STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
JORGE L. BARRETO, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
) Case No. 89-4048
OFFICE OF THE TREASURER, ) DIVISION OF STATE FIRE MARSHAL, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
This case was scheduled for final hearing for November 3, 1989. By stipulation, the parties agreed to submit documentary evidence in lieu of live testimony and complied with a schedule to file their proposed recommended orders. The parties have been represented in this cause as follows:
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Jorge L. Barreto, Lieutenant
1717 North Bayshore Drive #2737
Miami, Florida 33132
For Respondent: Lisa S. Santucci
Office of Legal Services
412 Larson Building
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The central issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to qualify for the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This case began on June 27, 1989, when the Office of the Treasurer, Department of Insurance, Bureau of Fire Standards & Training (Department) issued a notice to Petitioner advising him that his request for approval for the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program was denied. Specifically, the Department had determined that Petitioner's transcript did not establish that Petitioner possessed an appropriate major study concentration area to qualify for approval. Thereafter, the Petitioner requested a hearing to review the Department's denial. Petitioner's argument has been that other firefighters with whom he has worked had similiar or the same major and were approved for participation, that he knew of such approvals, and that he, too, should be approved.
By stipulation, the parties submitted documentary evidence consisting of the following: the transcript of Jorge Luis Barreto; Part V, Firefighters Educational Incentive Program (portions of Rule 4A-37, Florida Administrative
Code); copies of records for the following individuals- Donald P. Pilger; Andrew L. Huntington; Daniel G. Meadows; Edward Pidermann; Robert D. Martinez;
George T. Gross; Patrick J. Regan; statement issued by Adella Keels; statement issued by Eleanor B. Polster; and the entire file of the Department related to the Petitioner.
Petitioner submitted a statement which has been considered in the drafting of this recommended order. The proposed findings of fact submitted by the Department have also been considered; specific rulings on them are included in the attached appendix.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based upon the documentary evidence received, the following findings of fact are made:
At all times material to the issue in this case, Petitioner, Jorge L. Barreto, has been employed as a firefighter with the City of Miami, Fire, Rescue & Inspection Services Department (City). Petitioner has attained the rank of Fire Lieutenant with the City. Petitioner's primary function with the City is that of firefighter.
During the period March 10, 1986 until January 31, 1987, Petitioner was assigned to Rescue 2B. For that same period, a firefighter named George T. Gross was also assigned to Rescue 2B. Mr. Gross' request for supplemental compensation was approved by the Department on April 17, 1986. Mr. Gross' entry into the Firefighter Supplemental Compensation Program was deemed appropriate under the requirements of Section 633.382, Florida Statutes, and Rule 4A-37.76, Florida Administrative Code. Mr. Gross' field of major study as specified in his transcript indicated the degree, bachelor of business administration major- finance" from Florida Atlantic University.
On September 30, 1988, Patrick J. Regan, a member of the City's fire department, was approved for supplemental compensation. On August 12, 1988, Mr. Regan was awarded a bachelor of business administration with a major in finance.
On April 10, 1987, Robert D. Martinez, a firefighter with the City, was approved for entry into the Firefighter Supplemental Compensation Program. Pursuant to Statute 633.382, Florida Statutes, and Rule 4A-37.76, Florida Administrative Code, Mr. Martinez was deemed to have qualified. Mr. Martinez' transcript from the University of South Florida indicated "Latest college: Business Administration Latest Major: Finance."
On April 17, 1986, Andrew L. Huntington, a firefighter with the City's department, was approved for entry into the Firefighter Supplemental Compensation Program. Mr. Huntington possessed a bachelor of business administration degree with a major field of study in accounting.
On August 29, 1986, Edward Pidermann, a firefighter with the City's department, was approved for entry into the Firefighter Supplemental Compensation Program. Mr. Pidermann's notification letter specified he had qualified under the requirements "for possession of a/an B/A degree of Accounting."
On June 27, 1986, Daniel G. Meadows, a firefighter with the City's department, was approved for entry into the Firefighter Supplemental Compensation Program. Mr. Meadows' transcript specified that he had been awarded "Bachelor of Business Administration Major: Marketing School of Business and Organization Sci" from Florida International University.
Effective July 1, 1981, Donald P. Pilger was accepted foil entry into the Firefighter Educational Incentive Program established by Section 633.382, Florida Statutes. Mr. Pilger's transcript from St. Edward's University provided: "College ARTS and SCIENCES Major Subject Accounting Degree B.B.A."
On April 16, 1986, Bruce A. Oestreich, a member of the City's fire department, was authorized to receive supplemental compensation. Mr. Oestreich was awarded a bachelor of arts in political science on December 17, 1977. Mr. Oestreich's duties with the City are not a part of the record in this case.
On or about May 11, 1989, Petitioner executed a form entitled "Bureau of Fire Standards and Training Firefighter Educational Incentive Program Transcript Request." The purpose of the form was to secure a transcript which would verify Petitioner's eligibility for entrance into the Educational Incentive Program. On June 19, 1989, the transcript was received by the Department.
On or about April 21, 1989, Petitioner was awarded a bachelor's degree in business administration from Florida International University, College of Business Administration. His major field of study was finance. Prior to the award of this degree, Petitioner had received an associate in arts degree (A.A.) in general education on July 30, 1982. The A.A. degree course of study had included 46 semester hours in fire-related subjects.
On June 27, 1989, the Department advised Petitioner that it had determined that he did not possess an appropriate major study concentration to qualify for the firefighters supplemental compensation program. Thereafter, on July 18, 1989, Petitioner filed a letter requesting a formal proceeding regarding the denial of eligibility. The Department did not contest the accuracy of Petitioner' s transcripts.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of these proceedings.
The Petitioner bears the responsibility of establishing he is entitled to entry into the Firefighter Supplemental Compensation Program.
Section 633.382, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part:
QUALIFICATIONS FOR SUPPLEMENTAL COMPENSATION.--
In addition to the compensation now paid by an employing agency to any firefighter, every firefighter shall be paid supplemental compensation by the employing agency when such firefighter has complied with one of the following criteria:
* * *
2. Any firefighter, regardless of whether or not he earned an associate degree earlier, who receives from an accredited college or university a bachelor's degree, which bachelor's degree curriculum includes a major study concentration area readily identifiable and applicable to fire-related subjects, as outlined in policy guidelines of the division, shall receive compensation as outlined in paragraph (3) (b).
Rule 4A-37.072, Florida Administrative Code, provides, in part:
(1) The term "Bachelor Degree" as used in this rule chapter means a Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Science degree conferred by an
accredited post-secondary institution provided the major study concentration area is readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related.
* * *
(3) The major study concentration area, at least 18 semester hours or 27 quarter hours, must be readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related. Those major study concentration areas specifically identified in Rule 4A-
37.073 are considered by the Division to be readily identifiable and applicable as fire- related.
Rule 4A-37.073, Florida Administrative Code, provides:
The term "Major Study Concentration Area" as used in this rule chapter means, as identified on official sealed transcripts, a major in fire science, fire science technology, fire science administration, fire protection engineer, management, human resource management, management science, general business administration, public administration, emergency medical technology, paramedic technology, education, fire science vocational education, paramedic and/or health occupations, or any other degree that is found by the Division to be compatible with the functions of the employing agency or the job. Applicants who possess a degree with a major study concentration area which is not specified above may petition the Division for entry into the program if they feel that the major is fire-related. The burden of proof shall be on the applicant. (e.s.)
The term "general business administration" is not defined by statute or rule. The Department has, in the past, allowed entry to the program when the applicant had a business administration degree with a major in a specific subcatagory. The rationale for allowing others, but not Petitioner, to gain entry has not been explained. Further, Petitioner's total semester hours
specifically related to fire, health, paramedic, or fire science exceed the minimum specified by Rule 4A-37.072, Florida Administrative Code. Other applicants, who were admitted to the program, did not have comparable fire- related hours in the non- major field. The Department's past application of the pertinent rules must be persuasive in this case. No explanation as to how the records of other firefighters differ from this applicant has been suggested.
Moreover, the Department has not taken the position that the other firefighters gained entry to the program in error. Consequently, based upon a clear reading of the rules, the record submitted in this case, and the Department's past application of the rules, the Petitioner has established he is entitled to entry to the Firefighter Supplemental Compensation Program.
The Department's argument regarding Petitioner's claim of estoppel is without merit. The Petitioner is not required to establish estoppel when, as in this case, it has been shown that the Department has consistently interpreted the plain language of the rule as applied herein.
Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED:
That the Office of the Treasurer, Department of Insurance, Division of State Fire Marshal, enter a final order granting the application of Petitioner for the Firefighter Supplemental Compensation Program.
DONE and ENTERED this 29 day of January, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(904)488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 1990.
APPENDIX
RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER:
The Petitioner in this case submitted a narrative which was not in a form sufficient to address rulings; consequently, the narrative as been deemed argument or comment not requiring specific rulings.
RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE DEPARTMENT:
Paragraphs 1 through 3 are accepted. While finance is not listed specifically among the areas, business administration (which Petitioner received a degree in) is listed. Apparently, the subarea of specialty is finance but the degree is business administration.
The first sentence of paragraph 4 is accepted. The second sentence of paragraph 4 is rejected as irrelevant.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Lisa S. Santucci
Office of Legal Services
412 Larson Building
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Jorge L. Barreto
1717 North Bayshore Drive #2737
Miami, Florida 33132
Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner
The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Don Dowdell General Counsel
Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Frederick C. Stark Bureau Chief
Bureau of Fire Standards & Training 1501 W. Silver Springs Boulevard Ocala, Florida 32675-6499
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AGENCY FINAL ORDER
=================================================================
FIRE MARSHAL
IN THE MATTER OF:
OFFICE OF THE TREASURER DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
JORGE L. BARRETTO CASE NO. 89-4048
/
FINAL ORDER
THIS CAUSE came on before the undersigned Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner of the State of Florida for consideration and final agency action. By letter dated June 27, 1989, the Department of Insurance notified Petitioner, JORGE L. BARRETTO, that his application for the Firefighters supplemental
Compensation Program at the Bachelor level was denied. The denial was based upon the Department's determination that Petitioner did not possess an appropriate Major Study Concentration Area to qualify for the Firefighters supplemental Compensation Program at the Bachelor level. By letter dated July 17, 1989, the Petitioner requested a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
The parties agreed that, in lieu of live testimony, each party would submit written evidence together with their Proposed Recommended Orders on or before December 4, 1989. Respondent filed its Proposed Recommended Order and exhibits on December 4, 1989. Petitioner filed a statement and exhibits with the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 4, 1989. Respondent did not receive a copy of Petitioner's filing.
After consideration of the evidence submitted by the parties, the Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order, and the Petitioner's statement, the Hearing Officer issued a Recommended Order (attached as exhibit A) on January 29, 1990. The Hearing Officer recommended that the Department of Insurance, Division of State Fire Marshal, issue a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for the Firefighter Supplemental Compensation program.
On February 8, 1990, Respondent filed Exceptions to the Recommended Order and furnished copies of same to the Petitioner. No exceptions were filed by Petitioner.
RULING ON RESPONDENT'S EXCEPTIONS TO PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
7 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Respondent's Exceptions take exception to the Preliminary Statement in the Recommended Order which refers to a "statement issued by Adella Keels" and a "statement" filed by Petitioner which were considered in the drafting of the Recommended Order. These documents were not provided to Respondent by Petitioner or by the Hearing Officer. However, after receiving the Recommended Order, the Department obtained these exhibits for its file. Because these documents were considered by the Hearing Officer in drafting the Recommended Order, and because the consideration of these documents, in light of their content, would not result in prejudice to the Respondent, they will be considered as part of the record in this case. Therefore, Respondent's exceptions in Paragraphs 1 and 2 are denied.
RULING ON RESPONDENT'S EXCEPTION TO FINDINGS OF FACT
Paragraph 3 of Respondent's Exceptions takes exception to the statement in the Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact numbered 4, regarding a firefighter with a transcript similar to Petitioner's, that
Pursuant to Statute 633.382, Florida Statutes, and Rule 4A-37.76, Florida Administrative Code, Mr. Martinez was deemed to have qualified. Mr. Martinez' transcript from the University of South Florida indicated "Latest College: Business Administration Latest Major: Finance."
The transcript of Robert David Martinez is ambiguous as to the major earned by Mr. Martinez. Although the transcript states "Latest Major: Finance", the transcript also states "Major - Finance and General Business Administration." Accordingly, it is unclear whether Mr. Martinez earned a major in two fields, finance and general business administration, or in finance alone. This ambiguity also affects Respondent's argument that the transcript shows that Mr. Martinez had a double major in finance and general business administration and was therefore properly placed in the Firefighters supplemental Compensation Program. These statements in paragraph 3 of Respondent's Exceptions are supported only by the ambiguous transcript and are thus rejected. Because the finding that Mr.
Martinez earned a degree with a major in finance alone is not supported by competent, substantial evidence, Respondent's exception in paragraph 3 is accepted with the limitations noted above.
RULING ON RESPONDENT'S EXCEPTION TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Paragraph 4 of Respondent's Exceptions takes exception to the Hearing Officer's Conclusion of Law numbered 6 in the Recommended Order. There appears to be no dispute in this base that Petitioner earned a Bachelor of Business Administration with a major in finance from an accredited post secondary institution. The Hearing Officer has concluded that because Rule 4A-37.073, Florida Administrative Code lists "general business administration" as one of the qualifying majors, and because the Department of Insurance has, in the past, admitted firefighters with degrees entitled "Bachelor of Business Administration" (B.B.A.) with minors such as accounting or finance into the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program, that Petitioner should likewise be admitted into the program.
Rule 4A-37.072, Florida Administrative Code does not include a degree entitled Bachelor of Business Administration in the definition of bachelor degree. The rule defines "Bachelor Degree" as "a Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Science degree conferred by an accredited post secondary institution . Rule 4A-37.072, Fla. Admin. Code. Even if a Bachelor of Business Administration was an appropriate Bachelor Degree under the rule, Respondent correctly points out that the Rule requires the , as identified on sealed transcripts, to be one of the majors listed in Rule 4A-37.073, to be found by the Division of Fire Marshal to be compatible with the functions of the employing agency or the job, or to be shown by the applicant to be a fire-related major to qualify the applicant for the Firefighters supplemental Compensation Program. A Bachelor of Business Administration decree is not analogous to a Bachelor of Arts degree with a major in General Business Administration.
Clearly, Rule 4A-37.073 does not list finance as a qualifying major. The Division of Fire Marshal did not find that Petitioner's finance major was compatible with the functions of the employing agency or the job in this case. Accordingly, Petitioner had the burden of showing that his finance major was fire-related.
There is no evidence in the record that Petitioner's finance major is fire-related. Although Petitioner earned several semester hours' credit in
fire-related courses which applied to his associate degree, awarded in 1982, the record does not reflect that Petitioner took any fire-related courses in connection with his Bachelor of Business Administration degree with a major in finance, which was awarded in 1989
The Hearing Officer did not conclude that Petitioner's finance major was fire-related, as is required by a clear reading of the applicable rules. The Hearing Officer's Conclusion of Law numbered 6 concluded that Petitioner established his entitlement to entry into the Firefighter's Supplemental Compensation Program by providing evidence that the Department of Insurance has, in the past, allowed at least two firefighters with Bachelor of Business Administration degrees with majors in finance into the -program. Although the Hearing Officer does not explicitly so state, the conclusion that Petitioner has met his burden of showing his entitlement to entry into the Firefighter's Supplemental Compensation Program by showing "the Department's past application of the rules" depends upon a finding that the Department's past errors estop the Department from properly adhering to the clear language of Rule 4A-37.073, Florida Administrative Code. Because there was no showing or finding that Petitioner's finance major was fire-related, the issue of whether the Department is estopped by past erroneous interpretations of the rule is determinative of this case. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer's conclusion that "based upon a clear reading of the rules, the record submitted in this case, and the Department's past application of the rules, the Petitioner has established he is entitled to entry into the Firefighter supplemental Compensation Program" is rejected. Although examination of an applicant's total course work might be relevant to a determination of whether an unlisted major was fire-related, Petitioner's transcript does not contain evidence that he took fire-related courses in pursuit of his finance major. Respondents exception numbered 4 is accepted.
Paragraph 5 of Respondent's Exceptions excepts to the Hearing Officer's Conclusion of Law numbered 7. The Hearing Officer concluded that the Petitioner is not required to show that the Department of Insurance is estopped "when, as in this case, it has been shown that the Department has consistently interpreted the plain language of the rule as applied herein." The only support offered for Petitioner's claim is the past actions of the Department, relative to applicants similar to Petitioner. Accordingly, the question of whether the Department is estopped to deny Petitioner's application is determinative of this case and Respondent's exception numbered 5 is accepted. Because the Hearing Officer did not address the issue of estoppel, I will now address that issue.
It is well settled that equitable estoppel will be applied against the state only in rare instances and under exceptional circumstances. North American Co. v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1959); State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1981). In State Department of Revenue v.
Anderson, supra, the Florida Supreme Court listed the elements of estoppel by stating that
[i]n order to demonstrate estoppel, the following elements must be shown:
a representation as to a material fact that is contrary to a later asserted position;
reliance on that representation; and
a change in position detrimental to the party claiming estoppel1, caused by the representation and reliance thereon.
State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So.2d at 400. In Anderson, the court found that the Department of Revenue was not estopped from collecting back taxes from Anderson, even though the Department had erroneously given Anderson a refund of taxes on one occasion. Anderson argued that his failure to pay sales taxes for several years following the- refund resulted from his reliance upon
the refund as a statement that his transactions were exempt from sales tax. The Court found that the refund did not amount to a long-standing policy constituting an administrative construction of the applicable statutes and rules as exempting Anderson from payment of sales tax. The court noted that the state cannot be estopped through mistaken statements of the law. See also, Austin v. Austin, 350 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), review denied, 357 So.2d 184 (Fla.
1978) (erroneous statement of law in pamphlet issued to public did not estop Department of Administration- to refuse to comply with erroneous statement because no change in claimant's position in reliance upon erroneous statement shown).
Additionally, estoppel will not lie where there has been no representation by the agency upon which the person claiming estoppel could have relied. In State Department of Transportation v. Clancey, 521 So.2d 376 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), the agency was not estopped from enforcing an administrative rule requiring absent employees to obtain written authorization, even though the agency had, by its past conduct, led the employee to believe that such authorization would not be required. The court concluded that without a representation upon which the employee could have reasonably relied, no estoppel will result. See also, Shaffer v. School Board of Martin County, 543 So.2d 335 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).
In the instant case, Petitioner never received assurances, either overt or implied, from the Division of Fire Marshal that his major would qualify him for the Firefighter's supplemental Compensation Program. Petitioner did not pursue his Bachelors degree to his detriment in reliance on any statement from the Division of Fire Marshal. Although the record contains evidence that two firefighters with Bachelor of Business Administration degrees with majors in finance have been accepted into the Firefighter's supplemental Compensation Program, one in 1986 and the other in 1988, these erroneous applications of the law by the Division of Fire Marshal do not constitute a long-standing policy of administrative construction of the applicable rules to mean that firefighters with bachelors of business administration degrees with majors in finance are entitled to entry into the Firefighters supplemental Compensation Program.
This case is distinguished from Walker v. State Department of Transportation, 366 So.2d 96 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), where the Department of Transportation had routinely accepted late payment of permit fees for roadside billboards for years prior to refusing to accept certain late payments. The past practice by the Department of Transportation was "widespread and was known to, and relied upon by, sign owners." 366 So.2d at 99. In contrast, the erroneous acceptance of the two firefighters with finance majors and, between 1981 and 1987, the erroneous acceptance of five other firefighters with accounting, marketing, or political science majors into a program with over 400 participants at the bachelor level in the instant case has not been shown to be a widespread practice which is commonly known and relied upon by firefighters contemplating obtaining college degrees.
RULING ON RESPONDENT'S EXCEPTION TO RECOMMENDATION
Respondent excepts to the Hearing Officer's recommendation that a Final Order be entered granting Petitioner's application for entry into the Firefighter's Supplemental Compensation Program. Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Recommended by the Hearing Officer, and upon the foregoing rulings on Exceptions to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, I reject the Hearing Officer's recommendation.
Finance is not one of the majors listed in Rule 4A-37.073, Florida Administrative Code which are identified as fire-related majors. Petitioner's Bachelor of Business Administration degree is not analogous to a major in general business administration, as listed in the applicable rule.
The record in this case contains no evidence or finding of fact by the Hearing Officer that Petitioner has met his burden of proving that his Bachelor of Business administration degree with a major in finance is fire-related.
Fire-related courses taken by Petitioner to earn his associate degree do not affect the fire-related status of the finance major he earned seven years after the associate degree was awarded.
Because Petitioner's major is not listed in the applicable rule, and because there is no evidence that the bachelor degree was fire-related, the only basis for the Hearing Officer's recommendation would be a showing that the Department's past erroneous acceptance of other applicants into the program estops the Department from correctly enforcing Rule 4A-37.073, Florida Administrative Code. The record contains no evidence of any statements made directly to Petitioner concerning his eligibility for the program prior to his pursuing his bachelors degree. Therefore, in order to constitute an estoppel, the Department's past actions regarding other applicants must constitute such a routine, widespread, and well known practice as to justify Petitioner's detrimental reliance upon such past practices. The record simply does not contain competent, substantial evidence to support a conclusion that Petitioner has relied to his detriment on the Department's past mistakes in a small number of instances over a period of several years or that these errors constitute a routine, long-standing agency interpretation of Rule 4A-37.073, Florida Administrative Code.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
That the Findings of Fact of the Hearing Officer are adopted with the exceptions noted above;
That the Conclusions of Law of the Hearing Officer are adopted with the exceptions noted above:
That the recommendation of the Hearing Officer is rejected;
That the application of Jorge L. Barretto for the Firefighter supplemental Compensation Program is DENIED.
Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Order is entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Review Proceedings must be instituted by filing a petition or notice of appeal with the General Counsel, acting as the agency clerk, at 412 Larson Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399- 0300, and a copy of the same with the appropriate district court of appeal within thirty (30) days of the rendition of this Order.
DONE AND ORDERED this 27 day of March 1990.
TOM GALLAGHER
Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner
Copies furnished to:
Honorable Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
Jorge L. Barretto
1717 North Bayshore Drive #2737
Miami, Florida 33132
Lisa S. Santucci
Division of Legal Services
412 Larson Building
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Frederick C. Stark Bureau Chief
Bureau of Fire Standards & Training 1501 W. Silver Springs Boulevard Ocala, Florida 32675-6499
Issue Date | Proceedings |
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Jan. 29, 1990 | Recommended Order (hearing held , 2013). CASE CLOSED. |
Issue Date | Document | Summary |
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Mar. 27, 1990 | Agency Final Order | |
Jan. 29, 1990 | Recommended Order | Agency`s past application of rules persuasive and where agency fails to explain how applicant differs from others, petitioner must be treated in same manner |