Judges: DIANE K. KIESLING
Agency: Office of the Governor
Latest Update: Jun. 16, 1989
Summary: Standing to bring appeal ini Development of Regional Impact modification case is limited by 380.37(2).
89-2643STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
JOHN WARREN, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 89-2643
) CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG and TAMPA ) BAY REGIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL, )
)
Respondents, )
and )
) DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, )
)
Intervenor. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in this case on May 25, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida, before the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its designated Hearing Officer, Diane K. Kiesling. At issue were the Motion to Intervene filed by the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) and the Amended Motion to Dismiss filed by the City of St. Petersburg (City) and joined in by the Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council (TBRPC).
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Peter B. Belmont
Attorney at Law
511 31st Avenue North
St. Petersburg, Florida 33704
For Respondent: Michael S. Davis (City) Mirelle Murphy James
Mark A. Winn Attorneys at Law Post Office Box 2842
St. Petersburg, Florida 33731
For Respondent: Roger S. Tucker (TBRPC) Attorney at Law
Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council
Suite 209
9455 Roger Boulevard
St. Petersburg, Florida 33702
For Intervenor: Jeffrey N. Steinsnyder (DCA) Attorney at Law
Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive
Suite 138
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Petitioner, John Warren, filed a Petition on Appeal with the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission on March 20, 1989, seeking to challenge a development order of the City of St. Petersburg. Respondent City filed an Answer, Motion to Dismiss, and Memorandum of Law on April 5, 1989, and a Pre- hearing Statement on April 17, 1989. Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council filed a Motion to Intervene on April 18, 1989. Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and Pre-hearing Statement were both filed on April 19, 1989. Department of Community Affairs filed a Motion to Intervene on April 28, 1989. The City filed an Amended Motion to Dismiss dated May 2, 1989. By Order of Transmittal dated May 11, 1989, the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC) referred the Amended Motion to Dismiss and Department of Community Affair's Motion to Intervene to the Division of Administrative Hearings, along with further direction that a hearing pursuant to Chapter 120.57 be held if the Motion to Dismiss was denied.
The Motion to Intervene filed by Department of Community Affairs was granted during the May 25, 1989, hearing. That hearing was a full evidentiary hearing on the Amended Motion to Dismiss. Respondents presents Exhibits A-T which were admitted in evidence. Petitioner had Exhibits 1 and 2 admitted in evidence. The transcript of the hearing was filed on May 30, 1989.
FINDINGS OF FACT
In 1987 the City of St. Petersburg sought permission to file an application for an Areawide Development of Regional Impact (DRI) for the Intown Area.
On July 23, 1987, notice was sent to each property owner within the proposed Areawide DRI. The notice indicates that a public hearing would be held on August 27, 1987, from which the St. Petersburg City Council would decide whether to authorize the City of St. Petersburg to proceed to apply for the DRI.
Petitioner, John Warren, received said notice and owns property within the area encompassing the Areawide DRI.
Further notices were provided to property owners within the area, including a notice of the petition filed by the City which was published in the St. Petersburg Times on July 27, 1987; a notice to property owners dated September 1, 1987, advising that the City was authorized to proceed with the Intown Areawide DRI; and three other notices regarding public hearings and consideration of the DRI.
After all required notice, the St. Petersburg City Council considered the proposed Areawide DRI on December 15, 1988, and formally adopted the DRI by Ordinance No. 1072-F. The ordinance was signed on December 15, 1988.
A Notice of Adoption of a Development Order was executed and recorded in the public records on December 20, 1988.
The development order enacted on December 15, 1988, was transmitted to the Department of Community Affairs and the Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council on December 19, 1988, and to the City Clerk on December 20, 1988.
A certified copy of the DRI Ordinance 1072-F as enacted on December 15, 1988, is a part of the record as Exhibit K and it is incorporated by reference.
Thereafter the Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council appealed the DRI pursuant to Section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes, to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission.
The City and Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council reached an agreement for settling the appeal and said settlement was finalized in the Stipulated Settlement Agreement.
Pursuant to the Stipulated Settlement Agreement, the St. Petersburg City Council, at its February 2, 1989, meeting, adopted the terms of the Settlement Agreement, modified Ordinance 1072-F to incorporate the settlement terms, and adopted Ordinance 1072-F as modified.
Based upon the settlement and modification of the DRI by the St. Petersburg City Council, on February 7, 1989, the Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of its appeal to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission.
The Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission entered a Final Order of Dismissal on February 20, 1989.
Warren filed his Petition on Appeal on March 20, 1989. The Petition is filed pursuant to Sections 380.06(25)(h) and 380.07, Florida Statutes, and Rule 42-2.002, Florida Administrative Code.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding. Section 120.57(1) and 380.07(3), Florida Statutes.
The amended Motion to Dismiss, filed by the City and joined in by Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council and Department of Community Affairs, raised four grounds for dismissal of this Petition
The appeal is untimely.
The appeal is an impermissible collateral attack of a Final Order.
There are no appeal rights to a modification of a DRI that is not a substantial deviation.
Petitioner lacks standing.
Standing
While any hearing conducted pursuant to Section 380.07 is to be conducted in accordance with Chapter 120, standing to bring such appeals is established by Section 380.07(2). Caloosa Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners et al., 429 So.2d 1260, 1265
(Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Hence, substantially affected persons, as that term is used in Chapter 120, do not have standing to initiate an appeal under 380.07(2), and in fact, to permit such a broad standing test would contravene the requirements of Section 380.07(2). Id at 1265.
Section 380.07(2) is very explicit in specifying those persons with standing to bring an appeal in DRI cases. The appellate courts of this state have been consistent in interpreting that section to limit standing to the owner, the developer, an appropriate regional planning agency, or the state land planning agency. Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Monroe County, 456 So.2d 904, (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Londono v. City of Alachua, 438 So.2d 91 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); and Caloosa, supra.
The term "owner" is not defined in Section 380.07(2), but has been construed to mean the owner of the property that is the subject of DRI review. Caloosa, supra. at 1264. It was recognized by the court in Caloosa that in enacting the statute and defining those with standing, the legislature "did not refer to `an owner' or to `any property affected by such order.'" The use of the term "the owner" is meant "to specify the narrow class of property owners entitled under section 380.07(2) to appeal a development order." Id. at 1264.
The court in Friends of the Everglades at p. 911 summed it up best when it said:
Chapter 380 provides for notice and hearing at the local level and then provides for review by the FLWAC if the developer or property owner believes local authorities have acted improvidently in denying an application for development approval, or if the regional or state planning agencies believe that the public's interests will not be served by the local government's approval of a plan for development. Because it is within the legislature's prerogative to provide procedures to be followed when the rights of property owners are to be affected by governmental action, and to provide for review of such action, we cannot conclude that the limitation of standing to appeal development orders to FLWAC to, on the one hand, property owners directly affected and, on the other hand, to agencies designated to represent the public's interest in such proceedings violates due process concepts.
It is recognized that this case arises from an Areawide Development of Regional Impact as specified in Section 380.06(25). Certain rights are specifically given to owners of property within the defined planning area when an Areawide Development of Regional Impact is proposed. These rights include certain notice requirements and the right to be heard at public hearings. However, by reading Sections 380.06(25) and 380.07(2) in pari materia, the conclusion is in escapable that owners of property within an Areawide Development of Regional Impact, which property is not the direct subject of the development order, are not the owners referred to in Section 380.07(2) who have standing to appeal the development order.
The DRI process is recognized in Caloosa as being "primarily a comprehensive land use review technique for large scale development involving primarily two groups -- developers on one hand, and on the other, governmental planners and permitting authorities." Most cases involve a developer who is also the owner of the property proposed for development. There are also those development proposals which relate to areas not solely owned by one developer or areas designated for DRI review which contain property not proposed for new development. Londono, supra., involved just such a case.
In Londono, individual owners of lots, which they recently purchased in a residential development, sought to appeal a subsequent development order which encompassed, in part, the property of the individual owners; however, no new development was proposed for their individual lots. The Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission dismissed the appeals of these individual land owners. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed this dismissal and, in doing so, further clarified the concept of owner as it relates to Section 380.07(2) appeals.
The court, at page 93, narrowed "the class of potential appellants under Section 380.07(2) ... to disqualify `owners' of land included in the DRI for purposes other than for development." While owners of property within the area encompassed by a development order "may well be affected in the enjoyment of their properties by the presence around them of a development of regional impact ...," they "have no statutory standing to complain to the Commission [FLWAC] that [the] development order insufficiently protects regional interests; that function is reserved ... to the designated governmental bodies whose responsibility it is to protect those regional interests." Londono at p. 93.
In applying the Londono holding to this case, it must be concluded that Warren is not an owner with standing to appeal a development order pursuant to Section 380.07(2). The petition should be dismissed.
Timeliness
Even if Warren had standing, his appeal is untimely and should be dismissed for that reason. The facts are clear that the development order, Ordinance 1072-F, was entered on December 15, 1988. A timely appeal was brought by Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council. That appeal was settled and the settlement resulted in modification to Ordinance 1072-F. The appeal was then voluntarily dismissed by Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council and a Final Order was entered by the Florida Land and Water Adjudication Commission.
Without belaboring the facts, it is clear that the development order, Ordinance 1072-F, was signed on December 15, 1988. Under Section 380.07(2), an appeal of a development order must be filed "[w]ithin 45 days after the order is rendered." An order is rendered "for purposes of the time for filing a notice of appeal when the development order is `issued and transmitted.' Windley Key, Ltd. v. State of Florida, Department of Community Affairs, 456 So.2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)." Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. State Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, 464 So.2d 1361, 1362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). The development order is "`rendered' for purposes of the time for filing a notice of appeal when a signed development order is issued and transmitted." Id at 1362. The facts in this case make it clear that a signed development order was issued and transmitted on December 19, 1988. Any right to appeal began to run on this date. Petitioner Warren filed his Petition on Appeal on March 20, 1989. Hence, the appeal is untimely and should also be dismissed for this reason.
Remaining Grounds for Dismissal
The other two grounds raised in the Amended Motion to Dismiss are not considered herein and no Conclusions of Law are reached thereon. It is unnecessary to reach these two grounds since the Petition on Appeal must be dismissed for the reasons set forth above.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a Final Order granting the Amended Motion to Dismiss and dismissing the Petition on Appeal filed by John Warren.
DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of June, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida.
DIANE K. KIESLING
Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1989.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Peter B. Belmont Patty Woodworth, Secretary
Attorney at Law Planning and Budgeting
511 31st Avenue North Executive Office of the Governor St. Petersburg, Florida 33704 The Capitol, PL-05
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
Michael S. Davis
Mirelle Murphy James Honorable Bob Martinez
Mark A. Winn Governor, State of Florida
Attorneys at Law The Capitol
Post Office Box 2842 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731
Honorable Robert A. Butterworth
Roger S. Tucker Attorney General
Attorney at Law State of Florida Tampa Bay Regional Planning The Capitol
Council Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Suite 209
9455 Koger Boulevard Honorable Doyle Conner
St. Petersburg, Florida 33702 Commissioner of Agriculture
State of Florida
Jeffrey N. Steinsnyder The Capitol
Attorney at Law Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Department of Community Affairs
2740 Centerview Drive Honorable Betty Castor
Suite 138 Commissioner of Education Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 State of Florida
The Capitol
James C. Vaughn, Jr. Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Governmental Analyst
Florida Land and Water Honorable Jim Smith Adjudicatory Commission Secretary of State
The Capitol State of Florida Tallahassee, Florida 32399 The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
Honorable Tom Gallagher
Treasurer and Insurance Honorable Gerald Lewis Commissioner Comptroller, State of Florida
State of Florida The Capitol
The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
=================================================================
AGENCY FINAL ORDER
=================================================================
STATE OF FLORIDA
LAND AND WATER ADJUDICATORY COMMISSION
JOHN WARREN,
Petitioner
vs.
CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG and TAMPA CASE NO. 89-16 BAY REGIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL, DOAH CASE NO. 89-2643
Respondents,
and
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS,
Intervenor.
/
FINAL ORDER
This cause came before the Governor and Cabinet of the State of Florida, sitting as the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission ("the Commission"), on August 8, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida, pursuant to sections
and 380.07, Florida Statutes, for consideration of a Recommended Order from the Division of Administrative Hearings entered on June 16, 1989 ("the Recommended Order"), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit A, and exceptions filed subsequent thereto. Based upon the Commission's review of this cause, it is hereby ordered:
The Commission adopts and incorporates in this Order the Findings of Fact set out in paragraphs 1 through 14 of the Recommended Order.
The Commission adopts and incorporates in this Order the Conclusions of Law set forth on pages 5 through 8 under the heading of "Standing" to the extent explained in Section 3 of this Order.
The Commission adopts and incorporates in this Order the Conclusions of Law set forth on pages 9 through 10 under the heading of "Timeliness" to the extent that the Commission finds section 380.07(2), Florida Statutes requires that an appeal of a development order must be filed "within 45 days after the order is rendered" and that an order is rendered "for purposes of the time for filing a notice of appeal when a signed development order is issued and transmitted." Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. State Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, 464 So.2d 1361, 1362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). The Commission also finds that "the facts in this case make it clear that a signed development order was issued and transmitted on December 19, 1988. Any rights to appeal began to run on this date." However, this Commission also finds, that a party, under certain circumstances, may properly take an appeal of a
modification or settlement of a development order. The circumstances allowing such an appeal would only be when the subject of the modification to the development order or settlement of the appeal raises new or additional issues of concern to the statutorily-entitled party seeking to challenge the order at that point.
Rulings on Warren's Exceptions to the Findings of Fact
The Petitioner Warren's first exception is denied. Warren challenges in this first exception those findings set forth in paragraph 4 of the recommended order. Specifically, Warren excepts to the finding that he received the statutory notice required under Chapter 380 from the City of St. Petersburg, the developer of the development order subject of this appeal, prior to rendering the subject development order. Warren further excepts to the extent that any notice actually received by the Petitioner failed to advise Petitioner "as to the proposed conditions of the development order, as to any hearing times regarding the proposed development order, not as to the rights of appeal for property owners within the boundaries of the areawide development of regional impact." The Commission finds the hearing officer's finding in paragraph 4 was appropriately derived from the evidence presented. Certified copies of all notice requirements, as met by the city in compliance with Chapter 380, were admitted into evidence by the hearing officer at the hearing held on May 25, 1989 without objection by the Petitioner. (See R. 45-50). No testimony was thereafter offered by the Petitioner to rebut that the notices were either statutorily defective or not received.
Section 120.57(1)(b)(10) provides in pertinent part:
The agency in its final order may reject or modify
the conclusions of law and interpretation of administrative rules in the recommended order, but may not reject
or modify the findings of fact unless the agency first determines from a review of the complete record, that the findings of fact were not in the order, that the
findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply with the essential requirements of law.
Further, as stated by the court in Florida Department of Corrections v.
Bradley, 510 So.2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987):
The fact findings of a Hearing Officer become binding upon an agency unless it finds they are not supported
by competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply with
the essential requirements of law.
Petitioner's second exception is denied. Petitioner challenges the hearing officer's finding that the city complied with the statutory notice requirements of Chapter 380. A review of the transcript of the May 25 hearing reveals that the hearing officer allowed into evidence the proof submitted by the city of their compliance with the above notice requirements without objection by the Petitioner.
The Commission, therefore, finds paragraph 5 of the hearing officer's recommended order to be based on competent substantial evidence. The Petitioner may not fail to voice objections to the admission of this evidence, then claim prejudice when the recommendation of the hearing officer adversely affects him. See Allstate Insurance Company v. Gillesoie, 455 So.2d 617 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1984).
The Commission's ruling as to Petitioner's exception concerning his statutory construction of section 380.07, Florida Statutes is set forth in relation to Petitioner's fourth exception. All other aspects of Petitioner's second exception are beyond the scope of this appeal and are being presented for the first time in this appeal process in Petitioner's exceptions; therefore, they will not be considered by this Commission.
Rulings on Warren's Exceptions to Conclusions of Law
Petitioner's third exception is denied. Warren excepts to the hearing officer's specific conclusion that he is not an "affected property owner as that term is defined in Londono v. City of Alachua, 438 So.2d 91 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) and thus lacks standing to bring the instant appeal pursuant to section 380.07(2). The hearing officer reached this conclusion despite the fact that Warren does, in fact, own property within the area being encompassed by the
area-wide development order. However, it is important to note that Warren's appeal does not challenge, as is explained below, any issues directly affecting his property. Instead, Warren has challenged certain issues raised by a modification to the development order which was the result of the settlement of an appeal brought by the Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council. Because Warren did not file his appeal within the 45 day time period following the date that the original development order was rendered and, therefore, could not challenge that order, he has now filed a petition challenging "activities authorized by the St. Petersburg DRI development order (which will result in increased concentrations of stormwater pollution, the loss of historical or archaeological resources of state or regional significance, increased traffic, and increased burdens to the St. Petersburg taxpayer", which are additional issues raised by the modification. Historic preservation requirements, however, was not an issue challenged by the TBRPC in its appeal but is a subject of the original development order.
It is also important to note that not only are the above, as framed, not concerns directly affecting Warren's property and Warren himself as owner of that property, but his petition serves as an attempt to usurp the role of the state and regional planning agencies in addressing areas of regional and state concern as part of the DRI review process. Warren, as a property owner and even as an "affected" property owner, lacks standing to challenge these Issues as raised in his appeal, Londono at page 93. As stated, the issues as raised in Warren's petition do not relate to the impact of the subject development order on his property. Warren even states in his petition that the city's historic preservation requirements are not strict enough and that property around him needs preservation for historical reasons. His petition also focuses concern on state and local guidelines as not strict enough in regulating stormwater, not that the stormwater requirements present too harsh a burden on his property. As far as traffic improvements are concerned, he alleges that the city has not provided funding for the improvements as slated in the modification to the development order, clearly a concern for the governmental agencies involved.
Petitioner's exception asserts, however, that "(A) party having standing to maintain an appeal is not limited as to the issues which may be raised on
appeal." Had Warren filed a petition within the 45 days after the development order was rendered (the hearing officer determined this date to be December 19, 1988; Warren's petition was not filed until March 17, 1989), he may have had standing to challenge all aspects of the original development order which directly affected his property and himself as an owner of that property (as stated, Warren's timely appeal of the modifications to the development order must be limited to those new and additional issues raised by the modification). He did not. But, in any event, he does not have standing to challenge the above. "It is not the purpose of Chapter 380 to provide a forum for parties whose complaint focus on alleged detriment to the activities they wish to conduct on adjoining land. `Regional impact' is concerned with matters affecting the public in general, not special interests of adjoining landowners
... such special interests are properly asserted before the local governing body having jurisdiction to control land use and development under zoning and building regulation." Caloosa Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners, 429 So.2d 1260, 1264, (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). See also Suwannee River Area Council Boy Scouts of America v. State of Florida et al, 384 So.2d 1369 (Fla. 1st DC 1980).
Also, as cited by the hearing officer, "It was recognized by the court in (Caloosa supra) that in enacting the statute and defining those with standing, the legislature `did not refer to `an owner' or to `any' property affected by such order.` The use of the term `owner' is `meant to specify the narrow class of property owners entitled under section 380.07(2), to appeal a development order.'" If Warren were to maintain an appeal, he is limited in his challenge to those aspects of the development order as modified in the settlement agreement between the City of St. Petersburg and the TBRPC which raise new and additional issues from the original development order and must demonstrate how these issues directly affect him. The Petition filed before this Commission by Warren does not meet that standard. He also cannot, at this point in time, attempt to raise in his exceptions those aspects of the original development order which may directly affect him, i.e., "(A)lthough other land use and zoning restrictions may permit certain development, if the use limitations set forth in the development order have been fulfilled then the desired development may not proceed" (See Petitioner's Exceptions at page 6). These issues are not only outside the scope of the modification to the development order and were not properly presented to the hearing officer, but Petitioner is foreclosed by virtue of Rule 42-2.008(4), Florida Administrative Code from raising any new issues at this stage in the proceeding. To do so would contravene the purpose of Chapter 380 which is to bring an efficient and expeditious review of all disputes appealed under its provisions:
Appellees suggest that while Chapter 380 is intended to facilitate uniform regulation and orderly growth, limited standing under section 380.07(2) avoids
administrative and judicial delay in resolving landowners' development rights and also represents a factor in
the legislative balance between public and private rights. This is a legitimate governmental objective. To allow various other parties to appeal a development order could delay one's rights to proceed with a development project approved by local authorities and reviewed by regional officials. Caloosa at page 1266.
In addition, Petitioner stresses that the cases cited by the hearing officer in her recommended order have "limited applicability to the present case because none of the cases relied upon by the hearing officer involved a local
government sponsored areawide development of regional impact." This Commission disagrees. "Section 380.021, Florida Statutes, unequivocally provides that the procedures set forth in Chapter 380 are for the purpose of preserving our state's natural resources, as well as to `facilitate orderly and well-planned development' through state-established growth management techniques. Implicit in this statement of legislative purpose and review procedures in Chapter 380 is the view that the DRI review process is primarily a comprehensive land use review technique for large scale development..." Caloosa, at page 1264. These concerns remain constant regardless of whether development proceeds under section 380.06(6) or 380.06(25). Case law cited in this proceeding focuses on these concerns and is, therefore, equally applicable to the present case.
Petitioner's fourth exception is denied. Petitioner Warren excepts to the hearing officer's conclusion that his appeal was not timely filed. The Commission agrees that Warren's appeal was not timely filed so as to allow a broad challenge of the subject development order. However, had Warren established his standing to challenge the amended development order, his appeal would be considered timely. But, as determined above, this Commission does not believe that Warren made such a showing. All other aspects of Petitioner's exception go to a broad-based appeal, which, as has been stated, Petitioner is now precluded from arguing.
For the reasons stated above in sections 3 and 4, Petitioner's fifth exception is denied.
DONE AND ENTERED, this 30th day of August, 1989.
PATRICIA A. WOODWDRTH
Secretary
Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission
COPIES FURNISHED:
Members of The Commission Parties of Record
Honorable Bob Martinez Circle K. Corporation.
Governor of Florida 500 S. Faulkenberg Road
The Capitol, PL05 Tampa, FL 33619 Tallahassee, FL 32399
Honorable Gerald Lewis William B. Spottswood, Esquire
Comptroller Spottswood, Spottswood, et al.
The Capitol 500 Fleming Street
Tallahassee, FL 32399 Key West, FL 33040
Honorable Bob Butterworth Michele Russell, Esquire Attorney General Assistant General Counsel
The Capitol The Capitol, Room 209
Tallahassee, FL 32399 Tallahassee, FL 32399
Honorable Betty Castor Honorable Michael Puto Commissioner of Education Mayor, Monroe County The Capitol 310 Fleming Street
Tallahassee, FL 32399 Key West, FL 33040
Honorable Tom Gallagher Jack Osterholt, Exec. Director Treasurer South Florida Regional
The Capitol Planning Council
Tallahassee, FL 32399 3400 Hollywood Blvd.,
Suite 140
Hollywood, FL 33021
Honorable Jim Smith Randy Ludacer, Esquire
Secretary of State Monroe County Attorney
The Capitol 310 Fleming Street
Tallahassee, FL 32399 Key West, FL 33040
Honorable Doyle Conner William J. Kendrick Commissioner of Agriculture Hearing Officer
The Capitol Division of Administrative
Tallahassee, FL 32399 Hearings
The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway
John M. Carlson, Esquire Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 David L. Jordan, Esquire
Department of Community Affairs Kenneth A. Jones, Esquire 2740 Centerview Drive 2000 Main Street, Suite 401
Tallahassee, FL 32399 Barnett Centre
Fort Myers, FL 33901
Florida Administrative Law Diane K. Kiesling Report Hearing Officer
Post Office Box 2309 Division of Administrative
Gainesville, FL 32602 Hearings
The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
David L. Jordan, Esquire Roger S. Tucker, Esquire Department of Community Linda M. Hallas, Esquire
Affairs 9455 Koger Boulevard
2740 Centerview Drive Suite 209
Suite 138 St. Petersburg, FL 33702
Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100
Honorable Bob Martinez Diane K. Kiesling, Hearing
Governor of Florida Officer
The Capitol, PL05 The DeSoto Building
Tallahassee, FL 32399 1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
Honorable Gerald Lewis David L. Jordan, Esquire
Comptroller Department of Community Affairs
The Capitol 2740 Centerview Drive
Tallahassee, FL 32399 Suite 138
Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100
Honorable Bob Butterworth Michele Russell, Esquire Attorney General Assistant General Counsel
The Capitol The Capitol, Room 209
Tallahassee, FL 32399 Tallahassee, FL 32399
Honorable Betty Castor Roger S. Tucker, Esquire Commissioner of Education Linda M. Hallas, Esquire The Capitol 9455 Koger Blvd., Suite 209
Tallahassee, FL 32399 St. Petersburg, FL 33702
Honorable Tom Gallagher Peter B. Belmont, Esquire
Treasurer 511 31st Avenue, North
The Capitol St. Petersburg, FL 33704 Tallahassee, FL 32399
Honorable Jim Smith Michael S. Davis, Esquire
Secretary of State Mirelle M. James, Esquire
The Capitol Mark A. Winn, Esquire
Tallahassee, FL 32399 City Attorney's Office Post Office Box 2842
St. Petersburg, FL 33731
Honorable Doyle Conner Julia Greene, Executive Commissioner of Agriculture Director
The Capitol Tampa Bay Regional Planning
Tallahassee, FL 32399 Council
9455 Koger Blvd., Suite 219 St. Petersburg, FL 33702
Florida Administrative Law Report
Post Office Box 2309 Gainesville, FL 32602
Peter B. Belmont, Esquire Michael S. Davis, Esquire
511 31st Avenue, North Mirelle M. James, Esquire St. Petersburg, FL 33704 Mark A. Winn, Esquire
City Attorney's Office Post Office Box 2842
St. Petersburg, FL 33731
Julia Greene, Executive Director Tampa Bay Regional Planning
Council
9455 Koger Boulevard, Suite 219 St. Petersburg, Florida 33702
Docket for Case No: 89-002643
Orders for Case No: 89-002643
| Issue Date |
Document |
Summary |
|
Aug. 30, 1989 |
Agency Final Order
|
|
|
Jun. 16, 1989 |
Recommended Order
|
Standing to bring appeal ini Development of Regional Impact modification case is limited by 380.37(2).
|
