STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ) COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 90-6033DRI
) DCA CASE NO. 90-NOV-5
KILLEARN PROPERTIES, INC., )
LEON COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY ) COMMISSIONERS, SOUTHERN HERITAGE ) DEVELOPMENT, INC., SEAY ) ENTERPRISES, INC. and JIMMY BOYNTON ) REALTY, INC., (KINHEGA LANDING), ) STEPHEN STOUTAMIRE, et al., ) (KINHEGA OAKS), and TON REALTY ) PARTNERSHIP, )
)
Respondents. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Notice was provided and on May 13-16, 1991, a formal hearing was held in this case at the Offices of the Division of Administrative Hearings, The DeSoto Building, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida. Authority for the conduct of the hearing is set forth in Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Charles C. Adams was the Hearing Officer.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: M. B. Adelson, Esquire
David L. Jordan, IV, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
For Respondent Killearn Properties,
Inc. (Killearn): W. Douglas Hall, Esquire
Alan C. Sunberg, Esquire Nancy G. Linnan, Esquire Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
For Leon County
(County): Herb Thiele, Esquire Leon County Attorney
301 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
For Southern Heritage Development, Inc.; Seay Enterprises, Inc. and Jimmy Boynton,
Inc. (Kinhega Landing): Michael P. Bist, Esquire
1300 Thomaswood Drive
Tallahassee, Florida 32312
For Steven Stoutamire, et al.
(Kinhega Oaks); Edgar Lee Elzie, Esquire Post Office Box 82 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
For Ton Realty
Partnership: No Appearance STATEMENT OF ISSUES
In this case Petitioner through authority set forth in Section 380.11(2), Florida Statutes, seeks to take action against Respondents for alleged violation of a development order issued by the county on March 23, 1976. Petitioner would remedy those alleged occurrences through its opportunity to prevent, abate or control conditions which Petitioner asserts violate the development order.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Case Statement
On July 13, 1990, through its Case No. 90-NOV-5, Petitioner filed a notice of violation naming the present Respondents and Talquin Electric Cooperative and Killearn Lakes Tennis and Swim Club, Inc.
Provided a point of entry to defend this action Killearn petitioned for a formal administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, on August 6, 1990. On that same date it provided its answer and defenses.
On August 6, 1990, Killearn Lakes Tennis and Swim Club, Inc. filed its petition for formal administrative hearing and answer and defenses. On January 4, 1991, Petitioner gave notice of voluntarily dismissal in its action against Killearn Lakes Tennis and Swim Club, Inc. removing that Respondent from the dispute.
Talquin Electric Cooperative, Inc. on August 1, 1990, moved to dismiss that party from the action. On September 8, 1990, the Secretary of the Department of Community Affairs entered an order dismissing that Respondent.
On August 6, 1990, Petitioner received the county's petition for formal administrative hearing and answer and defenses.
On August 13, 1990, Kinhega Oaks submitted its petition for formal administrative hearing and answer and defenses.
On August 31, 1990, Petitioner in the person of its general counsel entered an order granting the formal hearing request of the aforementioned Respondents and requesting the assignment of a Hearing Officer from the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the formal hearing.
On September 25, 1990, the case was transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings for consideration with copies of pertinent pleadings enclosed. Those enclosures were as previously described together with letters of clarification dated August 3, 1990 and September 20, 1990 directed to the county attorney clarifying the scope of the notice of violation as it pertained to single lot owners in the subject development area contemplated by the development order. That correspondence effectively amended the notice of violation.
Having received the case, a prehearing conference was held on October 22, 1990. In the course of the prehearing conference a discussion was entered into concerning the participation in the hearing by Kinhega Landing and Ton Realty Partnership given the lack of information concerning a request by those parties to participate in formal proceedings. Petitioner and those Respondents who had requested a formal hearing were not opposed to allowing the missing Respondents to request a formal hearing by filing a pleading with the Division of Administrative Hearings no later than October 23, 1990. On October 23, 1990, Ton Realty Partnership petitioned for a formal administrative hearing and filed its answer and statement of defenses. On that date Kinhega Landing petitioned for a formal administrative hearing and filed its answer and defenses. The order of October 26, 1990 memorializes the decision granting the opportunity of the latter Respondents to participate. That order established the hearing for January 14-18, 1991 and required a prehearing stipulation in accordance with its terms. By motion Petitioner and Killearn moved to continue those hearing dates. The hearing was rescheduled for May 13-17, 1991, and the hearing was conducted in that week.
Killearn moved for partial summary recommended order. Petitioner moved to relinquish jurisdiction and a motion in limine. In addition to a consideration of the pleadings directed to those motions oral argument was heard. The motions concerned the issue of whether the development order established a deadline for concluding the project which had been exceeded. In this connection the subject of the possible preservation of the testimony of commissioners who served Leon County on March 23, 1976 when the development order was issued was argued. The April 2, 1991 order denied the motions with the exception that it granted the motion in limine to the extent of requiring the preservation of the testimony that might be offered by the commissioners by the use of depositions or the in- hearing appearance of those officials. Preservation of the testimony of the County Commissioners was to the extent " . . . inquiry may be made of the commissioners to ascertain whether in the course of their deliberations that took place on February [sic] 23, 1976 they discussed a build-out deadline for the project, the details of such discussion and whether any consensus was reached among the commissioners concerning the significance of the build-out date set forth in the application." In lieu of that testimony the parties were informed by the interlocutory order that they would be able to present a tape recording or transcript of a court reporter concerning the nature of the discussions by the commissioners as referred to.
On March 29, 1991, a further prehearing conference was held at which time Petitioner indicated that it might move to amend its notice of violation to include additional Respondents W. Robert Olive, Kenneth G. Oertel and Ken Hoffman. Ten days were granted to the Petitioner within which time it could request leave to amend to include the aforementioned individuals as Respondents, attaching the text of the proposed amendment to the motion. The present Respondents and the potential Respondents were afforded an opportunity to oppose the motion as allowed by Rule 22I-6.016, Florida Administrative Code. If the
motion was granted to add additional Respondents those Respondents would be given 20 days from the date of the order granting the amendment within which time the potential Respondents could offer written answers and defenses to the amendment.
On April 8, 1991, Petitioner moved to amend the notice of violation and provided the text of the proposed amended notice of violation. This action called for the addition of Kenneth G. Oertel, et al. Trust as a party Respondent. Kenneth G. Oertel, et al. Trust, responded in opposition to the motion to add it as a party.
On April 9, 1991, W. Robert Olive and Mary Taylor Olive, his wife, filed a notice of intent not to be a party notwithstanding that the amended notice of violation did not include those individuals as party Respondents.
On April 25, 1991, oral argument was held on the motion to amend to include Kenneth G. Oertel, et al. Trust, and to further state the alleged violations against the Respondents named in the original notice of violation who had not been dismissed from the case. By the April 26, 1991 order the motion to amend to add Kenneth G. Oertel, et al. Trust, was denied. The amended notice of violation pertaining to the named Respondents was allowed and forms the basis of Petitioner's claims against those Respondents together with the statements limiting the scope of the accusations as found in the aforementioned correspondence dated August 3, 1990, and September 20, 1990.
Through the oral argument presentation of April 25, 1991, an explanation was made to counsel for Kenneth G. Oertel, et al. Trust and W. Robert Olive and Mary Taylor Olive, concerning the possibility that the present case might have some influence on their property rights. Nonetheless Kenneth G. Oertel, et al. Trust and W. Robert Olive and Mary Taylor Olive, stated that they had no interest in participating in the case as Intervenors.
Witnesses and Exhibits
Petitioner presented the testimony of David King Williams, John M. DeGrove, John Thomas Beck and Henry Franklin Bittaker, III. In addition to the admission of joint exhibits nos. 1-11, Petitioner's exhibits 12-15, 18 and 20-28 were admitted.
Killearn presented the testimony of J. T. Williams, Jr.; Wayne H. Coloney; Honorable F. T. Steinmeyer, III; Glen Brown and Commissioner J. Lee Vause. The deposition testimony of former commissioners Travis Marchant, Jack Whiddon, J.
McCollum and William C. Holley, III, was presented and is received as evidence over objection by Petitioner. 1/ Killearn's exhibits 1 and 3 were admitted.
The county presented the testimony of Martin Patrick Black, Wade Pitt and Terry Ann Hegg together with exhibits 3D and 3F, which were admitted.
Kinhega Landing presented the testimony of Raymond Richard Yates, Jr. together with exhibits 1, 4, 5, 8 and 10 which were admitted.
Kinhega Oaks presented the testimony of Steven John Stoutamire.
Proposed Recommended Orders and Memoranda
All named parties, excepting Ton Realty Partnership timely filed proposed recommended orders. Petitioner, Killearn and Kinhega also offered memoranda supporting their positions in the dispute. The parties following discussion were allowed more than ten days to file proposed recommended orders. Therefore, the requirement for entering the recommended order within 30 days from receipt of the transcript was waived. See Rule 22I-6.031, Florida Administrative Code. The fact-finding set forth in the proposed recommended orders has been considered and is commented on in an appendix to the recommended order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Stipulated Facts Deemed Relevant to Be Found
Petitioner is the state land planning agency with the duty and responsibility to enforce and administer Chapter 380, Florida Statutes.
The Killearn Lakes project is a planned residential community located north of Tallahassee near Bradfordville in Leon County, Florida.
A portion of the Killearn Lakes Project, consisting of Units 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (phase I) is vested from Development of Regional Impact (DRI) review pursuant to Section 380.06(20), Florida Statutes. Petitioner recognized the vested rights for said portion of Killearn Lakes in BLIVR-274-037. The vested portion of Killearn Lakes has never undergone DRI review and is not a subject of this administrative proceeding.
The remainder of the Killearn Lakes project, consisting of Units 5 (phases II and III), 6 and 7, is not vested from DRI review.
Killearn was the sole owner of the non-vested portion of Killearn Lakes during the original DRI review, and is presently the owner and developer of most of the undeveloped portion of the Killearn Lakes DRI.
The county is the local government with the jurisdiction to issue DRI development orders, and is the local government with the primary responsibility for administering DRI development orders for the land covered by the Killearn Lakes DRI development order.
On November 14, 1974, Killearn filed a DRI application for development approval (ADA) for the non-vested portion of Killearn Lakes.
In March of 1976, the Northwest Florida Planning and Advisory Council, District II, issued its Development of Regional Impact Evaluation for Killearn Lakes, Inc.
On March 23, 1976, the county held a public hearing pursuant to Section 380.06(7), Florida Statutes (1975), on the Killearn Lakes ADA. The county commission issued a Development of Regional Impact Development Order approving the Killearn Lakes DRI and rejecting the conditions recommended by the Northwest Florida Planning and Advisory Council.
No notice of the adoption of the Killearn Lakes DRI development order was, or has ever been, recorded in the Public Records of Leon County. At the time of the adoption of the Killearn Lakes DRI development order, Chapter 380,
Florida Statutes, did not require the developer to record a notice of adoption, as is presently required by Section 380.06(15)(f), Florida Statutes (Supp.
1990), which first became effective in 1980.
The county has issued every final local permit for the development that has occurred in the Killearn Lakes DRI. The county has not adopted a document entitled "Amendment to the Killearn Lakes DRI Development Order," and no such amendment to the Killearn Lakes DRI Development Order has been rendered to the Petitioner.
Development within the Killearn Lakes DRI has not been completed.
Central sewer has not been constructed throughout the developed portion of Killearn Lakes DRI.
Other Facts
Issuance of the Development Order
Preliminary to action taken by the county commission which approved the subject development, the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission met on March 18, 1976. It considered the recommendations of the Northwest Florida Regional Planning and Advisory Council related to the project. The recommendations of the Council were:
Approval of the project on a phase by phases [sic] basis with necessary permits being granted after review and evaluation of the completed and proposed phases of development;
Close monitoring of the drainage methods throughout each phase of development by the Leon County Engineering Department through on-site inspection;
Developer is required to obtain a report from the Florida Games and Fresh Water Fish Commission for submission to the Leon County Commission concerning the evaluation of a lake drawdown project before a permit is granted;
Developer must provide more information to the Leon County Commission regarding dredge and fill operation prior to the issuing of a permit for each phase of construction;
Before the Leon County Commission issues a permit for each phase of development, a review of the upgrading of the Thoamsville [sic] Highway is required from the Florida Department of Transportation;
Developer is required to comply with the following two conditions before a permit can be granted:
Place hydrants so that all dwellings are within 1000 feet, and commercial property is within 500 feet.
Increase water pressure and supply.
A phase by phase review of projected growth of the Killearn Lakes Project and a brief impact analysis of Environmental and Natural Resources, Economy, Public Facilities, Public Transportation Facilities, and Housing in the immediate community and region is required before a permit can be issued to continue the Killearn Lakes project on a phase by phase basis.
The successful review and evaluation of the above mentioned modifications prior to issuing each phase construction permit is recommended.
The local planning group recommended approval of a development order without acceptance of the conditions suggested by the Northwest Florida Regional Planning Council.
As mentioned before in Footnote 1, the county rejected all recommendations by that planning and advisory group.
According to the minutes of the March 23, 1976 meeting: Mr. Simpson reported that the Planning
Commission had recommended granting the development permit of Killearn Lakes without the application of the recommendations of the Northwest Florida Planning & Advisory Council, Inc.
Commissioner Vause moved that the report from the Northwest Florida Planning & Advisory Council, Inc. dated March of 1976,
be reflected in the minutes as being received and filed and that the Board follow the recommendation of the Planning Commission, Commissioner Marchant seconded the motion.
Following very much discussion, Commission Vause amended his motion to adopt the following resolution and to issue a development order as recommended by the Planning Commission, Commissioner Marchant agreed to the amendment and the vote of the Board was unanimous in favor thereof.
The Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission in its action of March 18, 1976 had not suggested any substantive changes to the ADA. The County Commission did not vote to modify the ADA by changes to the language in the ADA through additions or deletions to the text of the ADA or requirements set forth in the development order or attachments to the development order. Having rejected the recommendations set out by the Northwest Florida Regional Planning and Advisory Council, and offering no other conditions to control the development order other than those contemplated by statutes or rules pertaining to the issuance of the development order, the terms of the development order became those found within the ADA.
Deadline for Development
Among the topics discussed in the ADA is the date for completing the project. The ADA identifies the project completion date as 1985. This information is provided in accordance with the questionnaire which the consultant to Killearn answered in preparing the ADA. Having examined the Draft Operating Manual for Developments of Regional Impact which had been prepared by the Division of State Planning, the predecessor agency to the Petitioner, it is inferred that the application format/questionnaire recommended by the Division of State Planning was followed in preparing the ADA. The questionnaire contemplates in a number of instances establishment of a concluding date for the project. The evidence presented at hearing did not show that the county made a conscious decision to require submission of the application in the format set forth in the draft operating manual by the Division of State Planning, rather it acquiesced in that protocol on this occasion. There is no evidence that the Division of State Planning had communicated with the county concerning the use of this questionnaire for preparing an ADA, especially as it might pertain to the policy reasons for setting forth a deadline for project completion.
Excepting the questionnaire, the Draft Operating Manual for Developments of Regional Impact prepared by the Division of State Planning was not shown to have been made available to the county or the applicant prior to the submission of the application. In particular, the applicant and county were unfamiliar with Section 2.05c. in its statement that all local development orders issued in response to an ADA should include provisions pertaining to the period of effectiveness of the development order and Section 2.07a.(2) pertaining to expiration of the period of effectiveness of the development order as a factor that may require retriggering of the DRI process.
By implication, the county was not carrying forward the policy ideas expressed by the Division of State Planning where it urges local government, in the interest of sound planning principles to include a provision in the development order pertaining to the period of effectiveness of that development order and the statement that at the expiration of that period of effectiveness the development order may require a retriggering of the DRI review process. In the abstract, the questions that were answered in the ADA in response to the format contemplated by the Division of State Planning dealing with a concluding date for the project can be seen as associated with the concept of establishing an expiration date for the development order. The answers do not equate to setting out the expiration date as an incorporated requirement countenanced by this development order. Neither does the development order nor the incorporated ADA remind the developer or its successors in interest that there is a deadline for concluding the project beyond which the development order is no longer effective and the possible requirement for retriggering review of the DRI.
Under the circumstances, absent some requirement of law not arising from the
development order per se, the statements found within the ADA concerning the projects's concluding date are nothing more than an internal planning device for the benefit of the developer and its successors in interests. As an estimate by the applicant it does not express the perception of local government in issuing the development order and is unenforceable. Statutes and rules in effect at the time that the development order was issued, and it is those statutes and rules which control for reasons discussed in the conclusions of law, did not mandate the establishment of deadlines for completing the project, establishment of a period of effectiveness for the development order or a statement setting out the ramifications for not complying with the deadlines for buildout on the possible consequences of operating beyond the period of effectiveness of a development order. More generally stated Chapter 380, Florida Statutes and the rules of the Division of State Planning in existence when the project was considered did not readily explain the application process.
It is not accepted that the county in view of the dialogue which took place between various commissioners and representatives of Killearn on March 23, 1976, took official action to extend the deadline set out in the ADA, but the resulting de facto extension of the buildout deadline beyond the effective date set forth in the ADA is irrelevant.
The discussion among the commissioners and with representatives of the developer concerning the project completion was inconclusive, because from a parliamentary viewpoint, the county did not act to restate the ADA and by such restatement set forth a project deadline.
The county never precluded further development in the DRI area after 1985 absent further DRI review. It did not have to. No deadline was required by law. No legally binding deadline has been imposed. Therefore development may proceed into the future.
Sewer Service At The Inception
Another item in dispute concerns the need to provide sewer service in the project area and at what point in time. The development order unequivocally requires a sewage treatment system so that units as they are built are connected to that system contemporaneous with their development. The development order does not allow alternative use of septic tanks until a central sewer system becomes available, if it ever does. The introductory portion of the ADA under the report summary speaks of sewer being provided by Talquin Electric Cooperative, Inc. Under the environmental assessments portion of the ADA associated with water quality, Paragraph 19.b.(3)(a), which speaks to possible discharges into ground water of liquid waste states:
All units will be connected to a central plant as they are developed. This plant will remove 90 percent of the bio-chemical oxygen demand (B.O.D.) and of suspended solids (Chapter 403, Florida Statutes) and discharge to a land via a land disposal system; no surface discharge,
(Figure 19-10).
The economic assessments, Paragraph 25, discusses sanitary sewers at pages 59 and 61, as follows:
a. Cite amount of sewage expected to be generated by the proposed development and source of treatment facility.
Amount generated (added to .04 of Phase I): About 1.4 million gallons per day (mgd) in DRI area. Treatment will be accomplished by Talquin Electric Cooperative for Phases I into IV. The collection system will utilize lift stations (Figure 25-1).
Will the design of the sewage system insure that all areas of the development have adequate facilities at all stages of the development? Specify.
The Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) and collection system construction will be phased (Table 2) to accommodate this flow as follows:
Now ready to start - .040 mgd S.T.P. (Phase (not in DRI area) 1, Unit 5)
Until January 1975 - .450 mgd S.T.P. (Phase
II, Units 5 & 6)
Until mid-1976 - .900 mgd S.T.P. (Phase III,
Unit 5+ apt./Condo. & Comm.)
1978 to mid-1982 - 1.800 mgd S.T.P. (Phase
IV) or convert .900 mgd
S.T.P. to a lift station and pump to City of Tallahassee
Talquin Electric Cooperative has a construction permit from the Department of Pollution Control, and operating permit will be issued when the S.T.P. is built, subject to conditions discussed under "discharge to groundwater".
The S.T.P. and land disposal site will be located at the northeast corner of Unit 2. Additional acreage, if needed, can be provided at the adjacent school site (Figure 19-10).
How does the development's sewage system relate to the county's sewer and water treatment facilities objectives?
During Phase IV this responsibility will shift to the City of Tallahassee. 16/ Killearn Lakes sewage then will be treated at the Tallahassee Northeast Treatment Plant (+ 1984).
What assurances will the developer provide that such a system will indeed be completed? Construction? Performance bonds?
Agreement with Talquin. 15/ Sewer connection to the City of Tallahassee depends on resolution of differences between the City and Leon County. The City/County Technical Coordinating Committee recently passed resolution urging priority action on this matter. Talquin Electric Cooperative builds and operates many total - utilities packages in the area, including sewer systems. It has been in business as a Rural Electric Cooperative for several decades.
In addition, in the environmental assessments section, Paragraph 19.b.(2)(a) at pages 7 and 8 dealing with discharges into surface water of detergents and solvents reference is made to commercial and residential sewer service. Figure 19-4, at page 8, related to land disposal speaks of the temporary land disposal site for sewage effluent. Again the section on economics found at page 49 in the ADA comments that Talquin Electric Cooperative is responsible for all utility installation. Table 1, item 25 discusses sewage and notes that all areas to be served by Talquin Electric will be phased into a regional facility in 1984 to meet county objectives. No exception to this requirement is stated.
Paragraph 31.c., at page 71, concerning alternative means of providing sewer states:
What alternative power, water, sewer and solid waste disposal sources or mixes were considered and evaluated in selecting this particular site?
The City of Tallahassee, Leon County, and Talquin Electric Cooperative are the alternative sources and they were selected through a combination of availability, common practice and cost.
Contrary to the opinion of the county, this reference is unambiguous and does not contemplate the use of septic tanks at any time as a possible alternative to sewer service. The statement of availability describes the choice between utilities, not the choice between sewer service and septic tanks.
Killearn's Agreement With Talquin Electric
The sewer service agreement between Killearn and Talquin Electric Cooperative concerning provision of sewer service commented on in Footnote 15 to the ADA addresses provision of sewer service for the entire project controlled by the development order upon request by Killearn with cost or return of the total cost to be guaranteed by Killearn as recited in the agreement. It makes Killearn responsible for depositing funds with Talquin Electric Cooperative as construction work progresses as may be required by Talquin. Those funds must be sufficient to cover Talquin's and Killearn's "actual direct costs related to the installation of said utilities, including engineering and debt service." Killearn is refunded or credited with one-half of all utility revenue received by Talquin in excess of $5 per month per customer. Those excess customer revenues would be credited first to repay amounts borrowed by Talquin for the installation of utilities to meet debt service. The excess of those revenues would be refunded to Killearn to the extent that Killearn had deposited funds with Talquin Electric for project purposes. The refund to Killearn would include any interest paid by Killearn associated with funding. By the agreement Talquin would borrow funds for the installation of the utilities if it could obtain better rates than were available to Killearn. All the funds borrowed by Talquin are subject to Killearn's guarantee on the repayment of all debt service required and if the aforementioned refunds and credits are insufficient to meet that requirement by Talquin, Killearn agrees to deposit with Talquin the amount of that deficiency which would be counted as a cost to Killearn and subject to some future refund. Killearn had agreed to execute the necessary documents for individual loans if requested to do so by Talquin. The agreement has a duration of 20 years beyond the date of completion of the last utility construction. The agreement allows Talquin to place a sewer service tap fee on lot purchasers in the project area at rates which are normal and competitive. Talquin is to deduct the direct cost of installation related to tap fees with agreement to credit or refund the remainder to Killearn. By the agreement Talquin committed to pay Killearn the cost of any land required by Talquin for sewer treatment facilities. Those purchase costs would be included in the total cost of utilities which required deposits or guarantees from Killearn to Talquin.
Nothing in the agreement between Talquin Electric and Killearn spoke to the means by which successor developers would assure that sewers were provided for units developed in the DRI area. The development order in addition to not being subject to recording in the Public Records of Leon County, Florida, based upon its own terms or requirements in law, did not obligate Killearn to advise purchasers of parcels in the DRI area who bought those parcels for development purposes, that the subsequent developer would need to provide sewers in accordance with the development order either through Talquin Electric or an appropriate utility. The failure of the development order to require disclosure is not unexpected given the county's willingness to allow the ADA to serve as the development order. The ADA informs the county of the project features. It is not designed to anticipate development controls, in this instance to set out the process by which the initial developer would alert subsequent developers to the terms of the ADA to include the requirement to provide sewer service. Nonetheless, the permission to develop was granted to Killearn as applicant and to the extent that right to develop was assigned to another developer by conveyance which removed Killearn as the responsible developer, it would be reasonable to expect Killearn to give notice of the existence of the development order and its salient features. The need to provide sewer service as development proceeds is among those features.
Transactions and Notice to Subsequent Purchasers
What did Killearn tell subsequent purchasers about the requirement to provide sewers? J. T. Williams, Jr., CEO and President of Killearn offered testimony on that subject. Williams identified that he had sold by warranty deed to Holt Robinson the Channel 40 television station property. The notice of violation refers to this property as Ton Realty Partnership. Killearn sold parcels to Dennette Rainey on contracts for deed for areas known as Mallard Bluff and Mallard Point. Parcels between Mallard Point and Mallard Bluff were sold to Perry Bodin on contracts for deed. The sales described occurred between 1979 and 1981. The balance of the project which is in dispute has been developed by Killearn and sewer has been installed in those developed areas that Killearn had not sold or agreed to sell.
According to Williams the contracts for deed to Rainey and Bodin included references about central sewer. Unfortunately, copies of the contracts for deed were not presented in the hearing to establish the exact nature of those references and the notice they may have given the purchasers concerning their obligations to arrange for sewer service contemporaneous with development (the building of residences). Williams said that the agreement was to provide sewer at the developer's request, meaning to Rainey and Bodin, pursuant to Killearn's agreement with Talquin Electric. As stated, Talquin Electric has no commitment to provide sewer service to a subsequent developer under the terms of its agreement with Killearn. More importantly the agreement with Killearn requires that the developer provide a substantial deposit before installation of sewer service. It is unclear from the record whether Rainey, Bodin or Robinson understood this. Given the arrangement described at hearing which Williams said that he would make between Talquin Electric and Respondents Kinhega Landing and Kinhega Oaks, as liaison, in which the expectation would be that those two developers would be responsible for funding or deposits to move the work forward, the possibility exists that Rainey, Bodin and Robinson had also been made aware that this funding would be needed to bring about the installation of sewer lines in areas to be developed by those purchasers. By contrast they may have understood Williams' explanation to be that Killearn would arrange for provision of the sewer service in the areas to be developed upon their request without the need for initial funding provided by the subsequent developers. The state of the record does reveal that none of the areas described in the contracts for deed between Killearn and Rainey and Killearn and Bodin have sewer service from a central location. Homes in those areas are served by septic tanks. The property conveyed to Ton Realty Partnership may or may not have sewer service based upon proof in this record.
Williams stated that he told his immediate purchasers that there was a DRI on the property and bragged that it would not be necessary for those persons who bought from him to go back through a process of project review. This does not signify that those purchasers were familiar with the contract with Talquin Electric which is spoken to under Footnote 15 to the ADA. In a more general sense, the record does not indicate that the immediate purchasers read the ADA. Again, they would not have been aware of the development order and its terms by resort to the Public Records in Leon County, Florida.
In addition to Robinson, Killearn gave warranty deeds to other purchasers of parcels within the DRI.
Killearn sold the parcel known as Mallard Bluff to Olin Mannheimer while under contract for deed to Rainey. The warranty deed under those circumstances went directly to Olin Mannheimer as developer. The terms of the warranty deed were not identified in the record nor any explanation made of Mannheimer's awareness of the requirement for sewers if he had an impression of that requirement.
Williams established that Rainey developed Mallard Point.
As Williams describes, for the property between Mallard Point and Mallard Bluff that had been sold to Perry Bodin in which the parcels known as Kinhega Landing and Kinhega Oaks are found, together with Kinhega Estates and the Kinhega Lodge, title was released per warranty deed as acreage was paid off. Except for the last parcel within the Bodin contract for deed with Killearn, that parcel being associated with Kinhega Landing group of Respondents (Southern Heritage Development, Inc., Seay Enterprises, Inc. and Jimmy Boynton Realty, Inc.), Killearn gave warranty deeds directly to persons who purchased property that had been identified under the contract for deed between Bodin and Killearn. Killearn conveyed the Kinhega Landing parcel to Bodin by warranty deed. The terms of that warranty deed were not identified in the record.
Killearn conveyed by warranty deed that property known as Kinhega Oaks. That conveyance was subject to restrictions, reservations, covenants and easements of record, if any. The conveyance to the Kinhega Oaks group of Respondents (Stephen John Stoutamire, Lewis Hill, Sr. and Lewis Hall, Jr.) took place on May 19, 1989.
Kinhega Landing, Kinhega Oaks and Other Particulars
The Kinhega Landing purchase by the present Respondents was based upon a deposit and receipt contract for sale and purchase between Bodin and his wife and James Jarrett followed by a warranty deed from Bodin and his wife to the Kinhega Landing group. No explanation is made concerning Jarrett's understanding of the need to provide sewers. The warranty deed to the Kinhega Landing group of Respondents was executed December 13, 1989, and refers to restrictions, easements, and reservations and covenants that are of record, if any. As with other conveyances and throughout the history of this project no reference to the development order could be found by a search of the Public Records. Neither does the deposit and receipt contract for sale and purchase identify the existence of the development order for the edification of the Kinhega Landing group.
Killearn had no direct dealing with purchasers of property contemplated within the agreement for deed between Killearn and Bodin other than the act of preparing and delivering a warranty deed to the Kinhega Oaks group and others similarly situated who took title directly from Killearn based upon the agreement for deed between Killearn and Bodin.
To the extent that the agreement for deed with Bodin may have informed the reader that Killearn had disclosed the nature of the requirement for provision of sewer as set forth in the development order, no indication was given in the record that someone other than Killearn may have then made the Kinhega Oaks and Kinhega Landing groups mindful of that caveat or that Bodin or someone that he was affiliated with otherwise disclosed the need to provide sewers for the parcels to be developed by the Kinhega Oaks and Kinhega Landing
groups. Bodin is not named as a Respondent nor was he called as a witness in this hearing to explain his position in these matters. Likewise Rainey, Mannheimer and Jarrett are not parties nor were they called as witnesses.
In that a warranty deed was given directly from Killearn to Kinhega Oaks, opportunity was presented by that conveyance for Killearn to have alerted the Kinhega Oaks group concerning the DRI and its terms, even if seen from Williams' viewpoint as principally being a favor to Bodin to avoid tax implications of a transfer from Bodin and thus to the Kinhega Oaks group. Although this opportunity was presented to Killearn to describe the existence of the requirements for sewer set out in the development order when making a direct conveyance to the Kinhega Oaks group, the warranty deed did not reveal that information and no discussion was entered into with Kinhega Oaks concerning any aspects of the purchase beyond the conveyance itself.
Williams asserts in his testimony in further explanation of the events that Bodin would be responsible for arranging the furnishing of sewer to the Kinhega Landing group, but that Killearn would voluntarily arrange for that sewer service as a matter of a favor, not a matter of contract. This would be upon provision of the payment of 30 per cent of cost of the installation by Kinhega Landing to Talquin Electric. At hearing Williams offered to make a similar arrangement for the Kinhega Oaks group as Williams described as having been done for Rainey under his contract with Killearn, a contract not presented at hearing. Again, this contemplates that Kinhega Oaks would pay 30 per cent of the total costs and that Killearn would get all rebates that pertained for coverage of interest and carrying costs during the rebate period. Notwithstanding Killearn's offer to make these arrangements with Talquin Electric to provide sewer for the benefit of the subsequent developers, those arrangements have not been made.
Nothing in the record establishes or suggests that the Kinhega Oaks group and the Kinhega Landing groups were aware of the existence of the development order and its requirement for installation of sewer contemporaneous with development when they purchased their parcels. Had they understood that requirement was incumbent upon them, they would not have undertaken the purchases and incurred debt obligations which they now are experiencing difficulties meeting, in part due to the possible outcome here which could prohibit development absent the contemporaneous installation of sewers.
Petitioner argues that no authority exists to allow septic tanks at individual lot sites as an interim condition prior to sewer lines being made available in the areas undergoing development by Kinhega Oaks and Kinhega Landing. This is contrary to the attitude expressed by the county in granting preliminary plats to the two developers and individual permits for septic tank installation until sewer is made available, if that eventuality occurs.
Raymond Richard Yates, Jr. testified. He is President of Southern Heritage Development Inc. and together with Jimmy Boynton Realty, Inc. and Seay Enterprises, Inc. owns the property known as Kinhega Landing. Those individuals became involved with the property through contacts between Yates and Jarrett.
As alluded to, Jarrett did not tell Yates that the property was subject to the development order and its requirements for provision of sewer. At the inception of their dealings the Kinhega Landing group intended to substitute for Jarrett and his contract and to purchase the property if plat approval could be gained. The record is not clear about Jarrett's position with Bodin and Killearn beyond the previously described deposit and receipt contract for sale and purchase Bodin to Jarrett. The Kinhega Landing group arranged to have a search made of
the Public Records of Leon County to discover any easement, development orders and/or restrictions affecting the property in question effective through December 13, 1989. That report of April 22, 1991, did not reveal the existence of the development order.
On November 16, 1989, the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission voted to approve the preliminary plat for Kinhega Landing subject to conditions. This was in accordance with the county ordinance on recording subdivision plats that became effective in 1984. (Other developers in the area of Lake Iamonia within the DRI as described had undertaken development before passage of the ordinance.) Among those conditions was the requirement for mound type septic tank systems in lieu of ordinary septic tank systems where subsurface conditions would require the mounded approach. Another condition required that the Kinhega Estates Home Owners Association's covenants and restrictions would apply. A condition was established that homeowners would be required to hook up to a central sewer system if and when it became available.
The Kinhega Landing group paid $240,000 for the land or an amount approximating that cost with a fee of $30,000 paid to Jarrett for the assignment of the contract. The Kinhega Landing group obtained a loan for $425,000 to develop the land. In furtherance of the project roads have been installed, clearing has been done and some holding facilities for stormwater runoff put in place. Other permits for development have been acquired to include environmental permits from the county and the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation.
After plat approval and purchase, the Kinhega Landing group first discovered that the property was subject to the development order. In addition to the prohibition against the use of septic tanks contemplated by the notice of violation, the county has told the Kinhega Landing group that they may not proceed with development. At present the property in question, which is 29.71 acres with 44 lots and a unit density of 1.65 units per acre lies dormant. No septic tanks have been installed as this developer had anticipated doing. Yates testified that he is not in a financial position to address the sewer requirements in an instance where deposit money would have to be made available for that activity. His other partners have decided they no longer wish to participate and Yates is in jeopardy with his financing institution.
On April 20, 1989, the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Commission voted to approve the preliminary plat for Kinhega Oaks. That parcel has an acreage of 11.87, with 15 lots of a unit density of 1.4 per acre. The preliminary plat has the same conditions that have been described for Kinhega Landing. Kinhega Oaks is owned by Stephen John Stoutamire, Lewis Hill, Sr. and Lewis Hill, Jr. The property was purchased through a real estate agency known as Rae Roeder Realty in the person of Bob Cole. The Kinhega Oaks group did not deal with Perry Bodin directly or anyone other than the realtor.
The Kinhega Oaks group bought the property for purposes of development of single-family residential lots of approximately one-half acre size. Improvements intended to be installed included a county maintained road. They did not intend to install a central sewer system. The project contemplated the use of septic tanks. In furtherance of the project the purchasers paid approximately $100,000 and had site evaluations done on two lots that were in the most sensitive area of the project near Lake Iamonia. An engineering firm was hired to gain that preliminary plat approval. Title work was done. Closing on the property was contingent upon activities by the engineering firm, soil
samples and title insurance. For the two lots which were the most sensitive in terms of use of septic tanks, soil studies were done and the necessary approvals were gained for the use of septic tanks.
In purchasing the property, the Kinhega Oaks group relied upon the conditions for development which were set out in the preliminary plat, including allowances for septic tanks to be used on an interim basis. If the preliminary plat had not been approved, the Kinhega Oaks group would not have purchased the property, nor would they have purchased the property if they had been aware of the existence of the development order. They would not have developed if the studies related to the use of septic tanks had been adverse. Since the purchase of the property, a road has been built, and water service and underground electric service has been provided. A concrete ditch has also been put in place and sod. Approximately $40,000.00 has been expended on improvements. In pursing the project, necessary permits have been obtained. The closest available central sewer is approximately one mile away. To install the sewer system, it would be necessary to tear up the road and lay the sewer line in the middle and T-off on the sides and re-pave the road.
Five lots have been sold in the subdivision. Two houses have been constructed and one is underway. All of those houses have septic tanks.
The Kinhega Oaks purchasers became aware of the existence of the development order after making improvements and selling the five lots. The Kinhega Oaks group first became aware of the development order when served with a notice of violation.
Under the orders for corrective action and the development order, the Kinhega Oaks group and the Kinhega Landing group are confronted with a requirement to provide sewer service within a year of a final order, if Petitioner's position is sustained. The Kinhega Oaks group understands that limits have been imposed on the installation of septic tanks. Had it realized that it would become necessary to place the sewer lines, it would not have purchased the property. If required to make the corrections that are contemplated by the Petitioner, Stephen Stoutamire on behalf of the Kinhega Oaks group, testified that he would "go broke".
The County: Application of The Development Order
Martin Patrick Black, the present Chief of Land Use Administration for the county, testified. He has held that position since December, 1989. He concedes that the ADA does not mention septic tanks.
The person who was principally responsible for considering the applications for plat approval from Kinhega Landing and Kinhega Oaks is Wade Pitt, a planner for the county. He knew of the existence of the development order from when he was initially employed in 1983. He testified that Mallard Bluff, Mallard Point and Kinhega Estates existed before the subdivision regulations were passed in 1984 and did not need to obtain plat approval as was necessary with Kinhega Landing and Kinhega Oaks. This did not excuse development without provision of sewer service. When he reviewed the subject requests for preliminary plat approval after the ordinance was enacted, he referred to the development order and ADA, in addition to the county subdivision regulations. On the issue of sewage disposal, he concluded that the ADA stated that central sewer would be provided by phases in the DRI; however, provision of central sewer was predicated on availability. Given that central sewer was not
available at the time that the plat approval was considered, he decided that septic tanks were an acceptable alternative to the installation of sewer until sanitary sewer became available. In effect, he believed septic tanks were an available and appropriate interim measure until sewer became available. His perceptions led to the above described conditions on wastewater treatment which were placed in the preliminary plat approval for both Kinhega Landing and Kinhega Oaks. His interpretation is erroneous. His position, as adopted by the county in the preliminary plat approvals, is incorrect in a setting in which the requirements announced in the development order/ADA are not fairly debatable.
There is no allowance for septic tanks as an interim response, especially not when the contingency in the plat approvals is for provision of sewer only when it becomes available, if at all. This is as contrasted with the absolute requirement of sewer service at the project inception, when development commences, found in the development order. The record is devoid of any statement that someone other than the subsequent developers would make the necessary financial contribution to bring about sewer service in those areas which were not developed by Killearn. It appears unlikely that sewer service will become available in substitution for septic tanks under the present circumstances.
To the extent that the applicant in responding to the questionnaire which formed the basis of the application considered alternative methods for wastewater treatment, those alternatives did not include septic tanks. The statement of how Killearn would respond to wastewater treatment did not set forth septic tanks as the means, even as an interim measure. For the county to perceive that the ADA/development order would allow septic tanks as an interim condition is contrary to reason and in contravention of the development order which it issued.
More About Covenants and Restrictions
On November 29, 1979, certain Declarations of Covenants and Restrictions for that portion of the DRI known as Mallard Point were recorded in the Public Records of Leon County, Florida. They are in substance the same as those associated with Kinhega Estates, Unit I, as recorded on December 21, 1982, and those for Kinhega Lodge recorded on February 23, 1987. All were recorded by Killearn as the developer and signed by J. T. Williams, as President of Killearn. The restrictive covenants by Killearn executed in 1979, 1982 and 1987 call for single-family residential development in an area of the DRI which was approved for condominium development. Kinhega Landing and Kinhega Oaks per the terms of the preliminary plats received by those developers must abide by the Kinhega Estates Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions. Pursuant to the definitional section in that document, the term "improvements" includes sewers. Under Article IX, having to do with the preservation of the natural environment, lakes, and Green Areas at Section 5, the developer, Killearn, reserves the right for itself and successors and assigns to go over and around the ground to erect and maintain and use sewers and for other suitable equipment for conveyance and use of sewers in the Green Areas. Right is reserved to locate pumping stations and treatment plants in the Green Areas; however, the rights which may be exercised by the developer and any licensee of the developer, also referred to as the company, shall not be considered as an obligation of the company to provide or maintain the utility, in this dispute, the sewer service. In Section
9 of Article IX, further mention is made of the idea that the granting of the easement in no way places a burden of affirmative action on the developer, and the developer is not bound to make any of the improvements noted or to extend service of any kind. Article XVIII speaks specifically of sewage disposal where
it says: "No individual sewage disposal system shall be permitted on any site unless such system is designed, located and constructed in accordance with the requirements, standards and recommendations of the State of Florida's Department of Pollution Control. Approval of such system as installed shall be obtained from such department or departments." These provisions fail to mandate the requirements for provision of sewer service by the original developer or subsequent developers. They also allow septic tanks in contravention of the development order.
Other Departures
Given the proposed stipulations in law among the parties in which consideration of the factual significance of those other departures from the terms of the development order is not anticipated, intricate treatment of those matters is not undertaken to examine the significance of these deviations from the development order. It suffices to say that the following improvements: the golf course known as Golden Eagle, the single-family residences in the vicinity of Lake Iamonia in lieu of the condominiums identified in the ADA, a school site under the ADA which has been converted to single-family residences in Golden Eagle Units 1 and 3, and the Television 40 site developed by Ton Realty Partnership in an area approved for a single-family residential development or a school site depart from the terms of the development order.
Forgiveness
Petitioner has not named individual lot owners who purchased property prior to the notice of violation as Respondents.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this action pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
The parties agreed to the following proposed stipulations of law:
May 9, 1991
The construction of residential units with septic tanks is not a proposed change to the Killearn Lakes DRI plan of development, and therefore is not a substantial deviation. The construction of residential dwelling units with septic tanks either is or is not a breach of the Killearn Lakes DRI development order.
The only change to the Killearn Lakes DRI plan of development that may be a substantial deviation requiring further DRI review is the extension of the buildout date, if any exists. However, if substantial deviation review is required because of a buildout date extension, all changes to the Killearn Lakes DRI plan of development must be included in the review.
If it is determined that none of the changes to the Killearn Lakes plan of development require further substantial deviation review, the changes must be approved in an amendment to the Killearn Lakes DRI development order.
In addition to the defences specifically raised in its answer filed in this cause, Respondent Stephen Stoutamire, et al. (Kinhega Oaks), and Respondent Southern Heritage Development, Inc. shall be deemed to have raised as a defense to the petition of the Department of Community Affairs the defense of estoppel based on the failure of
the Department of Community Affairs to record in the public records a copy of the DRI which is the subject matter of this proceeding, or to otherwise bring the existence and terms of said DRI to the attention of said Respondents.
May 10, 1991
If it is determined that the Killearn Lakes Development Order established 1985 or 1986 as the build-out date for the Killearn Lakes Development of Regional Impact, as the term build-out date is now used in Section 380.06(19)(c), then Killearn and Leon County agree that the presumption contained in Section 380.06(19)(c) applies to require further DRI review in accordance with Section 380.06. This stipulation is
intended solely to avoid the need for DCA to present evidence that an extension of such a build-out date, if one was imposed, would be a substantial deviation as defined by Section 380.06(19)(a). It is not intended as a concession by Killearn that such a build-out date was imposed or that the Leon County Commission intended to require further DRI review if Killearn Lakes did not build out
by 1985 or 1986. These remain disputed issues to be determined through the formal administrative hearing.
If it is determined that the Killearn Lakes Development Order did not establish a build-out date, as that term is now used in Section 380.06(19)(c), then Killearn and Leon County agree to amend the Killearn Lakes Development Order, without further DRI review, to incorporate those changes described in the Notice of Proposed Change previously filed by Killearn with DCA.
These stipulations are not controlling. The trier of fact may disagree.
Petitioner has brought this action under authority set forth in Section 380.11(2)(a) and (d), Florida Statutes, which says:
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.--
(a) If the state land planning agency has reason to believe a violation of this part or any rule, development order, or other order issued hereunder or other order issued hereunder or of any agreement entered into under s. 380.032(3) or s. 380.06(8) has occurred or is about to occur, it may institute an administrative proceeding pursuant to this section to prevent, abate, or control the conditions or activity creating the violation.
* * *
(d) The state land planning agency may institute an administrative proceeding against any developer or responsible party to obtain compliance with s. 380.06 and
binding letters, agreements, rules, orders or development orders issued pursuant to
s. 380.032(3), s. 380.05, s. 380.06, or
s. 380.07. The state land planning agency may seek enforcement of its final agency action in accordance with s. 120.69 or by written agreement with the alleged violator pursuant to s. 380.032(3).
Petitioner bears the burden of proving the occurrences alleged to be in violation of the development order. See Florida Department of Transportation
v. J.W.C., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1DCA 1981) and Balino v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 348 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
Petitioner's principal allegations are that the development order on March 23, 1976 imposed the legal requirement that the project be concluded by 1985 to forego further DRI review and that the project was not completed by that date and must now undergo further review. According to Petitioner, that review would promote additional consideration of other departures from the requirements set forth in the development order associated with the building activities that were not contemplated by the development order. This describes the installation of a golf course not contemplated by the development order, provision for
single-family residential units were condominiums were to be built, placement of residential subdivisions where school sites were contemplated, placement of a television station where single-family residential development or alternatively a school was to be built. Finally, there is a dispute about the requirement for installation of sewers to respond to wastewater treatment and who is responsible for that installation.
Concerning the issue of a buildout date or concluding date for the project, it is said to be 1985, as discussed in the facts. The ADA which was adopted by the county in issuing its development order describes a concluding date. The acceptance of the 1985 planning date set out in the application, in response to the questionnaire suggested by the Division of State Planning was
not emphasized by the county's development order. The one page document issued by the county which incorporated the ADA by approving the project "as stated" does not establish that the deadline suggested for buildout contemplated by the ADA must be met absent which the project might undergo further review. As the facts were found, the record does not point to an awareness by the county concerning the inclusion of a deadline and the possible consequence for not meeting that deadline as identified in the handbook issued by the Division of State Planning. Therefore when the county passed on the application it did not consciously impose a deadline concerning buildout or the date beyond which the development order would no longer be effective nor did the development order set forth the necessary concomitant that failure to meet the deadline could subject the project to further DRI review.
Absent a requirement set forth in the development order which mandated adherence to a schedule for completing the project, that requirement could only be imposed by statute or rule. The case is governed by Section 380.06, Florida Statutes (1975) and the rules of the Division of State Planning in effect at that time. The statute and rules in effect upon the issuance of the development order did not associate the decision by local government on the application for development approval with the imposition of a deadline for completing the project or an expiration date for the development order or the possibility of further review of the DRI if the deadline was not achieved or the development order expired. Subsequent to the issuance of the development order, Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the rules enacted by the state planning agency have changed. Section 380.06, Florida Statutes, (1985), mandated the inclusion of a termination date that reflected the time required to conclude the development and reminded the developer that failure to complete the buildout within five years beyond the expiration date would be considered to be a substantial deviation causing a presumption that the development would be subject to further DRI review. (The parties have stipulated that if the 1985 version of the statute is found to apply, the presumption controls and is not subject to rebuttal in a hearing before the county.) It is appropriate for the Petitioner to utilize the administrative remedies set forth in 380.11(2), Florida Statutes, made available subsequent to the date upon which the development order was issued for purpose of contemporaneously examining compliance with the requirements of law in existence on the date the development order was drawn.
It would be inappropriate to ascribe the substantiative requirements of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and attendant rules that were enacted beyond the date when the development order was issued. In particular, the requirement for including a termination date and the penalty for failing to comply with that date announced in 380.06, Florida Statutes (1985), do not apply to this case.
The 1985 amendment to Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and other amendments to that statute and the associated rules which took place after the development order issued on March 23, 1976 may not be applied retroactively. See Fleeman v. Case, 342 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1976); State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1983); Foley v. Morris, 339 So.2d 215 (Fla. 1976) and Department of Revenue v.
Zuckerman-Vernon Corporation, 354 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1977).
Having concluded that the Petitioner has no basis for requiring further DRI review for the alleged failure to complete the project by 1985, and in keeping with the stipulation by the parties it would not be appropriate to determine whether other activities in the development process described before need undergo further DRI review as possible substantial deviations from the terms of the development order or departures from its terms. Changes to the development order can be accomplished by an amendment to the development order
pursuant to the stipulation; however, it should be understood that the return to the county for an amendment to the development order shall result from the stipulation and not by a legal analysis mandating referral to the county.
There remains the matter of the significance of the requirements in the development order for wastewater treatment. For reasons set forth in the facts the development order mandated that these utilities would be provided through sewer service unassociated with septic tanks even on an interim basis. The county has knowingly violated its own development order in this particular.
Killearn has installed sewers in the area it specifically developed so it has acted consistently with the development order in that respect. It had and continues to have another obligation. That obligation was and is to notice subsequent developers that the project required central sewer contemporaneous with development as part of the revelation of the existence of the development order.
While Chapter 380, Florida Statutes (1975) did not require that the existence of the development order be recorded in the Public Records of Leon County, Florida and the county by allowing the ADA to become the substance of its development order did not explicitly impose the obligation for the original developer to record or otherwise disclose the existence of the development order/ADA and its terms, a requirement to disclose the existence of the development order and its terms can be reasonably implied based upon Killearn's agreement with the county (development order/ADA) and its subsequent willingness to have others proceed with its development opportunity granted by the county.
There is an importance to understanding the efforts by Killearn to make the subsequent developers aware of the development order and the requirements for provision of sewer service in a setting where Petitioner is trying to prove notice to the subsequent purchasers, making those latter purchasers responsible for the installation of sewer service. The subsequent developers to whom adequate notice may have been given to impose on them the requirements for providing sewer service, although the record is unsatisfactory on this point, have not been charged with a notice of violation. This refers to Bodin, Rainey and Mannheimer who not being charged necessarily have not defended their actions. The development order and Chapter 380, Florida Statutes (1975) did not limit development activities to the applicant seeking development approval such that conveyance to subsequent developers was an arrangement which made the applicant responsible in perpetuity for failure by the subsequent developers to meet the infrastructure requirement for sewer service given adequate notice to the latter developers to install the system. Being less than confident of the explanations given by Killearn at hearing concerning the quality of notice to subsequent purchases, and not being afforded the opportunity to hear from those subsequent purchasers and to review documents that address the transactions with the uncharged developers, a decision on the adequacy of notice cannot be reached. The attempt by Killearn to prevail on the notice issue, other than by a failure in Petitioner's proof, is hindered by its failure to disclose the existence of the development order in the warranty deed to Kinhega Oaks and the equivocation concerning the responsibility to provide sewer service and the allowance for septic tanks in the Declarations of Covenants and Restrictions it recorded in 1979, 1982 and 1987 for Mallard Point, Kinhega Estates, Unit I and Kinhega Lodge respectively. These are troubling facts, but it would be incorrect to use this information, to the exclusion of other facts found in the record and absent companion information not placed in the record, to impose the obligation on Killearn to provide the sewer service for failure to advise its successors in interest of their obligation to do so.
While it is not possible to remedy the past oversight in the process concerning notice to subsequent purchasers, it is possible to prevent future problems by requiring the original developer to record the development order in the Public Records of Leon County, Florida, and to carefully explain, among other matters, the terms of the Talquin Electric utility contract with Killearn if it serves as liaison between the subsequent developer and Talquin.
The record similarly does not reveal in what manner, if any, Ton Realty Partnership may be liable for acting contrary to the requirement for installing sewer service.
Based upon correspondence of August 3, 1990 and September 20, 1990 Petitioner announced its intention to exempt from administrative action single lot owners and the Killearn Lakes United Methodist Church who had closed on their property prior to the filing of the notice of violation, whose effective date is described as being July 26, 1990. The exemption waived the restrictions, imposed on development in the area of the project, against use of septic tanks in contrast to central sewer. Moreover, the recommendation portion of the proposed recommended order submitted by the Petitioner speaks of the development of property as allowed by the temporary injunction issued by the Honorable P. Kevin Davey in the Leon County Circuit Court, Case No. 91-683. (A copy of that order was not provided.) To the extent that the court order allows septic tanks as an interim measure and requires that these individual lots described in its order must connect to central sewer when it is provided, this recommended order acknowledges that requirement. In entering the recommended order it is with an awareness that the preliminary plats approved for Kinhega Landing and Kinhega Oaks obligate the purchasers of lots to connect to an available central sewer system whether the purchase was made before July 26, 1990 or after that date. It would be a reasonable interpretation to read the exclusions created by the August 3 and September 20, 1990 correspondence to anticipate the necessity for tying into a central sewer system for any individual lot purchasers who took title or signed contracts for deed before July 26, 1990 in areas not covered by the courts's order and the preliminary plats for Kinhega Landing and Kinhega Oaks. Finally, for other parcels subject to the development order unrelated to individual lot purchases described in this paragraph, and the succeeding paragraph, development should not proceed without contemporaneous provision of central sewer service.
Concerning the Kinhega Landing and Kinhega Oaks subdivision plats, they are found to be within the area controlled by the development order. For this reason those parcels would ordinarily be subject to the requirements in the development order, to include the need to provide sewer service at the inception of the development, provisions within the preliminary plats which allowed septic tanks in the interim notwithstanding. This case is not the ordinary case. Chapter 380, Florida Statutes (1975), did not require that the development order be recorded in the Public Records of Leon County which would have placed these purchasers on notice that sewer service was required. The requirement for recording occurred in 1980 through an amendment to Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. The recording requirement was not retroactive in its application. In addition, the county, which by statute has immediate oversight responsibility for activities within the purview of the development order, misinterpreted and misapplied its requirements by allowing septic tanks to be installed as an interim measure of treatment of wastewater. The Kinhega Landing and Kinhega Oaks purchasers were bona fide purchasers for value who under these circumstances could not reasonably have been expected to obtain notice about the development order. The county which had an opportunity to educate these
developers concerning the requirement to provide sewer service set forth in the development order mislead them into believing that septic tanks were an acceptable alternative in addressing wastewater treatment. Had these developers known of the true circumstance in which the money had to be deposited as a prerequisite to the contemporaneous installation of the sewer service, they would not have bought the property. Now, if unable to pursue the development of their property through the use of septic tanks on the individual residential lots these innocent purchasers will suffer financial hardship. During the time in question local government was primarily responsible for ensuring compliance with the development order. The absence of notice in a setting where the county could have given notice and the vagaries set forth in Chapter 380, Florida Statutes (1975) which did not require recording of the development order, estops Petitioner from enforcing against the principals who obtained the Kinhega Landing group and Kinhega Oaks group plats the requirement to provide sewer service for lots already sold or contracted for deed before July 26, 1990 and subsequent to that time. See Warren v. Department of Administration, 554 So.2d
568 (5th DCA 1990) and Tri-states Systems, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 500 So.2d 212 (1DCA 1986).
Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which:
Requires Killearn to:
comply with the requirements of the stipulation requiring an amendment to the development order incorporating the reduction in density from condominiums to single-family residences in the area bordering Lake Iamonia; the elimination of a school site in an area of residential development; the construction of a golf course and the construction of a television station in an area designated for a school site or alternatively for single-family residential development.
provide written notice in all it sells for development by others after the date of the final order that a development order exists and that all new development must have contemporaneous sewer service, and if Killearn intends to broker the contract between Killearn and Talquin Electric as a means of meeting the central sewer requirement the purchaser must be made aware that Talquin Electric must be paid a deposit from the subsequent developer before Talquin Electric will undertake the project.
record the development order/ADA and its amendments in the Public Records of Leon County, Florida.
Requires the County to:
amend the development order pursuant to the stipulation between the county and Killearn described at I.A.
refrain from issuing any permits which would allow development in the DRI area not served by a central sewer, excepting those situations set forth in the conclusions of law. In those instances development permits could be issued to successors in interest. In the exceptional cases the permit should provide that the lot owner will be required to connect to a central sewer system when made available.
faithfully fulfill the terms of its development order.
dismisses the notice of violation against Kinhega Landing, Kinhega Oaks and Ton Realty Partnership.
RECOMMENDED this 28th day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida.
CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1991.
ENDNOTE
1/ The depositions were admitted together with the testimony of Commissioner Vause to ascertain the meaning of the county commission's development order in that language:
Pursuant to Section 380.06 and after due consideration of this development and being appraised of the report of the Northwest Florida Planning and Advisory Council, Inc. District II, the Board of County Commissioners of Leon County took the following action:
The Board approved the project as stated.
The Board rejected the eight recommenda- tions of the Northwest Planning and Advisory Council, Inc. on the basis that the present Leon County Environmental Ordinances should be more than adequate to govern the problems raised in the eight recommendations.
Ordinances are similar to statutes and for these purposes the development order is another form of legislation. Consequently, one looks at the words within that legislation to understand its meaning; however, when that meaning is not evident it is appropriate to use extrinsic evidence such as tapes, transcripts and minutes in determining whether the legislation properly reflects the actions of the commission. The use of extrinsic evidence is for purposes of demonstrating what the legislative body did as opposed to what the legislative body may have intended to do. It is not appropriate to "read in" words or phrases that are not found within the legislative statement. See Riker Materials Corporation v. the City of North Miami, 286 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1973); Paragon Group, Inc. v. Hoeksema, 475 So.2d 244 (Fla. 2DCA 1985); Ramsey v. City of Kissimmee, 149 So. 553 (Fla. 1933); City of Coral Gables v. Sackett, 253 So.2d 890 (Fla. 3DCA 1971); Cordrey v. Holter, 283 So.2d 139 (Fla. 2DCA 1973) and Mandelstam v. City Commission of the City of South Miami, 539 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 3DCA 1988).
The key phrase within the quotation from the development order in determining what the county meant is where it said ". . . approved the project as stated." Did the county intend by its deliberations to amend the statements in the application for development approval (ADA)? To resolve that question it was deemed appropriate to examine the testimony of the commissioners who served when the development order was approved as well as the development order and minutes of the meeting.
APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-6033DRI
The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts of the parties:
Petitioner's Facts
1-4. Subordinate to facts found.
5. Rejected.
6-12 and the first two sentences in paragraph 13 are subordinate to facts found. The last sentence constitutes a proposed stipulation of law.
14-17. Subordinate to facts found.
18. Constitutes a proposed stipulation of law. 19-20. Subordinate to facts found.
21. Constitutes a proposed stipulation of law. 22-34. Subordinate to facts found.
35-39. Constitutes legal argument. 40-41. Subordinate to facts found.
Killearn's Facts
1-6. Not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. 7-10. Subordinate to facts found.
Not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Rejected.
Subordinate to facts found.
13-16. Rejected in its attempt to refute the concept of a concluding date for the project found in the ADA. Nonetheless, for reasons that have been discussed in the fact finding set forth in the Recommended Order, the time requirements announced in the ADA/development order are not availing as a means for Petitioner to impose its orders for corrective action.
17-19. Constitutes legal argument. 20-25. Subordinate to facts found.
26-28. Rejected in the attempt to identify action taken by the county commission in view of the remarks by the developer, which action amended the ADA projection of a concluding date for the project.
29. Subordinate to facts found. 30-31. Rejected.
Accepted in the concept that no requirement for further DRI review was imposed for the issuance of the development order.
Rejected. The suggestion that rejection of the idea that is expressed by the Northwest Florida Regional Planning and Advisory Council was equivalent to a statement by the
county that it was not imposing conditions requiring further review. To be more precise, the county rejected the recommendations of the Regional Planning Council and it did not impose further conditions for review which it had in mind.
34-38. Subordinate to facts found. 39-42. Constitutes legal argument.
County's Facts
1-14. 15. | Essentially the same as those set out in the Killearn proposed facts in paragraphs 1-19 and the response to paragraphs 1-14 would be as described in the discussion of paragraphs 1-19 for Killearn. Rejected in its suggestion that a deadline was not | |
16. | contemplated by the ADA. Rejected in any suggestion that septic tanks as an | |
17-21. | alternative method of treatment of waste water were acceptable under the terms of the ADA/development order. Same as paragraphs 23-27 within the Killearn proposed facts. | See |
discussion above. | ||
22-30. 31. | Similar to the proposed facts in paragraphs 28-38 Killearn, see discussion above. Constitutes legal argument. | by |
32. | Rejected. | |
33. | Subordinate to facts found. | |
34. | Not relevant. | |
35. | Constitutes legal argument. | |
Kinhega | Landing's Facts | |
1-10. | Subordinate to facts found. | |
Kinhega | Oaks' Facts | |
1-11. | Subordinate to facts found. | |
12-17. | Not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. | |
18-19. | Subordinate to facts found. | |
20. | Not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. | |
21-40. | Subordinate to facts found. | |
COPIES FURNISHED:
William E. Sadowski, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive
Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100
Herb Thiele, Esquire Leon County Attorney
301 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301
Margaret Ray Kemper, Esquire
101 North Monroe Street, Suite 1010 Tallahassee, FL 32301
H. Douglas Hall, Esquire Alan C. Sunberg, Esquire Nancy G. Linnan, Esquire Post Office Drawer 190 Tallahassee, FL 32302
Guyte P. McCord, III, Esquire Edgar Lee Elzie, Esquire
Post Office Box 82 Tallahassee, FL 32302
Michael P. Bist, Esquire 1300 Thomaswood Drive
Tallahassee, FL 32312
Silas R. Eubanks, Esquire
101 North Gadsden Street Post Office Drawer 1110 Tallahassee, FL 32302
M. B. Adelson, Esquire David L. Jordan, Esquire
G. Steven Pfeiffer, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100
Martha Olive, Esquire Bryant Miller & Olive
201 South Monroe Street, Suite 500 Tallahassee, FL 32301
M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, FL 32314-6507
James Harold Thompson, Esquire
Ausley, McMullen, McClosky, Smith, Carothers & Proctor
227 South Calhoun Tallahassee, FL 32301
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which top submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Feb. 12, 1992 | Final Order filed. |
| Aug. 28, 1991 | Recommended Order (hearing held May 13-16, 1991). CASE CLOSED. |
| Jun. 18, 1991 | Memorandum in Support Killearn's Proposed Recommended Order filed. (From W. Douglas Hall) |
| Jun. 18, 1991 | Recommended Final Order (unsigned); Notice of Filing Proposed Recommended Order; Kinhega Landing's Proposed Recommended Order (unsigned); Department of Community Affairs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Proposed Recommended Order; Department of Community |
| Jun. 17, 1991 | Proposed Recommended Order of Kinhega Oaks filed. (From Edgar Lee Elzie, Jr.) |
| Jun. 17, 1991 | Memorandum of Respondent Kinhega Oaks in Support of Proposed Recommended Order filed. (from Edgar Lee Elzie, Jr.) |
| Jun. 04, 1991 | Transcript filed. |
| Jun. 03, 1991 | Transcript (4 Vols) filed. |
| May 24, 1991 | Respondent Leon County Board of County Commissioners Exhibits 3(d) & 3(f) filed. (From Herbert W. A. Thiele) |
| May 23, 1991 | CC Letter to M. B. Adelson, IV from Herbert W. A. Thiele (re: Exhibits) filed. |
| May 13, 1991 | Final Hearing May 13-16, 1991 Held; for applicable time frames, refer to CASE STATUS form stapled on right side of Clerk's Office case file. |
| May 13, 1991 | CC Letter to David Jordan from James Harold Thompson (re: J. Jeffry Wahlen) filed. |
| May 10, 1991 | Stipulation filed. (from David L. Jordan et al) |
| May 10, 1991 | Subpoena Ad Testificandum w/Affidavit (3) filed. (From Herb Thiele) |
| May 09, 1991 | Letter to CCA from David L. Jordan (re: resuming hearing final hearing) filed. |
| May 09, 1991 | Prehearing Stipulation filed. |
| May 09, 1991 | Notice of Taking Deposition filed. (From W. Douglas Hall) |
| May 09, 1991 | Notice of Taking Deposition filed. (From W. Douglas Hall) |
| May 08, 1991 | Notice of Taking Deposition filed. (From Nancy G. Linnan) |
| May 03, 1991 | Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum filed. (From M. B. Adelson, IV) |
| May 03, 1991 | Respondent, Leon County's Response to Respondents' Request for Production of Documents filed. (From Herbert W. A. Thiele) |
| May 03, 1991 | Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum filed. (from M. B. Adelson, IV) |
| May 02, 1991 | Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum filed. (From M. B. Adelson, IV) |
| May 02, 1991 | Respondent, Leon County Board of County Commissioners' REsponse in Opposition to DCA'S Motion to Extend Time For Discovery Until May 10, 1991 filed. |
| May 02, 1991 | Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum filed. (From M. B. Adelson, IV) |
| May 01, 1991 | DCA's Motion to Extend Time For Discovery (until May 10, 1991) filed.(from M. B. Adelson) |
| May 01, 1991 | Notice of Taking Deposition filed. (From M. B. Adelson, IV) |
| May 01, 1991 | Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum filed. (From M. B. Adelson, IV) |
| Apr. 26, 1991 | Order sent out. (Re: Oral Argument ruling). |
| Apr. 26, 1991 | Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum filed. (From M. B. Adelson, IV) |
| Apr. 25, 1991 | (Killearn) Notice of Taking Deposition filed. (From W. Douglas Hall) |
| Apr. 25, 1991 | Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum filed. (From M. B. Adelson, IV) |
| Apr. 22, 1991 | Order (Conference will be Held on April 25, 1991: 3:00 pm: Tallahassee) sent out. |
| Apr. 22, 1991 | Second Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum filed. (From M. B. Adelson, IV) |
| Apr. 19, 1991 | Response to Motion to Amend Notice of Violation filed. (From M. Christopher Bryant) |
| Apr. 18, 1991 | Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum & attachment filed. (From M. B. Adelson, IV) |
| Apr. 16, 1991 | (DCA) Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum filed. |
| Apr. 16, 1991 | (Killearn) Notice of Taking Depositions filed. |
| Apr. 15, 1991 | Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum; Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum filed. (From M. B. Adelson, IV) |
| Apr. 10, 1991 | Supplement to DCA'S Motion to Amend Notice of Violation by Joining and Additional Respondent filed. (from M. B. Adelson, IV) |
| Apr. 10, 1991 | Notice of Intent Not to Be Party filed. (From Martha Corry Olive) |
| Apr. 09, 1991 | DCA's Motion to Amend Notice of Violation by Joining and Additional Respondent; Amended Notice of Violation & attachment filed. (from M. B.Adelson IV) |
| Apr. 03, 1991 | (Respondent) Notice of Appearance; Request for Production of Documents (3) filed. |
| Apr. 02, 1991 | Order sent out. (re: prehearing stipulation/discovery) |
| Apr. 01, 1991 | Notice filed. (from M. Kemper) |
| Mar. 14, 1991 | Order Establishing Oral Argument and a Further Prehearing Conference sent out. |
| Mar. 08, 1991 | Notice of Filing; Affidavit of Lee Vause filed. |
| Mar. 08, 1991 | Killearn's Response to Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction and Motion in Limine filed. |
| Feb. 25, 1991 | Ltr. to D. Jordan from D. Hall re: extension of Time for Killearn to respond to motions filed. |
| Feb. 15, 1991 | Dept. of Community Affairs' Response to Killearn's Motion for PartialSummary Recommended Order and Dept. of Community Affairs' Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction to the Department and Motion in Limine filed. |
| Feb. 08, 1991 | (Southern Heritage Development, Inc.) Notice of Appearance filed. (From Michael P. Bist) |
| Feb. 07, 1991 | Order (Petitioner has until Feb. 15, 1991, to respond to the motion for partial summary recommended order) sent out. |
| Feb. 06, 1991 | Department of Community Affairs Amended Motion for Enlargement of Time to Respond to Killearn's Motion for Partial Summary Recommended Order filed. |
| Feb. 05, 1991 | De0partment of Community Affairs' Motion For Enlargement of Time to Respond to Killearn's Motion For Partial Summary Recommended Order filed. (From M. B. Adelson, IV) |
| Feb. 01, 1991 | Memorandum of Law in Support of Killearn's Motion For Partial SummaryRecommended Order & Appendix filed. (From W. Douglas Hall) |
| Feb. 01, 1991 | Killearn's Motion For Partial Summary Recomended Order; Affidavit of David Williams; Affidavit of Jack G. Whiddon; Affidavit of Travis Marchant; Affidavit of William C. Holley III; Affidavit of Al Albert; Affidavit of A. L. Buford, Jr. filed. (From W. Dou |
| Jan. 09, 1991 | Order (Motion for Continuance GRANTED) sent out. (hearing rescheduled for May 13-17, 1991: 9:00 am: Tallahassee) |
| Jan. 08, 1991 | Amended Joint Motion for Continuance filed. (From M. B. Adelson, IV) |
| Jan. 04, 1991 | Joint Motion for Continuance; Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of A Respondent filed. (From M. B. Adelson IV & W. Douglas Hall) |
| Dec. 05, 1990 | Respondent Leon County Board of County Commissioners' Certificate of Service of First Set of Interrogatories and First Request for Production to Petitioner filed. (From J. Lovelace) |
| Dec. 04, 1990 | Killearn's Notice of Serving Answers to Interrogatories; Killearn's Response to The Department of Community Affairs' First Request For Production filed. (From W. Douglas Hall) |
| Nov. 07, 1990 | Notice of Service of Killean Lakes Tennis & Swim Club's First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner; Killearn Properties' First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner; Killearn Lakes Tennis & Swim Club's First Set of Interrogatories to Petitioner; Respondent |
| Nov. 07, 1990 | Petitioner's Notice of Filing Answers to Killearn Properties Inc. First Set of Interrogatories and First Request For Production; Petitioner's Notice of Filing Answers to Killearn Lakes Tennis & Swim Club, Inc.First Set of Interrog atories and First Reques |
| Oct. 30, 1990 | Department of Community Affairs First Request For Production to Leon County Board of County Commissioners filed. (From M. B. Adelson, IV) |
| Oct. 30, 1990 | Department of Community Affairs First Request For Production to Killearn Properties, Inc. filed. (From David L. Jordan) |
| Oct. 29, 1990 | Department of Community Affair's First Set of Interrogatories to Respondent Killearn Properties, Inc.; Department of Community Affair's First Set of Interrogatories to Respodnent Leon County filed. (From M. B.Adelson, IV) |
| Oct. 26, 1990 | Order (Final Hearing set for Jan. 14-18, 1991: Tallahassee: 9:00) sent out. |
| Oct. 23, 1990 | (Respondent) Petitioner For Formal Administrative Hearing; Southern Heritage Development, Inc.'s Petition For Administrative Proceedings, Answer and Defenses w/exhibit-A & Answer filed. (From R. Richard Yates,Jr.) |
| Oct. 23, 1990 | Notice of Deadline For Filing filed. (From M. B. Adelson, IV) |
| Oct. 15, 1990 | Notice of Prehearing Conference (Oct. 22, 1990: 10:30 am: Tallahassee) sent out. |
| Oct. 03, 1990 | (DCA) Order Granting A Formal Hearing and Request For Assignment of Hearing Officer; Order Granting Dismissal of Talquin Electric Cooperative, Inc. & attachment filed. (From G. Steven Pfeiffer) |
| Oct. 02, 1990 | PPF's sent out. |
| Sep. 25, 1990 | Order Granting a Formal Hearing and Request for Assignment of HearingOfficer filed. |
| Sep. 25, 1990 | Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing; Leon County Board of County Commissioners Answer and Defenses; Motion Requesting Dismissal of Talquin Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Order Granting Dismissal of TalquinElectric Cooperative, Inc. filed. |
| Sep. 25, 1990 | Agency referral letter; Notice of Violation; (Domestic Return Receipts); Killearn Properties Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing; Killearn Properties's Answer and Defenses; Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing; Killearn Lakes Tennis and Swim |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Aug. 28, 1991 | Recommended Order | Action for violating terms of Development of Regional Impact as to completion date and provision of services. Not proven, proof difficult due to time at which Developement of Regional Impact occured. |
| Aug. 28, 1991 | Recommended Order | Action for violating terms of Development of Regional Impact as to completion date and provision of services. Not proven, proof difficult due to time at which Developement of Regional Impact occured. |
