STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

Dr. C. J. COURTENAY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 91-4467F

)

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND )

REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, )

)

Respondent. )

)

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to notice, the above-styled matter was heard before the Division of Administrative Hearings by its duly designated Hearing Officer, Daniel M. Kilbride, on November 15, 1991, in Orlando, Florida. The following appearances were entered:

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Terrence William Ackert, Esquire

Southeast Bank Building

201 East Pine Street, Suite 1402 Orlando, Florida

For Respondent: James A. Sawyer, Esquire

District Legal Counsel Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services

400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award for attorney's fees for litigating the attorney's fees issue where the appellate court has determined the Petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under the provisions of Section 120.57(1)(b)10., Florida Statutes.

Whether the Petitioner is entitled to a multiplier enhancement to the lodestar in an award of attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.57(1)(b)10., Florida Statutes.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

In March, 1989, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department) sought bids for 17,500 square feet of office space in central Orlando, for a period of seven years beginning in December, 1989, with two three-year option extensions. Petitioner and two others submitted bids. After committee review, the bid was awarded to another bidder on or about June 26,

1989. Petitioner timely filed his informal and formal bid protests, and the matter was heard at length before the Division of Administrative Hearings in August, 1989. The Hearing Officer found that Petitioner had sustained the burden of proof and demonstrated that the Department had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in the bid process, and recommended that the lease be re-bid. The Secretary for the Department adopted the Recommended Order but also added an additional condition that the lease be re-bid only if necessary. Petitioner appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeal which sustained the position of the Petitioner and, although disputed by the Department, granted attorney's fees and costs for all stages of the proceedings. This matter was remanded to the Department for re-bidding and to the Division for the determination of fees and costs. Courtenay v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 581 So.2d 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).

The Petition for Costs and Attorney's Fees, pursuant to subsection 120.57(1)(b)10., Florida Statutes, was filed before the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Petitioner on July 19, 1991. This matter was set for hearing. Following various motions and a prehearing conference, prehearing stipulations with supporting Memorandum of Law and Affidavits, along with depositions of witnesses and of an expert witness, were filed. The hearing on the motions and on the merits was held on November 15, 1991. The transcript was filed with the clerk of the Division on December 16, 1991. The parties have not submitted proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law post-hearing, relying instead on the Memoranda submitted prior to, and at the hearing and oral argument of counsel.

Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. In March, 1989, the Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services sought bids for 17,500 square feet of office space in central Orlando, for a period of seven years beginning in December, 1989, with two three-year option extensions. Petitioner and two others submitted bids.

   
   

2. After committee review, the bid was awarded to another bidder on or about June 26, 1989. Petitioner timely filed his informal and formal bid protests, and the matter was heard at length before the Division of Administrative Hearings in August, 1989. The Hearing Officer found that Petitioner had sustained the burden of proof and demonstrated that the Department had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in the bid process, and recommended that the lease be re-bid.

   
   

3. The Secretary for the Department adopted the Recommended Order but also added an additional condition that the lease be re-bid only if necessary.

   
   

4. Petitioner appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeal which sustained the position of the Petitioner and, although disputed by the Department, granted attorney's fees and costs for all stages of the proceedings. This matter was remanded to the Department for re-bidding and to the Division for the determination of the amount of fees and costs to be awarded. Courtenay

   v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 581 So.2d 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).

   
   

5. The Law Office of Terrence William Ackert represented Petitioner through all stages of the administrative bid protest and appeal pertaining to

   the Invitation to Bid for 17,500 square feet of professional office space in the central Orlando, Florida area. Petitioner, a long time client of counsel of record, agreed to pay counsel at the rate of one hundred twenty-five Dollars, and later at one hundred thirty-five Dollars, per hour and for legal assistant charges ranging from twenty-five Dollars an hour to sixty Dollars an hour, and for costs.

   
   

6. The Petition for Costs and Attorneys' Fees was timely filed on July 19, 1991. The parties were unable to reach a stipulation regarding the amount of reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded.

   
   

7. A fair and reasonable fee for attorney and legal assistant time is as follows:

   
   

   For the period: 6/27/89-2/27/90

   Trial attorney time...141.9hrs at $125.00hr =$17,737.50 Legal assistant time...66.0hrs at $45/50hr = $2,990.00 Total. $20,736.50

   
   

   For the period: 2/27/90-6/30/91

   Post-hearing appellate attorney time...92.4hrs at

   $125.00 =$11,550.00

   Post-hearing appellate attorney time...50.6hrs at

   $135.00 = $6,871.50

   Total. $18,421.50

   Post-hearing appellate time for various legal

   assistants at $25/35/50/60hr. =$4,980

   Total. $23,401.50

   
   

   For the period: 7/1/91-to present

   Post-remand attorney time...48.2hrs at $135.00 = $6,489 Post-remand legal assistant time...50.1hrs at

   $25/35/60hr =$2,013.00 Total. $8,502

   Costs expended for hearing, appeal and remand hearing Total. $8,548.10

   Total due for reasonable attorneys' fee and

   costs. $61,188.10

   
   

8. During the administrative appeal, the Respondent vacated space previously leased from Petitioner and the consequent loss of income rendered Petitioner unable to make payments to counsel. Total payments to counsel of record have been limited to $5,785. Petitioner remains liable for all fees and costs, and has been billed regularly for the total due and owing.

   
   

9. Challenge of a proposed award of bid by an agency is complicated, difficult and time consuming process because the litigation is focused primarily in the administrative arena, where few attorneys are willing to accept cases of this type. In order to attain a successful result, it required considerable skill by counsel to properly perform the service. Acceptance by counsel of this matter precluded the acceptance of other litigation because of the three stage administrative process in order to secure relief for his client.

   
   

   CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

   
   

10. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding, and the parties thereto, pursuant to

    subsection 120.57(1)(b)10., Florida Statutes (1989), and the Mandate of the Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida in the case of Courtenay v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 581 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) which stated at pages 623-624:

    
    

    "...The best that this Court can do is to award attorney's fees to a challenging bidder who must have more courage than a "Mississippi riverboat gambler". The bidder must gamble on winning during the original bidding procedure, but if he loses as a result of an unfair bid procedure, he must then gamble that he will prevail in a three stage procedure -- once before the Hearing Officer, once before the Agency, and, finally, before the Appellate Court. The stakes of that gamble are that he will be reimbursed the costs and attorney's fees to obtain that which he was originally guaranteed statutorily -- an opportunity to obtain an award in a fair arena. Courtenay has prevailed at all levels of the procedure and is entitled to attorney's fees and costs in this example of a gross abuse of discretion by HRS.

    
    

    We remand to the Division of Administrative Hearings for further proceedings and for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees and costs to Courtenay pursuant to section 120.57(1)(b)10....

    
    

11. Petitioner has the burden of proof as to the amount to which the Petitioner is entitled. City of Miami v. Harris, 490 So.2d 69 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1985).

    
    

12. Petitioner has provided specific evidence to time, terms of agreement between attorney and client, rate of each attorney and legal assistant, and payment or nonpayment of bills, as set forth in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1985); see also Sierra v. Sierra, 505 So.2d

    432 (Fla. 1987) and Dade County v. Oolite Rock Company, 348 So.2d 902 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977), reh. den. August 26, 1977, which authorizes professional legal assistant recoupment through an attorney's fees award.

    
    

13. Petitioner is entitled to each of the items of cost for which reimbursement is sought since they were either matters of documentary evidence actually admitted, payments to experts actually qualified at hearing and testifying (including the expert on fees), payments to individuals for video tape services actually introduced into evidence, payments to court reporters for depositions actually introduced into evidence (DeLoach), or utilized to cross- examine the Department witness at hearing (Wilson) and for trial transcript, for photographic reproduction of documents for record on appeal, to the Department for preparation of record on appeal, and for photocopies of pleadings submitted to the court and the Agency and trial exhibits to the court and Agency and research utilized in connection with the oral argument. See, Statewide Uniform Guidelines for Taxation of Costs in Civil Actions, Florida Rules of Court (1991 Edition).

    
    

14. Petitioner is entitled to his expert witness costs in connection with the question now before the Hearing Officer regarding attorney's fees and costs. In Travieso v. Travieso, 474 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 1985), the Supreme Court mandated that such an award of costs is within the sound discretion of the trial court, at page 1185-1186. While in Travieso, the Court suggested that such testimony

    should, to the extent possible, be offered gratuitously as a matter of professional courtesy, it recognized the case where the time required for preparation and testimony is burdensome and should be reimbursed. At least one District Court has construed this standard to include the consideration of whether the testifying expert expects to be compensated for his testimony.

    Straus v. Morton F. Plant Hospital Foundation, Inc., 478 So.2d 472 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1985). In the matter sub judice, the Department has persistently rejected all efforts to negotiate a resolution of the attorney's fees and costs issue, has persisted in litigating it to its fullest extent, and has literally forced Petitioner to retain an expert witness (who has expended substantial time reviewing the file) to satisfy the prerequisites of Florida law which appear to require such testimony. See Newell v. Newell, 464 So.2d 222 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1985); Clinard v. Clinard, 478 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1985); see also Markham v. Markham, 485 So.2d 1299, 1301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), reh. den. April 1, 1986.

    
    

15. Although there is a line of authority that holds that time spent recovering attorney's fees is not recoverable, the cases cited by Respondent, Downs v. Austin, 559 So.2d 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990 and In Re: Platt, 586 So.2d

    328 (Fla. 1991), are distinguishable from this matter. Attorney's fees may be recoverable for the time spent litigating entitlement to attorney's fees under subsection 120.57(1)(b)10., Florida Statutes. See Ganson v. State Department of Administration, 554 So.2d 522, 525 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), rev'd on other grounds,

    566 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1990), in which fees and costs at each stage including litigating attorneys fees, were awarded. (Id, p. 530). See also State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Palma, 585 So.2d 329 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), in which the Fourth District in a similar situation observed that the issue of entitlement was no longer open to question, but constituted the law of the case as a result of the previous granting of a motion for attorney's fees, leaving open only the amount to be determined. See also State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Palma, 555 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1990). Accord, Gibson v. Walker, 380 So.2d 531, 533 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), in which the Fifth District noted that, in an insurance matter, the effort to recover attorney's fees under a policy is nonetheless a claim under the policy, and recoverable under a situation similar to the authority for awarding a reasonable attorney's fee in the matter sub judice [F.S. Section 120.57(1)(b)(10)]. It further appears to be the general rule that attorney's fees may be awarded for the additional legal effort required in obtaining a contested judgment for attorney's fees. See, Pirretti v. Dean, Whitter, Reynolds, Inc., 578 So.2d 474, 476 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) citing numerous citations from the Florida Supreme Court, and the First, Third, and Fourth District Courts of Appeal from the years 1974 - 1989.

    
    

16. It is significant to note that in the matter sub judice there was no agreement between Petitioner and his counsel relieving Petitioner of responsibility for attorney's fees in litigating the issue of attorney's fees, no offer by the Department to pay any attorney's fees and costs, and in fact, the Department steadfastly and persistently resisted payment of any attorney's fees or costs in this matter. See State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Palma, 585 So.2d 329, supra. Application of the lodestar theory, as clarified by Quanstrom, Id., calls for full compensation for attorney's fees and costs.

    
    

    There is no issue as to the question of entitlement of Petitioner to attorney's fees upon remand, in other words, for litigating the issue of the amount of attorney's fees. This is not a case in which the Petitioner and counsel have an agreement under which Petitioner is not responsible for the obligation of payment on attorney's fees incurred in litigating the attorney's fees issue (in fact the agreement is to the contrary), nor was this a case in which the Department had made a reasonable offer (or any offer at all) to pay

    fees, and further, in the matter sub judice, the Department steadfastly and persistently resisted and refused to pay Petitioner's fees. See Ganson v. State Department of Administration, supra: Pirretti, supra; State Farm Fire and Casualty v. Palma, 585 So.2d 329 supra.

    
    

17. While Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1985) remains the basis for determining reasonable attorney's fees in many types of cases in Florida, the Florida Supreme Court has clarified Rowe in its decision in Standard Guarantee Insurance Company v. Quanstrom, 555 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1990) by identifying three classes of cases and directing that two different methods be utilized to determine the lodestar figure in public policy enforcement cases, and tort/contract cases, as follows:

    
    

    1. In public policy enforcement cases, at page Quanstrom, based on the development of both lod theory (and contingency adjustment theory) i federal arena, adopted the standards of Johns Georgia Highway Express, 488 Fed.2d 714 (5th Cir. and required that the following factors must considered in determining a reasonable attorney's fees in such cases

       1. Time/labor requested

       2. Novelty/difficulty of quest

       3. Skill requisite to properly perform ser

       4. Preclusion of other employ

       5. Customary

       6. Whether fee fixed or contin

       7. Time limitations imposed by client or circumstances;

       8. Amount involved and result obtained;

       9. Experience/reputation/ability of attorney;

       10. Undesirability of the case;

       11. Nature and length of professional relationship with the client;

       12. Awards in similar cases.

    2. In contract/tort cases, at page 834, Quanstrom directed that the Rowe standards as currently set forth in Rule 4-1.5, Rules Regulating the Florida Bar must apply in determining the lodestar figure, as follows:

       1. Time/labor required, novelty, complexity, difficulty of questions, and the skill requisite to properly perform the service;

       2. Likelihood that the acceptance of employment will preclude other;

       3. Fee, or rate of fee, customarily charged in the locality for similar service;

       4. Significance of, or amount involved in, the subject matter of the representation, and the responsibility involved in the representation, and results obtained;

       5. Time limitations imposed by the client

          or by the circumstances and, as between and client, any additional or special time demands or requests of the attorney by client;

       6. Nature and length of professional relationship;

       7. Experience, reputation, diligence, and ability of lawyer and skill/expertise or efficiency of effort;

       8. Whether fee fixed or contingent, and if fixed as to amount or rate, then whether client's ability to pay rested to any significant degree on the outcome of the representation.

       
       

18. The evidence clearly demonstrates that, at this stage, this matter should be categorized as a public policy enforcement case, since the District Court has determined that the Department engaged in a gross abuse of discretion. Courtenay, supra at page 624. As set forth in Quanstrom, Each of the twelve factors have been satisfied, as set forth in the Finding of Fact above.

    
    

19. The critical issue then becomes whether Petitioner is entitled to an enhancement multiplier, and, if so, in what amount. The "contingency risk" factor, identified in many cases as a "multiplier" was first explained in Rowe, then modified in Quanstrom, surpa. The overriding reason for adopting the factor was to compensate attorneys for those cases where there is a risk of nonpayment, Quanstrom, supra. In the matter sub judice, the risk of nonpayment was enhanced by the Department's own recalcitrance and determination to fight, and by the vacating of space previously leased from Petitioner during the pendency of this action. See State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Palma, 555 So.2d 836, 837 (Fla. 1990), in which the maximum multiplier was applied.

    
    

20. That Quanstrom defines public policy cases at pages 830 - 834, as those which led initially to the Federal development of the lodestar approach, and generally represent discrimination, environmental, and consumer protection issues, whose primary purpose is to encourage individual citizens to bring actions that enforce statutory policy. Such circumstances have been fully set forth in Blanchard v. Bergeron - U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 939, 103 L. Ed.2d 67 (1989), with regard to civil rights claims. Quanstrom supplements Blanchard, at page 833, specifically approving the rationale of the 5th District Court of Appeal in LaFerney v. Scott Smith Oldsmobile, Inc., 410 So.2d 534 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) and illustrating another example of a case within the public policy enforcement area, to-wit, Chapter 501, Florida Deceptive Trade Practices actions by private individuals. The enforcement of such act depends on not only an enforcing authority, but also the injured consumer. These types of cases are analogous to the bid issue in the matter sub judice. The District Court of Appeal has held that the persistent, unlawful, and capricious acts of the Agency were a gross abuse of discretion of the Agency's responsibilities not only to all the bidders, but the citizenry of Florida. Citizens are virtual parties to a virtual contract relationship between the state and bidders, premised upon the bidders' guaranty of price and service, and the state's guaranty that all bids will be judged fairly and impartially under the law. Hotel China and Glassware Co. v. Board of Pubic Instruction, 130 So.2d 78, 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961).

The primary enhancement multiplier concern, referred to in Quanstrom at p. 832-833 (see also Justice Brennan's comment noted in ft. 5, Quanstrom, p. 833), which seeks to balance the effect of the risk of nonpayment, irrespective of the amount of recovery of damages for a petitioning party. In this matter, Dr.

Courtenay engaged such long odds, the Fifth District characterized him as a "Mississippi riverboat gambler" The limitations on his resources, and the nonexistence of opportunity without his counsel to redress a substantial wrong inflicted by the Department made the odds of success long indeed.

1. That with regard to an enhancement multiplier in the Quanstrom tort/contract matter (page 834 of Quanstrom) after determination of a lodestar under Rowe, the Court specifically noted that the following factors must be reviewed in determining whether a multiplier is necessary:

   
   

   1. Whether the relevant market requires contingency fee multiplier to obtain competent counsel;

   2. Whether the attorney was able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment in any way;

   3. Whether any of the factors set forth in Rowe are particularly applicable, especially the amount involved, results obtained, and type of

      fee arrangement between the attorney and his client. It is to these factors that the expert particularly addresses his testimony.

      
      

2. That the Quanstrom Court did modify the previous Rowe enhancement multiplier method as follows:

   
   

   1. If the trial court determines that success was more likely than not at the outset, it may apply a multiplier of 1 to 1.5 to the lodestar;

   2. If the trail court determines that the likelihood of success was approximately even at the outset, the trial judge may apply a multiplier of 1.5 to 2.0 to the lodestar;

   3. If the trial court determines that success was unlikely at the outset of the case, it may apply a multiplier of 2.0 to 2.5 to the lodestar.

      
      

3. Based on the public policy nature of this case, the long odds, especially based on risk of nonpayment and the unlikely chance of success, faced by Dr. Courtenay, and that without substantial funds Petitioner's ability to obtain competent counsel was severely impaired, a multiplier of 2.0 to the lodestar would appear to be appropriate in this case. See, Sun Bank of Ocala v. Ford, 564 So.2d 1078 (Fla. 1990), and State Farm Fire and Casualty v. Palma, 555 So.2d 836, 837 (Fla. 1990) in which the maximum multiplier was applied.

   
   

4. However, in discussing reasonable fees and multipliers, the Supreme Court said in Rowe that in no case should the court awarded fee exceed the fee agreement reached by the attorney and his client. Later, in Quanstrom, the Court reaffirmed and repeated this language, quoting from Rowe.

   
   

   "In no case should the court awarded fee exceed the fee agreement reached by the attorney and his client." Quanstrom, 555 So.2d at 831, quoting Rowe.

   
   

5. In this case, the undisputed testimony of both the client and the attorney is that a fee agreement was reached with this attorney. The attorney and the client agree that the fee was not contingent, that the fee, based on hourly rates, is owed by the client to the attorney, without contingency. The fee agreement was entered into at the inception of the case, and was thereafter modified only to the extent that the hourly rates increased modestly.

6. When an attorney and his client enter into a fee agreement on a case providing for statutory recovery of attorney's fees, the Florida Supreme Court appears to hold that the possibility of a court ordered enhancement does not convert that fee agreement into a contingent fee contract, and there can be no multiplier. In Daniels v. Bryson, 548 So.2d 679 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1989), the trial court had approved an hourly rate of $175.00 an hour, being the rate usually charged that client by that attorney, and had approved a multiplier of 2.5. The multiplier was reversed. Accord: Warren v. Department of Administration, 16 FLW D3004 (Fla. 5th DCA December 5, 1991).

   In considering the certified question from the District Court of Appeal: "Is the trial court limited by the non-contingent

   fee agreement between attorney and client when

   the trial court applies the principles set forth in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe,

   472 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), to determine an attorney's fee award pursuant to Section 768.56, Florida Statutes (1983) (repealed ch. 85-175)?"

   
   

   Perez-Borroto v. Brea, 544 So.2d at 1023 (Fla. 1989), the Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative, and quashed the decision of the District Court of Appeal.

   
   

7. Although for public policy reasons and the risk of nonpayment, a multiplier should be considered, based on these cases, it is clear that the basic threshold for consideration of a lodestar multiplier has not been crossed. Petitioner and his attorney have entered into a contract for fees, based on their usual course of dealings, and the attorney accepted and pursued the case pursuant to this contract. In both Rowe and Quanstrom, the Supreme Court has emphatically recited that the existence of a contract between attorney and client themselves, fixing the fee, also fixes the maximum exposure of a third party who might be called upon to pay that fee after losing the litigation.

   
   

8. Petitioner asks this tribunal to apply a lodestar multiplier to an hourly rate attorney's fee contract. This Hearing Officer is precluded from doing so. See: Warren, supra. The attorney in this case did not assume the risk that losing the case would result in the client owing him nothing. The client in this case did not receive the benefit of an agreement in which failing to prevail would result in owing his attorney nothing for fees. The attorney's fee contract is definite and certain, and in fact the attorney has billed the client for a sum certain. This is the amount the attorney contracted to receive and the client to pay, even though, from the evidence, the client is presently unable to pay. This amount, plus the time spent for the litigation of attorney's fees, represent the maximum amount which might be awarded against HRS for attorney's fees in this proceeding, which totals $52,640 as reasonable attorney's fees and $8,548.10 for costs. This amount should be promptly paid by the Department.

Therefore, it is

ORDERED that the Petition for Attorney's Fees and Costs is

GRANTED and the Respondent shall promptly pay to the Petitioner reasonable attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $61,188.10.

DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida.

DANIEL M. KILBRIDE

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 1992.

APPENDIX

The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties.

Both parties submitted Memoranda of Law with references to the facts and citations of law. They did not submit separate findings of fact and, therefore, no specific rulings are required or possible.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Terrence William Ackert, Esquire Southeast Bank Building

Suite 1402

201 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32790-2548

James A. Sawyer, Esquire District Legal Counsel Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services

400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801

Robert B. Williams, Secretary Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

John Slye General Counsel

Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services

1323 Winewood Boulevard

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700

Clerk of Court

Fifth District Court of Appeal State of Florida

300 So. Beach St.

Daytona Beach, Florida 32114

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS ARE GOVERNED BY THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. SUCH PROCEEDINGS ARE COMMENCED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS AND A SECOND COPY, ACCOMPANIED BY FILING FEES PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIFTH DISTRICT. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED.

Docket for Case No: 91-004467F

Orders for Case No: 91-004467F