The Issue The issue presented for consideration herein concerns the standing of Petitioners to challenge the development order entered by the City of Alachua, Florida, granting DPI approval to Turkey Creek, Inc. That order dates from June 15, 1982. In particular, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Respondent Turkey Creek asserts that Petitioners are not members of the class of individuals delineated in Subsection 380.07(2), Florida Statutes, who would have standing to appeal the development order; in that Petitioners are neither "owners" or within other classifications of individuals who might file an action before the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, which action is in opposition to the grant of the development order. RECORD Although a transcription was not made of the motion hearing, the following items which are attached to this Recommended Order constitute the factual basis for this decision. Attachment "A" is the Notice of Appeal of development order; Attachment "B" is the petition for review of development order with its attendant exhibits; Attachment "C" is the letter of referral from the Secretary to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission to the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings; Attachment "D" is the answer and affirmative defenses to the petition filed by Turkey Creek; Attachment "E" is the motion to dismiss filed by Turkey Creek; Attachment "F" is the notice of hearing related to the motion to dismiss; and Attachment "G" is the supplemental authority offered by Turkey Creek. For purposes of this Recommended Order, notwithstanding the answer of Turkey Creek wherein facts of the Petition are denied, the factual allegations related to the standing issue as made through the petition are deemed to be factually accurate, with the exception of those contentions pertaining to conclusions of law.
Findings Of Fact On January 4, 1982, the Turkey Creek Development of Regional Impact Application for Development Approval was filed with the City of Alachua, Florida, City Commission and North Central Florida Regional Planning Council in accordance with Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. It was filed by Turkey Creek, Inc., as applicant. Turkey Creek, Inc. is wholly-owned by Norwood W. Hope, N. Forest Hope and A. Brice Hope. Turkey Creek proposes to develop 5,300 residential dwelling units on 976+- acres, which constitutes a residential development of regional impact according to Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 22F-2.10, Florida Administrative Code, involving real property located in the City of Alachua, Alachua County, Florida, as included in the property description found as an exhibit to the petition document which is Attachment "B" to this Recommended Order. Prior to June 15, 1982, the City of Alachua had previously duly zoned or did simultaneously zone the said 976+-acres PUD and commercial to permit the development as specified in the said application. June 15, 1982, is the date when the City of Alachua adopted the development order for the Turkey Creek Development of Regional Impact. Following the action by the City of Alachua, the Petitioners in this cause, in the person of counsel, filed a notice of appeal of the development order. This appeal was made on June 28, 1982, and on that same date, the petition for review of that development order was filed with the State of Florida, Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. On August 4, 1982, the matter was transmitted to the division of administrative Hearings for formal hearing by action of the Office of the Office of the Secretary of the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. The case was subsequently assigned to this Hearing Officer and a motion hearing was conducted to consider a dismissal of this action based upon Respondent Turkey Creek's allegation that the Petitioners lack standing. The motion hearing was conducted on September 2, 1982. Petitioners are owners of real property included within the Turkey Creek development of regional impact and their property is adjacent or in close proximity to properties which were the subject of the City's zoning decision made in conjunction with approval of the development order.
Findings Of Fact Respondent has a bachelor of science degree in accounting and a master of business administration with an emphasis in accounting. Both degrees are from Florida State University. However, Respondent is not a licensed certified public accountant. From 1982 to 1986, Respondent was employed by Deloitte Touche, one of the "big-six" accounting firms. He worked in Deloitte's Los Angeles office. After one year in audit, Respondent was assigned to the tax department of Deloitte. In 1986, Lorimar-Telepictures, Inc.--an entertainment industry conglomerate--hired Respondent as Director of Taxes. In this position, Respondent was responsible for tax planning and compliance issues for the parent and its affiliates. In 1989, Respondent returned to Florida to work with Rafor Management, Inc. (Rafor), which is owned primarily by Respondent's parents, Mr. and Mrs. Cicco. Mr. Cicco, Mrs. Cicco, and Respondent are the officers of Rafor. Rafor is a licensed real estate company. Mrs. Cicco is a licensed real estate broker and has placed her license with Rafor. Mr. Cicco is a licensed real estate sales person. Respondent is neither a licensed real estate broker nor a licensed sales person. Rafor manages real estate projects. The majority of these projects were constructed by an affiliated company. Mr. Cicco's expertise is in development, including construction and management, and he owns companies and partnerships that are involved with the projects that he has developed. Respondent has assumed the role of Chief Financial Officer of about 10- 15 entities, including Rafor, owned by his father. Respondent also provides tax planning and automated financial services for his father's companies and partnerships. Rafor is a small organization with few, if any, employees outside of three members of the Cicco family. The Shore Manor Condominium Association, Inc. is the first and last time that Rafor attempted to provide management services to an association of homeowners or condominium owners. The Board of Directors of Shore Manor, which consists of 54 units, invited Rafor to make a presentation in connection with their search for management assistance. At the time, the condominium residents were reluctant to serve as directors and sign association checks due to liability concerns. Representing Rafor, Mr. Cicco made a presentation to the Board of Directors and later negotiated the conditions of the agreement between Rafor and Shore Manor. Respondent played a relatively minor role in the presentation or the negotiations. A corporate resume submitted by Rafor to Shore Manor does not identify individuals involved with Rafor, but limits itself to corporate characteristics. However, the resume closes as follows: "If you have any questions, please call me at [telephone number omitted]. Thank you for your consideration." Beneath this statement is Respondent's signature over his typewritten name and title of Chief Financial Officer. After receiving proposals from several prospective management companies, Shore Manor selected Rafor in December 1991. Except for some year- end matters, Rafor began serving as the management company on January 1, 1992. The resulting management agreement, which is dated December 24, 1991, recites that Rafor is in the "business of providing management and supervision for the operation, conduct and management of condominium buildings." The agreement states that Rafor will "order and supervise" all labor and materials supplied in connection with the operation, management, and maintenance of the condominium project and pay all obligations of the condominium association. The agreement authorizes Rafor to collect all regular and special assessments from association members and foreclose assessment liens in the name of the condominium association. The management agreement provides that the association will assess the members the amount set forth in the annual budget, as adopted by the association through its Board of Directors "and any Manager or Management Company which may from time to time be employed by the of [sic] the Association to prepare such annual budget . . .." "Management Company" is defined in the management agreement to mean "Rafor." "Manager" is an undefined term. Other provisions of the management agreement authorize Rafor to supervise the bookkeeping records and order all work and materials needed for the day-to-day operation, maintenance, and repair of the condominium project. The management agreement requires that Rafor to provide an onsite "Manager" for at least two hours weekly and for attendance at monthly association meetings. Ensuing provisions of the management agreement identify Rafor or the "Manager" as the entity to be directed by the association in providing specific services. The term of the management agreement is three years. The association agrees to pay Rafor $16,000 annually, plus reimbursement of authorized expenditures made by Rafor on behalf of the condominium association. Respondent signed the agreement on behalf of Rafor, noting beside his name that he is the Chief Financial Officer of Rafor. The management agreement imperfectly reflects the practice of the parties, especially as to the role of the "Manager." No individual ever served as an onsite manager during the time in question. Rafor's duties regarding financial matters were carefully circumscribed. There are two main accounts (ignoring a relatively minor laundry account, whose receipts were handled exclusively by the association). The accounts are for regular assessments and reserve assessments. Residents paid these assessments by checks payable to Shore Manor and delivered directly to Rafor. Authorized signatories on the accounts into which these funds were deposited were Respondent, Mrs. Cicco, the association president, and the association treasurer. Although Respondent signed nearly all of the association checks, the president and treasurer of the association closely supervised Rafor during the term of the management agreement. Mr. Cicco first approved all invoices. Then, he or Respondent would convey the information to the president or treasurer, who would tell Respondent to write the check. There was daily contact between the president and treasurer, on the one hand, and Mr. Cicco and Respondent, on the other hand. Except during the summer months, when many residents were out of town, Rafor submitted the ledger and canceled checks to the entire Board of Directors monthly for their review and approval. Neither Respondent nor Rafor had much responsibility regarding budgets either. Respondent, on behalf of Rafor, entered all transactions on spreadsheets. Rafor ran the budget numbers from a preceding interval and, at prescribed intervals, proposed options to a special Budget Committee for their consideration. In one such report, dated November 23, 1991, Rafor described three options for a budget with brief discussions of each. Advising the president that final action was the responsibility of the Board, the letter concludes that "I would welcome the opportunity to review and discuss all aspects of our proposal with you." The letter is signed by Respondent as Chief Financial Officer. Respondent handled other Shore Manor financial matters for which Rafor was responsible. By letter to Shore Manor residents dated January 25, 1992, Respondent, as Chief Financial Officer, outlined the adopted budget and advising that assessments were due. The letter concludes that if there are any questions or requests for help, residents should "feel free to call me at [telephone number omitted]." Respondent's remaining financial services for Shore Manor were limited to the preparation of tax or information returns for the association. In general, Respondent was less involved in maintenance matters than he was in financial matters, where his father has relatively little expertise. The most important maintenance issue that arose during the term of the management agreement involved substantial repairs to an existing seawall. Shore Manor is on the Gulf of Mexico and is protected by a seawall. One day, Respondent or Mr. Cicco learned that someone had fallen in a hole that had eroded behind the seawall protecting the condominium project. Rafor handled the seawall problem flawlessly. Its first response was to hire an engineer to prepare a written report on the condition of the seawall and available options. Mr. Cicco did not attempt to deal with this engineering problem himself. After the engineer completed his report recommending elaborate repairs, Rafor contacted another engineer who orally agreed with the findings of the first engineer. The first report cost about $300. When Respondent or Mr. Cicco relayed the oral findings of the second report, coupled with the second engineer's offer to prepare a written report for a fee, the Board of Directors told them not to bother obtaining another written report. There was considerable discussion among residents as to the best course to take. There is evidence that the Shore Manor residents resisted actions that resulted in the increase of regular or special assessments upon them. For instance, some residents opposed Rafor's sensible proposal that Shore Manor substantially increase its reserves to the amount maintained by a nearby, substantially similar condominium. Rafor took the position that, once the deterioration of the seawall had been documented, Rafor had a fiduciary duty to the association to recommend the repairs identified by the engineer. However, several residents remained strongly opposed to the repairs. At one point, by letter dated April 8, 1993, Respondent, as Chief Financial Officer of Rafor, asked for an opinion letter from an attorney concerning the individual and corporate liability that would arise from failing to repair the seawall. The opinion letter, which was addressed to Respondent, as Chief Financial Officer, warned of potential liabilities. The seawall issue demanded considerable time from Rafor in the persons of Respondent and Mr. Cicco. At one point, they submitted a detailed invoice showing that they had expended $42,900 in time with an actual invoice of $2500, which was the figure on which the president and Mr. Cicco had agreed. For the first nine months of 1993, Mr. Cicco spent 319 hours and Respondent spent 110 hours on the seawall matter. Respondent and his father each attended several special meetings of the residents and Board of Directors devoted to the seawall issue. Eventually, the requisite number of residents approved the seawall repairs, and the Board of Directors authorized Rafor to solicit bids for the proposed repair project. As Rafor's Chief Financial Officer, Respondent signed letters in July 1993 soliciting bids and informing residents of the status of the bidding process. Rafor obtained four bids, and the Board selected a bid in the amount of $65,000. The contractor began the repairs in the fall of 1993 and completed the project at $5000 under budget. In early 1993, Mr. Cicco and Respondent discovered that Shore Manor had failed to register as a condominium and no one at Rafor had obtained the required license as a community association manager. On March 1, 1993, Respondent, as Chief Financial Officer of Rafor, submitted to Petitioner an information request form, evidently in connection with the registration of Shore Manor. On March 11, 1993. Mr. Cicco became licensed as a community association manager. Mr. Cicco and Respondent decided, based on the advice of counsel, that the law required only Mr. Cicco to obtain the license and not also Respondent. Eventually, residents opposed to the seawall project filed a complaint with Petitioner. Following an investigation, Petitioner commenced this case. The parties amicably terminated the management agreement in October 1994. In a related case, Petitioner prosecuted Mr. Cicco for providing services as a community association manager without a license. By Consent Order dated August 29, 1994, the parties settled the case with Mr. Cicco paying a fine of $1500. There is absolutely no evidence of fraud or mismanagement of Shore Manor matters by Rafor, Mr. Cicco, or Respondent. To the contrary, Rafor, and Respondent individually, appear to have provided wise counsel and valuable services to the association. Petitioner has failed to prove that Respondent individually noticed or conducted meetings of the association. Petitioner tried to prove that Respondent controlled or disbursed funds or prepared budgets or other financial documents for the association. This is a close issue. Respondent answered with proof that he worked under the direct supervision of his licensed father, but it is unlikely that, given the backgrounds and areas of expertise of the two men, Mr. Cicco supervised Respondent as to these matters. However, the president and treasurer of Shore Manor left Respondent no managerial discretion in the control or disbursement of association funds. They were in daily contact with Respondent, who signed checks as a convenience to them and other directors. The president and treasurer delegated no meaningful authority to Respondent or Rafor as to the control or disbursement of association funds and effectively reduced their services to those of a bookkeeper, who is willing to undergo the liability of a signatory on an association checking account. Respondent prepared alternative budgets, but there is no evidence that he presented them to the association with recommendations. Rather, he merely ran spreadsheets based on past costs with some input from various members of the Budget Committee on projected future costs for such items as cable television and utilities. Respondent then provided the output to the Budget Committee, so they could adopt a budget. Again, the services of Rafor and Respondent concerning budgets does not significantly exceed the services offered by a good bookkeeper. The supervision of Board members over Respondent likely was less direct when it came to the matter of preparing tax or information returns. However, Petitioner failed to prove exactly what Respondent prepared, and Respondent himself did not know. It is thus impossible to find that the financial document was a document of any more substance than, for instance, a change-of-address form. The question of coordinating maintenance is also close. Respondent's involvement with maintenance is less than his involvement with financial and budgetary matters, but the statute does not require as much activity in the area of maintenance as it does in financial and budgetary matters. Unlike the other statutory provisions, which speak in terms of "controlling," "disbursing," and "preparing," management regarding maintenance arises merely by "coordinating." Respondent's involvement with the seawall project rises to the level of coordination, unless his testimony is credited that he signed the various letters, such as to the prospective bidders, as a convenience to his father. The ultimate question is therefore whether Respondent performed only clerical or ministerial functions under the direct supervision and control of a licensed manager. Unlike the situation regarding finances, the backgrounds and areas of expertise of Respondent and his father militate in favor of close supervision and control when it comes to maintenance matters. The evidence discloses that Respondent has absolutely no background in construction, while his father has a substantial background in construction. Working on the seawall matter, Mr. Cicco spent nearly three hours for every one that Respondent spent. Moreover, most of Respondent's time was directed toward handling the complaints of dissatisfied association members, while a much greater percentage of Mr. Cicco's time went toward coordinating with the engineer in the design of the repaired seawall. The same relationship between father and son characterizes Respondent's involvement in other maintenance projects during the term of the management agreement. Of course, this defense is unavailable to Respondent during the period that Mr. Cicco was unlicensed from no later than January 1, 1992, through March 11, 1993. Petitioner did not plead a timeframe for the violations. Petitioner's main witness testified that she believed the timeframe extended past even the filing of the Notice to Show Cause. (Tr. p. 83.) Although Respondent might have legitimately claimed confusion on this point to preclude evidence concerning acts earlier than March 11, 1993, he candidly disclaimed such an interpretation when he stated that he thought that the covered period ran from December 1991 or January 1992 to March 11, 1993. (Tr. p. 84.) It is unnecessary to consider the timeframe that Petitioner intended to encompass in the Notice to Show Cause. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent coordinated maintenance for Shore Manor prior to the licensure of his father. Respondent prepared the letter to the attorneys and bid solicitation letters after Mr. Cicco was licensed. The record does not establish that Respondent coordinated maintenance of the seawall or anything else prior to that time.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes enter a final order dismissing the Notice to Show Cause against Respondent. ENTERED on July 25, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this on July 25, 1996. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1 (except last sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 1 (remainder): rejected as not finding of fact. 2-5 (except last sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 5 (remainder): adopted or adopted in substance, except for implication that such an act, alone, satisfies the statutory criterion. Also, this finding is rejected if it implicitly precludes the finding that Respondent was under Mr. Cicco's supervision in coordinating maintenance. 6: adopted or adopted in substance. Also, this finding is rejected if it implicitly precludes the finding that Respondent was under Mr. Cicco's supervision in coordinating maintenance. 7: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 8: rejected as recitation of evidence. 9 (except last sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. (remainder): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. (except last sentence): adopted or adopted in substance. 10 (remainder): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 11: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 11(a)-(c): adopted or adopted in substance as subordinate facts. 12: rejected as subordinate and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 13-18: adopted or adopted in substance. 19: adopted in substance as to financial and budgetary matters, except as to implication that Respondent exercised discretion as to such matters. Rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence as to other matters. 20: rejected as recitation testimony and subordinate. 21: rejected as subordinate. 22-23: rejected as subordinate and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-3: adopted or adopted in substance. 4: rejected as irrelevant. 5-6: adopted or adopted in substance. 7: adopted or adopted in substance, except that the financial and budgetary services were not under the direct supervision of Mr. Cicco. 8: adopted or adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: James Norred, Acting Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 1950 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Theresa Bender, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Robert A. Cicco, Jr. 9190 Oakhurst Road, Suite 2 Seminole, Florida 34646
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: All statements contained within the Petition have been found to be true and correct. The area encompassed by the proposed District is 30,637+- acres located within unincorporated areas of Glades and Hendry Counties, Florida (Exhibit 7). The external boundaries of the District are coterminous with the external boundaries of General Development Corporation's Port LaBelle development. Within these boundaries but excluded from the District are several out parcels that were never part of the original Villages of Port LaBelle development, as well as four Port LaBelle plat units where there are currently numerous property owners. The property within the District to be excluded from the community development district is described in Exhibit 10. General Development Corporation, a Delaware corporation authorized to do business in the State of Florida, is the major landowner within the proposed District (Exhibits 8 and 9A). Four other property owners owning seven parcels within the proposed District have joined in the Petition (Exhibit 9B). Installment lot contract purchasers within the areas to be included within the District who had not received a Property Offering Statement from GDC indicating the possibility of the formation of a special taxing district were separately notified by mail of the time and place of hearing and provided with information on the functions of the proposed District. Out of a total of 10,270 letters sent, only six lot purchasers made further inquiries, and those inquiries were not related to the formation of the District, but were related to property values. (Testimony of Lawrence W. Mobley. Affidavit of Mark Billson, Exhibits 19A and B.) The area of land within the proposed District is of sufficient size, is sufficiently compact, and is sufficiently contiguous to be developed as one functionally interrelated community. This finding is based in part on the fact that the area to be included within the proposed District contains approximately 30,637+- acres. Property within the proposed District includes "vested" areas and areas which have been and continue to be subject to Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, review and is planned to be developed as a functional, interrelated community with a variety of land uses, including commercial, institutional, residential, and recreational. The District is ultimately projected to include 49,646 dwelling units. The area encompassed by the proposed District was subject to a Master Application for Development Approval. The Master Land Use Plan depicting uses is shown in Exhibit 13A. Master Development Orders were issued by Glades and Hendry Counties in 1974, subject to further incremental review as detailed technical data became available (Exhibits 13A, B, C and D). In 1980, Development Orders were issued by Glades and Hendry Counties for Increment II (Exhibits 14A and B). Portions of the remaining property will be subject to further incremental review (Exhibit 15A). The area subject to further review contains approximately 13,690+- acres and includes residential villages and a town center as well as a variety of other land uses. The projected population for this area is 48,700 (Exhibit 15B). The proposed designation of the future general distribution, location and extent of public and private uses within the District is shown in Exhibit 15A. All mandatory elements of the local government comprehensive plans for both Glades and Hendry Counties have been adopted in compliance with the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 (Exhibits 17A, 17A1, 17B and 17B1) The proposed creation of the District is not inconsistent with applicable elements of the State Comprehensive Plan. The proposed District is not inconsistent with the applicable elements of the Glades and Hendry Counties Comprehensive Plans, as evidenced by the fact that the Planning Director for each county has indicated that the establishment of the District is not incompatible with applicable elements of the local government comprehensive plans (Petitioner's Exhibits 18A and 18B). The five persons proposed to be the initial members of the board of supervisors who shall serve in that office until replaced by elected members as provided by Section 190.006, Florida Statutes, are: C. C. Crump Senior Vice President General Development Corporation 1111 South Bayshore Drive Miami, --Florida -33131 (305) 350-1525 Arthur L. Harper, Jr. Vice President General Development Corporation 1111 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33131 (305) 350-1533 James E. Clark Assistant Vice President 1111 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33131 (305) 350-1531 Wayne L. Allen Vice President and General Counsel General Development Corporation 1111 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33131 (305) 350-1261 Lawrence W. Mobley Assistant Vice President General Development Corporation Highway 80 East Birchwood Boulevard LaBelle, Florida 33595 (813) 675-1712 The proposed name of the District is the Port LaBelle Community Development District. A map of the proposed District showing current major trunk water mains and sewer interceptors and outfalls have been provided in Exhibits 11A and B. No water distribution and collection systems are proposed to be constructed, operated or maintained by the District. Facilities are to be constructed by the District over a period of 40 years. The timetable for construction indicates that all facilities should be completed by the year 2020 (Petitioner's Exhibit 23). The total costs associated with the capital facilities to be constructed are estimated in good faith to be $5,433,000.00 (Exhibit 22). Glades County Resolution 80-9 (Exhibit 14A) and Hendry County Resolution 80-37 (Exhibit 14B) requested that the applicant, GDC, work together with each county to investigate the feasibility of establishing certain special taxing districts. As a result of these conditions, GDC filed a petition for establishing a community development district. The applicable local governments, the Board of County Commissioners of Glades and Hendry Counties have evidenced their support of Petitioner's request to have a District established by rule by passing Resolution 81-62, dated September 8, 1981, by Hendry County, and Resolution 81-17, dated September 14, 1981, by Glades County (Exhibits 20A and B, respectively). The District is the best available alternative for providing and delivering community services and facilities to the area to be serviced by the District. This finding is supported by the Resolutions of the Board of County Commissioners of Glades County and Hendry County acknowledging that neither county is presently in a position to provide any of the essential services required by a community of this size. The Community Development District will be able to provide reliable long-term maintenance of the services and facilities not otherwise provided by the counties or other appropriate units of local government (Exhibits 20A and B). The Barron Water Control District, a district established pursuant to Chapter 298, Florida Statutes, within the area of the proposed District, has also evidenced its support of Petitioner's request to establish a Community Development District by rule (Petitioner's Exhibit 21). The Community Development District will not be incompatible with the capacity and uses of existing local and regional community development services and facilities. The area that will be served by the District is amenable to separate district government. This finding is supported by the foregoing findings of fact which establish that the nature, location, and size of the proposed Port LaBelle Community Development District would make it amenable to separate district government. Members of the public testifying at hearing had no complaints that related to the specifics of the petition filed in this cause. Instead, their concerns related to the wisdom of the Legislature in enacting Chapter 190, Florida Statutes, in the first instance, and the witnesses' desires that the Act be repealed as soon as possible. These concerns are, of course, outside the scope of issues properly involved in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law hereby submitted, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission grant the Petition of General Development Corporation, and adopt a rule which will establish the Port LaBelle Community Development District. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1982, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Nancy H. Roen, Esquire General Development Corporation 1111 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33131 Ms. Miriam Schreiner Post Office Box 1288 LaBelle, Florida Mayor Joan Jefferson City of Stuart Stuart, Florida 33495 Robert Miller, Chairman Treasure Coast Regional Planning Council Post Office Box 2395 Stuart, Florida 33495 Honorable Bob Graham Governor, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Jim Smith Attorney General State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Ralph D. Turlington Commissioner of Education State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable George Firestone Secretary of State State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. John T. Herndon Director of the Office of Planning and Budget Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the subject plan amendment, which changes the future land use designations of parcels owned by each of the Petitioners, is not in compliance for the reasons set forth in the petitions.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Each Petitioner submitted oral or written objections during the review and adoption proceedings culminating in the adoption of the plan amendment at issue. Petitioner Wilson owns about 2.5 acres on the north 1/ side of State Route 524 and east side of Westminster Drive. The Wilson parcel, which is vacant, contains about 300 feet of frontage on State Route 524 and about 250 feet on Westminster Drive. Petitioner Tompkins owns about 3.5 acres on the north side of State Route 524 and west side of Westminster Drive. The Tompkins parcel, which is vacant, contains about 600 feet of frontage on State Route 524 and about 250 feet on Westminster Drive. The Wilson and Tompkins parcels lie between State Route 524 and Cocoa North, which is a large residential subdivision. The existing land uses near the area, which is a growth center in Cocoa, are largely low density residential, and there remains considerable vacant land. There are no commercial uses within the Cocoa North subdivision. The only access to Cocoa North is by way of State Route 524, using Westminster Drive or one of two other roads. The nearest convenience store is about two-thirds of a mile east of Westminster Drive on State Route 524. An I-95 interchange lies about 1.8 miles to the west of Westminster Drive on State Route 524. The nearest property to the west designated Commercial is at the northwest corner of the Tenzel property, which is discussed below. The Commercial parcel on the Tenzel property is about one and one-quarter miles from Westminster Drive. Petitioner Messiah Church owns about 2.3 acres on the east side of U.S. Route 1 about 300 feet north of Michigan Avenue. Petitioner Fountain owns about 0.72 acre on the east side of U.S. 1 about 1200 feet north of the Messiah Church's property. The Messiah Church parcel contains a church. The Fountain parcel is vacant. The Messiah Church and Fountain parcels lie between U.S. Route 1 and a wide strip of existing low density residential uses bordered on the east by the Indian River. The narrower strip containing the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels is located in an underutilized area characterized by a mix of existing commercial uses. For example, a flea market occupies the west side of U.S. Route 1 across from the Messiah Church parcel. Respondent Department of Community Affairs (DCA) is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing plans under Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. Respondent the City of Cocoa (Cocoa) is a local government required to adopt a revised comprehensive plan under Sections 163.3164(12) and 163.3167, Florida Statutes. History of Cocoa Comprehensive Plan Cocoa adopted its comprehensive plan and transmitted it to DCA on October 4, 1988. DCA issued a notice of intent to find the plan in compliance. A petition was filed challenging the determination of compliance and requesting a hearing under Section 163.3184(9), Florida Statutes. Following an administrative hearing, an order recommended that DCA forward the case to the Administration Commission for entry of a final order determining the plan not to be in compliance. The parties then negotiated a settlement agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, the Administration Commission entered a final order and later an amended final order determining the plan not to be in compliance and identifying the remedial amendments necessary to attain compliance. The designations challenged by Petitioners are part of a set of plan amendments consisting of the remedial amendments ordered by the Administration Commission, amendments required to settle a federal court action in which Cocoa was a defendant, and amendments having nothing to do with either legal proceeding. The challenged designations fall in the last category. The Future Land Use Map (FLUM) in the original plan adopted in 1988 designated as Commercial a strip of land containing the Wilson and Tompkins parcels. The entire strip runs 2700 feet along State Route 524, which is a two lane undivided minor arterial, and extends about 250 feet deep. The Wilson and Tompkins parcels constitute about 40% of the strip and are located at its extreme western end. State Route 524 operates at a level of service C and is projected to remain at this level of service though 1997. The FLUM designated as High Density Residential a strip of land containing the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels. The entire strip, which is generally quite shallow, runs about 3400 feet along U.S. Route 1, which is a four lane divided principal arterial. The Messiah Church and Fountain parcels constitute about 20% of the strip and are located in its northern half. U.S. Route 1 is operating at level of service D and is projected to be operating at level of service E by 1992 and level of service F by 1997. Transmittal and Adoption Process On October 30, 1989, the Planning and Zoning Board, which acts as the local land planning agency (LPA), conducted a public meeting at which it discussed at length new public participation procedures that it was considering adopting. Specific provisions were prepared following the meeting, circulated at the next LPA meeting on November 13, discussed, revised somewhat, and finally adopted. On November 21, 1989, the LPA met to discuss remedial amendments necessary to comply with the requirements of the Amended Final Order of the Administration Commission. Pursuant to a contract with Cocoa, the East Central Florida Regional Planning Council (Regional Planning Council) had prepared a draft set of amendments for review by the LPA. At the beginning of the November 21 meeting, the city attorney stated that the purpose of the meeting was to obtain information and comments from the public. He explained that he and city staff recommended that the LPA defer any formal action on the proposed amendments until their next scheduled meeting on November 27. A representative of the Regional Planning Council was in attendance to assist in the discussion. The proposed amendments drafted by the Regional Planning Council did not change the designations of the parcels owned by any of the Petitioners. In fact, according to the minutes, none of the four parcels nor either of the two strips containing the parcels was even mentioned at the November 21 meeting. Following a very short meeting on November 27 to discuss remedial amendments, the LPA next met on November 30. By this time, the Regional Planning Council had prepared a "final draft" of proposed remedial amendments. Following discussion, the LPA voted to recommend the proposed amendments to City Council. Toward the end of the meeting, the Vice Chairman moved that the strip containing the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels be designated Low Density Residential. The motion passed. At a regular meeting on November 28, the City Council adopted Resolution 89-37, which provides for public participation procedures in connection with the comprehensive planning process. The ordinance calls for advertising of transmittal and adoption hearings in accordance with applicable law, the encouragement of oral or written public comment, and responses from the City Council or its designee. At a special meeting on December 5, the City Council considered the proposed amendments that had been recommended by the LPA. At this meeting, the City Council voted to change the designations for both strips, including all of Petitioners' parcels to Low Density Residential. The vote on the strip containing the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels was unanimous. The vote on the strip containing the Wilson and Tompkins parcels was four to one. Neither DCA nor Cocoa staff originally suggested the new designations for Petitioners' parcels. The new designations were not prompted by any changes to the original data and analysis. It does not appear that the Regional Planning Council, which also assisted in the preparation of the original plan, proposed that the parcels originally be designated Commercial, but it does not appear that the Regional Planning Council made the suggestion for a change in designation. At a special meeting on December 11, the City Council considered the proposed amendments, including the new designations for Petitioners' parcels, as well as the amendments to settle the pending state and federal litigation. No one appeared on behalf of any of the Petitioners to object to the proposed designations. However, in response to the objections of an owner of other property on the south side of State Route 524, whose property was also proposed for redesignation as Low Density Residential, representatives of Cocoa explained that the redesignation on both sides of State Route 524 was based on Cocoa's recent experience with DCA on unrelated plan amendments involving what is known as the Tenzel property. The city attorney indicated that staff was concerned that the objections lodged by DCA to the plan amendments involving the Tenzel property, which Cocoa was at the same time annexing, could possibly be made against the Commercial designation along both sides of State Route 524. The city manager also mentioned his concern that the plan be internally consistent. The Tenzel property consists of 157 acres on the south side of State Route 524 about one mile west of Westminster Drive. Cocoa transmitted the proposed Tenzel amendments to DCA on March 13, 1989. The proposed amendments designated 60 acres, including its entire State Route 524 frontage, Commercial and the remainder Industrial. Cocoa was planning to annex the Tenzel property, which was at the time of the transmittal in unincorporated Brevard County. In its Objections, Recommendations, and Comments (ORC) dated July 6, 1989, DCA objected that, among other things, the proposed designation was inconsistent with Future Land Use Element (FLUE) Policy 1.2, which is to discourage new linear commercial development. Instead, DCA recommended that new commercial uses should be clustered. DCA also complained that the designation was not supported by data and analysis and the portion of the FLUM covering the Tenzel property did not depict natural resources. On September 6, 1989, Cocoa annexed the Tenzel property and amended its plan. The adopted plan amendments designated only 10 acres Commercial and the remaining 147 acres Residential. 2/ The property designated Commercial was limited to only about half of the available frontage and was restricted to the northwest corner, which is farthest from the Tompkins and Wilson parcels and closest to the I-95 interchange at State Route 524 to the west. The adoption package contained considerable data and analysis concerning the newly annexed property. DCA issued its notice of intent to find the plan amendment in compliance on October 25, 1989. Notwithstanding the Tenzel-related concerns expressed at the December 11 hearing of the City Council, an owner of about 2.5 acres of land on Westminster Drive near State Route 524 objected to the redesignation of his land from Commercial to Low Density Residential. He argued that the land was unsuitable for residential uses due to traffic and other factors. In response, the city manager stressed the possibility of conflict with the plan if strip commercial were "proposed." 3/ With one member changing his vote as to the strip containing the Wilson and Tompkins parcels, the City Council voted three to two to transmit to DCA the proposed amendments, including the new Low Density Residential designations for the two strips containing the four parcels of Petitioners. The sole issue concerning the advertisements for the transmittal hearings of December 5 and 11 is their failure to identify the Wilson and Tompkins parcels as the subject of proposed land use changes. The advertisement for the December 11 hearing states in bold, capital letters at the top: "Notice of Change of Land Use and Comprehensive Plan." Following a brief paragraph announcing the time and place, the first item to be discussed is: "Proposal to change the use of land within the areas shown on the map below." Immediately below this sentence is a map of the entire city. Beside the map in one block is the statement: "Landuse changes to the future landuse map." A second block below the first states: "Black shaded areas to low density residential." The shading covers the High Density Residential strip including the parcels owned by the Messiah Church and Fountain, but omits the Commercial strip including the parcels owned by Wilson and Tompkins. The map for the December 11 hearing was published on December 4. The change of designation for the Wilson and Tompkins parcels was first proposed at the City Council hearing the following day. By letter dated March 22, 1990, DCA transmitted its ORC on the proposed plan amendments. The ORC informed Cocoa that DCA had no objections, recommendations, or comments on the transmitted amendments. Following receipt of the ORC, the LPA met on May 2, 1990, to review staff's response. During the meeting, the LPA discussed the Wilson parcel with her attorney, who objected that the Commercial designation would render the property useless due to its shallow depth. The attorney pointed out that a residential designation was impractical at that location; to the east, on the north side of State Road 524, townhouses had remained unsold for a long time. A motion not to change the Commercial designation on the Wilson and Tompkins parcels, while changing the designation for the rest of the strip to Low Density Residential, was seconded and discussed. It failed by a vote of four to three. At this point, the city attorney suggested that condominiums already in the area would be incompatible with Low Density Residential. The discussion acknowledged the protests of surrounding homeowners to the Commercial designation. A motion, seconded, to designate the entire strip north of State Route 524 as High Density Residential failed by a four to three vote. This vote was immediately followed by a motion, seconded, to designate the entire strip north of State Route 524 as Medium Density Residential. This motion passed by a five to two vote. The same attorney also represented the Messiah Church at the LPA meeting. He stated that the church intended to sell the property and the new designation was disadvantageous to a sale. In the ensuing discussion, it was noted that central sewer had yet to reach this site. A motion, seconded, was made to designate the Messiah Church parcel High Density Residential. The motion failed by a five to two vote. A motion, seconded, to designate the entire strip along the east side of U.S. Route 1 Low Density Residential passed unanimously. At the conclusion of the meeting, the LPA voted to adopt the amendments, subject to changes made at the meeting, and send the package to the City Council. The City Council meeting of May 8 was announced by a large display newspaper advertisement, which was published on April 27. The advertisement contained a map shaded to indicate that the designation of the two strips in question was proposed to be changed to Low Density Residential. During the meeting, the city attorney discussed the redesignation of the strip along State Route 524 from Low Density Residential, as it was shown in the transmittal amendments, to Medium Density Residential, as had been recommended by the LPA at its May 2 meeting. An attorney representing Wilson and Tompkins argued in favor of the Commercial designation given the property in the original plan. The city manager responded that the property was reexamined as a result of Cocoa's recent experience with DCA on the Tenzel plan amendments. Trying to avoid the appearance of strip commercial zoning, staff favored the proposed recommendation. The city attorney likewise warned the City Council to consider as a matter of policy the concern of DCA to avoid urban sprawl and strip commercialism. Nearby residents were almost uniformly in favor of a residential designation. Wilson complained that she purchased the property after being told by Cocoa that she could use it for commercial purposes. She also argued that 15 units per acre would allow 30 homes, which would add to the congestion in the area. After everyone had a chance to speak, a motion, seconded, called for designating the Wilson and Tompkins parcels as Commercial with the remainder of the strip designated Medium Density Residential. The motion failed three votes to two. A motion, seconded, to accept the recommendation of the LPA passed three to two. After other parcels were discussed, the city attorney raised the redesignation as Low Density Residential of the High Density Residential strip along the east side of U.S. Route 1. The attorney representing Messiah Church asked that the City Council consider the church property separately because it was for sale and worth more in its present designation as High Density Residential. He argued that buffering provisions of the plan would be violated by a Low Density Residential designation. Concerning his property, Fountain agreed with the attorney's reasoning and informed the City Council that no home had been built along U. S. Route 1 from Sharpes to south Rockledge for over 30 years. Following discussion, during which the Mayor noted that the Regional Planning Council had recommended that the property be designated Low Density Residential, a motion, seconded, to leave the strip High Density Residential failed three votes to two. A motion, seconded, to approve the recommendation of the LPA passed by the same margin. At the conclusion of the meeting, the City Council approved on first reading the ordinance adopting the plan amendments. Following another display newspaper advertisement indicating proposed land use changes for the two strips, the City Council again met on May 22, 1990. A minister of the Messiah Church praised the City Council for its recent decisions and announced that the church had decided that to meet the needs of the community it would minister to persons whose needs were presently unmet, like transients, mentally retarded persons, handicapped persons, and residents of halfway houses. Church officials had decided that such a ministry could be carried out from the present location with the proposed designation, which nonetheless remained an example of bad planning in their opinion. Addressing the strip north of State Route 524, the attorney representing Wilson and Tompkins objected to the absence of representatives from the Regional Planning Council despite the fact that they had been responsible for drafting the plan amendments. The city attorney advised that the Regional Planning Council had originally recommended that these parcels be designated Low Density Residential, but the City Council, as it was then constituted, decided to change the designation to Commercial in the original plan. The city manager again justified the decision as to the Wilson and Tompkins parcels based on DCA's objections to the transmittal amendments for the Tenzel property. After discussion on the State Route 524 strip concluded, the attorney for Messiah Church objected to the proposed redesignation from High Density to Low Density Residential. Again protesting the absence of the Regional Planning Council planners, he asked for an explanation of this action. The city manager responded that staff's concerns involved compatibility with existing uses and recommendations of citizens in the area. The city attorney added that the central sewer lines ended south of the Messiah Church parcel. Various persons spoke on both sides of the issue. After discussion of other plan issues, the City Council adopted Ordinance 15-90, which includes the plan amendments that, among other things, redesignate the Commercial strip containing the Wilson and Tompkins parcels to Medium Density Residential and the High Density Residential strip containing the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels to Low Density Residential. The failure of the published map to depict the four parcels or the two strips undoubtedly accounts for the absence of the Petitioners from the second transmittal hearing. However, the arguments of similarly situated landowners were presented at the hearing. Moreover, five months passed between the transmittal and adoption hearings. Nothing in the record suggests than any Petitioner could have accomplished more in a few days before the second transmittal hearing that he, she, or it accomplished in the several months that passed before the adoption hearings. All Petitioners complain that the inadequacy of explanations received at the hearing for the redesignations deprived them of effective public participation. Generally, they received responses to their demands for explanations. Several reasons emerge from the record for the redesignation of Petitioners' parcels. As to the Wilson and Tompkins parcels, Cocoa staff officials expressed concerned about the appearance of strip commercial designations. This explanation is difficult to justify objectively because the Commercial designations probably could not have been challenged by DCA in the subject plan amendments. DCA's objections to the transmittal plan amendments on the Tenzel property were not relevant to the Commercial designations given these four parcels, especially if taken in isolation from the strips of which they were a part. It is of course possible that, given Cocoa's recent experience in federal and state review of its land use planning efforts, beleaguered staff and local officials chose to exercise an abundance of caution. As to the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels, Cocoa staff and officials expressed concern about the unavailability of central sewer. However, the concern, at least as voiced personally by the Mayor at the May 8 City Council hearing, was not so much for the protection of natural resources as for the protection of nearby homeowners from the expense of tying in to central sewer lines if they were extended through the High Density Residential strip. Transcript of May 8 hearing, pages 48-49. The Mayor's concern points to the most compelling explanation for the new designations for all four parcels. Each designation was driven by political pressure from residents, which, to some extent in this case at least, may be characterized in the more appealing terms of concerns about surrounding land use compatibility. The forces of neighborhood preservation confronted the forces of development and, in this encounter, the former prevailed by a bare majority of the City Council. The evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the above-described facts are not consistent with the applicable public participation criteria. Data and Analysis in Support of Designations Cocoa did not submit new data or analysis when it submitted the adopted plan amendments. However, data and analysis transmitted with the original plan, as well as the Tenzel amendments, bear on the new designations. More pertinent to the Wilson and Tompkins parcels, the data and analysis note: Neighborhood commercial uses of low density and intensity should be located within neighborhoods or central to several residential clusters. Such a locational strategy would produce the beneficial effects of reducing the time and distance to neighborhood commercial, making trips quicker, easier, and more economical. Background Analysis, FLUE, page 1-26. At the same time, the data and analysis predict significant traffic impacts on State Route 524 as the impact of new residential developments is felt. Background Analysis, Traffic Circulation Element, page 2-16. On the other hand, another locational recommendation in the data and analysis is for the central business district, which is south of all four parcels, to serve as "the community focal point providing a mixture of retail and services." Background Analysis, FLUE, page 1-26. Projecting a population increase of nearly 4000 persons from 1986 to 2000, the data and analysis report that there is generally enough land available for residential needs. Background Analysis, Housing Element, p. 3-15. The analysis concludes that County will need about 309 acres for residential development through 2000. Background Analysis, FLUE, page 1-26. Additional data and analysis accompanying the Tenzel plan amendments lower this amount to 130.6 acres, at least as to single family residential. Tenzel Data and Analysis, Part II. However, a corresponding increase in projected population probably should have accompanied the Tenzel plan amendments because they involved an annexation. Although the data and analysis provide little useful information concerning the amount of acreage designated, rather than zoned, residential, there is no evidence on which to base a conclusion that changing the designations of the State Route 524 strip from Commercial to Medium Density Residential and the U.S. Route 1 strip from High Density Residential to Low Density Residential defy the data and analysis regarding the need for residential land. The data and analysis project that 385 acres will need to be devoted to commercial uses by 2000. Background Analysis, FLUE, page 1-26. In 1987, about 276 acres were in commercial use. Table 1-2, Background Analysis, FLUE, page 1-6. Although the data and analysis do not indicate the number of vacant or developed acres designated Commercial under the plan, Tables 1-3 and 1-4 indicate that about 800 acres are zoned commercial. Background Analysis, FLUE, page 1-7 and 1-11. The acreage zoned commercial and acreage designated Commercial are probably about the same. Table 1-4 indicates that 170 acres zoned commercial are vacant and suitable for development. If Cocoa requires another 100+ acres for commercial uses in addition to the 276 acres already in commercial use, the designation of 800+ acres as Commercial is ample to meet this need. Thus, the removal of a Commercial designation from the 15-acre strip, of which the Wilson and Tompkins parcels are a part, does not defy the data and analysis. The fairest conclusion that can be drawn from the data and analysis is that Cocoa suffers no deficiency, in terms of projected needs in the year 2000, in land designated Commercial or in either of the relevant residential categories. Pertinent to the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels, the data and analysis indicate that the City's wastewater treatment facility was to be expanded in November, 1988. Background Analysis, Capital Improvements Element, page 9-11. The project was completed, and the wastewater facility has a considerable reserve capacity. Presently, the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels, and the surrounding area, are served by septic tanks. The data and analysis indicate, however, that the City is committed to a program of gradually extending central sewer services to areas within the city not currently served. Background Analysis, Wastewater Element, page 3-5. More recently, the Tenzel analysis states: "A policy of phasing out septic tanks has been in place in order to protect the environment." Tenzel data and analysis, Section IV, Wastewater. A rough estimate of the cost to extend sewer lines the necessary one- quarter mile to the area of the Messiah Church parcel is $500,000. Although it might be more feasible for the developer of a High Density Residential project to provide the funds to extend sewer lines, the feasibility is not clear given a project on a 2.3 acre parcel in an underutilized part of town. In any event, Cocoa has demonstrated a commitment to expanding the central sewer system, require connections, and finance the expansion by special assessments. The data and analysis would support either designation. The evidence thus does not establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the designations are not supported by the data and analysis. Consistency of Designations with Criteria of Land Use Suitability Analysis, Encouraging Redevelopment of Blighted Areas, and Discouraging Urban Sprawl For the four parcels, the land use suitability analysis accompanying the original plan supports the designations adopted in the plan amendments. This issue has been considered above with respect to the issue involving supporting data and analysis. Given the changes in designations from Commercial and High Density Residential to Medium and Low Density Residential, respectively, no additional land use analysis was required for the reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law corresponding to the preceding section. The evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the designations are not supported by a land use suitability analysis. For the reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law corresponding to this section, no findings are necessary to address the issue of the consistency of the plan amendment with the criteria of Chapter 163, Part II, and Chapter 9J- 5 concerning redevelopment of blighted areas and urban sprawl. Findings concerning urban sprawl in the context of internal consistency are in the following section. Although not alleged as a basis for a finding of internal inconsistency, the issue of redevelopment of blighted areas has been considered in the following section as well, for the reasons set forth in the corresponding Conclusions of Law. Consistency of Designations with Plan Provisions Encouraging Redevelopment of Blighted Areas and Discouraging Urban Sprawl FLUE Objective 1.1 is to adopt land development regulations to "discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl." Goal 1 of the Public Facilities Element is to provide public facilities in a manner that "protects investments in existing facilities and promotes orderly, compact urban growth, and discourages urban sprawl." Similarly, Public Facilities Element Objective 4.1.2 is to coordinate the provision of public facilities with the FLUE "to discourage urban sprawl and maximize the use of existing facilities." Other provisions relied upon by Petitioners to show internal inconsistency are Public Facilities Objective 4.2.5 and FLUE Policy 1.1.2 Residential Areas--General Paragraphs 1-2 and 5-6. Public Facilities Objective 4.2.5 is to adopt land development regulations that prohibit the installation of additional septic tanks within the incorporated city limits will be discouraged except when it is determined that the use of a septic tank system is the most efficient, cost effective and environmentally compatible alternative. [sic] FLUE Policy 1.1.2 Residential Areas--General Paragraphs 1-2 and 5-6 provide that land development regulations shall be based upon the following locational criteria: Provisions of new residential uses shall be adequately balanced with the availability of residential support services including community facilities, shopping, schools, parks and open space, and transportation services. The City will encourage infill development in areas of existing viable housing, provide for redevelopment in blighted areas or areas in transition, and encourage new housing development in appropriate areas where community services exist or are programmed to occur. Residential areas shall be buffered from major transportation arteries and from incompatible non-residential uses. Residential areas should be served by sidewalks and, where practical, bikeways with convenient access to recreation, shopping, and schools. FLUE Policy 1.1.2 Commercial Areas Paragraph 2 4/ provides: New commercial uses shall be discouraged from linear commercial development and shall be encouraged to develop in clusters, with coordinated parking facilities, and with frontage roads where practical. Resulting in most cases from ineffective or no land use planning, urban sprawl is the extension of urban-type development into rural, agricultural, or other undeveloped or sparsely developed lands in a haphazard development pattern in which land uses are not functionally related to each other. Common patterns of the premature land development characteristic of urban sprawl are the ribbon pattern, leapfrog pattern, and concentric circle pattern. In the ribbon pattern, development not functionally or proximately related to other non-urban development in the area extends in ribbons or strips along certain roads and away from urban development. In the leapfrog pattern, development not functionally or proximately related to other non-urban development in the area leaps from urban development so as to leave significant amounts of rural, agricultural, or other undeveloped or sparsely developed land between the existing urban development and the scattered leapfrog development. The concentric circle pattern is similar except that the development not functionally or proximately related to other non-urban development in the area assumes the pattern of concentric circles, such as along rural roads bypassing an urban area, and is characteristically more exclusively low-density residential. Urban sprawl typically interferes with one or more of four general objectives of effective land use planning: 1) promotion of the efficient use of land in the development of new, and maintenance of existing, viable mixed-use communities; 2) protection of natural resources in rural, agricultural, or other undeveloped or sparsely developed areas; 3) protection of agricultural lands and uses in rural, agricultural, or other undeveloped or sparsely developed areas; and 4) promotion of the efficient provision to both urban and non-urban areas of public facilities and services, such as water, sewer, roads, schools, police, fire, drainage, and other infrastructure, whether provided by public or private entities. The long strip of Commercial along State Route 524 suggests the presence of commercial sprawl along a thoroughfare. By removing the Commercial designation, Cocoa eliminates this type of sprawl. On the other hand, with respect to the Wilson and Tompkins parcels, Cocoa North resembles another example of sprawl. The introduction of compatible neighborhood commercial uses would tend to mix the uses with an immediate impact of relieving some traffic on State Route 524, as residents could make small purchases at, say, a convenience store located at State Route 524 and Westminster Drive. However, the solution adopted by Cocoa for the Wilson and Tompkins parcels, although possibly not the only one available under the circumstances, is consistent with the provisions of the plan to discourage urban sprawl. When compared to the prospect of the entire strip remaining designated Commercial, Cocoa's solution represents an improvement in terms of urban containment. The reduction of density for the strip east of U.S. Route 1 has few evident sprawl implications. To the extent this action may focus more dense residential development in the central business district or elsewhere where central sewer is already provided, the new designation serves the objectives to discourage urban sprawl. In any event, the new designation is not inconsistent with the sprawl provisions of the plan. The puzzling septic tank policy is probably intended to read that septic tanks are prohibited except when the use of a septic tank is the most efficient, cost effective, and environmentally compatible solution. The new designation for the strip east of U.S. Route 1 is not inconsistent with this policy. Consequently, the evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the designations are inconsistent with the provisions in the plan to discourage urban sprawl. FLUE Objective 1.3 is to eliminate "[e]xisting conditions of slum and blight . . . by the year of 2000." FLUE 1.1.2 Redevelopment Area Paragraph 1 designates the Redevelopment Area, which is depicted by map and excludes the two strips containing Petitioners' parcels, as an area of slum or blight pursuant to Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. Paragraph 3 adds that the City shall redevelop the central business district, which is within the Redevelopment Area, as a viable business district consistent with surrounding historic resources, residential neighborhoods, and natural resources. There is no evidence of blight as to the Wilson and Tompkins parcels, notwithstanding the marketing problems experienced in connection with the nearby townhouses. Concerning the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels, a haphazard collection of largely commercial uses, such as a flea market, have accumulated over the years along U.S. Route 1 in the vicinity of the two parcels. The immediate area appears not to be economically vibrant, but no evidence establishes that the area is blighted. Further, no evidence suggests that the area's economic fortunes would be enhanced if the strip were designated High Density Residential, notwithstanding the Messiah Church's intended use of the parcel if it is not given a High Density Residential designation. The evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the designations are inconsistent with plan provisions to encourage the redevelopment of blighted areas. Consistency of Designations with Regional and State Plans Regional Plan Policy 51.12 states: The "infilling" of existing urban areas and the renovation of blighted areas shall be encouraged in areas where existing wastewater transmission and treatment capacity are available for allocation, or funding has been committed for the provision of sufficient capacity. Emphasis should be placed on encouraging development activities within the urban service area boundaries as identified in local government comprehensive plans. Techniques of encouragement include but are not limited to: Provision of public or private facilities and services in strict accordance with adopted growth management objectives and policies . . Providing incentives for restoration or rehabilitation of blighted areas with existing sewer service through various actions such as but not limited to rezoning to other uses or higher densities Strengthening and preserving existing residential areas through the planned provision of public services, zoning and other techniques. Regional Plan Policy 57.7 5/ specifies the "designation of . . . activity centers . . . as a means of planning appropriate and balanced land uses on a scale and at an intensity consistent with the availability of public facilities and services . . Regional Policy Plan 51.10 limits the use of septic tanks in areas where conditions are suitable for installation and effective operation, provided that central sewer system services are not available due to lack of available treatment capacity, accessible facilities, or other considerations . . .. The following minimum criteria and procedures shall be adhered to . . . where regional resources may be adversely affected: * * * 3. The decision to require phasing out of septic tank systems where centralized sewer systems are available should be based solely upon the availability of those centralized systems and not upon any other consideration of ground water hydrology and current performance levels of septic tanks. For the reasons already discussed, the evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the designations are not consistent with these provisions of the Regional Plan. Section 187.201(18)(a), Florida Statutes (the State Plan) is for Florida to "protect the substantial investments in public facilities that already exist and . plan for and finance new facilities . . . in a timely, orderly, and efficient manner." Goal 16 of the State Plan is to direct development "to those areas which have in place, or have agreements to provide, the land and water resources, fiscal abilities, and service capacity to accommodate growth in an environmentally acceptable manner." The first three policies under Goal 16 are: Promote state programs, investments, and development and redevelopment activities which encourage efficient development and occur in areas which will have the capacity to service new population and commerce. Develop a system of incentives and disincentives which encourages a separation of urban and rural land uses while protecting water supplies, resource development, and fish and wildlife habitats. Enhance the liveability and character of urban areas through the encouragement of an attractive and functional mix of living, working, shopping, and recreational activities. In addition to the above-cited provisions relied upon by Petitioners, Policy 3 of Goal 5 of the State Plan is to increase the supply of safe, affordable, sanitary housing for low- and moderate-income persons by, in part, "recycling older houses and redeveloping residential neighborhoods." For the reasons already discussed, the evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the designations are not consistent with these provisions of the Regional Plan.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order dismissing the petitions of the four Petitioners. ENTERED this 8 day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8 day of August, 1991.
The Issue The issue is whether to approve Petitioners' application for a beneficial use determination (BUD) on their property in Key Largo, Florida, and if approved, to determine the type of relief that is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners purchased their property in September 2006 for $60,000.00 (or at the peak of the Florida housing boom). The parcel is located at the corner of Meridian Avenue and Lycaloma Avenue, mile marker 94.5, on the Gulf of Mexico side of U.S. Highway 1 in Key Largo. It is also identified as Block 9, Lot 1, Section 3 of the Bay Haven Subdivision, an older, partially-developed subdivision comprised of four sections and several hundred lots. Since September 15, 1986, the subdivision, including Petitioners' lot, has been zoned Suburban Residential (SR), which allows only one residential unit per two acres. No challenge to that action was taken by any person, and no contention has been made that the County failed to follow the established procedure for adopting its LDRs. A challenge to the validity of the LDRs is now barred by the statute of limitations.1 See § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. The Bay Haven Subdivision is located in South Key Largo and was first platted after World War II. Building permits for all existing homes in the subdivision were applied for before the zoning change became effective in September 1986. Due to the SR restrictions, around 250 lots remain vacant at this time, including 99 in Section 3 where Petitioners' lot is located. Many of these vacant lots have been deeded by their owners to the County for conservation purposes in exchange for points that can be used with a Rate of Growth Ordinance (ROGO)2 allocation to develop other property in the County. Petitioners' corner lot lies at the intersection of two streets and has an irregular shape with a large radius at the intersection. It is bordered on two sides by single-family homes, measures 8,276 square feet, or around 0.19 acres, and is somewhat larger than the typical subdivision lot size of 5,000 square feet. Mr. Beauchamp, who resides in Wisconsin, testified that he purchased the property with the expectation of building a home when he retired as an air traffic controller. Before purchasing the property, he assumed that it was zoned Improved Subdivision (IS) because this was the zoning incorrectly shown on the multiple listing service sheet provided by his realtor. Neither Mr. Beauchamp nor his realtor was familiar with County zoning classifications or permissible uses for the parcel.3 Sometime in 2006 they visited a County office to secure further information. Mr. Beauchamp says they spoke with two unidentified "planners," who told them that a single-family home could be built on the property. However, nothing was confirmed in writing, and there is no record of the meeting. Other than this meeting, neither Mr. Beauchamp nor his realtor took any other steps to verify the zoning on the property and/or any development restrictions that might apply. Based solely on the oral advice given by these two unnamed County employees, the Beauchamps purchased the lot. According to Petitioners' expert, Robert Smith, before purchasing a vacant lot in the Keys, normal due diligence would require a prospective purchaser to arrange a pre-application conference with Planning Department staff and secure a written Letter of Understanding confirming the rights of the property owner. See § 110-3, M.C.C. However, Petitioners (and their realtor) did not complete appropriate due diligence; they simply checked with an unidentified County employee and without any other assurance purchased the property.4 In May 2012, Petitioners' agent, Randy Wall, a builder and former Planning Commissioner but not an attorney, met with a representative of the County Building Department to begin the process of securing approval to build a single-family residence on the property. Mr. Wall was advised that the zoning on the property was SR, which allows only one dwelling unit per two acres. This was confirmed in an email dated July 13, 2012, from the Assistant Director of Planning, which stated as follows: The parcel has a zoning designation of SR which requires Two (2) acres per residential unit. As noted by planning staff, this parcel does not have sufficient land area for the zoning and associated density. At the meeting, Mr. Wall also inquired about the possibility of changing the zoning on the property from SR to IS (which would allow construction of a single-family home), but decided not to pursue that option because he recognized the poor prospects of securing a zoning change for a single lot in a large subdivision, when scores of other lots were subject to the same restriction. He assumed, probably correctly, that this might invite a spot zoning challenge. Other than having a discussion with County representatives, Mr. Wall did nothing more. He did not file an application for a residential dwelling unit allocation under the County's ROGO process, or any other formal application for relief, such as a change in the zoning district or land use designation, a variance, or an exception. Believing that the County staff would "fix the problem" because the County had made "a mistake" in reclassifying the entire subdivision as SR, Mr. Wall prepared and filed a BUD application, which was eventually deemed to be complete on September 27, 2013. The BUD process is intended "to provide a means to resolve a landowner's claim that a [LDR] or comprehensive plan policy has had an unconstitutional effect on property in a nonjudicial forum." § 102-103(a), M.C.C. An applicant for a BUD must include a statement "describing the [LDR], comprehensive plan policy, or other final action of the county, which the applicant believes necessitates relief under this division." § 102-105(b)(5), M.C.C. The application at issue simply stated that "the adoption of the land use designation of SR for the subdivision of Bay Haven constituted a compensable taking." The application did not refer to any comprehensive plan policy or final action taken by the County. As relief, the application requested that the County take one of the two following actions: (a) change the Future Land Use Map and zoning designations to allow a residence to be built on the lot; or (b) notwithstanding the SR zoning, issue a permit for development. The BUD process requires applicants to state whether they are alleging a facial or as-applied regulatory taking as the basis for administrative relief. See § 102-104, M.C.C. Unless a landowner asserts that a LDR or comprehensive plan provision, on its face, has caused a taking of his property, relief is permitted only after "the landowner has received a final decision on development approval applications from the county, including building permit allocation system allocations, appeals, administrative relief pursuant to section 138-54, and other available relief, exceptions, or variances." Id. Mr. Wall did not formally apply for any type of development approval and received no final decision, as contemplated by the Code. However, Mr. Wall testified that he "understood" the County was waiving that requirement in this instance. He also stated in the application that "Joe Haberman contracted [sic] the Beauchamps and informed them that staff had deemed this phase unnecessary and to move directly to submitting a [BUD] application." Other than this assertion, there is no evidence to confirm this understanding, and the County's Principal Planner testified that a waiver had not been granted. She also confirmed that no development approval application had been filed, and no final decision had been made, both required by the Code in order to seek relief under an "as applied" theory. Therefore, rightly or wrongly, as plainly stated in the application, Petitioners' basis for relief is that the LDR on its face constitutes a taking of their property.5 Besides a single-family home, which is impermissible here due to size limitations of the lot, two other uses are permitted as of right in the SR district: community parks and beekeeping. See § 130-94, M.C.C. Also, a property owner may apply for a minor conditional use, subject to approval by the Planning Director. Permissible minor conditional uses include public or private community tennis courts and swimming pools; public buildings and uses; parks and community uses; institutional uses; and churches, synagogues, and houses of worship. Id. However, Mr. Beauchamp testified that he is not interested in any of these uses since he believes most, if not all, would be offensive to a residential neighborhood or simply impractical due to the size of his lot. The property can also be sold to the owners of adjacent Lot 11 to be used as a side yard, its use before being purchased by Petitioners. Finally, the Principal Planner testified that there are transferable development rights (TDRs) on the property, whose value at this time is unknown. See § 130-160, M.C.C. Therefore, the Beauchamps are not deprived of all economically beneficial use of their property. Cf. § 102-110(c), M.C.C. ("[t]he highest, common, or expected use, is not intended as an appropriate remedy, unless expressly required by applicable statute or case law"). There was no evidence from a property appraiser on the fair market value of the parcel, as encumbered by the regulation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of County Commissioners deny Petitioners' application for relief under the BUD Ordinance. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2014.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the amendment to the Lee County Comprehensive Plan adopted by Ordinance No. 05-20 is "in compliance," as that term is defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2005),1 for the reasons set forth in the Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing and Statement of Intent filed by the Department of Community Affairs ("the Department").
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Department is the state land planning agency and is statutorily charged with the duty of reviewing comprehensive plans and their amendments, and determining whether a plan or amendment is “in compliance,” as that term is defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Lee County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida and has adopted a comprehensive plan that it amends from time to time pursuant to Section 163.3167(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Leeward is a Florida limited liability company that owns a portion of the real property that is the subject of the amendment at issue. The Amendment The amendment would change the future land use designation for 41.28 acres in the northeast quadrant of the Interstate 75 (I-75)/State Road 80 (SR 80) interchange from General Commercial Interchange to Urban Community, as shown on the FLUM. The General Commercial Interchange land use is described in the County Plan as “intended primarily for general community commercial land uses: retail, planned commercial districts, shopping, office, financial, and business.” It does not allow residential development. The Urban Community land use provides for a mix of residential, commercial, public, quasi-public, and limited light industrial uses. The standard density range for residential uses in the Urban Community category is one to six dwelling units per acre (du/a). The 41.28 acres affected by the amendment ("the amendment site") consist of 19.28 acres of lands along the Orange River owned by Leeward, a platted subdivision known as Dos Rios of approximately 11 acres, and the remaining acreage consists of right-of-way for SR 80 and I-75. Currently operating on Leeward's property is a vessel repair facility, a marina with wet and dry slips, and an ecotourism company. Leeward also has its office on the site. The Dos Rios subdivision includes 26 single-family lots. Apparently, only a few of the lots (the number was not established in the record) have been developed. Because residential land uses are not allowed in the General Commercial Interchange category, the Dos Rios lots were non-conforming uses. Maximum Allowed Density The County Plan provides residential density bonuses to promote various County objectives, such as the provision of affordable housing. With density bonuses, lands designated Urban Community can boost their density to a maximum of ten du/a. There was testimony presented by Leeward that the County has not often approved applications for density bonuses. Even if the practice of the County in approving density bonuses were relevant, the practice can change. It is reasonable for the Department to consider the maximum intensity or density associated with a future land use designation when determining whether a FLUM amendment is in compliance. Therefore, in this case, it is reasonable to consider the Urban Community land use designation as allowing up to ten du/a. The Department asserts that the amendment would allow the 41.2 acres affected by the amendment to have a total of 412 dwelling units (41.2 acres x 10 du/a). Leeward disputed that figure because the 41.2 acres includes road right-of-way and the Dos Rios subdivision. A hearing officer appointed to review a Lee County development order recently determined that right-of-way external to a development should not be included in calculating allowable units, and the County accepted the hearing officer's recommendation based on that determination. The definition of "density" in the County Plan supports the determination.2 Therefore, for the purposes of this case, the right-of-way in the northeast quadrant should not be included in calculating the maximum residential density that would result from the amendment. On the other hand, Leeward's argument that the Dos Rios subdivision acreage should not be included in the ten du/a calculation is rejected. For the purposes of an "in compliance" determination, it is reasonable for the Department to apply the maximum potential densities to all developable and re- developable acreage. Using 29 acres as the approximate acreage affected by the amendment when road right-of-way is subtracted, the amendment would create the potential for 290 residences in the northeast quadrant of the interchange. Adoption of the Amendment The amendment was initiated as part of the County's reexamination of the existing land use designations in the four quadrants of the I-75/SR 80 interchange. Following the County planning staff's completion of a study of the entire interchange, it recommended several changes to the County Plan, but no change was recommended for the northeast quadrant. Apparently, the amendment at issue was urged by Leeward, and, at a public hearing held on June 1, 2005, the Board of County Commissioners voted to adopt the amendment. Pursuant to Section 163.3184(6), Florida Statutes, the proposed amendment was forwarded to the Department for an "in compliance" review. Following its review, the Department issued its ORC Report on August 19, 2005. In the ORC Report, the Department objected to the proposed amendment based upon what it considered to be inappropriate residential densities in the coastal high hazard area (CHHA) and floodplain. The Department recommended that the County not adopt the proposed amendment. On October 12, 2005, another public hearing was held before the Board of County Commissioners to consider adoption of the amendment. At the public hearing, the County planning staff recommended that the land use designation in the northeast quadrant not be changed to Urban Community "due to the potential increase in density in the Coastal High Hazard Area." Nevertheless, the Board of County Commissioners approved the amendment. Representatives of Leeward appeared and submitted comments in support of the amendment at the public hearings before the Board of County Commissioners. On December 16, 2005, the Department issued its Statement of Intent to Find Comprehensive Plan Amendment Not in Compliance, identifying three reasons for its determination: (1) inconsistency with state law regarding development in the CHHA and flood prone areas, (2) internal inconsistency with provisions of the County Plan requiring the consideration of residential density reductions in undeveloped areas within the CHHA, and (3) inconsistency with the State Comprehensive Plan regarding subsidizing development in the CHHA and regulating areas subject to seasonal or periodic flooding. On January 5, 2006, the Department filed its petition for formal hearing with DOAH. Coastal High Hazard Area The Florida Legislature recognized the particular vulnerability of coastal resources and development to natural disasters and required coastal counties to address the subject in their comprehensive plans. [I]t is the intent of the Legislature that local government comprehensive plans restrict development activities where such activities would damage or destroy coastal resources, and that such plans protect human life and limit public expenditures in areas that are subject to destruction by natural disaster. § 163.3178(1), Fla. Stat. The statute also requires evacuation planning. Until 2006, the CHHA was defined as the "category 1 evacuation zone." § 163.3178(2)(h), Fla. Stat. In 2006, the CHHA was redefined as "the area below the elevation of the category 1 storm surge line as established by the Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) computerized storm surge model."3 Ch. 2006-68, § 2, Laws of Fla. The County Plan defines the CHHA as "the category 1 evacuation zone as delineated by the Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council." Map 5 of the County Plan, entitled "Lee County Coastal High Hazard Area (CHHA)," shows the entire amendment site as being within the CHHA. Nothing on Map 5, however, indicates it was produced by the Regional Planning Council. Daniel Trescott, who is employed by the Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council and is responsible for, among other things, storm surge mapping, stated that the Category 1 evacuation zone is the storm surge level for the worst case scenario landfall for a Category 1 storm. He stated that the Category 1 storm surge for Lee County was determined by the SLOSH model to be 5.3 feet. Mr. Trescott stated that the 5.3 foot contour (shown on Plate 7 of the Regional Planning Council's "Hurricane Storm Tide Atlas - Lee County") more accurately delineates the CHHA than Map 5 of the County Plan. Although Mr. Trescott's testimony suggests a conflict between the County Plan's definition of the CHHA and Map 5's depiction of the CHHA, the two can be reconciled by a finding that Map 5 is a gross depiction of the CHHA for general public information purposes, but the precise location of the CHHA boundary is the one delineated by the Regional Planning Council, and the latter is controlling. Using the 5.3 contour on the amendment site, Leeward's witness, Michael Raider, estimated that there are approximately 16 acres of the amendment site within the CHHA. Applying the maximum allowable residential density under the Urban Community land use designation (with bonuses) of ten du/a means the amendment would result in a potential for 160 dwellings in the CHHA. Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.012(3)(b)6. and Rule 9J-5.012(3)(c)7., respectively, require each local government’s coastal management element to contain one or more specific objectives that "[d]irect population concentrations away from known or predicted coastal high-hazard areas” and limit development in these areas. The parties' evidence and argument regarding whether the amendment was "in compliance" focused on these rules and the following goal, objective, and policy of the County Plan related to the CHHA: GOAL 105: PROTECTION OF LIFE AND PROPERTY IN COASTAL HIGH HAZARD AREAS. To protect human life and developed property from natural disasters. OBJECTIVE 105.1: DEVELOPMENT IN COASTAL HIGH HAZARD AREAS. Development seaward of the 1991 Coastal Construction Control Line will require applicable State of Florida approval; new development on barrier islands will be limited to densities that meet required evacuation standards; new development requiring seawalls for protection from coastal erosion will not be permitted; and allowable densities for undeveloped areas within coastal high hazard areas will be considered for reduction. POLICY 105.1.4: Through the Lee Plan amendment process, land use designations of undeveloped areas within coastal high hazard areas will be considered for reduced density categories (or assignment of minimum allowable densities where ranges are permitted) in order to limit the future population exposed to coastal flooding. In the opinion of Bernard Piawah, a planner employed by the Department, the amendment is inconsistent with the goal, objective and policy set forth above because these provisions only contemplate possible reductions of residential densities in the CHHA and there is no provision of the County Plan that addresses or establishes criteria for increasing residential densities in the CHHA. Population Concentrations As stated above, Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.012(3)(b)6. directs local governments to include provisions in their comprehensive plans to direct population concentrations away from the CHHA. The term "population concentrations" is not defined in any statute or rule. The term apparently has no generally accepted meaning in the planning profession. The word "population" has the ordinary meaning of "all of the people inhabiting a specific area." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1981). The word "concentration" has the ordinary meaning of "the act or process of concentrating." Id. The word "concentrate" means "to direct or draw toward a common center." Id. In the context of Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.012, the term "population concentrations" suggests a meaning of population densities (dwelling units per acre) of a certain level, but the level is not stated. Leeward argues that, because there is no state guidance on the meaning of the term "population concentrations," surrounding land uses should be examined to determine whether a proposed density would be "proportionate to its surroundings." According to Leeward, in order to be a population concentration, the density under review would have to be greater than the surrounding density. This comparative approach is rejected because the overarching Legislative objective is protection of life, which plainly calls for a straightforward consideration of the number of lives placed in harm's way. The Department, in its Proposed Recommended Order, states: By assigning either zero residential density to land by virtue of an Open Space land use designation, or a maximum density of one unit per acre by assigning a low density land use designation, the County Plan fulfills the mandates of State law that development be limited in and residential concentrations be directed away from the CHHA. Thus, not surprisingly, the Department does not consider one du/a to be a population concentration. A density of ten du/a is an urban density, as indicated by the fact that it is the maximum density allowed in the Urban Community land use designation and the highest density within the "standard density range" for the County's Central Urban land use designation. It is a generally known fact, of which the undersigned takes notice, that urban areas are areas where populations are concentrated. It is a another generally known fact, of which the undersigned takes notice, that ten dwelling units on one acre of land amounts to a lot of people living in a small space. Leeward, itself, described the residential density allowed under the Urban Community designation as "relatively intense." Leeward's Proposed Recommended Order, at 7. Whether measured by density alone (ten du/a) or by Leeward's estimate of 160 residences on 16 acres, the amendment places a population concentration in the CHHA. Offsets in the CHHA Leeward presented evidence that the County has been reducing residential densities, sometimes referred to as "down- planning," in other areas of the CHHA in Lee County. The reduction in dwelling units in the CHHA over the past several years may be as high as 10,000 units. The Department did not present evidence to dispute that there has been an overall reduction in dwelling units in the CHHAs of Lee County. Leeward argues that these reductions "offset" the increase in dwelling units in the CHHA that would result from the amendment and this "overall" reduction in densities in the CHHA must be considered in determining whether the amendment is "in compliance" with state law and with provisions of the County Plan related to directing population concentrations away from the CHHA. At the hearing and in its Proposed Recommended Order, the Department argued that the consideration of offsets in the CHHA was improper and unworkable, but that argument conflicts with the Department's actual practice and official position as described in the January 2006 "Department of Community Affairs Report for the Governor's Coastal High Hazard Study Committee." In that report, the Department acknowledged there is no statutory or rule guidance regarding what the maximum density should be in the CHHA. The Report notes that some local governments have established maximum densities for the CHHA (e.g., Pinellas County, 5 du/a; Franklin County 1 du/a). The Department states in the report that it reviews amendments to increase density in the CHHA on a "case by case" basis, and explains further: When a Comprehensive Plan Amendment in the CHHA proposes a density increase, DCA's review considers the amount of the density increase, the impact on evacuation times and shelter space, and whether there will be a corresponding offset in density through "down planning" (generally accomplished through public acquisition). One of the visual aides used in conjunction with the 2006 report to Governor's Coastal High Hazard Study Committee, entitled "Policy Issue #2 - Densities in High Hazard Areas," also describes the Department's practice: Without locally adopted density limits, DCA conducts a case by case review of amendments without any defined numeric limit. DCA considers amount of density increase, impact on evacuation times and shelter space, and whether there will be a corresponding offset in density through "down planning" in other areas of the CHHA. These statements use the phrase "there will be a corresponding offset," which suggests that for an offset to be considered, it would have to be proposed concurrently with an increase in residential density on other lands within the CHHA. However, according to the director of the Department's Division of Community Planning, Valerie Hubbard, offsets in the CHHA do not have to be concurrent; they can include previous reductions. Furthermore, although the Department pointed to the absence of any criteria in the County Plan to guide an offset analysis, Ms. Hubbard said it was unnecessary for a comprehensive plan to include express provisions for the use of offsets. To the extent that this evidence of the Department's interpretation of relevant law and general practice conflicts with other testimony presented by the Department in this case, the statements contained in the report to the Governor's Coastal High Hazard Study Committee and the testimony of Ms. Hubbard are more persuasive evidence of the Department's policy and practice in determining compliance with the requirement that comprehensive plans direct population densities away from the CHHA and limit development in the CHHA. As long as the Department's practice when conducting an "in compliance" review of amendments that increase residential density in the CHHA is to take into account offsets, the Department has the duty to be consistent and to take into account the County's offsets in the review of this amendment. The County planning director testified that he believed the applicable goal, objective, and policy of the County Plan are met as long as there has been a reduction in residential densities in the CHHAs of the County as a whole. The Department points out that the planning director's opinion was not included in the County planning staff's reports prepared in conjunction with the amendment. However, it necessarily follows from the Board of County Commissioners' adoption of the amendment that it does not interpret Objective 105.1 and Policy 105-1.4 as prohibiting an increase in residential density in the CHHA. Although these provisions make no mention of offsets, the Department has not required offset provisions in a comprehensive plan before the Department will consider offsets in its determination whether a plan amendment that increases density in the CHHA is in compliance. The wording used in Objective 105.1 and Policy 105-1.4 requiring "consideration" of density reductions in the CHHA can be harmonized with the County planning director's testimony and with the County's adoption of the amendment by construing these plan provisions consistently with the Department's own practice of allowing increases in the CHHA when the increases are offset by overall reductions in dwelling units in the CHHA. Seeking to harmonize the amendment with the provisions of the County Plan is the proper approach because, as discussed later in the Conclusions of Law, whether an amendment is consistent with other provisions of the plan is subject to the "fairly debatable" standard which is a highly deferential standard that looks for "any reason it is open to dispute or controversy on grounds that make sense or point to a logical deduction." Martin County v. Yusem, 690 So. 2d 1288, 1295 (Fla. 1997). Shelter Space and Clearance Time Prior to the hearing in this case, Leeward moved to strike certain statute and rule citations in the Department's petition related to shelter space and clearance time4 because they were not included in the Department's ORC Report. The motion was denied because, although Section 163.3184(8)(b), Florida Statutes, limits the Department's petition to issues raised in the "written comments" in the ORC Report, the statute does not indicate that the Department is barred from citing in its petition, for the first time, a rule or statute that is directly related to the written comments. The CHHA is defined in the County Plan as the category one "evacuation zone." It is the area most in need of evacuation in the event of a severe coastal storm. Shelter space and clearance time are integral to evacuation planning and directly related to the Department's comment in the ORC Report that the amendment would, "expose a substantial population to the dangers of a hurricane." Therefore, the Department was not barred from presenting evidence on shelter space and clearance time in support of this comment. The Department's practice when reviewing an amendment that increases residential density in the CHHA, described in its 2006 report to the Governor's Coastal High Hazard Area Study Committee, is to consider not only dwelling unit offsets in the CHHA, but also the effect on shelter space and clearance time. That report did not elaborate on how shelter space and clearance time are considered by the Department, but evidence that a comprehensive plan amendment would have a significant adverse effect on shelter space or clearance time could presumably negate what would otherwise appear to the Department to be an acceptable offset of residential density in the CHHA. On this record, however, the Department did not show that a significant adverse impact on shelter space or clearance time would be caused by this particular amendment.5 Special Planning Areas Leeward argues that, even if the amendment were determined to be inconsistent with Objective 105.1 and Policy 105-1.4, that inconsistency should be balanced against other provisions in the County Plan that are furthered by the amendment, principally the provisions related to the Caloosahatchee Shores Community Planning Area and the Water- Dependent Use Overlay Zone. There is no authority for such a balancing approach that can overcome an inconsistency with an objective or policy of the comprehensive plan. Therefore, whether the amendment furthers the provisions of the County Plan related to the Caloosahatchee Shores Community Planning Area, Water-Dependent Use Overlay Zone, or other subjects is irrelevant to whether the amendment is consistent with Objective 105.1 and Policy 105-1.4. On the other hand, the Department's contention that the amendment is inconsistent with the provisions of the County Plan related to the Caloosahatchee Shores Community Planning Area is contrary to the more credible evidence. 100-Year Floodplain The amendment site is entirely within the 100-year floodplain. In its Statement of Intent, the Department determined that the amendment was not in compliance, in part, because the amendment site's location in the 100-year floodplain made it unsuitable for residential development. In addition, the Department determined that the amendment caused an internal inconsistency with the following policies of the County Plan related to development in the floodplain: POLICY 61.3.2: Floodplains must be managed to minimize the potential loss of life and damage to property by flooding. POLICY 61.3.6: Developments must have and maintain an adequate surface water management system, provision for acceptable programs for operation and maintenance, and post-development runoff conditions which reflect the natural surface water flow in terms of rate, direction, quality, hydroperiod, and drainage basin. Detailed regulations will continue to be integrated with other county development regulations. According to Mike McDaniel, a growth management administrator with the Department, "we try to discourage increasing densities in floodplains and encourage that it be located in more suitable areas." The policies set forth above are intended to aid in the achievement of Goal 61 of the Community Facilities and Service Element "to protect water resources through the application of innovative and sound methods of surface water management and by ensuring that the public and private construction, operation, and maintenance of surface water management systems are consistent with the need to protect receiving waters.” Plainly, Goal 61 is directed to regulating construction and surface water management systems. There is no mention in this goal or in the policies that implement the goal of prohibiting all development or certain kinds of development in the 100-year floodplain. The Department's argument in this case regarding development in the 100-year floodplain is rejected because it ignores relevant facts and law. First, substantial portions of Lee County and the State are within the 100-year floodplain. Second, there is no state statute or rule that prohibits development in the 100-year floodplain. Third, the Department of Environmental Protection, water management districts, and local governments regulate development in the floodplain by application of construction standards, water management criteria, and similar regulatory controls to protect floodplain functions as well as human life and property. Fourth, there has been and continues to be development in the 100-year floodplain in Lee County and throughout the State, clearly indicating that such development is able to comply with all federal, state, and local requirements imposed by the permitting agencies for the specific purpose of protecting the floodplain and the public. Fifth, the Department "discourages" development in the floodplain but has not established by rule a standard, based on density or other measure, which reasonably identifies for local governments or the general public what development in the floodplain is acceptable to the Department and what development is unacceptable. Finally, the Department's practice in allowing offsets in the CHHA, as discussed previously, necessarily allows for development in the 100-year floodplain in that particular context.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission determining that the amendment adopted by Lee County in Ordinance No. 05-10 is "in compliance" as defined in Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2006.
