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DONALD EUGENE HALPIN AND RICHARD EDWARD JACKSON vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 91-001656RX (1991)

Court: Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 91-001656RX Visitors: 3
Petitioner: DONALD EUGENE HALPIN AND RICHARD EDWARD JACKSON
Respondent: DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Judges: LARRY J. SARTIN
Agency: Department of Corrections
Locations: Arcadia, Florida
Filed: Mar. 18, 1991
Status: Closed
DOAH Final Order on Wednesday, October 16, 1991.

Latest Update: Feb. 11, 1993
Summary: Whether Rules 33ER91-1 and 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority?Failed to prove emergency rules governing custody classification invalid. One emergency rule invalid because of 120.54(9)(c)
91-1656.PDF

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS


DONALD EUGENE HALPIN and ) RICHARD EDWARD JACKSON, )

)

Petitioners, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 91-1656RX

) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, )

)

Respondent. )

)


FINAL ORDER


Pursuant to written notice a formal hearing was held in this case before Larry J. Sartin, a duly designated Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, on July 18, 1991.


APPEARANCES


For Petitioners: Donald Eugene Halpin, pro se

#076151, D-4

Glades Correctional Institution

500 Orange Avenue Circle Belle Glade, Florida 33430


-and-


Richard E. Jackson, pro se #054990, Mail No. 1088

Martin Correctional Institution 1150 S.W. Allapattah Road Indiantown, Florida 33456


For Respondent: Linda B. Miles

Assistant Attorney General Division of General Legal Services Department of Legal Affairs

Suite 1603, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300


STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES


Whether Rules 33ER91-1 and 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority?


PRELIMINARY STATEMENT


On March 18, 1991, the Petitioners, Donald Eugene Halpin and Richard Edward Jackson, filed a Petition for Administrative Review. The Petitioners challenged Rules 33ER90-4 and 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code. On March 19, 1991,

the case was assigned to the undersigned. The formal hearing was scheduled for April 18, 1991, by Notice of Hearing entered March 20, 1991.


On March 22, 1991, the Respondent, the Department of Corrections, filed a Motion to Dismiss. The Petitioners filed Petitioners' Reply to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss on April 1, 1991, and Petitioners' Supplemental Authority in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss on April 8, 1991. On April 12, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and Cancelling Formal Hearing was entered. Pursuant to this Order the Petition was dismissed, the formal hearing scheduled for April 18, 1991, was cancelled and the Petitioners were given until April 30, 1991, to file an amended petition correcting the deficiencies of the original Petition.


On April 18, 1991, the Petitioners filed a Motion for Rehearing or in the Alternative, Motion for Clarification. This motion was denied by Order entered April 23, 1991. The time for filing an amended petition was extended to May 13, 1991.


On April 24, 1991, the Petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Administrative Review. In this Amended Petition the Petitioners alleged that Rule 33ER91-1 was invalid because it was arbitrary and capricious, among other things. Rule 33ER90-4, Florida Administrative Code, was not challenged in the Amended Petition. On May 8, 1991, an Order Concerning Amended Petition was entered. In this Order, the Petitioners were informed that a formal hearing would be conducted to afford the Petitioners an opportunity to prove that Rule 33ER91-1 was arbitrary and capricious. The Petitioners were also informed that other challenges which they had raised in their Amended Petition concerning Rule 33ER91-1 were not proper and would not be heard. Therefore, the Petitioners were informed that the evidence and argument they could present during the formal hearing would be limited to the issue of whether the challenged rule was arbitrary and capricious. A Second Notice of Hearing was also entered on May 8, 1991, setting the formal hearing for July 18, 1991.


On May 13, 1991, the Petitioners filed Supplement to Amended Petition for Administrative Review. In this Supplement the Petitioners attempted to challenge Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code. On June 6, 1991, an Order concerning this Supplement was entered. In the June 6, 1991, Order the parties were informed that the Supplement would be treated as a motion to amend the Petitioners' Amended Petition and the Respondent was given until June 18, 1991, to respond to the "motion." No response was filed by the Respondent.

Therefore, on July 10, 1991, an Order Granting Amendment of Petition was entered informing the parties that the Petitioners would be allowed to present evidence concerning Rule 33ER91-2. A Motion for Ruling on Petitioners' Supplement to Amended Petition for Administrative Review filed by the Petitioners was also granted.


On May 30, 1991, the Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition for Administrative Review. On June 13, 1991, this Motion was denied.


During the formal hearing of this case, counsel for the Department of Corrections and James Mitchell were located in Tallahassee, Florida. The undersigned, Petitioners and the other witnesses who testified during the hearing were located at DeSoto Correctional Institution, Arcadia, Florida. The hearing was conducted by a telephone connection between the two locations.


During the formal hearing the Petitioners testified on their own behalf, and presented the testimony of Kenneth Reeves, James Mitchell, Sterling

Staggers, James K. Smith, James McManus, Robert Sanders, Louis Williams and John Shaw. Petitioners offered four exhibits which were accepted into evidence. The Respondent did not call any witnesses because the Respondent presented its testimony during the cross examination of some of the witnesses called by the Petitioners. The Respondent offered no exhibits.


The transcript of the formal hearing was filed on August 19, 1991. As agreed following the formal hearing, proposed final orders were to be filed by the parties within thirty days after the transcript was filed. On August 21, 1991, a Notice of Filing of Transcript was entered informing the parties of the filing of the transcript and informing the parties that proposed final orders were due on or before September 18, 1991.


Subsequent to the issuance of the Notice of Filing Transcript, Donald Halpin filed a letter with the Division of Administrative Hearings requesting that a copy of the transcript of the formal hearing be provided to him. On September 5, 1991, an Order Denying Request for Transcript was entered. Mr. Halpin was informed that the undersigned was aware of no authority requiring that he be provided a transcript. The parties were again reminded that proposed final orders must be filed on or before September 18, 1991.


On September 13, 1991, Mr. Halpin filed a Motion for Rehearing requesting rehearing on the question of whether a transcript should be provided to him. On September 16, 1991, the Motion was denied.


No proposed final order has been filed by the Petitioners or the Respondent.


FINDINGS OF FACT


  1. Standing.


    1. The Petitioners, Donald Eugene Halpin and Richard Edward Jackson, are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections.


    2. The Petitioners are subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the emergency rules at issue in this proceeding.


  2. The Respondent.


    1. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida.


    2. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing the rights of inmates, the operation and management of correctional institutions, classification of inmates and all other aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida.


  3. Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code.


    1. Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code, governs, among other things, the classification of inmates.


    2. Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code, governs the classification of inmates for purposes of determining the type of custody an inmate should be subjected to.

    3. Pursuant to Rule 33-6.009(3), Florida Administrative Code, inmates may be classified in one of five custody classifications: minimum, medium-out, medium-in, close or maximum.


  4. History of Changes in Custody Grade Classification of Inmates Since 1990.


    1. In June of 1990, Donald D. Dillbeck, an inmate of the Respondent, was classified and placed in a minimum custody classification, which is the least restrictive custody classification.


    2. While outside of the institution in which he was housed and while working at a vocational center, Dillbeck escaped from custody of the Respondent and murdered a woman in the parking lot of a shopping center in Tallahassee, Florida.


    3. In response to this murder, then Governor Bob Martinez issued an executive order ordering that all medium or minimum custody classifications of capital-life felons be revoked and that all capital-life felons be classified as close custody, the second most restrictive custody classification.


    4. Governor Martinez's executive order was followed by the promulgation by the Respondent of Rule 33ER90-4, Florida Administrative Code, amending Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code.


    5. Effective January 23, 1991, the Respondent promulgated Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, amending Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code.


    6. Effective April 23, 1991, at approximately the same time that Rule 33ER91-1 expired, the Respondent promulgated Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, amending Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code.


  5. Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code, Prior to the First 1991 Emergency Rule.


    1. Rule 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code, prior to its amendment by Rule 33ER91-1, and other subsequent amendments, contained the following general provisions, pertinent to this proceeding:


      1. Section (3) contained provisions concerning the manner in which custody grades of inmates were determined;


      2. Section (4) contained provisions placing restrictions on the placement of certain inmates into the community; and


      3. Section (5) contained provisions placing restrictions on the assignments that certain inmates could be given.


    2. In general, Rule 33-6.009(3), Florida Administrative Code, provided the following:


      1. Five classes of custody were established. Rule 33-6.009(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code;

      2. An initial questionnaire and reclassification questionnaires were required to be completed for all inmates. Rule 33-6.009(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code;


      3. Inmates were awarded a numerical score as a result of the completion of the initial and reclassification questionnaires. Each inmate's custody classification was initially determined based upon this numerical score. For example, an inmate with an initial score of six or more and an inmate with a reclassification score of eight or more was classified as close custody. Rule 33-6.009(3)(c), Florida Administrative Code;


      4. If an inmate's numerical score was below the score for close custody and the inmate was not within thirty-six months of release, the inmate's custody classification had to be raised to close custody if any of a number of factors referred to as a "custody checklist" applied to the inmate. For example, an inmate serving a sentence for first or second degree murder had to be classified as close custody even if that inmate's questionnaire score was below six points (on an initial questionnaire) or below eight points (on a reclassification questionnaire). Rule 33-6.009(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code;


      5. Additionally, an inmate had to be classified as close custody even if the inmate's score was below six or eight points until the minimum mandatory portion, if any, of the inmate's sentence was satisfied or the inmate was within thirty-six months of release, if the inmate was serving time for certain specified offenses. Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)4, Florida Administrative Code;


      6. An inmate's custody grade questionnaire score could also be modified upward based upon consideration of other factors specified in Rule 33- 6.009(3)(d)5, Florida Administrative Code, such as whether the inmate's primary offense had been reduced as a result of a plea bargain. Custody grade scores could be modified downward based upon the same factors but only if the custody checklist was met. Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)5, Florida Administrative Code;


      7. Finally, all custody assignments had to be reviewed and approved by the superintendent or his designee. Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)6, Florida Administrative Code.


    3. Rule 33-6.009(4), Florida Administrative Code, prohibited the placement of an inmate on work release or other community contract bed if the inmate met any of a number of specified factors, including conviction of 1st or 2nd degree murder (unless the inmate had completed the mandatory portion of the inmate's sentence and was within twelve months of release).


    4. Rule 33-6.009(5), Florida Administrative Code, prohibited inmates from being assigned to a road prison, vocational center, forestry camp or to a work camp not adjacent to a major institution if the inmate met any of a number of specified factors, including conviction of 1st or 2nd degree murder.


  6. Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code.


    1. Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, amended the substance of Rule 33-6.009(3), (4) and (5), Florida Administrative Code.


    2. Rule 33ER91-1 did not amend the five classes of custody established in Rule 33-6.009(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code.

    3. Rule 33ER91-1 did not amend the requirement that initial and reclassification questionnaires be completed for all inmates contained in Rule 33-6.009(3)(b), Florida Administrative Code.


    4. Rule 33ER91-1 did not amend the manner in which inmates are awarded a numerical score as a result of the completion of the initial and reclassification questionnaires. Each inmate's custody classification is still initially determined based upon this numerical score. Rule 33-6.009(3)(c), Florida Administrative Code.


    5. Rule 33ER91-1 did amend Rule 33-6.009(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code, by eliminating the requirement that the custody classification of an inmate with a grade below the score for close custody had to be raised if any of the factors on the "custody checklist" applied to the inmate. Therefore, for example, an inmate serving a sentence for first or second degree murder is not automatically classified as close custody even if that inmate's questionnaire score is below the six points (on an initial questionnaire) or below eight points (on a reclassification questionnaire).


    6. Rule 33ER91-1 also amended Rule 33-6.009(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code, by eliminating the requirement that an inmate be classified as close custody even if the inmate's score was below six or eight points until the minimum mandatory portion, if any, of the inmate's sentence was satisfied or the inmate was within thirty-six months of release based upon the specified offenses formerly contained in Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)4, Florida Administrative Code.


    7. Rule 33ER91-1, also amended Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)5, Florida Administrative Code. In essence, the amendment to Rule 33-6.009(3)(d)5, Florida Administrative Code, requires that the Respondent consider a number of factors to either increase or decrease an inmate's custody grade questionnaire score. Generally, all of the factors which the Respondent was required to consider under Rule 33-6.009(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code, and all of the factors which required close custody under Rule 33-6.009(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code, must only be considered by the Respondent under the emergency rule.


    8. Rule 33ER91-1, eliminated the requirement contained in Rule 33- 6.009(3)(d)6, Florida Administrative Code, that all custody assignments be reviewed and approved by the superintendent or his designee. The superintendent of a prison is now required under the emergency rule to review and approve all modifications to the custody classification resulting from an inmate's questionnaire.


    9. Rule 33ER91-1 repealed Rule 33-6.009(4), Florida Administrative Code, and its prohibition on the placement of an inmate on work release or other community contract bed if the inmate met any of the factors specified in this portion of the rule.


    10. Finally, Rule 33ER91-1 repealed Rule 33-6.009(5), Florida Administrative Code, and its prohibition on inmates being assigned to a road prison, vocational center, forestry camp or to a work camp not adjacent to a major institution if the inmate met any of the factors specified in this portion of the rule.


    11. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the requirements of Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, are arbitrary or capricious.


  7. Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code.

  1. Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, is for all practical purposes identical to Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code.


  2. Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, was declared invalid in a Final Order entered on October 1, 1991, in Darryl James McGlamry v. Department of Corrections, Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 91-2804R.


    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW


    1. Jurisdiction.


  3. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding. Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1991).


    1. Standing.


  4. The Petitioners have standing to institute the instant action. They are incarcerated by the Respondent and subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rules at issue in this proceeding. See Department of Corrections

    v. Sumner, 447 So.2d 1388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).


    1. Nature of the Petitioners' Challenge.


  5. An emergency rule may be challenged before the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The only relief which may be sought pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, is a determination of the invalidity of the emergency rule on the ground that the rule is an "invalid exercise of delegated authority."


  6. What constitutes an "invalid exercise of delegated authority" is defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, as follows:


    1. "Invalid exercise of delegated authority" means action which goes beyond the powers, functions, and duties delegated by the Legislature. A proposed or existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority if any one or more of the following apply:

      1. The agency has materially failed to follow the applicable rulemaking procedures set forth in s. 120.54;

      2. The agency has exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(7);

      3. The rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(7);

      4. The rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vest unbridled discretion in the agency; or

      5. The rule is arbitrary or capricious.

  7. In order to challenge an emergency rule, the person bringing the challenge must state with particularity which portion(s) of the above definition the challenged rule violates and the facts supporting such an allegation.


  8. In this case, the Petitioners have alleged that Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an "invalid exercise of delegated authority" in violation of Section 120.52(8)(e), Florida Statutes, because the Rule is "arbitrary or capricious".


  9. In the Supplement to Amended Petition filed by the Petitioners, the Petitioners have alleged that Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, was enacted contrary to Section 120.54(9)(c), Florida Statutes. Thus, the Petitioners have alleged that Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated authority pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(a), Florida Statutes.


  10. The Petitioners have also alleged that Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, is unconstitutional. A Hearing Officer has no jurisdiction over constitutional challenges brought pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Key Haven Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund, 427 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1982); Long v. Department of Administration, 428 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); and Cook v. Parole and Probation Commission, 415 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).


  11. The Petitioners have also argued that Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, was improperly applied to them. Although the application of a rule may be relevant for purposes of proving standing, the correctness of the Respondent's application of the rule cannot be addressed as an issue in a proceeding brought pursuant Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.


  12. The Petitioners also argued that Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, is invalid because of the treatment of inmates who committed crimes after their early release. These allegations do not constitute the proper basis for a challenge to a rule under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.


  13. Finally, the Petitioners have attempted to question whether there was a valid emergency for the enactment of Rule 33ER91-1. Such a challenge must be brought before the courts. See Section 120.54(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes.


    1. Burden of Proof.


  14. The burden of proof in this proceeding was on the Petitioners. Florida League of Cities, Inc. v. Department of Insurance and Treasurer, 540 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Department of Administration, Division of Retirement v. Albanese, 455 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); and Agrico Chemical Company v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).


    1. The Validity of Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code.

  15. The Petitioners have alleged that Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, is invalid pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(e), Florida Statutes, because the Rule is "arbitrary and capricious". An arbitrary and capricious action has been defined as follows:


    A capricious action is one which is taken without thought or reason or irrationally.

    An arbitrary decision is one not supported by facts or logic, or despotic.


    Agrico, supra.


  16. The weight of the evidence presented in this proceeding failed to prove that Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, was promulgated without thought or reason or that the Rule is not supported by facts or logic.


  17. In particular, the Petitioners have alleged that Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, is arbitrary and capricious "because it is a spin- off of former Rule 33ER90-4 (amended Chapter 33-6.009, Florida Administrative Code)." The evidence presented during the formal hearing did not prove this allegation.


  18. The Petitioners have also argued that Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, was "enacted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, because it denied [the Petitioners] due process of law . . . ." The evidence presented failed to prove this allegation.


  19. Based upon the foregoing, it is concluded that the Petitioners failed to prove that Rule 33ER91-1, Florida Administrative Code, is "arbitrary or capricious". Therefore, the Petitioners have failed to prove that Rule 33ER91- 1, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(e), Florida Statutes, in violation of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.


    1. The Validity of Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code.


  20. The Petitioners have alleged that Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, violates Section 120.54(9)(c), Florida Administrative Code. This emergency rule was declared invalid in a Final Order entered on October 1, 1991, in Darryl James McGlamry v. Department of Corrections, Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 91-2804R.


ORDER

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED that the Petitioners have failed to prove that Rule 33ER91-1,

Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated authority in violation of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, and the Petitioner's Amended Petition is DISMISSED. It is further


ORDERED that Rule 33ER91-2, Florida Administrative Code, is invalid as explained in the October 1, 1991, Final Order entered in Darryl James McGlamry

v. Department of Corrections, Division of Administrative Hearings Case No. 91- 2804R.

DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida.



LARRY J. SARTIN

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675


Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1991.


COPIES FURNISHED:


Donald E. Halpin #076151, D-108

Glades Correctional Institution

500 Orange Avenue Circle Belle Glade, Florida 33430


Richard E. Jackson #054990, Mail No. 1088

Martin Correctional Institution 1150 S.W. Allapattah Road Indiantown, Florida 33456


Linda B. Miles

Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1603

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050


Richard Doran

Assistant Deputy Attorney General Division of General Legal Services Department of Legal Affairs

The Capitol

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050


Donna Malphurs Suite 439

Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500


Carroll Webb, Executive Director Administrative Procedures Committee Holland Building, Room 120 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300

Harry K. Singletary, Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500


A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS ARE GOVERNED BY THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. SUCH PROCEEDINGS ARE COMMENCED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS AND A SECOND COPY, ACCOMPANIED BY FILING FEES PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT, OR WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE PARTY RESIDES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED.


Docket for Case No: 91-001656RX
Issue Date Proceedings
Feb. 11, 1993 BY ORDER of THE COURT (appeal dismissed) filed.
Mar. 20, 1992 Appellee's Motion to Dismiss filed.
Feb. 06, 1992 Notice of service of transcript(2 copies) filed.
Jan. 31, 1992 ORDER(Appellant's motion for transcripts is GRANTED) filed.
Jan. 16, 1992 Ltr. to Harry Chiles from JWY forwarding copies of pleadings filed with DOAH sent out.
Jan. 13, 1992 Application and Petition for a Writ of Mandamus(Supreme Court) filed.
Dec. 12, 1991 Index, Record, Certificate of Record sent out.
Nov. 01, 1991 Letter to DOAH from DCA filed. DCA Case No. 1-91-3497.
Oct. 30, 1991 Order Certifying Indigency Sent Out.
Oct. 29, 1991 Certificate of Notice of Administrative Appeal sent out.
Oct. 28, 1991 Directions to Clerk filed.
Oct. 28, 1991 Notice of Administrative Appeal filed.
Oct. 16, 1991 CASE CLOSED. Final Order sent out. Hearing held 7/18/91.
Sep. 16, 1991 Order Denying Motion for Prehearing sent out.
Sep. 13, 1991 (Petitioner) Motion for Rehearing & Affidavit filed. (From Donal E. Halpin)
Sep. 05, 1991 Order Denying Request for Transcript sent out.
Sep. 03, 1991 Letter to LJS from D. Halpin (re: transcript) filed.
Aug. 21, 1991 Notice of Filing of Transcript sent out.
Aug. 19, 1991 Transcript (Rule Challenge Proceedings) filed.
Jul. 30, 1991 Letter to LJS from Richard Jackson (re: Statement) w/New address filed.
Jul. 26, 1991 (ltr form) Changed of Address filed. (From Donald E. Halpin)
Jul. 24, 1991 Order Denying Motion for A Temporary Injunction sent out.
Jul. 18, 1991 CASE STATUS: Hearing Held.
Jul. 18, 1991 (Petitioners) Motion for A Temporary Injunction filed. (From Donald E. Halpin & Richard Edward Jackson)
Jul. 10, 1991 Order Concerning Subpoenas sent out.
Jul. 10, 1991 Order Granting Amendment of Petition sent out.
Jul. 10, 1991 Order Concerning Subpoenas sent out.
Jul. 08, 1991 Letter to LJS from Richard Jackson (re: Subpoenas regarding Petitioners) filed.
Jul. 08, 1991 Letter to LJS from D. E. Halpin (re: Statement) & attachments filed.
Jul. 08, 1991 (Petitioners) Motion for Ruling on Petitioners` Amended Petition of Rule 33ER91-2 filed. (from D. E. Halpin et al)
Jul. 08, 1991 (Petitioners) Motion for Additional Subpoenas filed. (From Donald E. Halpin)
Jun. 24, 1991 Second Amended Request for Subpoenas filed. (From Doanl E. Halpin & Richard E. Jackson)
Jun. 13, 1991 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition for Administrative Review sent out.
Jun. 07, 1991 Order Concerning Amended Request for Subpoenas sent out.
Jun. 06, 1991 Petitioners` Response to Respondent`s Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition for Administrative Review filed. (from Donald E. Halpin)
Jun. 06, 1991 Order Concerning Motion for A Ruling on Petitioners` Supplement to Amended Petition for Administration Review sent out.
Jun. 05, 1991 Motion for A Ruling on Petitioners` Supplement to Amended Petition for Administrative Review filed. (From Donald Eugene Halpin et al)
May 31, 1991 (Petitioner) Amended Request for Subpoenas (Exhibits Att) filed.
May 30, 1991 (Respondent) Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition for Administrative Review filed.
May 15, 1991 Order Concerning Request for Subpoenas sent out.
May 13, 1991 Supplement to Amended Petition for Administrative Review w/Exhibit-A filed. (From Donald E. Halpin & Richard E. Jackson)
May 08, 1991 Second Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for July 18, 1991; 10:30am; Arcadia).
May 08, 1991 Order Concerning Amended Petition sent out.
May 06, 1991 Letter to LJS from Donald E. Halpin (re: status of Amended Petition) filed.
Apr. 24, 1991 (Petitioners) Amended Petition for Administrative Review w/Exhibit-A filed. (From Donald Eugene Halpin)
Apr. 23, 1991 Order Denying Motion for Prehearing or in The Alternative, Motion for Clarification and Extending Period of Time to File an Amended Petition sent out.
Apr. 22, 1991 Order Concerning Petitioners` Written Objections to Administrative Hearings and Motion for Production of Documents sent out.
Apr. 18, 1991 (Petitioners) Motion for Rehearing or in The Alternative, Motion for Clarification w/Exhibit A-C filed. (from Richard E. Jackson & Donald E. Halpin)
Apr. 12, 1991 Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and Cancelling Formal Hearing sent out.
Apr. 08, 1991 (Petitioners) Motion for Production of Documents filed. (From Donald E. Halpin)
Apr. 08, 1991 Petitioners` Supplemental Authority in Opposition to Respondent`s Motion to Dismiss w/Exhibit-A filed. (From Richard E. Jackson)
Apr. 02, 1991 Order Concerning Motion for Court Reporter (DENIED) sent out.
Apr. 02, 1991 Order Denying Motion for Appointment of Counsel sent out.
Apr. 01, 1991 Petitioners Reply to Respondents Motion to Dismiss; Motion for Appointment of Counsel filed.
Apr. 01, 1991 (Respondent) Objection to Request for Subpoenas filed.
Apr. 01, 1991 (Petitioner) Request for Subpoenas; Motion for Court Reporter filed.
Mar. 27, 1991 (Petitioner) Subpoena Ad Testificandum (request for) filed.
Mar. 22, 1991 (Respondent) Motion to Dismiss filed.
Mar. 20, 1991 Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 4/18/91; 10:00am; Arcadia)
Mar. 19, 1991 Order of Assignment sent out.
Mar. 18, 1991 Petition for Administrative Review filed.
Mar. 18, 1991 Letter to Liz Cloud & Carroll Webb from Marguerite Lockard

Orders for Case No: 91-001656RX
Issue Date Document Summary
Oct. 16, 1991 DOAH Final Order Failed to prove emergency rules governing custody classification invalid. One emergency rule invalid because of 120.54(9)(c)
Source:  Florida - Division of Administrative Hearings

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