The Issue Is the practice of the Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency), to decline Medicaid-funded compensation for emergency medical services provided to undocumented aliens once the patients have reached a point of stabilization an unpromulgated rule? The Petitioners' Proposed Final Order identifies the Agency's use of limited InterQual criteria to determine medical necessity as an issue in this proceeding. But the Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy does not raise this issue. Neither party's pre-hearing statement identifies it as an issue. Consequently, this Order does not consider or determine whether the Agency's limitation on the use of InterQual criteria is an "unpromulgated rule."
Findings Of Fact Proceedings Before the Division of Administrative Hearings and the First District Court of Appeal In the beginning this was an action by the Hospitals aimed at stopping Agency efforts to recoup reimbursement of Medicaid payments to the Hospitals for emergency services provided to undocumented aliens once the patients have reached a point of “stabilization.” The issue of whether the Agency could apply the “stabilization” standard to the Hospital claims for Medicaid payment for services provided indigent aliens recurred in Agency claims against hospitals throughout the state to recoup Medicaid payments. Hospitals challenged Agency claims in individual proceedings under section 120.569, which the Agency referred to the Division for disputed fact hearings. Duane Morris, LLP (Duane Morris), led by Joanne Erde, represented the hospitals in the individual proceedings. The Hospitals collectively engaged Duane Morris to represent them in this proceeding challenging the Agency’s stabilization standard as an unpromulgated rule. Joanne B. Erde, Donna Stinson, and Harry Silver were the Hospital’s lawyers in this proceeding. Ms. Erde is an experienced lawyer who has focused her practice in health care. Ms. Stinson is an experienced lawyer who concentrated her practice in health care and administrative law litigation before the Division. The Agency does not question their expertise. Mr. Silver is an experienced lawyer with no Florida administrative law experience. His role in the case was minimal. Depositions taken in one of the individual reimbursement cases were significant evidence in this proceeding. Those depositions make it clear that the Hospitals’ counsel was tuned into the unpromulgated rule issue and using discovery in that case to gather and identify the evidence that they would need in this case. Representation of the Hospitals in individual reimbursement actions provided Hospitals’ counsel the advantage of preparing with level of detail before filing the petition. The engagement letters recognize this stating: “We have an understanding of the facts underlying this matter and have substantial knowledge concerning the law governing the issues in this case.” This well-developed understanding of the facts should have minimized the need for discovery and preparation in this proceeding. Counsel were well positioned to prosecute this matter efficiently. Likewise, counsel’s “substantial knowledge concerning the law governing the issues in this case” should have minimized the need for time spent in research. This is not what happened. The pre-existing representation in the reimbursement cases provided another obvious and significant benefit to the Hospitals and their counsel. Since counsel represented the individual hospital in the separate reimbursement matters, the Hospitals could band together to jointly finance one case that would resolve the troublesome point of “stabilization” issue more consistently and more cheaply than if they litigated it in each and every case. As the basically identical engagement agreements between each hospital and counsel state: “Because many hospitals’ interests in [sic] are similar or identical as it relates to the Alien Issue and in order to keep legal costs to a minimum, each of the participants in the [hospital] Group will [sic] have agreed that it wishes this firm to represent them in a Group.” Because of counsel’s pre-existing relationships with the Hospitals, litigating this matter should have continued or enhanced the client relationships. The time required for this matter could not result in lost business opportunities. In fact, by consolidating the issues common to all the clients and their cases, counsel freed up time to work on other matters. Presentation of the issue for resolution in a single case also saved the Hospitals the greater cost of disputing the issue in each case where the Agency sought reimbursement. The Hospitals and counsel dealt with the only possible downside of the representation by including disclosures about joint representation and a waiver of conflict claims in the engagement letters. This was not a contingent fee case. The agreement provided for monthly billing and payment from counsel’s trust account. Each group member made an initial payment of $10,000 to the trust account. Any time the trust account balance dipped below $15,000, each group member agreed to contribute another $10,000 to the trust account. For counsel, this representation was about as risk free as a legal engagement can be. The Hospitals and their counsel knew from the outset that they would have to prove their reasonableness of their fees and costs if they prevailed and wanted to recover fees. The Petition for Determination of Invalidity of Non-Rule Policy seeks an award of fees and costs. They could have adjusted their billing practices to provide more detail in preparation for a fees dispute. An "unpromulgated rule challenge" presents a narrow and limited issue. That issue is whether an agency has by declaration or action established a statement of general applicability that is a "rule," as defined in section 120.52(16), without going through the required public rulemaking process required by section 120.54. The validity of the agency's statement is not an issue decided in an "unpromulgated rule challenge." Courts have articulated the legal standards for unpromulgated rule challenges frequently. See, e.g., Coventry First, LLC v. Off. of Ins. Reg., 38 So. 3d 200, 203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Dep’t of Rev. v. Vanjaria Enters., 675 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); and the cases those opinions cite. The facts proving the “stabilization” standard were easy to establish. Many Agency documents stated the shift to the “stabilization” standard. Documents of Agency contractors did also. Two examples of how clear it was that the Agency was applying a new standard were the Agency’s statements in its 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 reports to the Governor on efforts to control Medicaid fraud and abuse. The reports describe the “stabilization” standard as “more stringent” and certain to recover millions of dollars for the Agency. As the Agency’s reports to the Governor indicate, the stakes were high in this matter. For the Hospitals and other hospitals collectively affected by the Agency’s effort to recoup past payments by applying the “stabilization” standard, $400,000,000 was at stake. This matter did not present complex or difficult issues, legally or factually. The Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions requiring parties to disclose documents and witnesses and update the disclosures alleviated the discovery demands present in other litigation. The Agency’s failure to fully comply with the pre- hearing instructions and unfounded Motion in Limine added some additional time demands for the Hospital’s counsel. Nonetheless the issues were narrow, and the facts were essentially undisputed, if not undisputable. This matter did not require extraordinary amounts of time for discovery or preparation. Ordinarily challenges to rules or unpromulgated rules impose time pressures on the attorneys because of the requirement in section 120.56 that the hearing commence within 30 days of assignment to the Administrative Law Judge. The time constraint was not a factor in this case. The Hospitals requested waiver of the time requirement to permit more time for discovery. The Agency agreed, and the undersigned granted the request. Thus the Hospitals had the time their counsel said they needed to prepare for the hearing. The appeal imposed no time constraints. Both parties received extensions of time for their filings. Seventeen months passed between filing the notice of appeal and oral argument. Time for the Administrative Proceeding The total number of hours claimed for the services of the three lawyers, their claimed hourly rate, and the total fees claimed appear below. Joanne B. Erde 458.20 hours $550.00 rate $252,010.00 Donna Stinson 136.20 hours $455.00 rate $61,971.00 Harry Silver 93.40 hours $550.00 rate $51,370.00 Total 687.80 hours $365,351.00 The Hospitals’ counsel’s billing records are voluminous. For the proceeding before the Division, the Hospitals’ counsel’s invoices list 180 billing entries for the work of three lawyers. A substantial number of the entries are block billing. In block billing, all of a lawyer’s activities for a period of time, usually a day, are clumped together with one time total for the entire day’s service. It is an acceptable form of billing. But block billing presents difficulties determining the reasonableness of fees because a single block of time accounts for several different activities and the invoice does not establish which activity took how much time. Here are representative examples of the block billing entries from the Division level invoices: August 20, 2012 (Erde) – Conference call with ALJ; telephone conference with AHCA attorney; telephone conference with newspaper reporters – 2.0 hours September 16, 2012 (Erde) – Review depositions; prepare opening remarks; develop impeachment testimony – 5.50 September 27, 2012 (Erde) – Intra-office conference; finalize interrogatories; work on direct – 8.50 October 2, 2012 (Stinson) – Review and revise Motion in Limine; Telephone conferences with Joanne Erde and Harry Silver; review emails regarding discovery issues - `2.60 October 19, 2012 (Erde) – Intra-office conference to discuss proposed order; Research Re: other OIG audits; research on validity of agency rules – 2.10 hours November 9, 2012 (Erde) – Conference with ALJ; Intra-Office conference to discuss status; further drafting of proposed order – 7.70 hours. November 19, 2012 (Stinson) – Final Review and Revisions to Proposed Final order; Telephone conferences with Joanne Erde to Review final Changes and comments; Review AHCA’s proposed order and revised proposed order – 3.20 hours. Many of the entries, block or individual, do not provide sufficient detail to judge the reasonableness of the time reported. “Prepare for deposition and hearing,” “review depositions,” “review new documents,” “review draft documents,” “intra-office conference” and “attention to discovery” are recurrent examples. Senior lawyers with more expertise and higher billing rates are expected to be more efficient. This, the fact that the matter was not complicated, the relative simplicity of the issue, and the fact that the Hospitals’ counsel already had a great deal of familiarity with the facts and law involved, all require reducing the number of hours compensated in order for them to be reasonable. For this matter, in these circumstances, the claimed number of hours is quite high. The claimed 687.80 hours amounts to working eight hours a day for 86 days, two of which were the hearing. This is not reasonable. A reasonable number of hours for the proceedings before the Division is 180. That is the equivalent of 22.5 eight-hour days. That is sufficient to handle the matter before the Division from start to finish. The number includes consideration of the worked caused by the needless difficulties presented by the Agency in discovery and with its Motion in Limine. Time for the Appellate Proceeding The fees that the Hospitals seek for the appeal are broken down by hours and rates as follows: Joanne B. Erde 255.10 hours $560.00 $142,856.00 Joanne B. Erde 202.80 hours $580.00 $117,624.00 Donna Stinson 88.50 hours $460.00 $40,710.00 Donna Stinson 67.10 hours $500.00 $33,550.00 W.D. Zaffuto 48.30 hours $435.00 $21,010.50 Rob Peccola 10.90 hours $275.00 $2,997.50 Rob Peccola 17.50 hours $300.00 $5,250.00 L. Rodriguez- Taseff 6.20 hours $520.00 $3,224.00 L. Rodriguez- Taseff 19.50 hours $545.00 $10,627.50 Rachel Pontikes 38.20 hours $515.00 $19,673.00 Total 754.10 hours $397,522.50 For the appellate proceeding, the invoices present 341 entries, a substantial number of which are block billing for work by six lawyers. Here are representative examples from the appellate level invoices: May 16, 2013 (Erde) – Reviewed AHCA’s initial brief; intra- office conference to discuss; preliminary review of record – 2.90 May 24, 2013 (Erde) – Intra-office conference to discuss response to brief; preparation to respond to brief – 2.50 May 30, 2013 (Erde) – Attention to Appeal issues; finalize request for extension; brief research re jurisdictional issues – 1.60 June 18, 2013 (Peccola) – Strategy with J. Erde regarding research needs; review/analyze case law cited in answer brief; conduct legal research regarding documentary evidence and exhibits on appellate review; write email memo to J. Erde regarding same – 2.00 July 19, 2013 (Zaffuto) – Revise/draft Answer Brief; discuss extension of time with H. Gurland; research appellate rules regarding extension of time and staying proceedings pending ruling on motion; review appendix to answer brief; instructions to assistant regarding edits and filing of answer brief and appendix prepare answer brief for filing; call to clerk regarding extension of time review initial brief by AHCA and final order by ALJ – 5.50 August 14, 2013 (Erde) – Intra-office conference to discuss brief; further revised brief – 5.80 August 15, 2013 (Stinson) Reviewed appellees' answer brief; discussed language in answer brief with Joanne Erde – 2.50 October 9, 2013 (Stinson) – Review draft motion to relinquish regarding admission of exhibit; exchange e-mails with Joanne Erde; telephone conference with Joanne Erde – 1.60 October 10, 2013 (Erde) – Attention to new motion re relinquishing jurisdiction; review of revisions; further revisions – 6.00 October 30, 2013 (Erde) – Research re: AHCA’s current behavior; intra-office conference to discuss status of action at DOAH - .70 November 7, 2013 (Peccola) – Strategy with J. Erde regarding Appellees’ response in opposition to Appellant’s motion for supplemental briefing; conduct research regarding same; draft same; look up 1st DCA local rule on appellate motions and email same to J. Erde – 3.60 December 5, 2013 (Erde) – Research Re: supplemental briefing issues; research to find old emails from AHCA re: inability to produce witnesses -.90 January 21, 2014 (Rodriguez-Taseff) – Working on Supplemental Answer Brief – legal argument re authentication and cases distinguishing marchines [sic]; editing facts – 6.70 February 3, 2014 (Erde) – Review and revise response to motion for further briefing; intra-office conference to discuss same – 2.20 May 2, 2014 (Pontikes) – Continue to review relevant case law regarding the definition of an unpromulgated rule; continue to analyze the briefs and the arguments; continue to draft an outline of the argument discussed – 5.00 June 5, 2014 (Erde) – draft email to group regarding AHCA’s settlement offer; reviewed supplemental settlement offer from AHCA; draft email to group re same – 1.70 June 11, 2014 (Erde) – Attention to finalizing response to AHCA’s notice of dismissal and filing of fee petition; memo to members of group – 8.00 July 21, 2014 (Erde) – completed motion for rehearing re: fees as sanctions; drafted status report for DOAH regarding status of DCA opinion; drafted status report in companion case; emails with AHCA re: withdrawing pending audits – 6.90 July 21, 2014 (Peccola) – Strategy with D. Stinson and J. Erde regarding motion for rehearing; revise/edit same; review/revise edit notices in trial court 1.20. The descriptive entries in the invoices for the appellate representation also lack sufficient detail. Examples are: “begin preparation to respond to AHCA”s brief,” “attention to appeal issues,” “preparation to draft answer brief,” and “research and draft answer brief.” For the appellate proceedings, Duane Morris added four lawyers, none with experience in Florida administrative or appellate matters. W.D. Zaffuto, L. Rodriguez-Taseff, and Rachel Pontikes are senior level lawyers in Duane Morris offices outside of Florida. Rob Peccola is a junior level lawyer from a Duane Morris office outside of Florida. The apparent result is those lawyers spending more time on issues than the more experienced Ms. Erde and Ms. Stinson would. One example of this is a July 19, 2013, billing entry where a lawyer spent time researching “appellate rules regarding extension of time and staying proceedings pending ruling on motion.” The two lawyers primarily responsible for this matter, both laying claim to Florida appellate expertise, would only need to quickly check the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure to confirm their recollection of the rules, something that would probably take less time than it took to make the time entry and review the draft bill. Hospitals’ also filed a puzzling motion that presents a discreet example of needless attorney time billed in this matter. The Hospitals expended 21.8 hours on a Motion for Rehearing of the court’s order awarding them fees and costs. The court’s opinion and the Final Order stated that fees and costs were awarded under section 120.595(4)(a), Florida Statutes. Yet the Hospitals’ motion fretted that fees might be assessed under section 120.595(4)(b), which caps fees at $50,000. The court denied the motion. Two things stand out when reviewing the invoices for the appellate proceeding. The first is that the appeal took more hours than the trial proceeding. A trial proceeding is generally more time-consuming because of discovery, a hearing much longer than an oral argument, witness preparation, document review, and preparing a proposed order. The second is the sheer number of hours. Hospitals’ counsel seeks payment for 754.10 hours in the appellate proceeding. This is 66.3 more than for the Division proceeding. It included a two day hearing, trial preparation, research, and preparing a 37 page proposed final order. In eight-hour days the claimed hours amount to a staggering 94.26 days. That amounts to one lawyer working on the appeal for eight hours a day for three months. Of this time, 613.5 hours were spent by Ms. Erde and Ms. Stinson, lawyers with expertise in the subject area, who had prepared the case for hearing, who participated in the hearing, who closely reviewed the entire record for preparation of their proposed final order, who researched the issues before the hearing and for the proposed final order, and who wrote the proposed final order. With all this knowledge and experience with the record and the law, handling the appeal should have taken less time than the proceeding before the Division.2/ One factor supports the appellate proceeding taking as many hours, or a few more hours, than the administrative proceeding. It is the Agency’s disputatious conduct over a scrivener’s error in the Final Order which erroneously stated that the Agency’s Exhibit 1 had been admitted. The Agency’s conduct increased the time needed to represent the Hospitals in the appeal. The Agency relied upon the exhibit in its initial brief, although it twice cited page 359 of the transcript where the objection to the exhibit was sustained. Also the Agency’s and the Hospitals’ proposed final orders correctly stated that Agency Exhibit 1 had not been admitted. The Hospitals’ Answer Brief noted that Agency Exhibit 1 had not been admitted. The transcript of the final hearing and both parties’ proposed final orders were clear that the exhibit had not been admitted. Yet the Agency argued in its Reply Brief that it had been. This required the Hospitals to move to remand the case for correction of the error. The Agency opposed the motion. The court granted the motion. The Final Order was corrected and jurisdiction relinquished back to the court. The Agency used this as an opportunity to trigger a new round of briefing about whether Exhibit 1 should have been admitted. This has been considered in determining the reasonable number of hours for handling the appeal. A reasonable number of hours for handling the appeal is 225. Converted to eight-hour days, this would be 28.13 days. For the appeal, Duane Morris attributes 28.4 hours of the work to a junior lawyer. This is 3.8 percent of the total time claimed. Applying that percentage to 225 hours, results in 8.6 hours attributed to the junior lawyer with the remaining 216.45 hours attributed to senior lawyers. Attorneys and Fees Each party presented expert testimony on the issues of reasonable hours and reasonable fees. The Agency presented the testimony of M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire. The Hospitals presented the testimony of David Ashburn, Esquire. As is so often the case with warring experts, the testimony of the witnesses conflicts dramatically. Mr. Bryant opined that a reasonable rate for senior lawyers, such as Ms. Erde and Ms. Stinson, ranged between $350 and $450 per hour. The reasonable rate for junior lawyers was $200 per hour. Mr. Ashburn opined that the reasonable hourly rate for senior lawyers ranged between $595 and $700 and the reasonable rate for junior lawyers was between $275 and $300. The contrast was the same for the opinions on the reasonable number of hours needed to handle the two stages of this litigation. Mr. Bryant testified that the administrative proceeding should have taken 150 to 170 hours and that the appeal should have taken 175 to 195 hours. Mr. Ashburn testified that the Hospitals’ claimed 687 hours for the proceeding before the Division and 754.10 hour for the appellate proceeding were reasonable. The Hospitals argue that somehow practicing in a large national law firm, like Duane Morris justifies a higher rate. The theory is unpersuasive. A national law firm is nothing special. There is no convincing, credible evidence to support a conclusion that lawyers from a national firm in comparison to smaller state or local firms provide better representation or more skilled and efficient lawyering that justifies a higher rate. Based upon the evidence presented in this record, a reasonable rate for the senior lawyers participating in this matter is $425 per hour. A reasonable rate for the junior lawyer participating in this matter is $200.00. Fee Amounts A reasonable fee amount for representation in the proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings is $76,500. A reasonable fee amount for the proceeding before the First District Court of Appeal is $93,701.25. Costs Hospitals seek $6,333.63 in costs. The evidence proves these costs are reasonable. The Agency does not dispute them.
The Issue Pursuant to the order of the First District Court of Appeal dated October 18, 2005, the issue before the Division of Administrative Hearings is a determination of the amount of attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded for the administrative proceeding in Department of Health v. Anthony Glenn Rogers, M.D., DOAH Case No. 02-0080PL, and for the appellate proceeding styled Anthony Glenn Rogers, M.D. v. Department of Health, Case No. 1D04-1153 (Fla. 1st DCA Oct. 18, 2005).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine, and the Board of Medicine ("Board") within the Department is the entity responsible for entering final orders imposing disciplinary action for violations of the laws regulating the practice of medicine. See §§ 455.225 and 458.331(2), Fla. Stat. On January 4, 2002, the Department of Health filed an Administrative Complaint charging Dr. Rogers with violations of Section 458.331(1)(m), (q), and (t), Florida Statutes (1998).3 The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, which assigned the matter DOAH Case No. 02-0080PL. The case was heard on May 7, 2002, by Administrative Law Judge Michael J. Parrish. Judge Parrish entered his Recommended Order on February 21, 2003, in which he found that the Department had failed to prove violations of Section 458.331(1)(q) and (t), Florida Statutes (1998), and recommended dismissal of those charges. Judge Parrish found that the Department had proven a violation of Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1998), failing to keep medical records as required by rule, and he recommended that Dr. Rogers be required to pay a $1,000.00 administrative fine and attend a Florida Medical Association record-keeping course as the penalty for the violation. The Board entered its Final Order on February 17, 2004, in which it adopted its own findings of fact and conclusions of law; found Dr. Rogers guilty of all three charges in the Administrative Complaint; and imposed a penalty on Dr. Rogers consisting of a $10,000 administrative fine, completing of a drug course sponsored by the University of South Florida, completion of a Florida Medical Association record-keeping course, and two years' probation, during which he was not permitted to practice medicine unless his practice was monitored quarterly by a physician approved by the Board. Dr. Rogers appealed the Board's Final Order to the First District Court of Appeal, challenging the Board's determination that Dr. Rogers had violated Section 458.331(1)(q) and (t), Florida Statutes (1998). Dr. Rogers filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs based on Section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes. In addition, Dr. Rogers filed a Motion for Stay of Final Order, which the Board opposed. The district court denied the motion for stay in an order entered April 2, 2004, and Dr. Rogers proceeded to comply with the terms of the two-year probationary period imposed by the Board, as well as fulfilling the other requirements set forth in the Board's Final Order of February 17, 2004. In an opinion issued on October 18, 2005, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the Board's Final Order with respect to its determination that Dr. Rogers had violated Section 458.331(1)(q) and (t), Florida Statutes (1998), and remanded the matter to the Board for entry of a Final Order consistent with its opinion. The district court held in its opinion that the Board had erroneously re-weighed the evidence and had rejected findings of fact in the administrative law judge's Recommended Order that were supported by competent substantial evidence. The district court also entered on October 18, 2005, the order granting Dr. Rogers's motion for attorneys' fees and costs that is the subject of this proceeding. The district court's mandate issued on February 23, 2006, and, on April 21, 2006, the Board entered a Final Order on Remand adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law in Judge Parrish's Recommended Order, finding that Dr. Rogers had violated Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1998), and imposing a $1,000.00 administrative fine on Dr. Rogers and requiring him to attend a medical record-keeping course. Based on the Amended Affidavit of C. William Berger filed August 24, 2006, the total number of hours Mr. Berger spent in representing Dr. Rogers in the administrative proceeding in DOAH Case No. 02-0080PL is 79.75, a total that the Department does not challenge. Mr. Berger's billing rate was $300.00 per hour, a rate that the Department accepts as reasonable. The total amount of attorney's fees paid to Mr. Berger for his representation of Dr. Rogers through the administrative proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings was, therefore, $23,925.00. Dr. Rogers was ultimately found to have violated one count of the three-count Administrative Complaint filed against him by the Department, the count in which the Department alleged that Dr. Rogers had violated Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1998), by failing to keep adequate medical records related to the patient that was the subject of the charges against him. Mr. Berger did not record in his billing statements the amount of time he spent researching this charge, preparing for hearing on this charge, or addressing this charge in the Proposed Recommended Order he filed in 02-0080PL. It is reasonable that Mr. Berger spent 10 percent of the hours included in his billing statements preparing Dr. Rogers's defense to the charge that he failed to keep adequate medical records.4 Accordingly, Mr. Berger's attorney's fees will be reduced by 10 percent, or by $2,392.50, for a total of $21,532.50. In reaching the percentage by which Mr. Berger's fees should be reduced, consideration has been given to the amount of the fees in relationship to the failure to prevail on the medical-records violation, to the seriousness of the alleged violations on which Dr. Rogers prevailed before both the administrative law judge and on appeal,5 and the penalty ranges that the Board could impose for the violations with which Dr. Rogers was charged.6 Based on the Supplemental Affidavit of Lisa Shearer Nelson Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs filed September 5, 2006, Ms. Nelson claimed that she spent a total of 187.1 hours "from the issuance of the final order of the Board of Medicine through the appeal and remand and initial preparation of the petition for attorney's fees and costs." Ms. Nelson's billing statements reflect that she represented Dr. Rogers during the appellate proceedings before the First District Court of Appeal in Case No. 1D04-1153 and before the Board on remand from the district court. Ms. Nelson's billing rate was $250.00 per hour, a rate that the Department accepts as reasonable. The total amount of attorney's fees paid by Dr. Rogers to Ms. Nelson for her representation was, therefore, $46,775.00. A review of the billing statements attached to Ms. Nelson's supplemental affidavit reveals that the final billing statement, dated June 9, 2006, was for "preparation of petition for fees and costs; preparation of affidavit re same." Dr. Rogers was billed for 1.9 hours in this billing statement, for a total of $475.00. Because the work done by Ms. Nelson reflected in this billing statement did not involve the appellate proceeding arising out of the Board's Final Order of February 17, 2004, the hours claimed by Ms. Nelson are reduced by 1.9 hours, for a total of 185.2 hours. Accordingly, Ms. Nelson's attorney's fees for her representation of Dr. Rogers on appeal total $46,300.00. The total costs identified in Mr. Berger's Amended Affidavit and in the billing statements attached to the Amended Affidavit is $4,462.55. This amount is reduced by $1,000.00 attributable to a retainer paid to a Dr. Spanos, who was initially retained as an expert witness but who ultimately did not testify on Dr. Rogers's behalf. The total allowable costs for the administrative proceeding, therefore, are $3,462.55. The total costs identified by Ms. Nelson in her Supplemental Affidavit and in the billing statements attached to the Supplemental Affidavit is $1,005.01. The total costs for both the administrative and the appellate proceedings are, therefore, $4,467.56. Dr. Rogers submitted an affidavit in which he claimed that he expended total costs of $154,807.23 in fulfilling the terms of the penalty assessed against him in the Board's Final Order of February 17, 2004, which was reversed by the district court.
Conclusions For Petitioner: C. William Berger, Esquire One Boca Place, Suite 337W 2255 Glades Road Boca Raton, Florida 33486 For Respondent: John E. Terrel, Esquire Michael D. Milnes, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing the original Notice of Appeal with the agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.
The Issue The issue is the amount of attorney's fees and costs to which Petitioner is entitled by Order of the appellate court pursuant to Subsection 120.595(5), Florida Statutes (2007).1
Findings Of Fact On February 9, 2005, the Commissioner of Education (the Commissioner) filed an Administrative Complaint against Ms. Stacy Stinson, now Ms. Stacy Lewis. Ms. Stinson requested an administrative hearing pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1) (a 120.57 proceeding). The Commissioner referred the matter to DOAH to conduct the 120.57 proceeding. DOAH opened the 120.57 proceeding as Jim Horne, as Commissioner of Education v. Stacy Stinson, Case No. 05-0504PL (DOAH August 11, 2005) (the underlying proceeding). The Recommended Order in the underlying proceeding recommended the entry of a final order finding the respondent in the underlying proceeding not guilty of the charges against her and imposing no penalty against her teaching certificate. On January 5, 2006, the Educational Practices Commission (EPC) entered a Final Order rejecting or modifying some findings of fact in the Recommended Order, reprimanding the respondent, imposing a two-week suspension of her teaching certificate, and placing her on probation for three years. On January 5, 2006, the respondent in the underlying proceeding filed a notice of administrative appeal to the First District Court of Appeal. The initial brief was filed on March 16, 2006. The answer was filed on May 1, 2006. On May 15, 2006, the respondent filed a reply brief, motion for attorney's fees, and request for oral argument. On August 22, 2006, the appellate court issued its order in Stinson v. Winn, 938 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). The appellate court concluded that the EPC improperly rejected or modified factual findings and legal conclusions of the ALJ and remanded the matter for entry of a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint and finding the respondent in the underlying proceeding not guilty of the allegations, consistent with the Recommended Order. The appellate court also granted the motion for attorney's fees, pursuant to Subsection 120.595(5), and remanded the case to DOAH to determine the amount of fees. The instant proceeding ensued. Respondent does not contest the reasonableness of costs in the amount of $3,484.95. Petitioner seeks an award of costs in the amount of $3,954.95. Petitioner is entitled to costs in the amount of $3,484.95. Petitioner seeks attorney's fees for the underlying proceeding and the appellate proceeding in the amount of $94,104.45, plus interest. The amount of fees is based on 360.6 hours at an hourly rate of $250.00. Respondent claims the correct amount of attorney's fees is $22,680.00. The amount of fees is based on 252 hours at an hourly rate of $90.00. An hourly rate of $90.00 is reasonable. The $90.00- rate is the rate established in the fee agreement reached between Petitioner and her attorney. Judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law hold that in no case should the court-awarded fee exceed the fee agreement reached by the attorney and her client. The number of hours reasonably expended is 283.15 hours. The hours claimed by Petitioner in the amount of 360.6 should be reduced by 62.8 hours based on credible and persuasive testimony of Respondent's expert. The subtotal of 297.8 hours includes 34.9 hours billed, from June 6 through July 5, 2005, to prepare the PRO in the underlying proceeding. The total time billed for preparing the PRO includes 19.2 hours for what is labeled, in part, as research undertaken to prepare the PRO. The 2.7 hours for research pertaining to penalties, bearing an entry date of June 27, 2005, is reasonable because the research is reflected in the PRO. The remaining legal research undertaken to prepare the PRO is not reflected in the PRO. The amount billed for preparation of the PRO is reduced from 34.9 hours to 20.25 hours, a reduction of 14.65 hours. The Conclusions of Law in the PRO consist of 33 paragraphs numbered 17 through 49. Apart from administrative proceedings pertaining to penalties, the 33 paragraphs cite three appellate decisions, one of which may be fairly characterized as a "boiler-plate" citation for the burden of proof. The remainder of the 33 paragraphs consists of naked argument. A principal purpose of a PRO is to inform the ALJ of relevant judicial decisions, to distinguish between supporting and contradicting decisions, and to explain why, in the context of the facts at issue, the supporting decisions seize the day for the client. That is the proper role of an attorney in the adversarial process at the trial level. The PRO does not reflect that effort.3 Economic reality is not lost on the fact-finder. It may be that the fee-sensitivity of a client in a particular case precludes an attorney from fully researching and discussing a relevant legal issue. In the instant case, however, the attorney billed 34.9 hours for a PRO with two citations to appellate decisions beyond the burden of proof. Novel and difficult questions of fact and law were present in the underlying proceeding. The factual issues involved a so-called trial by deposition in a penal proceeding. The legal issues involved a literal conflict between a so-called adopted rule and a statute in a 120.57 proceeding. However, the PRO filed in the underlying proceeding provided no legal research concerning either novel question. Judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law hold that reasonable attorney's fees are determined by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. The mathematical product is the lodestar. The lodestar in this proceeding is $25,483.50, determined by multiplying 283.15 hours by an hourly rate of $90.00. The lodestar is not increased or decreased by the results obtained or risk factor. There is no evidence of a "risk factor" attributable to contingency or other factors. There is no increase for the results obtained. Although the results were favorable, the favorable results turned principally on issues of fact and law for which relevant judicial decisions exist and were found through independent research by the ALJ without any assistance from legal research evidenced in the PRO.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Anthony D. Demma, Esquire Meyer and Brooks, P.A. Post Office Box 1547 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 For Respondent: Todd Resavage, Esquire Brooks, LeBoef, Bennett, Foster & Gwartney, P.A. 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The factual issue to be determined is the amount of attorney fees and costs due and owing to the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner incurred the following costs related to the proceedings in Case No. 87-0605: Copying Charges for Office Copies of Pleadings and Papers $173.25 Court Reporter Fees for Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing held 9/9/90 510.30 Miscellaneous Postage 26.75 Copying Charges 9.80 Typing Charges 100.00 TOTAL COSTS: $820.10 The parties stipulated that a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Traynham's services was $150.00 per hour. At the time of the final hearing in Case No. 90- 5301F, Mr. Traynham had expended 25 hours in Case No. 90-5301F. A reasonable fee for counsel for Petitioner's services in the aforementioned case is $3,750.00. The parties also stipulated that work in presentation of this case to the Commission must be considered separately. The parties did not agree to an hourly rate or number of hours for the services provided by Mr. Stafman. Based upon the records presented and the testimony of Mr. Stafman, the reasonable number of hours required to review the file and for testimony at the hearing is seven hours. The reasonable rate for Mr. Stafman's professional services based upon the value of his services in relationship to the value of the services provided by Mr. Traynham is $150.00 per hour. A reasonable total fee for Mr. Stafman's professional services was $1,050.00. Curley Doltie, Esq. was retained by the Petitioner to represent him in this proceeding on a contingency fee basis. A contingency fee basis means that Mr. Doltie would be compensated for representing the Petitioner only if the Petitioner prevailed in the litigation. The amount of the contingency fee was to be determined and awarded by the Commission. The rule regulating the Bar requires contingency fee contracts to be reduced to writing. The Petitioner was a casual client of Mr. Doltie, and their contingency fee contract was not reduced to writing and executed. Mr. Doltie is a 1979 graduate of the Law School at Florida State University and was admitted to the Bar in that year. Between May 1980 and May 1982, Mr. Doltie served as an armored officer in the United States Army. Mr. Doltie's legal experience includes working as a staff attorney for the Legal Aid Society of Orange County from October 1979 until May 1980; assistant public defender in Sanford, Florida, from May 1982 until April 1983; private practice from April 1983 until October 1984; associate general counsel with the Public Service Commission from October 1984 until January 1987; Legal Services of North Florida from January 1987 until opening a private practice in Tallahassee in September 1987. The Petitioner was one of Mr. Doltie's first clients after he opened his private practice in 1987. Mr. Doltie currently handles both contingency fee cases and cases for which he regularly bills his clients. Mr. Doltie's current billing rate is $150.00 per hour. Mr. Doltie's practice involves, primarily, administrative litigation. Mr. Doltie regularly keeps time records, which reflect the activities in which he is engaged on behalf of his client, and the time expended in pursuit of these activities. Mr. Doltie maintained time records for the activities which he performed in providing professional services to the Petitioner. In addition, Mr. Doltie expended 4.5 hours preparing for the attorney fee hearing, 1.0 hour for a prehearing conference, and 8.0 hours testifying or being available to testify at the final hearing on the matter of attorneys fees and costs. The total number of hours expended by Mr. Doltie in the fee case was 13.5 hours. Mr. Doltie's summary of professional services rendered by date, description, and time expended on the administrative proceedings before the Commission, the Division of Administrative Hearings, and the appeal of the original case to the District Court of Appeals and the Florida Supreme Court is presented in the Petitioner's Exhibit 2. Mr. Doltie withdrew his claim for the appeal. Mr. Doltie recorded his time carefully and conservatively and claimed only that time which contributed significantly to the work product. The Respondent would reduce the time allowed for the services rendered on the following dates because the explanation is insufficient or the amount of time is excessive or the activity was unnecessary: 1/5/88 C/Weaver 3/23/88 C/Weaver 5/11/88 C/Weaver; R/Case 6/7/88 C/Weaver 9/27/88 L/Carothers 4/17/90 R/Case; P/Motion for Evidentiary Hearing 4/17/90 L/Carothers 5/1/90 P/Motion To Strike Respondent's Motion To Tax Costs; R/Case; C/Weaver 5/4/90 P/Petitioner's Reply To Respondent's Response To Petitioner's Motion For Evidentiary Hearing 5/23/90 R/Case 5/24/90 R/Case; P/Notice Of Failure To Settle; Motion For Rehearing And Motion For Clarification; Memorandum of Law; Motion To Strike 6/13/90 P/Petitioner's Motion Requesting FCHR To Become A Deferral Agency For The Federal Government; R/Case; P/Motion For Seniority Pay Steps; P/Motion Requesting An Expedited Hearing On Damages 6/14/90 R/Case; P/Motion Requesting FCHR To Appeal DCA Order 6/22/90 RV/FCHR Order; C/Weaver Based upon review of the time records and consideration of the services performed, the following adjustments are made with regard to the times recorded by Mr. Doltie: 1/5/88 C/Weaver .5 2/23/88 C/Weaver .2 6/3/88 1/ R/Case; RV/DOAH Order 1.2 6/7/88 C/Weaver 1.0 The total number of hours accepted from Mr. Doltie for his services rendered before the Division of Administrative Hearings and the Commission is 121.9 hours through the initiation of the appeal to the District Court of Appeals. The total number of hours of professional services rendered provided by Mr. Doltie after this case was returned to the Commission is also itemized in the Petitioner's Exhibit 2, commencing with the services provided on 4/17/90. Of those items to which the Respondent takes exception, only the services provided on 6/13/90 and 6/14/90 were adjusted. In both instances, it was determined that the motions were unnecessary, without precedent, and the time expended thereon should be disallowed. The total number of hours of professional services rendered from 4/17/90 through 8/16/90 were 32.2 hours. The total number of hours expended by Mr. Doltie and allowed to be charged after review is 154.1 hours. Based upon a consideration of Mr. Doltie's background and experience, in comparison with the fees for professional services charged by other attorneys in the Tallahassee, a reasonable rate for his services at the time would have been $110.00 per hour. Having originally heard the case presented by Mr. Doltie and being familiar with the litigation, Mr. Doltie's professional services undoubtedly resulted in the Petitioner vindicating his civil rights and the Respondent being directed to employ the Petitioner. Although the Petitioner's initial claim was for broader relief, the Petitioner did not present evidence on many of these issues and thereby abandoned them at hearing. Based upon the results achieved, a contingency fee of one-half again the billed rate would have been reasonable; however, as stated above, the contingency fee agreement between the Petitioner and Mr. Doltie was not reduced to writing. Recovery on a contingency fee in the absence of a written contract would be precluded by the Rules Regulating the Bar. Therefore, the recovery in this matter is on a quantum meruit basis. The value of the job and benefits of employment to the Petitioner were equal to the actual dollar value of the allowable hours times $110.00 per hour for 154.1 hours and $150.00 per hour for 13.5 hours.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner be awarded the following attorney's fees and costs: Costs: $ 820.10 Mr. Stafman: 1,050.00 Mr. Doltie: 18,976.00 Mr. Traynham: 3,750.00 Further, Mr. Traynham should receive an added fee for his presentation before the Commission to be determined by the Commission in its Final Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 1991.
The Issue Whether Keith Jackson, Ph.D. ("Petitioner") should be required to pay FAMU's claimed overpayment of salary as calculated in the amount of $29,141.57, for the pay periods between July 11, 2008 and December 12, 2008.
Findings Of Fact On or about July 1, 2005, Petitioner executed an employment contract with FAMU to serve as Vice President for Research. The contract executed by Petitioner provides that Petitioner "is subject to the Constitution and Laws of the State of Florida and the United States and the rules, policies, guidelines and procedures of the Board of Governors and the University as now existing or hereafter promulgated." On July 11, 2008, Petitioner submitted to the University a letter advising that he was resigning from his administrative position with the University as the Vice President for Research. Petitioner's letter of resignation was accepted by the University effective July 11, 2008. Tenure as a faculty member was granted to Petitioner by the University on May 25, 2007. 12 When Petitioner resigned from his administrative position on July 11, 2008, he was a tenured faculty member at the University. FAMU BOT Policy 2005-15, adopted June 30, 2005 and revised on February 12, 2008, requires that the salary for former administrators, such as Petitioner, be adjusted to "the median salary of the employees within the same professorial rank and discipline." On July 11, 2008, Petitioner's annual salary, based on his service as Vice President for Research, was $166,400.00. According to FAMU BOT Policy 2005-15, his salary, upon resignation from his administrative position as Vice President for Research and movement to his faculty position, should have been adjusted to $72,662.00 in that this amount reflected, at the time, the median salary of employees within Petitioner's rank and discipline. Due to administrative oversight, Petitioner, after the effective date of his resignation, continued to receive his full administrative salary of $166,400.00. Petitioner's salary was adjusted to the correct amount beginning with the biweekly pay period of December 12, 2008. Petitioner was erroneously paid his salary of $166,400.00 from July 11, 2008 through the biweekly pay period of December 12, 2008. This resulted in Petitioner receiving a salary overpayment in the amount of $29,141.27. Petitioner has not refunded any money to FAMU.
Conclusions This matter is now before Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University Board of Trustees ("FAMU," "Respondent," or the "University") for final agency action.
Other Judicial Opinions This Order Constitutes Final Agency Action. A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing an original Notice of Administrative Appeal with the Agency Clerk of Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, Office of the General Counsel, Lee Hall, Suite 300, Tallahassee, Florida 32307, and a copy of the Notice of Appeal attached to which is a conformed copy of the order designated in the Notice of Appeal, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the First District Court of Appeal. The Notice of Administrative Appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days of the date this Final Order is rendered. Copy: Teresa Hardee, CFO and Vice President, Administrative and Financial Services Avery D. McKnight, FAMU General Counsel Linzie F. Bogan, Associate General Counsel, Director of Labor Relations Nellie C. Woodruff, Associate Vice President, Human Resources Robert E. Larkin, Ill, Esq. Jacqueline Lester, Associate Director of Payroll Claudio Llado, DOAH Clerk 16
The Issue The issue is the amount of attorney's fees and costs to which Petitioner is entitled as the prevailing party in the underlying matter, DOAH Case No. 19-4155.
Findings Of Fact Through its submission of evidence and presentation of witnesses, Petitioner has demonstrated that the attorney's fees sought are reasonable based upon the reasonable rate charged and the reasonable hours expended in this matter. During the December 19, 2019, hearing, Respondent offered little evidence and no witnesses to adequately dispute Petitioner's position. The hours expended in this matter are reasonable given the time and labor required, the novelty, complexity, and difficulty of the questions involved, the skills required to perform the legal service properly, the fact that working on this matter precluded other employment, and the accelerated time limitations imposed by section 1002.33(8)(c). For example, although the documents reviewed and relied upon by Petitioner were voluminous, and the motion practice was unrelenting throughout the abbreviated discovery period, the allotted time to conduct discovery, prepare for, and litigate this matter was minimal. The governing statute itself, section 1002.33(8)(c), requires that a final order be issued within 60 days of the request for hearing. In order to adequately litigate this matter, Petitioner's legal team had to dedicate almost entirely all of their time to this matter for several weeks at the cost of time that would otherwise have been dedicated to other cases and/or employment opportunities. The impact of this preclusion is especially significant given the fact that Johnson Jackson PLLC Attorney Erin G. Jackson's hourly rate for Petitioner ($165.00) is significantly lower than the hourly rate charged to the firm's private sector clients. This preclusion additionally resulted in Ms. Jackson relying upon the assistance of multiple Johnson Jackson PLLC attorneys, clerks, and paralegals, in addition to Attorney Terry J. Harmon of Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. Like Ms. Jackson, Mr. Harmon charged Petitioner a rate that is significantly lower than the rate he generally charges for private sector clients. The unique circumstances of this case rendered this assistance both reasonable and necessary to Petitioner's success in this matter. Further complicating matters, the question at issue, i.e., whether Petitioner proved violations of law and other good cause to immediately terminate a charter school agreement pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c), is a novel one. In fact, section 1002.33(8)(c) was recently revised in 2018 in two notable and impactful ways: (1) section 1002.33(8)(d) became 1002.33(8)(c); and (2) the Florida legislature removed the option for the sponsor to hear an appeal of immediate termination, instead now requiring that all such appeals be held before an ALJ. Compare § 1002.33(8)(d), Fla. Stat. (2017), with § 1002.33(8)(c), Fla. Stat. (2018). Consequently, precedent with similar factual circumstances raising related issues pursuant to this statute is nearly nonexistent. The lack of precedent on this issue is further heightened by the fact that the conditions necessary to warrant immediate termination, i.e., an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of charter school students, are more severe and, therefore, much less common than terminations pursuant to other portions of section 1002.33. The novelty, complexity, and difficulty of this issue necessarily required Ms. Jackson to expend significant time and resources on researching and strategizing in preparation for the hearing. Respondent's evasive and dismissive behavior further contributed to the foregoing challenges and required Petitioner's legal team to dedicate additional hours and attorneys to this matter that would not have otherwise been necessary if Respondent simply complied with the rules of discovery and the undersigned's orders regarding the same. Consequently, Petitioner's legal team spent more than 73 hours drafting motions and performing related duties addressing Respondent's persistent refusal to respond to discovery. As a result of Respondent's failure to comply with discovery requirements and direct orders from the undersigned, Petitioner had no choice but to expend this additional time. The legitimacy and necessity of these efforts is further evidenced by the fact that the undersigned granted each of Petitioner's motions to compel. Further, Johnson Jackson PLLC maintained detailed records of all services rendered as evidence of the extensive time and effort dedicated to this matter. These records demonstrate that Johnson Jackson PLLC attorneys and staff dedicated approximately 1,178.8 hours between July 30, 2019 (when Ms. Jackson began drafting written discovery to be issued to Respondent), and January 15, 2020, to this matter. Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., also maintained detailed records of all services rendered. These records show that the attorneys and staff of Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., dedicated approximately 71.9 hours to this matter between August 2019 and January 15, 2020. During the December 19, 2019, hearing, Petitioner's expert, Attorney Robert W. Boos of Adams and Reese, testified to the reasonableness of the hours expended by Johnson Jackson PLLC in this matter. Mr. Boos has been practicing law for approximately 40 years and has served as counsel for the Hillsborough County School Board. Based on Mr. Boos' years of experience as an attorney, in addition to a review of the hours expended by the attorneys and staff of Johnson Jackson PLLC and Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., Mr. Boos testified that the total amount of hours expended was reasonable given the underlying circumstances of this matter. He also found the discounted hourly rate to be "eminently reasonable." In an effort to rebut the reasonableness of the hours expended by Petitioner's legal team, Respondent attempted to dispute the nature of its behavior in the underlying proceedings during the December 19, 2019, hearing. Specifically, although Respondent contended that it was not there "to relitigate what already happened at the previous hearing," Respondent then went on to assert that, "LMA's entire inventory, every single piece of paper, every single record was seized by Manatee County School Board. They had access to everything." However, as already thoroughly addressed by the undersigned in his 95-page Final Order, Petitioner, in fact, did not have access to everything. In fact, Petitioner still does not have access to "everything." As previously explained by the undersigned: Another factor that has not gone unnoticed by the undersigned in the course of these expedited proceedings is that LMA's pattern of refusing to respond to requests for information made by the School District during discovery has continued into these proceedings. The undersigned can only imagine Petitioner's frustration with the constant refusal of LMA to provide the documents requested during discovery, with the common refrain of "you already have the documents, because you (the School District) seized all of LMA's records … leaving us (the former staff) with nothing to provide you." However, this cry by LMA fails to ring true … . No evidence was presented through testimony, and certainly not through documentation, that LMA provided the complete records of their activities in this first year of the charter's school operations. As acknowledged by Respondent, the parties have already litigated this issue. The undersigned previously issued his Final Order as to the issue of these documents. The undersigned also stated his intent to avoid relitigating the issue during the December 19, 2019, hearing. Respondent's argument is without merit, blatantly disregards previous rulings in the underlying case, and, therefore, should have no bearing on the present issues. Notably, Respondent did not dispute the novelty and complexity of the issues involved or expedited nature of this matter. To the contrary, Respondent's qualified representative, Mr. Norwood, described this matter as "very quick, very expedited," explaining further that, "[t]here was a lot of things that happened not, you know, typical of any case … . This is a fairly new area of law, period." Such factors are relevant to determining whether the number of hours expended were reasonable. Although Respondent did not dispute the expedited nature of this matter, it nonetheless attempted to argue that the School Board had a "choice," with respect to terminating LMA's charter immediately pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c), which requires expedited proceedings, versus section 1002.33(8)(b), which allows for a 90-day timeline. Based on this contention, Respondent suggested that it was Petitioner's own fault that these proceedings were expedited, and, therefore, Petitioner should pay for it. But this argument fails to account for the fact that the undersigned has already determined that the rationale underlying Petitioner's decision to terminate Respondent's charter was warranted due to the dangers that Respondent posed to its students' health, safety, and welfare. With student health, safety, and welfare at risk, Petitioner did not have a "choice." Rather, the act of immediately terminating LMA's charter was "the only remaining" measure available to Petitioner at that point in time: The testimony presented by both parties to this proceeding leads the undersigned to the conclusion that no tools were left for the School District in dealing with a charter school that failed to address their repeated efforts at gathering information. As evidenced by the foregoing, Petitioner has already litigated and provided sufficient evidence of the numerous notices and warnings Petitioner issued to Respondent and Respondent's lack of cooperation preceding the termination of its charter. Contrary to Respondent's allegations, Respondent's own choices caused this expediency. Accordingly, Respondent should bear the cost, not Petitioner. Given the novelty, complexity, and difficulty of resolving this issue coupled with the extraordinary circumstances of this matter, including but not limited to, the time spent by Petitioner's legal team attempting to overcome Respondent's prejudicial hurdles, the hours expended were clearly reasonable. The rates charged by Petitioner were equally reasonable. In consideration of the market value and the factors set forth in Rule Regulating Florida Bar 4-1.5, Johnson Jackson PLLC charged Petitioner $165.00 per hour for attorneys; $100.00 per hour for first-year attorneys; and $90.00 per hour for paralegals and law clerks. Johnson Jackson PLLC's hourly rate is extremely reasonable given the experience and expertise of its attorneys and staff, as evidenced by their CVs and affidavits. Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., similarly charged Petitioner $165.00 per hour for attorneys; $75.00 per hour for paralegals; and $50.00 per hour for law clerks. As evidenced by the fact that both Johnson Jackson PPLC attorneys and Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., attorneys billed the same rate, Sniffen & Spellman, P.A.'s, hourly rate is consistent with the market rate and reasonable given the experience and expertise of its attorneys and staff, once again as evidenced by Mr. Harmon's CV and affidavits. The foregoing rates are also consistent with, if not noticeably lower than, the rates charged by other attorneys, paralegals, and/or law clerks, to school boards in other nearby counties in Florida. For example, attorneys for Indian River County charge $250.00 to $180.00 per hour and attorneys for Hernando County charge $285.00 to $215.00 per hour. Importantly, despite the expedited nature of this matter, these rates do not exceed the fee agreements between Petitioner's legal team and Petitioner, which both preceded the circumstances that gave rise to this matter. Both Johnson Jackson PLLC and Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., remained committed to the hourly rates agreed-to pursuant to these agreements regardless of the complexity, novelty, and difficulty of the issues. The reasonableness of these rates is further evidenced by the nature and length of Johnson Jackson PLLC and Sniffen & Spellman, P.A.'s, professional relationship with Petitioner. For example, Ms. Jackson has had a professional relationship with Petitioner since 2009. The length of Ms. Jackson and Mr. Harmon's relationship with Petitioner also serves as evidence of Ms. Jackson and Mr. Harmon's extensive experience, skills, expertise, and abilities in this area of law. Ms. Jackson has been admitted to The Florida Bar since 2000, and Mr. Harmon has been admitted to The Florida Bar since 2006. Ms. Jackson is board certified by The Florida Bar in labor and employment law, and Mr. Harmon is board certified by The Florida Bar in education law. During the December 19, 2019, hearing, Petitioner's expert, Mr. Boos, testified to the reasonableness of the fees charged by Ms. Jackson in this matter. As mentioned previously, Mr. Boos has been practicing law for approximately 40 years and has served as counsel for the Hillsborough County School Board. Mr. Boos testified that he generally charges the School Board of Hillsborough County $310.00 per hour. By comparison, Petitioner's legal team charged Petitioner no more than $165.00 per hour. Based on Mr. Boos' years of experience as an attorney, in addition to his review of the lawyer invoices, Mr. Boos testified that Petitioner's legal team's hourly rate was "eminently reasonable." Respondent did not dispute or otherwise offer any evidence disputing the reasonableness of the hourly rates charged during the December 19, 2019, hearing. Based upon the foregoing findings, Petitioner's legal team's hourly rates are clearly reasonable in light of the market value, the agreements between the parties, and the experience and skill offered by the attorneys and staff at Johnson Jackson PLLC and Sniffen & Spellman, P.A. Accordingly, the undersigned accepts these rates in calculating the total amount of attorney's fees owed by Respondent in this matter. Based upon the reasonableness of the fees charged and hours expended, the Lodestar figure (i.e., the fees charged multiplied by the hours expended) is $175,658.00 for work performed prior to November 30, 2019, and is $17,992.50 for work performed through January 15, 2020; together, totaling $193,650.50. These totals are broken down in detail below: For work performed prior to November 30, 2019: Erin Jackson (Shareholder) - $165.00 x 346.5 hours = $57,172.50 Kevin Johnson (Shareholder) - $165.00 x 9.1 hours = $1,501.50 Christopher Bentley (Partner) - $165.00 x 4.9 hours = $808.50 Ashley Gallagher (n/k/a Tinsley) (Associate Attorney) - $165.00 x 434.1 hours = $71,626.50 Beatriz Miranda (Associate Attorney) - $165.00 x 118.2 hours = $19,503.00 Colby Ellis (Associate Attorney) - $100.00 x 2.5 hours = $250.00 Colby Ellis (Law Clerk) - $90.00 x 8.3 hours = $747.00 Julia Shinn (Paralegal) - $90.00 x 109.6 hours = $9,864.00 Tiffany Albertson (Paralegal) - $90.00 x 35.5 hours = $3,195.00 Terry J. Harmon (Shareholder)- $165.00 x 66 hours = $10,890.00 Sara Finnegan (Law Clerk) - $50.00 x 2 hours = $100.00 TOTAL PRE-NOVEMBER 30, 2019: $175,658.00 For work performed since the November 30, 2019, invoice: Erin Jackson (Shareholder) - $165.00 x 31.8 hours = $5,247.00 Ashley Gallagher (Associate Attorney) - $165.00 x 61.6 hours = $10,164.00 Bridget McNamee (Of Counsel) - $165.00 x 2.8 hours = $462.00 Julia Shinn (Paralegal) - $90.00 x 15.8 hours = $1,422.00 Tiffany Albertson (Paralegal) - $90.00 x 0.6 hours = $54.00 Terry J. Harmon (Shareholder) - $165.00 x 3.9 hours = $643.50 TOTAL POST-NOVEMBER 30, 2019: $17,992.50 TOTAL FOR PRE- AND POST-NOVEMBER 30, 2019: $193,650.50 Because the total fee amount of $193,650.50 is based upon reasonable hours expended and a reasonable hourly rate, this amount, at a minimum, should be awarded. The costs sought by Petitioner in this matter are also reasonable. As previously mentioned, Ms. Jackson and Petitioner have a professional relationship that began approximately ten years ago. This relationship is governed by a fee agreement. Petitioner's fee agreement with Johnson Jackson PLLC provides that its invoices itemize all costs, and such costs may include travel expenses, courier services, service of process fees, photocopy charges by third parties, filing fees, recording fees, lien and judgment searches, expert witnesses, court reporter services, corporate record books, registration fees charged by governmental authorities, and any other costs incurred in the course of representation. In accordance with this agreement, Johnson Jackson PLLC maintains documents itemizing all costs incurred. Accordingly, Petitioner has proper notice of the costs that may be included in any invoices issued, and each cost can be identified and allocated for purposes of demonstrating the reasonable need for these expenses. During the December 19, 2019, hearing, Mr. Boos testified that he reviewed the expenses and costs charged and found those expenses to be reasonable and customary for this type of matter. For purposes of the December 19, 2019, hearing, Petitioner paid Mr. Boos $7,500.00 for his services and $598.45 for court reporter services, totaling $8,098.45 in additional taxable costs accrued since the December 19, 2019, hearing. These costs were necessary expenditures for purposes of pursuing attorney's fees and costs in this matter. In consideration of Mr. Boos' testimony in addition to the applicable factors and guidelines, the following expenditures by Johnson Jackson PLLC should be taxed: Court Reporters/Transcripts: $25,607.9017 Service of Subpoenas & related services: $4,141.74 Cost of expert testimony by Bob Boos, Esq.: $7,500 The foregoing expenditures total $37,249.64 in taxable costs. Given the reasonableness and necessity of these expenditures, Petitioner should be awarded these costs in full. In addition to the costs outlined above, Respondent must also pay for the services rendered by CRI and Sylint. Petitioner hired CRI to conduct a forensic investigation of LMA, which included, but was not limited to, conducting an analysis of the funding received by LMA and the categorical use of those funds by LMA; confirming LMA's payroll process and determining the status of employee payroll to determine employee payroll liabilities; determining LMA employee withholdings for payroll taxes meant to be paid to the Internal Revenue Service, and LMA employee withholdings for the pension meant to be paid to the Florida Retirement System; and determine LMA's liabilities based upon the unpaid invoices and breakdown of all liabilities between the 2018/2019 and 2019/2020 school year. Based on a thorough analysis of this data, CRI prepared a report, accompanied by hundreds of pages of exhibits, upon which Petitioner's legal team heavily relied on during the formal hearing. Among other things, this report identified the voluminous debts accrued by Respondent; the source of some of those debts; and the funds that still remained unaccounted for. Pursuant to this investigation, CRI was able to confirm Respondent's debt totaled more than one million dollars. CRI Manager Mark S. Smith, Jr., drafted the report and testified about his findings and the basis for his conclusions during the hearing. During the December 19, 2019, hearing, Mr. Smith confirmed that he testified during the August 2019 hearing and verified the authenticity of his CV, CRI's invoices, and the scope of CRI's services pursuant to CRI's engagement letter with Petitioner. CRI's forensic investigation and report served as undisputable evidence of Respondent's egregious financial mismanagement and how this financial mismanagement posed an immediate danger to student health, safety, and welfare of LMA's students. The pivotal role that CRI's services played in the underlying case is undisputed. Services rendered by CRI total $42,091.00 and are broken down as follows: August 15, 2019 Invoice: $18,258.00 August 27, 2019 Invoice: $18,871.00 September 10, 2019 Invoice: $4,962.00 For similar reasons, Respondent should also pay for Sylint's services. Petitioner hired Sylint to conduct a forensic audit and investigation of Respondent's laptops, cloud accounts (including but not limited to LMA's "G-suite"), emails, and other electronic software and devices, and provide forensic and evidentiary guidance relative to this litigation. In the performance of these services, Sylint analyzed and authenticated evidence demonstrating the danger that Respondent's ongoing operations posed to student health, safety, and welfare, including but not limited to, surveillance videos showing CEO Eddie Hundley having direct contact with students while on campus, even though this conduct expressly violated statutory law and directives from the Commissioner of Education. The CEO and President of Sylint, John E. Jorgensen, testified and authenticated the date and time of these surveillance videos during the formal hearing on August 27, 2019. Sylint also discovered that agents of Respondent, including, but not limited to, Chief Financial Officer Cornelle Maxfield, deleted hundreds of files during the pendency of this action after Petitioner had served Respondent with written discovery requests. Sylint's employee, Weston Watson, testified regarding the deletion of these files during the formal hearing on August 26, 2019. To demonstrate the prejudicial effect of Respondent's conduct, Sylint also created several demonstratives presented at the hearing, including, but not limited to, a timeline showing when agents of LMA deleted documentation seemingly responsive to Petitioner's discovery requests. In addition to deleting files that should have been preserved, Respondent failed to comply with numerous requests by Sylint, Petitioner, and the undersigned to hand over tablets, phones, and/or emails in a timely fashion. For example, Mr. Hundley never gave Petitioner or Sylint his phone despite numerous requests that he do so and did not provide a USB containing his emails until approximately 3:00 p.m. on the second day of the four-day hearing. Services rendered by Sylint from August 2, 2019, to August 30, 2019, which included, but were not limited to: evidence collection and intake; data analysis; device imaging; hearing preparation; and testimony at hearing, cost approximately $24,996.68. During the December 19, 2019, hearing, and pursuant to a Motion in Limine, Respondent objected to the introduction of evidence regarding CRI and Sylint's services because the respective investigations "would have happened regardless of whether or not LMA had appealed the decision to terminate the school." In support of this contention, Respondent cited the July 23, 2019, School Board meeting minutes. However, contrary to Respondent's contentions, the July 23 School Board meeting minutes demonstrate exactly why CRI and Sylint's invoices are relevant and should be reimbursed—because the services performed by CRI and Sylint would not have been necessary but for LMA's mismanagement and poor decision- making—not any action taken by the School Board. As pointedly explained by the undersigned: I don't think they bring in a firm to perform an audit between school years … if they didn't think there was a problem going on … But this was in no way, shape, or form a routine audit being performed by CRI. It was a forensic audit looking for money that was believed to have gone missing, and ultimately based on my findings proven to have gone missing. The undersigned has already determined that the conditions resulting in the termination of LMA's charter posed an immediate danger to student health, safety, and welfare; and Respondent's conduct caused such conditions to arise. The evidence discovered and/or analyzed by Sylint and CRI was vital to Petitioner's case. In fact, the undersigned expressly relied on evidence discovered and/or analyzed by CRI and Sylint in finding that both Respondent's financial mismanagement and Mr. Hundley's conduct posed an immediate danger to the health, safety, and welfare of students. As explained by the undersigned in his Final Order: When forensic accountants and long-time public officials cannot find all of the necessary records to continue the operation of the school, just two days after being taken over by the School District, to answer the questions about payroll taxes, FRS contributions, Best and Brightest awards, food service menus and purchases, and utility payments, someone is hiding the ball. … Even with limited records available, however, the School District has made a strong case for immediately terminating the charter. Although Respondent disputes whether Petitioner would have employed CRI and Sylint's services regardless of Respondent's appeal, Respondent does not dispute the vital role that CRI and Sylint's services played in this matter. Respondent failed to produce documentation requested during discovery despite assurances that it would do so and, months later, still has not produced requested documentation. Respondent has never, during the pendency of these proceedings, in good faith responded to reasonable discovery requests. CRI and Sylint, to the extent possible, were able to at least partially to fill this gap of missing information and even demonstrate how Respondent was actively engaging in conduct to ensure Petitioner did not have access to this information. In light of Respondent's complete failure to cooperate with Petitioner, Petitioner had no choice but to rely upon CRI and Sylint's assistance. Absent this assistance, Respondent's prejudicial conduct would have significantly, if not completely, debilitated Petitioner's ability to demonstrate the true extent of the immediate dangers that Respondent posed to student health, safety, and welfare. It is also important to note that Petitioner has already reduced the requested costs for CRI and Sylint's services in an effort to be reasonable. As noted by the undersigned, Petitioner reduced the CRI invoices from $54,000.00 to $42,091.00, only submitting invoices beginning in August 2019. Sylint's invoices also begin in August 2019. Thus, prior to submission of Respondent's Motion in Limine, Petitioner already excluded, although it did not have to, any costs pertaining to services that could have arguably been perceived as "outside the scope of the Order on Termination." In consideration of the foregoing, Respondent should pay for CRI and Sylint's services as taxable costs and/or as sanctions for Respondent's willful lack of cooperation throughout these proceedings. Respondent's conduct remains undisputed. The prejudicial effect of Respondent's conduct remains undisputed. Accordingly, Respondent should be liable for these costs, totaling $67,087.68.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for a certificate of need should be deemed withdrawn from further review and consideration for the reasons stated in the Agency for Health Care Administration's November 12, 1997, letter to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a division of Jewish Family Service of Broward County, which operates under the umbrella of the Jewish Federation of Broward County. On August 1, 1997, Petitioner submitted to the Agency a letter indicating its intent to seek a certificate of need authorizing the establishment of a Medicare-certified home health agency in Broward County. By letter dated August 27, 1997, the Agency advised Petitioner that Petitioner's letter of intent "had been accepted . . . for submission of an application in the upcoming review cycle" and that the application filing deadline was September 24, 1997. In its letter, the Agency provided the following additional advisement: The application filing fee is $5,000.00 plus 0.015 times the total project cost up to a maximum fee of $22,000.00. The minimum fee for projects with no capital expenditure is now $5,000.00. The non-refundable filing fee should be submitted with the application on or before the application due date listed above [September 24, 1997]. Petitioner filed its application for a certificate of need on September 24, 1997. The application indicated that the "project cost subject to fee" (Schedule 1, Line 51, which excludes the base application filing fee of $5,000.00) would be $44,150.00. Accompanying Petitioner's application, among other things, was a check in the amount of $5,000.00 and an audited financial statement of Jewish Family Service of Broward County covering the fiscal year ending September 30, 1995. No other audited financial statements were provided. By letter dated October 9, 1997 (Agency's omissions letter), the Agency advised Petitioner that Petitioner had submitted neither the "appropriate [filing] fee," nor the audited financial statement(s), "needed to implement formal review" of Petitioner's application, and it requested that Petitioner cure these deficiencies by providing the appropriate fee and by furnishing "audited financial statements of the applicant's most recent complete fiscal year of operation," or, "[i]f the most recent fiscal year ended within 120 days prior to the application filing deadline and the audited financial statements [we]re not yet available, [of] the prior fiscal year." In its omissions letter, the Agency issued Petitioner the following warning: Section 408.039, (1992 Supplement to Florida Statutes), requires that you file a response to the attached omissions with the agency and the appropriate health council by November 10, 1997. Failure to file your written response to this office and the appropriate local health council by 5 p.m. on that date will result in your application being deemed withdrawn from consideration, pursuant to Rule 59C-1.010, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner received the Agency's omissions letter on October 14, 1997. Petitioner submitted its response to the Agency's omissions letter on November 10, 1997. It provided the Agency with a check in the amount of $425.00 and financial statements and reports (including a profit and loss statement covering the period starting October 1996 and ending September 1997) that were not audited. In a cover letter, Petitioner explained that, "[a]t this time, there is no complete financial audit for Jewish Family Home Care, since its first fiscal year just ended on September 30, 1997." On November 12, 1997, the Agency sent a letter to Petitioner advising that, "[b]ecause of [Petitioner's] failure to submit the correct CON filing fee in accordance with Chapter 59C- 1.008(3)(b)2., Florida Administrative Code and an audited financial statement of the applicant in accordance with Chapter 59C-1.008(5)(c)1.-3., Florida Administrative Code, and Section 408.037(1)(c), Florida Statutes, [Petitioner's] application [would be] deemed incomplete and withdrawn from further review." Petitioner thereafter requested an administrative hearing on the matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order taking the action proposed in its November 12, 1997, letter to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1998.
The Issue Whether, under section 120.569(2)(e), Florida Statutes, Petitioner, Garber Housing Resorts, LLC ("Garber"), is entitled to its reasonable attorney's fees incurred because of responding to three specific pleadings filed by Respondent, Glenda Q. Mahaney ("Mahaney"), and if so, the amount of such reasonable attorney's fees.
Findings Of Fact On March 27, 2019, DEP issued an SRCO after reviewing a limited groundwater assessment dated May 9, 2018, which included a recommendation for risk management option level one. DEP's SRCO stated that the prior conditional SRCO was being replaced because the limited groundwater assessment "demonstrates that conditions on the property have changed and improved such that the [conditional SRCO] is no longer appropriate.” Mahaney's May 13, 2019, petition and Garber's May 23, 2019, motion to dismiss were referred to DOAH on June 25, 2019, and assigned Case No. 19-3429. Garber's petition was 77 pages, 654 paragraphs, and contained 56 pages of attachments. 2 The Office Depot email suggested that an email was sent on January 4, 2020, but without the documents attached. The email address to which the document was allegedly sent was "AskDOAH," which is not a proper method for filing pleadings. The November 6, 2019, Notice from DOAH opening this fees case explained that "Parties not represented may file electronically through eALJ, facsimile, or mail. CHOOSE ONE METHOD of filing for each document." On July 18, 2019, Mahaney's petition was dismissed with leave to amend as legally insufficient under Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.201(2). The petition also contained irrelevant allegations that were not cognizable in an environmental administrative proceeding. Mahaney was allowed ten days to file an amended petition that "shall comply with the requirements of rule 28-106.201(2) and shall not contain the irrelevant and immaterial allegations discussed in this Order." On August 1, 2019, DEP received from Mahaney a document titled "Petitioner's 7-25-2019 Amended 5-9-2019 Petition for Hearing Regarding SRCO Dated Dated [sic] 3-27-2019 for Lamont Garber and/or Garber Housing Resorts, Inc., and Motion for Summary Proceedings Regarding Issues Admitted by FDEP and/or Motion to Immediately Revoke SRCO or Motion to Abate Proceedings Until Such Time as Petitioner's Property is Tested" ("amended petition"). DEP forwarded Mahaney's amended petition to DOAH on August 5, 2019. The amended petition was 69 pages, 690 paragraphs, and contained 59 pages of attachments. Garber had already filed, on August 2, 2019, its motion to dismiss the amended petition. On August 13, 2019, Mahaney filed her response to Garber's motion to dismiss the amended petition. A Recommended Order of Dismissal was issued on August 19, 2019, finding that the amended petition remained legally insufficient. The amended petition still contained irrelevant allegations concerning issues outside the subject matter of the SRCO. Those issues included a property boundary dispute, trespass and nuisance claims, alleged violations of pollution laws, alleged non-compliance with local land use regulations, flooding issues, and stormwater runoff issues. DEP issued its Final Order on November 1, 2019. Attached to the Final Order provided to DOAH were Mahaney's exceptions and Garber's responses to exceptions that had been timely filed with DEP. The Final Order denied each of Mahaney's exceptions, adopted the Recommended Order of Dismissal, and approved the SRCO. Mahaney is opposed to Garber's plan to develop the property that is the subject of DEP's SRCO. It was clear from Mahaney's testimony and her history of challenging remediation actions taken by Garber and prior property owners, that her primary purpose for bringing the underlying proceeding was her concern for potential contamination of her well and property. In addition, she was concerned that the SRCO did not "certify the entire [Garber] property as clean." Because of Mahaney's stated belief that DEP has not done its job over the years with regard to Garber's property and her property, she had challenged the prior conditional SRCO, and then the replacement SRCO. In addition, Mahaney testified that additional remediation occurred on Garber's property in February 2019, approximately a month before DEP issued the SRCO. She obtained a letter that was from the remediation company to Mr. Lamont Garber describing the remediation activities. Through reasonable inquiry, she learned that the letter was not in DEP's possession at the time of issuing the SRCO. The circumstances surrounding Mahaney's filing of her petition, amended petition, and exceptions show that her pleadings were not filed for an improper purpose. Garber's expert on reasonable attorney's fees reviewed the invoices of legal fees and the filings in the underlying proceeding. He testified that the time spent and legal fees incurred by Garber responding to Mahaney's pleadings and litigating entitlement to fees, were reasonable.3 Mahaney did not present an expert to dispute his testimony. 3 Garber's Composite Exhibit No. 1 consisted of nine invoices for legal services and three prebilling reports dated through January 21, 2020, which was the date of the final hearing. One invoice and one prebilling report addressed a separate matter titled "Maitland Rezone." One invoice did not separate Mahaney's petition from a separate petition filed by Corinne Garrett. The time spent on the underlying proceeding and this fees case reflected in the other seven invoices and two prebilling reports, total $16,621.00.
