The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner qualifies for the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program at the Bachelor level for supplemental compensation at the rate of $110.00 per month.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant and material to these proceedings, the Petitioner has been employed as a firefighter with the Metro-Dade Fire Department. The Petitioner's primary function with the Metro-Dade Fire Department is as a firefighter. By letter dated May 30, 1991, and received on June 10, 1991, the Petitioner applied to the Respondent for Firefighters Supplemental Compensation at the Bachelor degree level. Three transcripts were submitted with the Petitioner's application. The first was from Miami-Dade Community College, and showed that an Associate of Science degree in Fire Science was awarded to the Petitioner on May 4, 1991. The second transcript was from Broward Community College, showing many courses taken by Petitioner, but no degree awarded. 3/ The third transcript was from Florida International University, and showed that a Bachelor of Science degree with a major in Industrial Technology was awarded to Petitioner on December 12, 1980. Petitioner's Bachelor degree from Florida International University is not based upon, and does not include, any of the courses in fire science that formed the basis for Petitioner's Associate degree from Miami-Dade Community College. 4/ Petitioner's transcript of her Bachelor degree does not reveal a major study concentration area of at least 18 semester hours or 27 quarter hours which is readily identifiable and applicable as fire- related. On or about June 24, 1991, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that she was eligible for the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program at the Associate degree level by virtue of her Associate of Science degree in Fire Science from Miami-Dade Community College. On or about June 26, 1991, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that she was not eligible for the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program at the Bachelor degree level because Petitioner's major in Industrial Technology from Florida International University was not a recognized Major Study Concentration Area in Rule 4A-37.084. The denial letter cites and quotes the definition of "Bachelor's Degree" at Rule 4A-37.084(3), Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation For all of the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance issue a final order in this case denying the Petitioner's application for participation in the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program at the Bachelor degree level. 7/ DONE AND ENTERED at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of December, 1991. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1991.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner successfully completed the Firefighter Minimum Standards Practical Examination or the Practical Examination Retest for certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a candidate for certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida. To be certified as a firefighter, a candidate is required to successfully complete the Firefighter Minimum Standards Written and Practical Examination (Practical Examination). A candidate is able to take the certification test twice. If a candidate fails the first time, the candidate is automatically afforded an opportunity for a retest. On October 15, 2012, Petitioner initially took the Practical Examination at Daytona State Fire College in Daytona, Florida. The Practical Examination consists of four parts, or evolutions: self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), hose operation, ladder operation, and fireground skills. To successfully complete the Practical Examination, a candidate is required to receive a minimum of 70 points on each evolution and to complete all mandatory steps. Petitioner received more than a minimum of 70 points on the SCBA and hose evolutions, but did not achieve a passing score on either the ladder evolution or the fireground skills evolution. The maximum time allowed on the ladder evolution is four minutes and 30 seconds. Exceeding the maximum time allowed is an automatic failure of the ladder evolution. Petitioner’s time on the ladder evolution was four minutes and 50 seconds, which was 20 seconds more than the maximum time allowed. Petitioner admitted that he exceeded the maximum time allowed to complete the ladder evolution. He blames that failure on the testing instructor, Mr. Johnson, for not being located where Petitioner could hand off a halligan to him in order to complete the test. A halligan is a tool used by firefighters to sound the floor of a burning building for safety. During the ladder evolution, a candidate is required to pick up the halligan prior to ascending a pre-positioned 24-foot extension ladder, sound the floor with the halligan, enter the second floor, descend a set of stairs to the first floor, locate a mannequin, and execute a “rescue” by dragging or carrying the mannequin out of a doorway. When a candidate clears the doorway threshold with the mannequin, the ladder evolution is complete. During testing, Petitioner understood he would be handing the halligan off to Mr. Johnson. However, Mr. Johnson was not there, and, as Petitioner explained, “I had my halligan in my hand and I was looking around for him, but he was nowhere to be found. . . . Well, the time that it took me to look for my instructor, which I am not supposed to do, he was supposed to be there, my time went over –- my time went over.” Because of his failure to pass the ladder evolution and fireground skills evolution, Petitioner failed to successfully complete the Practical Examination. On November 6, 2012, Petitioner took a Practical Examination Retest (Retest) at Florida State Fire College in Ocala, Florida. The Retest consisted of the same four evolutions. He was required to receive a minimum of 70 points on each evolution and to complete all mandatory steps in order to successfully complete the Retest. On the Retest, Petitioner received a perfect score of 100 points on the SCBA and hose evolutions. He received 90 points on the fireground skills evolution, but received no points on the ladder evolution. Petitioner exceeded the maximum time allowed on the ladder evolution. As on the original examination, the maximum time allowed is four minutes and 30 seconds and exceeding the maximum time allowed is an automatic failure of the ladder evolution. Petitioner’s time was four minutes and 38 seconds, which is 8 seconds more than the maximum time allowed. He received zero points on the ladder evolution for exceeding the maximum time allowed. As a result of his failing to pass the ladder evolution, Petitioner failed to successfully complete the Retest. Because Petitioner failed the Retest, the Department denied his certification as a firefighter. In support of his challenge to the Department's determination that he exceeded the maximum time allowed on the ladder evolution, Petitioner testified that his wife was present at the Retest and recorded his time on the ladder evolution as four minutes and 17 seconds, 13 seconds faster than the maximum time allowed. Petitioner explained that his wife was positioned in an automobile at the grounds with a “straight-shot” view of the ground skills course, then drove to the other side of the course to observe and time the ladder evolution. Petitioner introduced into evidence a photocopy of a sheet of notebook paper on which was written “Ricky’s time 3:58” on one line and “4:17” on the next line. Petitioner’s wife neither testified to overcome the hearsay nature of the evidence, nor did she authenticate the evidence. Further, Petitioner admitted that the time his wife recorded was likely not exact, but rather gave him a “ballpark figure of not going over the four minutes and 30 seconds that I had.” Petitioner stated his wife’s recorded time would not be the same as the field representative’s because the field representative started the stopwatch when Petitioner touched the ladder, as per protocol. Petitioner’s wife started her clock when Petitioner gave her the “thumbs up.” Dennis Hackett, Interim Standards Supervisor, testified that it would be impossible for a third party to accurately time a candidate during the ladder evolution at Florida State Fire College. Mr. Hackett explained: There’s just too many obstructions. If they were –- the tower, where the ladder evolution starts, is on the opposite side of where [third party observers] have to stay. Or they could go to another roadway that they could see the ladder evolution started, but there’s a burn building in the way to see the ascension of the ladder to the second floor. You can’t see that. They would have to be a marathon runner to get from where they could see to the second portion where they would come out of the building. [T.53:18 through T.54:2] The time of four minutes and 17 seconds recorded by Petitioner’s wife for Petitioner’s completion of the ladder evolution is not accepted as competent substantial evidence of the actual time in which Petitioner completed the ladder evolution on the Retest. Tuffy Dixon is the Department’s field representative who administered the Retest to Petitioner in Ocala. Petitioner argues that Mr. Dixon may have failed to reset the stopwatch to zero prior to Petitioner beginning the ladder evolution. Petitioner testified that he had been told by unnamed instructors at Daytona State Fire College that mistakes like that had been made. Petitioner failed to present any evidence as to the inaccuracy of the stopwatch used to time the ladder evolution or as to the inaccuracy of the Mr.Dixon’s use of the stopwatch at the Retest. He presented only assumptions or speculation as to the inaccuracy of Mr. Dixon’s use of the stopwatch. Mr. Dixon has administered approximately 500 practical examinations in the two years he has served the Department. He testified that he is certain his stopwatch was functioning correctly on the day of Petitioner’s Retest and that he reset the stopwatch to zero prior to Petitioner beginning the ladder evolution. Mr. Dixon’s testimony is accepted as credible. In further support of his arguments, Petitioner also testified that he never exceeded the maximum time allowed for the ladder evolution during practice runs at the facility. He maintained that the course in Daytona is longer than the course in Ocala, so it does not make sense that he would not complete the ladder evolution within the maximum time allowed. Despite the fact that Petitioner submitted with his petition in this case a list of names and telephone numbers of Daytona State Fire College classmates who could attest to his time on practice runs of the ladder evolution, Petitioner did not present the testimony of any of those candidates. Nor did he introduce any other evidence to corroborate his testimony that he never exceeded the maximum time allowed for the ladder evolution during practice. Further, no evidence was offered as to the comparable length of the two courses. The evidence fails to demonstrate that the amount of time in which Petitioner completed the ladder evolution, as determined by the Department, was incorrect or inaccurate. Therefore, the evidence demonstrates that Petitioner failed to successfully complete the ladder evolution within the maximum time allowed. Hence, the evidence demonstrates that Petitioner failed the Retest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order: Finding that Ricardo Francois failed to successfully complete the Practical Examination Firefighter Retest; and Denying Ricardo Francois’ application for certification as a firefighter in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Linje E. Rivers, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Ricardo Francois 778 Jimmy Ann Drive, No. 1011 Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue Is Petitioner eligible for Respondent sponsored retraining?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Petitioner sustained a workers’ compensation injury (injury) to his right knee on November 26, 1989, while working for the Polk County Fire Department (Fire Department), as a firefighter. Following the injury, Petitioner received authorized medical care at the expense of his employer, which included surgery, followed by approximately one year of physical rehabilitation. After completing approximately one year of physical rehabilitation and light duty work, Petitioner was returned to full duty work with the Fire Department in January 1991. Petitioner continued to experience problems with his right knee, including pain and swelling. However, Petitioner continued on full time duty receiving medical care for his knee. Petitioner’s right knee remained problematic and required regular medical attention between 1990 and 1996. In January 1996, Thomas F. Winters, Jr., M.D. performed a second surgical procedure on Petitioner’s right knee. Following the second surgical procedure, Dr. Winters provided conservative treatment for a brief period before releasing Petitioner to full duty on March 9, 1996, without any restrictions. On March 12, 1996, Dr. Winters placed Petitioner at maximum medical improvement (MMI). Dr. Winters is of the opinion that Petitioner had some degenerative changes to his knee but that those changes were related to a previous arthritic problem, not to the workman’s compensation injury; and if Petitioner was performing full firefighter duties before the injury then he could perform those duties after March 9, 1996. However, based on the opinions expressed by Dr. Barrett, and Dr. McGregor, Dr. Croft, it appears that Dr. Winters did not properly take into account Petitioner’s continued problem with his knee when Dr. Winters found Petitioner at MMI and put Petitioner on full firefighter’s duty. At the time of his release by Dr. Winters on March 9, 1996, and placed at MMI, Petitioner’s knee was so weak that he could not climb stairs or climb ladders or lift anything with any degree of certainty and Petitioner did not feel himself capable of safely performing the full duties of a firefighter. Because of his knee, Petitioner did not return to full duty as a firefighter but instead requested another medical opinion. Petitioner was authorized to see Carl L. Croft, M.D. for a second opinion. Dr. Croft agreed that Petitioner could not perform full duty as a firefighter and recommended that he receive further physical therapy. This physical therapy was never authorized. Petitioner did not return to full duty as a firefighter following Dr. Winters’ release. Instead, Petitioner requested the additional care recommended by Dr. Croft. This additional care was never authorized. Ultimately, Petitioner exhausted his sick leave and vacation time and was forced to return to work in May 1996. Upon his return to work in May 1996, Petitioner advised his employer of his continued concerns as they related to his knee and his inability to perform the essential functions of a firefighter. At this point, Petitioner’s employer changed Petitioner’s work duties and he was not functioning as a firefighter. Because of Petitioner’s physical limitations on performing full firefighter duties his employment could not be considered "suitable gainful employment" as that term is defined in Section 440.491(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Petitioner was placed on administrative leave in October 1996, and remained on administrative leave until his termination for cause on January 17, 1997. At the time of termination, Petitioner’s right knee continued to be problematic. Petitioner sought retraining through Respondent and was approved for retraining on July 14, 1998. However, the Fire Department and its insurance carrier objected on the basis that Petitioner had returned to work for 90 days or more after the injury and therefore, retraining was precluded by rule. After a reevaluation, the Respondent determined that Petitioner had worked more than 90 days after being released by Dr. Winters to return to full-time work and, additionally, had worked more than 90 days after Dr. Winters had determined that Petitioner had reached MMI. Therefore, Petitioner was denied retraining on the basis that retraining was precluded by rule. Thereafter, Respondent’s initial decision to grant retraining was revoked and retraining denied by letter dated August 5, 1998. Petitioner worked full-time for more than 90 days after his injury when he was returned to full firefighter’s duty by Dr. Winters in January 1991, and when he returned to work after Dr. Winters had determined that Petitioner had reached MMI on March 12, 1996. However, neither of these periods of employment could be considered as "suitable gainful employment" as that term is defined in Section 440.491(1)(g), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent enter a final order granting Petitioner’s request for retraining. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary Hooks, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Sherri Wilkes-Cape, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Geoffrey Bichler, Esquire Geoffrey Bichler, P.A. 533 West New England Avenue, Suite C Winter Park, Florida 32789 Nancy Staff Slayden, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the bachelor's degree curriculum by which the Petitioner, James E. Dalrymple, earned his degree "includes a major study concentration area readily identifiable and applicable to fire-related subjects," as set out in Section 633.382(2)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (1991), so as to entitle him to the firefighter supplemental compensation for which he has applied.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner has a bachelor's degree in Communication Arts awarded by Judson College in Illinois on or about June 11, 1978. Judson College is accredited. The Petitioner's official sealed transcript from Judson College reveals that the Petitioner took no "fire-related" courses to get his degree. He did take courses in language arts and communication arts, such as: "English Language: Uses and Resources"; "Oral Interpretation and Mass Media"; "Language and Society"; "Man and Women"; "Analysis of Literature"; and "Mass Media in Contemporary America." Courses such as these are certainly compatible with and useful for work in the field of firefighting. But they, along with his other general study courses, do not reflect a "major study concentration area readily identifiable and applicable to fire-related subjects."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Insurance Commissioner, in his capacity as State Fire Marshal, and agency head of the Department of Insurance and Treasurer, Division of State Fire Marshal, enter a final order denying the application of the Petitioner, James E. Dalrymple, for firefighters supplemental compensation. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2150 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the Department of Insurance and Treasurer's proposed findings of fact: 1.-5. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 6.-7. Accepted and incorporated. 8. Accepted but conclusion of law. 9.-12. Accepted but unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: James E. Dalrymple 2816 Weston Terrace Palm Harbor, Florida 34685 Elizabeth J. Gregovits, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner's application for supplemental compensation pursuant to Section 633.382, Florida Statutes, should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact 1. The Petitioner holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Michigan State University. The degree was earned in the College of Communication Arts and Science. The major on the Petitioner's degree is advertising. 2. The transcript of the courses taken by the Petitioner to earn his bachelor's degree does not list any courses that appear to come within the criteria listed at Rule 4A- 37.084(5) (b)1, Florida Administrative Code. 3. The transcript of the courses taken by the Petitioner to earn his bachelor's degree lists several courses that appear to come within the criteria listed at Rule 4A-37.084(5) (b)2, Florida Administrative Code. However, there are not enough of such courses to comprise a major. 4. The transcript of the courses taken by the Petitioner to earn his bachelor's degree lists one course that appears to come within the criteria listed at Rule 4A.37.084(5) (b)3, Florida Administrative Code. 5. The Petitioner is presently employed by the Miami Beach Fire Department as a Firefighter I. The Petitioner has been employed full-time in his present firefighter position at all times material to the pending application. 6. The Petitioner's fire department duties are described in a written position description for the Firefighter I position. It is clear from the description of those duties that a Firefighter I position with the Miami Beach Fire Department is not one of the "management positions within a fire department," nor is it a position that includes "arson investigators." Such a position is also not one of the "special positions" contemplated by Rule 4A-37.084(5) (b)4, Florida Administrative Code. 7. When the Petitioner submitted his present application, Floyd Jordan, the Fire Chief of the Miami Beach Fire Department, by letter dated November 15, 2000, advised the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training as follows: After review of the attached college transcript and the City of Miami Beach Job Description for Firefighter I, it is my conclusion that this request does not meet the requirements of the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program. As of the date of the final hearing, Chief Jordan continued to be of the same view of the matter. 8. The Petitioner was previously employed by the Boca Raton Fire-Rescue Services as a firefighter/paramedic. The Petitioner's job duties in the Boca Raton position were essentially the same as his job duties in his present position. While employed with the Boca Raton Fire-Rescue Services, the Petitioner applied for supplemental compensation on the basis of the same bachelor's degree on which he bases his present application. The Petitioner's prior application was approved and he received supplemental compensation while employed with the Boca Raton Fire-Rescue Services.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Chuck Pereny, pro se 259 Northwest 90th Avenue Coral Springs, Florida 33071 For Respondent: Elenita Gomez, Esquire James B. Morrison, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order denying the Petitioner's application and dismissing the petition in this case. Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. = DONE AND ENTERED this CS “day of June, 2001, in CH heseu Loe € MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this Q — day of June, 2001.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Department of Financial Services, Division of State Fire Marshal (the Department), properly administered and graded the Firefighter Minimum Standards practical examination taken by Petitioner, Catalina Williams (hereinafter Williams).
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility for testing, monitoring and certifying firefighters. The Department conducts certification examinations at the Florida State Fire College in Ocala, Florida, and some thirty-plus other sites around the State. Those sites are located on college campuses, training facilities, fire stations, and other locales. The test at issue in this proceeding was administered at the Fire College site. Catalina Williams is an Hispanic woman who desires to become a certified firefighter. Her interest in firefighting began when she worked as a photographer covering fire-related events for a magazine and thought it would be exciting and interesting to be on “the front line.” Williams has also served as a caregiver, giving her experience in providing assistance to others, and is a certified lifeguard. In order to accomplish her goal of becoming a firefighter, Williams entered into schooling to learn the trade. Williams first attended First Coast Technological College (First Coast) in 2009. She completed the Firefighter Minimum Basic Standards Course (Firefighter I) that year. In 2010, she enrolled at the school for the summer semester to begin training in the advanced (Firefighter II) curriculum. That school term was shorter and more compressed than a regular semester. Despite her best efforts, Williams did not successfully complete the Firefighter II course. Rochford was one of her instructors during her first unsuccessful enrollment at First Coast. In 2012, Williams entered First Coast again. At that time, she was working as a paid volunteer firefighter for Volusia County. The county paid her tuition costs at First Coast when Williams entered the school for the Firefighter II course work. The second time, Williams was able to successfully complete the course material and pass her final examination. Passing the final examination was a prerequisite to taking the State certification exam. While attending First Coast, Williams took hundreds of practice exams, especially on the practical portions of the tests. She took exams as part of her classes, took exams voluntarily with someone timing her, and took exams just to practice. The State Certification Exam There are four primary segments of the State certification exam: A written examination of 100 multiple choice questions; A hose evolution involving a self- contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and personal protection equipment (PPE); A ladder/search and rescue evolution; and A skills portion, involving ropes and knots, two fire ground skills, and a short test on the emergency response guide (ERG). The ladder/search and rescue evolution is a practical portion of the exam; it is the singular portion of the test at issue in this proceeding and will be referred to as the ladder evolution. The ladder evolution portion consists of the following tasks and assignments: The candidate inspects ladders hanging on a simulated fire truck. He or she then takes a 24-foot ladder from the truck and extends it against the wall of a building up to the second floor. Once that ladder is properly hoisted, the candidate confirms that a ladder guard (another candidate acting as a spotter) has control of the ladder. The candidate then initiates radio contact and then walks quickly around the building to another ladder that is already in place. He/she must ascend the ladder to the second floor, test the floor inside the building to make sure it is safe, and enter the building through a window. Upon entry the candidate must find a “victim” (a 125-pound mannequin) on the lower floor, secure the victim in an approved manner, and then exit the building with the mannequin. Upon exit, the candidate must safely deposit the victim on the ground and provide notice by way of radio contact that he/she and the victim are outside the building. The radio transmission is something along the lines of: “PAR 2 [Personnel Accountability Reporting, two people]. Firefighter No. “X” and victim have safely exited the building.” The entire ladder evolution sequence must be done within four minutes and 30 seconds although, as will be discussed below, there are differences of opinion as to when the timed portion of the evolution ends. It is necessary for candidates taking the test to pass each of the four sections. Failure of any one portion would result in failure overall. Should a candidate fail the examination, they must reschedule their retest within six months of the failed test. All retest examinations are administered at the Fire College. On test day, there may be dozens of applicants taking the test at the same time. The procedure dictates that candidates arrive at the test facility in time to process paperwork prior to the 7:30 a.m., test commencement. Candidates must first provide identification to an instructor and be assigned a candidate number. They then fill out paperwork, including a waiver should any injuries occur during testing. Candidates will have their gear inspected to make sure it is in compliance with State standards. Prior to commencement of testing, one of the instructors or examiners will read a document called the “Minimum Standards Pre-Exam Orientation” (the Orientation) to the candidates. During the reading of the Orientation, which may take 45 minutes to an hour or more, candidates are allowed and encouraged to ask questions. Unless a question is asked, the Orientation will be read verbatim, word for word, with no additional comment. After the Orientation is read, candidates are walked through the facility so they can familiarize themselves with the test site. Once the test commences, candidates are not allowed to ask any questions. Williams’ Test Experience In October 2012, after successful completion of the Firefighter II course at First Coast, Williams applied for and was approved to take the State certification examination. The exam was conducted at First Coast on the school’s training grounds. The test was conducted by certified employees of the Department. Williams did not pass the examination. One of her shortcomings in that test was a failure in the ladder evolution. Her timed completion of that evolution was in excess of the required time of four minutes and 30 seconds. Williams had been confident she would pass the certification exam because it was similar to the final exam she had passed at First Coast during her schooling. She believes she failed because she was too nervous when she took the exam when it was administered as the actual State certification test. After failing the exam, Williams then applied for a retest which would be held at the Fire College on February 7, 2013. That re-test is the focus of the instant proceeding. On the morning of the retest, Williams arrived well in advance of the 7:30 a.m., start time. As she inspected her gear in anticipation of the start of the exam, she found that the SCBA regulator she was supposed to use did not properly fit the face mask on her helmet. There were extra regulators behind one of the tables being used to process applicants for that day’s test. Examiner Harper was sitting at that table and was providing paperwork to applicants who had already signed in at the first processing station. Williams went to Harper’s table and was allowed to obtain a new regulator. Inasmuch as she was already at Harper’s table getting her replacement regulator before going to the first processing station, Williams went ahead and filled out the paperwork Harper was providing to candidates at his processing station. That is, she filled out the paperwork before actually checking in at the first station. Williams then went to the first check-in table which was manned by Examiner Rochford. She provided her identification to Rochford and was assigned candidate number 37. Rochford then told Williams to go to Harper’s table to fill out the paperwork at that station. Williams told Rochford she had already done so and walked away. (At that point, Williams remembers Rochford yelling at her, asking whether she understood his order and telling her in a harsh manner to obey him. Rochford does not remember talking to Williams at all. Neither version of this alleged confrontation is persuasive. Inasmuch as the conversation was not verified one way or another by a third person -- although there were probably a number of other people around, it will not be considered to have happened for purposes of this Recommended Order.) The Orientation was then read to the candidates. The various portions of the test were addressed in the Orientation. The ladder evolution contained the following language, which Rochford read verbatim to the candidates without anything added or deleted: “Time starts when you touch anything. Time ends when the candidate and victim fully exit the building.” There is no evidence that any of the candidates asked a question concerning this part of the Orientation. Rochford’s timing policy regarding the ladder evolution differs from what he read to the candidates. He takes the position that time stops when the candidate exits the building with the victim, places the victim on the ground in an appropriate manner, and issues a verbal statement into the radio indicating that the firefighter and victim are out of the building. By his own admission, Rochford could not speak to how other examiners handle this timing issue. Harper, who was Williams’ assigned examiner on the test, also seemed to require candidates to lay the victim down and make radio contact before stopping the time. Neither Rochford nor Harper satisfactorily explained why their timing policy was different from what was stated in the orientation. The testimony concerning the correct way of timing the evolution was, at best, confusing. The following statements from the record provide contradictory and disparate opinions by various examiners: Rochford: “As soon as they lay the mannequin on the ground [and] announce they have exited the building . . . the time stops.” Tr. p. 45, lines 9-18 “The mannequin’s feet have got to be outside the plane from the door opening. That’s when the time stops.” Id. Lines 23- 25. “Until they talk on the radio is – - when they finish talking on the radio is when the time would stop.” Tr. p. 255, lines 7-9. Johnson: “At that point, they’ll use one of the prescribed methods for rescue to take the victim and themselves past the threshold out to the fresh air. At that point, the time stops.” Tr. p. 111, lines 11-14 “I read [the Orientation] word for word.” Tr. p. 114, line 23 “On the ladder rescue evolution . . . we [examiners] all stop when they pass the threshold.” Harper: “Then they’re told to lay the victim down, make radio contact you’re out of the building. Time stops.” Tr. p. 138, lines 7-8 “After they make radio contact.” Tr. p. 147, line 3 “[Orientation] says time starts when they touch anything, time ends when the candidate and the victim fully exit the building.” Tr. P. 148, lines 15-17 Hackett: “It stops when the victim comes out of the building.” Tr. p. 222, lines 7-8 [If the victim was thrown out of the building by the firefighter] “I think they would stop the clock.” Id., lines 9-11 “It is part of the timed part that they have to designate that they’re out of the building safely and lay down the victim.” Tr. pp. 222, line 24 through 223, line 1 Question to Hackett: “If [Williams] is coming out and she dropped the victim and picked up -- and presumably picked it up or whatever and then radioed, would that add time?” Answer: “No.” Tr. p. 246, lines 5- 10 Williams was timed by Harper when she took the ladder evolution portion of the exam. According to Harper’s (deposition) testimony, he subscribes to the version of timing that requires the victim to be laid down on the ground and the firefighter to make radio contact. Using that version of timing, Williams received a time of four minutes and 35 seconds for the entire ladder evolution portion of the test. In March, the Department mailed out notices to all the candidates that had tested on February 7. Notices of failure were sent by registered mail, return receipt requested. Williams’ letter was returned to the Department as unclaimed. Williams at some point in time found out from Chief McElroy, head of the Fire Academy, that she had purportedly failed the exam. She began calling examiner Harper in March seeking to find out what portion of the exam she had not successfully completed. She had at least two telephone conversations with Harper in March 2013. On April 4, 2013, the Department re-sent the failure letter to Williams, again by certified mail. This time, the letter was claimed by Williams and she became officially aware that she had not passed the exam. The basis given for Williams’ failure was that she did not complete the ladder evolution within the prescribed time parameters. She was timed at four minutes and 35 seconds, just five seconds beyond the allowable limit. It is her contention that she exited the building with the victim within the four minute/30 second time frame. The basis for her belief is that she has done the test so many times that she knows when she is behind schedule. During the test she did not stumble, drop any equipment, or have any other problem that would have added to her time. So, she concludes, she must have completed the evolution timely. Her personal feelings on the matter, without further corroboration or support, are not persuasive. Harper did not testify at final hearing. The transcript of his deposition taken in this case was admitted into evidence. In that transcript, Harper talks about his policy regarding timing of the evolution. His policy is the same as Rochford’s and is discussed above. He does not specifically say if he employed that policy when timing Williams during her test on February 7, 2013. He does not explain the difference between the Orientation statement about timing and his personal policy. The most persuasive evidence at final hearing established that it would have taken ten to 15 seconds after exiting the building to lay the victim down and make radio contact. The radio contact itself would have taken about four seconds. If Harper had stopped his timing when Williams and the victim broke the threshold of the building, her time would have likely been less than four minutes and 30 seconds. If he used his personal timing policy, then the time of four minutes/35 seconds was probably accurate. Harper deducted points from Williams’ score because of other minor mistakes. The totality of those points would not have caused Williams to fail the test. It was the ladder evolution time that caused the failure. In fact, Williams successfully completed all portions of the re-test except for the timing issue in the ladder evolution portion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of State Fire Marshal, rescinding the failing score on the State Firefighter Certification Examination for Catalina Williams and certifying her as a Firefighter. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Seth D. Corneal, Esquire The Corneal Law Firm 904 Anastasia Boulevard St. Augustine, Florida 32080 Michael Davidson, Esquire Department of Financial Services Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Department of Financial Services Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390
The Issue The issues for determination are whether Petitioner, Paul F. Meloy (Meloy), is an employee of Petitioner, Alva Fire Protection and Rescue District (District), and is entitled to participate in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) pursuant to Section 121.051, Florida Statutes (2001). (All references to statutes are to Florida Statutes (2001) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Section 121.051 requires participation in the FRS by all employees hired after December 1, 1970. The District hired Meloy after 1970. Meloy has worked for the District as the fire chief and administrator since the District's inception in 1976. Meloy was instrumental in establishing the District. The other requirement imposed by Section 121.051 for participation in the FRS is that Meloy must be an employee. Section 121.021(11), in relevant part, defines an employee as any person receiving salary payments for work performed in a regularly established position. Respondent denies that the payments Meloy receives from the District are salary payments. Respondent asserts that the payments are reimbursement for expenses. Respondent denies that the payments to Meloy are compensation. Section 121.021(22) defines the term "compensation" to mean: . . . the monthly salary paid a member by his or her employer for work performed arising from that employment. The payments from the District to Meloy since October 1990 have been compensation. In October 1990, the District began paying Meloy a monthly salary "for work performed arising from his employment with the District." Before October 1990, the District reimbursed Meloy for expenses he incurred in housing fire trucks in the garage at Meloy's auto service business. The District also reimbursed Meloy for the maintenance and repair of District vehicles. In 1988, the District began reporting the payments made to Meloy as salary for purposes of the federal income tax. Each year from 1988 to the present, the District has reported the payments to Meloy on a W2 Wage and Tax Statement. Between 1988 and October 1990, the District stopped housing vehicles in Meloy's garage, and Meloy stopped servicing vehicles for the District. In October 1990, the amount of the monthly payment to Meloy increased substantially. Thereafter, the District provided annual cost of living increases to Meloy. The payments to Meloy from October 1990 to the present have been unrelated to expenses incurred by Meloy. Those payments have been regular monthly salary payments for work performed to implement the policy of the District and to administer the day-to-day operations of the District. Even if the payments are salary payments, Respondent argues that Meloy did not receive those payments for work performed in a regularly established position. Section 121.021(52)(b) defines a regularly established position as one that will be in existence for six months. Meloy's position has been in existence since 1976. It will be in existence for six months. Respondent asserts that the position occupied by Meloy is a temporary position defined in Section 121.021(53)(b). Section 121.021(53)(b) defines a temporary position as one that will exist for less than six months or as defined by rule, regardless of its duration. Respondent claims that the position occupied by Meloy is a temporary position because it is an "on call position" defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S- 1.004(5)(d)5. The rule defines an on call position as one filled by employees who are called to work unexpectedly for brief periods and whose employment ceases when the purpose for being called is satisfied. (All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.) Meloy performs some of his duties unexpectedly when called anytime 24 hours a day. He performs his other duties in the normal course of business. Meloy does not maintain any time sheets, and the District does not require Meloy to perform his duties within an established work schedule. Meloy does not occupy an "on call position" within the meaning of Rule 60S-1.004(5)(d)5. Meloy's employment does not cease when the purpose of his being called is satisfied. Meloy has been performing his on-call duties and his other duties for approximately 25 years. In 1994, Mr. William D. Wilkinson became the Chairman of the District (Wilkinson). Wilkinson is also the Court Administrator for the Circuit Court in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit of Florida, in which the District is located. After Wilkinson became Chairman, he determined that Meloy receives compensation in a regularly established position and is entitled to membership in the FRS. Wilkinson testified at the hearing. Meloy has sole responsibility for implementing the District's policy and administering the day-to-day operation of the District. Relevant portions of Wilkinson's testimony are instructive. Q. And whose job is it to carry out that policy? A. Mr. Meloy. Q. When you came on board in 1994, Mr. Meloy, was he employed by the district? A. That's correct. Q. How many other administrators does the district employ? A. None. Q. Who runs the day-to-day affairs of the fire district? A. Mr. Meloy. Q. He is required to work a certain work schedule? A. No, sir. Q. What is he required to do as far as hours go? A. Once we set the policy, then we expect, you know, the chief to carry that out. And for however many hours it takes during the week, you know, the month to see it is fulfilled. Q. Do you know if he is on call? A. He is on call 24/7. Q. And what does that mean? A. 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Q. Is that 365 days a year? A. That's correct. * * * Q. Let me ask you to put your other hat on as the court administrator for the 20th Judicial Circuit. Are you involved with the Florida Retirement System? A. Yes, I am. Q. And you are a participant? A. Yes, I am. Q. Your duties as the court administrator, how would you compare that to Mr. Meloy's duties as the fire chief administrator of the Alva Fire District? A. Well, with the exception that I certainly make a lot more than he does for the duties that he has, it is similar. You know, I'm paid an annual salary and expected to get the job done. If you have to work 60 hours, you have to work 60 hours. If you get through sooner, hopefully you do. But that never happens. The District requires Meloy to spend as much time as is needed to implement the policy of the District and to administer the day-to-day business of the District. The hours vary, and there are no set hours. Some days, Meloy's day begins at 6:00 a.m. Other days, Meloy does not get to work until 9:00 a.m. or noon. Some days, Meloy leaves work at 5:00 p.m. and then must return immediately to the office. "It is whatever is needed." The District employs four individuals. One is Meloy. Two are certified firefighters. The other is a part- time bookkeeper. The bookkeeper and the two certified firefighters are members of the FRS. The two full-time firefighters maintain time sheets, and the District pays them for overtime. The District compensation of its full-time firefighters is consistent with compensation on an hourly basis. Meloy is not a certified firefighter, and the District does not compensate Meloy on an hourly basis. Meloy does not maintain or submit time sheets. The District does not pay Meloy for overtime. Like the certified firefighters, Meloy performs some of his duties when called anytime, 24 hours a day. However, neither the certified firefighters nor Meloy has the option to refuse to work when called. The employment positions of the certified firefighters and Meloy do not cease when the purpose for being called is satisfied. Although the bookkeeper for the District is never on call, she maintains a schedule similar to that of Meloy. She works those hours necessary to perform her duties. Like Meloy, the bookkeeper's position does not cease when she completes her work. The District pays compensation to Meloy in accordance with an annual salary rather than an hourly rate. Meloy does not have an established schedule during which he must implement the board's policy and administer the day-to- day operations of the District. Meloy occupies a regularly established position within the meaning of Section 121.021(52)(b). Meloy is the District administrator. The position has been in existence since 1988 and is not a temporary position within the meaning of Section 121.021(53)(b) or Rule 60S-1.004(5). Respondent's final argument is that a determination of Petitioners' request to enroll Meloy in the FRS is barred by the judicial doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Respondent argues that final agency action determined that the payments received by Meloy through June 29, 1992, are reimbursement for expenses. Respondent argues that nothing has changed since that time, and Meloy cannot now revisit the issue of his compensation. Findings regarding Respondent's final argument require some historical perspective. The District joined the FRS in 1988. At that time, the District purchased past service credit for a number of employees, including Meloy. Meloy enrolled as a member of the Special Risk Class. When Meloy enrolled as a member of the Special Risk Class, a question in the enrollment form asked Meloy if the applicant was certified as a firefighter or required to be certified as a firefighter. Meloy answered in the affirmative. Meloy has always been required to be certified as a firefighter in order to receive retirement benefits as a member of the Special Risk Class. However, Meloy has never been certified as a firefighter pursuant to Section 633.35. Meloy has never completed an essential firefighting course that is a statutory prerequisite to certification. By letter dated June 29, 1992, Respondent notified Meloy that Respondent was terminating Meloy's membership in the FRS. The letter stated two grounds for termination. One ground was that Meloy had not completed the firefighting course required for membership in the Special Risk Class. The second ground was that the payments Meloy received from his employer are reimbursement for expenses rather than compensation. Meloy did not appeal either ground stated by Respondent on June 29, 1992, for the termination of benefits. Meloy does not contest the first ground and is not now seeking enrollment in the FRS as a member of the Special Risk Class. Rather, Meloy now seeks benefits as a member in a regularly established position defined in Section 121.021(52)(b). Meloy does contest the second ground stated by Respondent on June 29, 1992, for terminating Meloy's membership in the FRS. Respondent determined that Meloy did not receive compensation from 1988 through June 29, 1992. The time for appealing that determination has expired, and Meloy cannot now amend the scope of this proceeding to include any payments he received on or before June 29, 1992. Respondent asserts that its determination on June 29, 1992, also establishes that payments received by Meloy after June 29, 1992, are not compensation. Respondent argues that Meloy's duties have not changed, and the payments Meloy receives are reimbursement for expenses. On June 1, 1999, Respondent sent a letter to Wilkinson explaining Respondent's denial of Meloy's application for enrollment in the FRS. In relevant part, the letter stated: By certified letter dated June 29, 1992 (copy enclosed), the State Retirement Director, Mr. A.J. McMullian III, advised Mr. Meloy that he was inelligible for Florida Retirement System (FRS) participation since the monthly payments he received were for "expenses" and not compensation. Subsequent to Mr. McMullian's letter, a hearing was conducted by the Division of Administrative Hearings and Mr. Meloy's payments were defined as expenses as a statement [sic] of fact (copy enclosed). In light of this, the Division has already made a determination that Mr. Meloy is ineligible for FRS participation from 1979 through 1992. Since your letter indicates that Mr. Meloy's duties and payments he has received have not changed since 1988, he remains ineligible for FRS participation. Respondent's Exhibit 10. The DOAH hearing referred to in the letter on June 1, 1999, involved allegations that Meloy had violated state ethics laws when he first attempted to enroll in the FRS in 1988. In 1992, the Florida Commission on Ethics (Commission) investigated Meloy's participation in the FRS. The Commission entered an order finding probable cause that Meloy violated Section 112.313(6) when he submitted his enrollment form for retirement benefits by corruptly using or attempting to use his official position to retain retirement benefits for himself and his assistant fire chief when neither was qualified to receive benefits. The findings concerning the assistant fire chief are neither relevant nor material to this proceeding. Meloy requested an administrative hearing, and the Commission referred the matter to DOAH to conduct the hearing. ALJ Susan B. Kirkland conducted the administrative hearing and entered a Recommended Order on July 8, 1994. The Recommended Order found that Meloy misrepresented his entitlement to membership in the Special Risk Class and did so with wrongful intent. The Order concluded that Meloy violated the relevant statute because Meloy attempted to use his position, or the property and resources entrusted to him, to secure a benefit. The Order recommended a civil penalty, public censure, and a reprimand. The Final Order of the Commission adopted the Recommended Order. The Recommended Order contains three paragraphs that discuss the payments received by Meloy. Those three paragraphs state: 3. In 1976, the . . . District was established. The firefighting equipment and vehicles were originally located in Meloy's garage, where he maintained an automotive repair shop. Meloy received a fixed reimbursement from the District each month for the use of his garage and for repair services which he rendered for the District. * * * 5. In 1988, the District joined the . . . (FRS). At that time the District employed four full-time firefighters and a part-time secretary. Meloy worked part-time as the administrator of the District but did not draw a salary and continued to receive remuneration in the form of the monthly reimbursement for expenses. . . . * * * 18. By letter dated June 29, 1992, [Respondent] notified Meloy that his membership in the FRS . . . was being terminated. The grounds for termination were that Meloy had been receiving payments for expenses and not compensation. . . . The Recommended Order does not operate under the judicial doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel to preclude a determination of whether the payments received by Meloy after 1988 are compensation. The Recommended Order limits the finding that Meloy received payments for expenses to those received in 1988. Paragraph 5 expressly states, "At that time. . . Meloy . . . continued to receive . . . reimbursement for expenses. . . ." The findings in paragraph 18 merely recite the grounds stated by Respondent but do not make findings on the merits of the stated grounds. The findings in paragraph 3 are not probative. The Recommended Order made no findings concerning the payments Meloy received after 1988. Respondent determined that the payments between 1988 and June 29, 1992, were payments for expenses rather than compensation. Irrespective of whether Respondent's determination was legally and factually correct, Meloy did not appeal Respondent's determination. The determination by Respondent on June 29, 1992, involved a separate and distinct application from the application at issue in this case. No determination has been made that the payments since June 29, 1992, either are or are not compensation. The application at issue in this case is a new application for different benefits. Meloy is not applying for benefits to which he would be entitled if he were a member of the Special Risk Class. Nor can Meloy apply for benefits related to the payments received on or before June 29, 1992. Respondent argues that nothing has changed in the course of Meloy's tenure with the District. Payments that were reimbursement for expenses before 1992 arguably have not now been transformed into compensation. Respondent is incorrect. Something has changed in the course of Meloy's tenure with the District. Sometime after September 1990, the payments to Meloy changed from reimbursement for expenses to monthly salary payments. The District no longer housed equipment at Meloy's garage, Meloy no longer serviced the equipment at the garage, and the amount of the monthly payments to Meloy increased from $540 to $833. Relevant portions of the transcript of the administrative hearing in the ethics case are instructive. Meloy asserted in the ethics case that in 1988, he was a volunteer fireman. As a volunteer, rather than a salaried employee, Meloy argued that he was not required to be certified as a firefighter. The attorney who represented the Commission sought to show that Meloy was not a volunteer after 1990 but was a salaried employee of the District. As long as I'm volunteering, I don't have to have it. Q. Okay. You are also the administrator for the full-time firemen, is that right? A. Yes. Q. You have the power to hire and fire them? A. Yes. Q. You set their hours? A. Yes. Q. The district also has a part-time secretary, is that right? A. Yes. Q. And currently that's Ms. Connie Bull? A. Correct. Q. She handles payroll matters? A. Yes. Q. She writes checks? A. Yes. Q. Pays bills? A. Yes. Q. She and you both answer questions that the full-time firemen might have about vacation or sick leave or retirement, is that right? A. To the best of our ability, yes. Q. Okay. Now, before 1990 you were not an employee of the fire district, is that right? A. According to how you define it, I guess. I was paid more as an expense type arrangement up until sometime around '90. I don't remember the exact date. Q. Okay, you received the expense reimbursement prior to 1990 for working on the fire equipment; is that right? A. It covered a lot of things. We worked on the fire equipment there in my business, we housed a lot of equipment there, used my facilities for -- well, we have used my facilities as a station for awhile. Q. When you say your facilities, you mean the Alva garage that you used to own? A. Right. Q. When you got the expense reimbursement, you would get the same amount every month, is that right? A. Yes. Q. It changed some over time, though, didn't it from '73 to 1990? A. Yes. Q. You got that same reimbursement amount regardless of the number of hours that you worked for the district? A. Yes. Q. And regardless of what any actual expenses might be? A. Correct. Q. Now, sometime in 1990 you became an employee of the district on a part-time basis; is that right? A. That's when they started taking out taxes and all and that reverted to more of a salary type reimbursement rather than expense. In other words, I was paying income tax and Social Security and everything and at that time it was considered more of a salary. Q. And they started doing that in 1990 sometime? A. I don't remember the date. It was approximately then. Q. When you started receiving a salary, you stopped getting the reimbursement; is that right? A. Right. Q. Isn't it true that when you first started getting the salary that the amount of the salary was several hundred dollars a month more than what the reimbursement had been? A. I couldn't tell you. Q. Isn't it a fact that the last-- A. I don't believe that would be right, though, because it didn't go up very much any one time, I don't think. I would have to see the figures to tell for sure. Q. All right. Isn't it a fact that the last time you received a monthly reimbursement you were receiving about $540 a month? A. I don't have those figures in front of me. Q. You don't remember? A. No. Q. Isn't it a fact that when you first got a salary in October 1990, you got $833 a month? A. I still couldn't tell you. I don't have those figures in front of me. I have them wrote down if I can get my papers. Q. All right. You don't know how much you get now? A. Yeah, but this ain't 1990. Respondent's Exhibit 3 at 29-32. The state argued in the ethics case that Meloy has been salaried since October 1990 and was required to be certified as a firefighter before enrolling in the FRS as a member of the Special Risk Class. The state now argues that Meloy has never been salaried and cannot enroll in the FRS as member of the regular class. The state cannot have it both ways. Meloy is entitled to membership in the FRS for the period after June 29, 1992. During that time, the District has paid a salary to Meloy that is compensation for duties performed in a regularly established position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order granting Petitioners' request for Meloy to participate in the FRS. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _________ ________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Frank Porter, Esquire Porter & Jessell, P.A. 1424 Dean Street Ft. Myers, Florida 33901 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Division of Retirement P.O. Box 3900 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-3900 Erin B. Sjostrom, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Mallory Harrell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact On September 3, 1992, petitioner, James Cardova, filed an application for certification as a firefighter with respondent, Department of Insurance and Treasurer, Division of State Fire Marshal (Department). Such application included a report of medical examination which reflected that petitioner was without vision in his left eye. Indeed, the proof at hearing confirmed that due to a childhood injury, petitioner had lost the use of his left eye, and it had been replaced by a glass prosthesis. By letter of September 21, 1992, the Department notified petitioner that his application was denied because he did not meet the medical standards established by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) in its pamphlet NFPA No. 1001, adopted by reference in Rule 4A-37.037(4), Florida Administrative Code. Specifically, Section 2 of NFPA pamphlet No. 1001 provides: 2-2 Medical Requirements for Fire Department Candidates. The candidate shall be rejected when the medical examination reveals any of the following conditions: * * * 2-2.7.1.9 Miscellaneous Defects and Disease. The causes for rejection of appointment shall be: * * * (b) Absence of an eye. In response to the Department's letter of denial, petitioner filed a timely request for formal hearing to contest the Department's decision. Here, the gravamen of petitioner's case is his contention that, notwithstanding the absence of his left eye, he is qualified to perform the duties of a firefighter and, therefore, under the provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC 12101, et seq., the Department is obligated to grant his request for certification. Regarding petitioner's abilities, the proof demonstrates that petitioner has reasonably compensated for the absence of his left eye such that its absence does not significantly limit any of his major life activities. Moreover, petitioner has satisfactorily completed all of the basic firefighting school requirements, as well as the written and practical state examination. Indeed, among the firefighting instructors who know of him, petitioner's ability to perform the skills required of a firefighter is not deemed to be adversely affected by his loss of vision in one eye.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered denying petitioner's application for certification as a firefighter. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of April 1993. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April 1993.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to supplemental compensation pursuant to Section 633.382(2)(a)2, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is certified as a firefighter. She has been so certified at all material times. The Petitioner is presently employed as a "firefighter-paramedic" with the City of Rivera Beach Fire Department. She has been so employed at all material times. In her present position the Petitioner performs the "essential job functions" described in her job description. Those functions are: Lays, connects and places hose line in operation. Raises and climbs ladders. Enters building and other fire involved areas. Uses extinguishers, bars, hooks, lines, and axes and other hand equipment. Ventilates burning buildings and structures. Throws salvage covers and removes debris. Makes regular inspections of apparatus and equipment and notifies supervisor of defects. Assists Driver-Engineer routine maintenance and apparatus check-out as required. Makes visual and physical inspections of buildings to locate fire hazards. Rescues and removes individuals from danger. Administers Advanced Life Support medical treatment to sick, injured or afflicted persons. Makes periodic inspections of buildings to locate fire hazards. Performs physical cleaning and maintenance tasks on department buildings and equipment using brooms, mops, vacuum cleaners, etc. Performs hydrant maintenance. Attends training and drill sessions in such subjects as firefighting and inspection methods, equipment operations and emergency medical treatment. In her present position the Petitioner is required to have and use the "knowledge, skills, and abilities" described in her job description. The required knowledge, skills, and abilities set forth in the job description are: Knowledge of the street locations, geography and takes of construction in the City. Knowledge of advanced Life Support Emergency Medical procedures, practices and techniques. Knowledge of various types of fire hazards of the City. Knowledge and skill in the use of Advanced Life Support (ALS) emergency medical treatment, practices, and procedures. Knowledge of firefighting techniques, policies, procedures and practices. Ability to learn and perform many and varied fighting techniques and procedures. Ability to understand and follow oral and written instructions. Ability to perform prolonged and arduous work under adverse conditions. Ability to work at heights. Ability to drive fire apparatus over the road safely under emergency conditions. Skill in the use and maintenance of firefighting equipment. In 1987 the Petitioner was awarded a Bachelor of Liberal Studies degree, with a major in Liberal Studies, by Barry University. Review of the Petitioner's transcript from Barry University does not reveal any course that appears to be "readily identifiable as applicable to fire department duties" performed by the Petitioner in her present position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the Petitioner's application for Firefighters' Supplemental Compensation. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th of March, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us. Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th of March, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Maria Fonzi-Gonzalez 212 Southwest 12th Avenue Boynton Beach, Florida 33435 Maria Fonzi-Gonzalez 14915 78th Place, North Loxahatchee, Florida 33470 Elenita Gomez, Esquire Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capital, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in the case is whether Petitioner’s employment position was properly reclassified from career service to the selected exempt service pursuant to Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes (2001). All citations are to Florida Statutes (2001) unless otherwise stated.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed with the Department beginning in 1998 as a Grant Specialist. In April 2000, she applied for and was promoted into a newly created position of Operations Management Consultant (OMC) Manager in the Serving Health Insurance Needs of Elders (SHINE) program. The SHINE program is primarily a statewide health insurance counseling program designed to serve Florida’s elders. At the time of her promotion, Petitioner’s new position was classified under the Career Service System. The position was reclassified from Career Service to Selected Exempt Service effective July 1, 2001. Petitioner’s position description describes the duties and responsibilities of the position as follows: The Operations and Management Consultant Manager assists with supervision and coordination of day-to-day volunteer management and program management functions for the SHINE (Serving Health Insurance Needs of Elders) Program. Works [sic] is performed under the supervision of the program coordinator (Senior Management Analyst Supervisor) and in support of the department’s mission, vision and values. The position description also provides percentages of time regarding activities engaged in pertaining to these duties and responsibilities: 30% Manages volunteer support activities for the SHINE Program. Provides orientation, training and ongoing technical assistance to program partners and volunteer leadership; develops resource guides and other tools to assist with programmatic and operational issues; conducts meetings, workshops and seminars to build leadership skills; maintains regular communication with program liaisons and volunteer leadership; disseminates correspondence on key programmatic issues; helps resolve operational challenges; and works to ensure outcomes measures are achieved. 20% Supervises volunteer service functions for the program. Develops protocols and tracking systems for service and support provided to volunteers and staff. Coordinates collection of information for the volunteer database and maintenance of volunteer files. Assists with surveys and evaluations. Supervises activities of program staff. 10% Assists with development, preparation, monitoring and oversight of contracts of agreement with providers and program partners. 10% Performs other duties as assigned by SHINE Program Coordinator. 10% Ensures the aspects of SHINE Program of Information& Referral (I & R), education and outreach are coordinated with the overall agency responsibility in those areas. Supervises staff activities as they relate to these functions. 5% Takes the lead for the preparation for the SHINE grant reapplication and other related new grant applications and opportunities. 5% Assists with budget development. 5% Ensures that required grant reports and narratives are submitted to funder on time and complete. 5% Represents Department of Elder Affairs and SHINE at community education events for the public and the aging network. May make presentations at workshops, community forums and seminars as assigned. Serves as an advocate for elders. Further, the position description lists six positions which are described as “subordinate positions.” This is consistent with the organizational chart of the Division of Self Care and Community Volunteer Initiatives which also reflects six positions directly under her position. However, during the time Petitioner held the position of OMC Manager, there were some reorganizations that resulted in two of the positions being shifted, sometimes being under the authority of Petitioner and sometimes being under the authority of others. In any event, at all times material hereto Petitioner was the supervisor of five to seven persons. Petitioner does not dispute that she performed some supervisory duties. At hearing, she acknowledged that she had supervisory duties, but asserts that she only spent a minimal amount of time in the performance of supervisory activities. Each morning, Petitioner would hold a staff briefing which lasted 15 to 30 minutes with the individuals she supervised. Petitioner described these group staff meetings as an update session to discuss “what’s hot, what are you working on, do you need help, do you need information . . . and more targeted towards continuing to instill a teamwork type of effort in the attitude of the staff.” In addition to her duties regarding staff, Petitioner was also responsible for the oversight of contracts with program providers and with volunteers. These providers and volunteers were not employees of the Department. Petitioner estimates that she spent between 50 and 75 percent of each day on contract management issues. However, in terms of her responsibility to develop, prepare, monitor, and oversee those contracts, she would utilize her staff in order to carry out many of those duties. Tom Reimers has worked for the Department since 1995. He is currently the Director of the Division of Volunteer and Community Services. Prior to that, he served as Director of the SHINE Program. During part of that time, Mr. Reimers was Petitioner’s direct supervisor. According to Mr. Reimers, Petitioner was responsible for the work product of the employees she supervised, in reviewing their work product, in informing those employees when their work product was inadequate, and in evaluating employees including signing their “Review and Performance Planning” forms. Her signature on those employee reviews appears in the line designated for “supervisor’s signature.” Mr. Reimers considered Petitioner to be a full-time supervisor in that Petitioner had the authority to sign time sheets, approve and consider requests for travel, provide information to her employees about their job and about the Department’s mission, ensure that they were carrying out the mission, and provide guidance to her subordinate employees. When Mr. Reimers received communications from the persons under Petitioner’s supervision or needed to communicate something to them, he would generally funnel that communication through Petitioner. Moreover, Mr. Reimers was frequently out of the office due to his job responsibilities. When he was out of the office, Petitioner described herself as a “second-in-command type of individual monitoring the program at home.” Mr. Reimers conducted Petitioner’s employee evaluations. His review of her work included her ability to communicate with employees, whether she was properly assigning and overseeing work of her subordinates, and whether she was motivating her staff. Petitioner received positive evaluations from Mr. Reimers. Petitioner interviewed applicants for at least two employment positions and made recommendations regarding their employment. In both instances, those persons recommended by Petitioner were hired. Petitioner was employed by the Department until March 31, 2002, when her position was eliminated because of loss of grant monies which funded her position. The weight of the evidence supports a conclusion that Petitioner spent a majority of her time supervising employees as contemplated by Section 110.205(2)(x), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Department of Elder Affairs should enter a final order finding that the position held by Petitioner Candace C. McMahon on July 1, 2001, was properly classified into the selected exempt service. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 2004.
