-2997
Issue Date | Proceedings |
---|---|
Oct. 14, 1987 | Recommended Order (hearing held , 2013). CASE CLOSED. |
Issue Date | Document | Summary |
---|---|---|
Sep. 11, 1990 | Agency Final Order | |
Oct. 14, 1987 | Recommended Order | Insufficient evidence to show incompetence, gross insubordination or willful neglect. |
HERNANDO COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs. LINDA ALEXSUK, 87-002001 (1987)
THOMAS E. DEEN vs. HERNANDO COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 87-002001 (1987)
HERNANDO COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs MICHAEL ELLISON, 87-002001 (1987)
RALPH D. TURLINGTON, COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION vs. THOMAS B. FERRIS, 87-002001 (1987)
BROWARD COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs. V. R. SULCER, 87-002001 (1987)