STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

GREG RUSHTON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 93-1223A

) JAMES R. SMITH & D. RANDALL SMITH, ) d/b/a MIDWEST MARKETING COMPANY ) and SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE CO., )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Upon due notice, this cause came on for formal hearing on June 29, 1993, in Dunnellon, Florida, before Ella Jane P. Davis, a duly assigned hearing officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Greg Rushton

10940 N. Circle M Avenue Dunnellon, Florida 32630

For Respondent James R. Smith & D. Randall Smith d/b/a

Midwest Marketing Company:

James R. Smith, as qualified representative Post Office Box 193

Vincennes, Indiana 47591

For Respondent South Carolina Insurance Company:

No appearance STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether or not Petitioner is entitled to $1,820.96 or lesser amount from Respondents and their surety.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Petitioner filed his claim/complaint with the Department of Agriculture on or about December 1, 1992. On or about December 14, 1992, the Department of Agriculture gave notice to Respondents of the filing of the complaint, advising Respondents that response must be made within 21 days or their right to a hearing would be forfeited.

On February 1, 1993, the Department of Agriculture entered an order concluding that Respondents had failed or refused to answer the complaint and finding in favor of the Petitioner. That same order provided that it would become final in 14 days, and that appeal time pursuant to Section 120.68 F.S. would run 30 days from finality of the order.

On or about February 8, 1993, Respondent Dealers requested a formal hearing. The Department of Agriculture deemed the request timely and referred it to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1) F.S.

James R. Smith fulfilled the necessary requirements and was accepted as qualified representative for Respondents James R. Smith & D. Randall Smith d/b/a Midwest Marketing Company, pursuant to Rules 60Q-2.007 and 60Q-2.008 F.A.C.

Petitioner testified on his own behalf and presented the oral testimony of James R. (Jim) Smith, Charles Adams Jenkins, and Debbie Jenkins. Petitioner had three exhibits admitted in evidence.

Respondent Dealer presented the oral testimony of James R. Smith and had five exhibits admitted in evidence.

Respondent Surety did not appear.

All parties waived the filing of a transcript and the opportunity to file proposed recommended orders.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Petitioner Rushton is a grower of watermelons and qualifies as a "producer" under Section 604.15(5) F.S.

   
   

2. Respondents Smith are broker-shippers of watermelons and qualify as dealers" under Section 604.15(1) F.S.

   
   

3. Respondent South Carolina Insurance Company is surety for Respondents Smith. The amount and period of the bond have not been established.

   
   

4. Petitioner's complaint sets out the amounts owed as follows:

   
   

   DATE OF SALE	QUANTITY, AND PRICE	PRODUCTS PER UNIT	GRADE
   6/7/92	Inv.#2051	43,200 lbs.

   AMOUNT

   
   

   
   

   Crimson Sweet Melons @.04 lb. $1,728.00

   NWPB - 8.64

   Adv. - 700.00

   
   

   $1,019.36

   
   

   6/10/92 Inv.#2053 43,900 lbs.

   Crimson Sweet Melons @3.5 lb. $1,536.50

   NWPB - 8.78

   Adv. - 700.00

   
   

   $ 827.72

   6/10/92 Inv.#2056 46,180 lbs.

   Crimson Sweet Melons @3.5 lb. $1,616.30

   NWPB - 9.24

   Adv. - 700.00

   
   

   Less Payment

   of - 933.18

   
   

   $ 907.06

   
   

   $2,754.14

   TOTAL $1,820.96

   
   

5. Regardless of the form of the complaint, Petitioner acknowledged at formal hearing that his claim relates only to Load 2051, that he did not dispute the deductions made by Respondents for NwPB or the advances paid him by the Dealer. Petitioner's complaint lumped the three loads together only because Respondent chose to cut a single check for all three loads and pay his accounts that way nearly three months after Load 2051 was shipped.

   
   

6. With regard to Load 2051, it is not disputed that 43,200 pounds of watermelons were loaded by Dealers in Petitioner's field on June 7, 1992.

   
   

7. The 1992 season was Petitioner's initial endeavor at growing watermelons. He was "in a bind" from the beginning of the growing season. Petitioner had originally intended to sell his watermelons to another buyer- dealer, but that person failed to send trucks to Petitioner's field.

   
   

8. Petitioner was approached by Bobby Patton who put him in contact with Respondent Jim Smith on Saturday, June 6, 1992. Petitioner testified that Bobby Patton cut into and inspected sample melons and accepted most of his field of melons on Friday, June 5, 1992.

   
   

9. After speaking with Petitioner by telephone on Saturday, June 6, 1992, Jim Smith went to Petitioner's field on Sunday, June 7, 1992. Petitioner and Respondents had no prior business dealings before their June 6 phone call.

   
   

10. Jim Smith did not arrive at Petitioner's field on June 7, 1992 until the open-topped truck he had sent was half-loaded with Petitioner's melons. At that time, Smith and his employee, Dale Hires, inspected the melons on the truck and found some hollow hearts. At that time, Mr. Smith thought that the melons on the truck had been picked since Friday, but the undersigned accepts Petitioner's testimony and finds as fact that all the melons loaded into Load 2051 had been picked only since Saturday. Petitioner admitted that the melons were, "a little overripe and should have been loaded on Thursday or Friday and moved."

    
    

11. Petitioner admitted that he and Smith then discussed that the melons were a little overripe and that they were "close" and had to be moved. Respondent Jim Smith told Petitioner there was a "potential problem," and he would let him know if a problem actually developed. Smith also said that they would try to work together and move the melons and try not to get Respondents "hurt." However, Petitioner did not specifically agree to "help" Respondent on melon loss. Petitioner later thought he was "helping" by putting a trucker up overnight in a motel at Petitioner's own expense. Smith used the phrases, "help each other" "help us" and "not hurt" to mean, "help Respondents so that Respondents would not show a loss." Petitioner testified that he had understood on June 7 that he was "not going to ride no freight" on the load. Smith concurred that this phrase he had used was mutually understood to mean that

    Respondents agreed to pick up the cost of freight. Respondent Smith considered the arrangement reached on June 7 to be a brokeraged deal wherein Respondent Dealers would "ride the freight" and Petitioner would "ride the melons," that is, Respondents expected Petitioner to absorb any loss occasioned by bad melons. Petitioner, on the other hand, considered all the watermelons accepted without reservation by Hires and Smith when they stepped off the half-loaded truck on June 7, 1992 and continued to load the truck with melons of questionable ripeness.

    
    

12. Despite Petitioner's first assertion that he considered Bobby Patton's acceptance of the melons on Friday, June 5 to have been made on behalf of Respondents, that testimony is found to be contrary to his subsequent and more credible testimony that he considered Dale Hires to be acting for Respondents on June 7 and that he personally negotiated with Jim Smith on June 6 and June 7, after Bobby Patton was out of the picture. Respondents did nothing to cloak Bobby Patton, an independent contractor who "finds" melon fields, with apparent agency to negotiate the final "deal" for them with Petitioner.

    
    

13. The "deal" between Petitioner and Respondents, such as it was, was finally and fully negotiated on June 7 between Petitioner and Respondent Jim Smith.

    
    

14. The "deal" applied only to a certain specified segment of Petitioner's watermelon crop. Respondent Dealers thereafter handled a total of ten loads of watermelons. Respondent Dealers paid Petitioner satisfactorily on nine of the ten loads Only Load 2051, the first load, presented any problems. No agreement as to Respondents accepting all of Petitioner's field of watermelons was ever reached between the parties. Petitioner lost money with regard to the rest of his field, but that loss is in no way attributable to Respondents, despite Petitioner's expressed frustration in that regard.

    
    

15. Petitioner heard nothing from Respondents until he requested payment and to "settle up" concerning all ten loads, approximately June 17, 1992. At that time, Jim Smith gave Petitioner settlement documents, including weight tickets and invoices for all ten loads at one time in a large envelope. Petitioner termed these documents "confirmations." At the time Smith handed Petitioner the envelope, Smith mentioned to Petitioner that one load had a problem with it. He did not give Petitioner any further information about which load had the problem. Before putting the confirmations in the envelope, Jim Smith had written across them, " * protect shipper on quality (ripe)." Petitioner testified that if this phrase had been on the documents, he did not see it, and if he had seen the phrase, he would not have understood it.

    
    

16. Jim Smith had originally been promised $3,564.00 on Load 2051 in a telephone conversation with the ultimate recipient/receiver. He had based his June 6 offer and "deal" on June 7 with Petitioner for an expected gross to Petitioner of $1,734.04 in anticipation of the Respondents realizing the full amount of $3,564.00 from the receiver.

    
    

17. Smith testified that when Load 2051 reached the receiver, it was rejected by the receiver due to the melons being overripe and hollow-hearted and that a federal inspection paid for by the receiver showed 15 percent to 40 percent of the samples were hollow hearted and the overall samples in the load was 25 percent, with bruising throughout but with the highest percentage in the lower layer of the piled watermelons, and some sunburn. He produced a federal

    inspection sheet dated June 10, 1992 (three days after the melons left Petitioner's field), covering an estimated sixteen hundred melons to the same effect.

    
    

18. Respondent Smith had mailed this inspection sheet to Petitioner only in August 1992, with the final settlement documents and Respondents' check covering three loads, including Load 2051. The inspection sheet indicates "Midwest Marketing 2051" and "North Coast Brokerage, Cleveland, Ohio and carrier 39TR337-AL." The settlement sheets show the same trailer license number for Load 2051. (P-2) Smith also produced a bill of lading showing that North Coast Produce received carrier 39TR337 and rejected 15 melons cut for inspection, 238 melons bruised and racked, and seven decayed melons on June 10, 1992. The bill of lading shows 260 out of 1568 melons or roughly 17 percent of the load were rejected by the receiver. (R-5) Smith also produced a Norman's Brokerage invoice for shipping that trailer, for which shipping he says he paid $1,676.16, (R-4) and an invoice showing he was paid only $1,700.00 by the receiver for this load (R-2). Neither the receiver, the federal inspector, nor any trucker testified. Smith testified that after the receiver rejected some or all of Load 2051, he thought he would get at least $1,743.04 from the receiver but the receiver's check to him was rounded to only $1,700.00. The foregoing shows that Respondent Smith ultimately accepted, without dispute, the $1,700.00 paid him by the receiver which amount was less than 50 percent of the originally promised amount and which amount did not comport with a load that was at the worst only

    15 percent to 40 percent bad as per the inspection report and which the bill of lading shows contained only 260 or 17 percent rejected melons.

    
    

19. When Jim Smith totalled out the final settlement sheets for Petitioner in August 1992, Smith intended to deduct $1,676.16 for shipping and $108.00 as a "finder's fee" he had paid to independent contractor Bobby Patton from the

    $1,700.00 that he had actually been paid by the receiver, thus showing a net loss to Respondents on Load 2051 of $84.16. Instead, he explained Respondents' loss to Petitioner in the final August 1992 settlement documents as "original invoice $3,564.00, (meaning the originally anticipated revenues to Respondents) less actual receipts $1,743.04, (meaning the amount Smith had expected to receive after federal inspection and rejection of part of Load 2051 by the receiver, and not what Smith actually received from the receiver) for a balance of $1,820.96." Smith labelled that figure of $1,743.04 as "customer deducts" meaning it was Respondents' net loss due to actions of the receiver. He then deducted the $1,820.96 figure from the total amount owed by Respondents to Petitioner for three loads.

    
    

20. Mr. Smith admitted he had no authority or justification per his agreement with Petitioner for deducting the finder's fee of $108.00 he paid to Bobby Patton or his additional loss of $43.04, which occurred when the recipient promised $1743.04 and paid $1700.00. He also admitted he had no authority per Respondents' agreement with Petitioner to deduct anything attributable to freight charges.

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

21. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this cause pursuant to Section 120.57(1), F.S.

    
    

22. In agricultural product bond enforcement proceedings, a Petitioner has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the dealer defaulted on its agreement, and is indebted to the Petitioner. See Ernest

    Leclerq d/b/a Suncoast Farms, Inc. v. Orin H. Cape Produce, Inc. d/b/a South Dade Product, 9 FALR 852 (1986).

    
    

23. Petitioner's theory of recovery is that he understood he was selling his watermelons at a predetermined rate per pound as is, not subject to approval by a third party, the ultimate receiver.

    
    

24. Respondent Dealers' theory of the case is that enough was said at the time Jim Smith accepted Petitioner's goods in the field to show that Petitioner knew or should have known their agreement contemplated Petitioner's absorbing any loss on the melons reported to Respondents by the ultimate receiver.

    
    

25. There are no prior dealings between these parties by which their agreement in 1992 can be compared and construed in some standard operating context. There also is no evidence in this record of perishable agricultural goods industry standards covering the circumstances under the facts as found. No controlling "black letter law" or case citations have been provided by the parties.

    
    

26. Respondents never made clear to Petitioner that "ride the melons" or "help us out" or any other euphemism Smith employed on June 7, 1992 meant "share/spread out the loss to Respondents by Petitioner absorbing the loss for the bad melons and protecting the shipper on the quality of the melons when they reach the receiver," before the "deal" was sealed by the actual removal of the melons from Petitioners' field by Respondent Dealers' truck.

    
    

27. It is not the intention existing in the minds of one or more parties which governs, but the intent of the language used in a contract. See, Gendzier

    v. Bielecki. So.2d 604 (Fla. 1957), cited at 11 Fla. Jur 2d Contracts, Section 13.

    
    

28. It is also fundamental that doubtful language in a written contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who has elected that language, especially where he seeks to use the language to defeat the contract or its operation. In this regard, it has been held or indicated in a number of cases involving written contracts that doubtful or ambiguous language is to be construed against the party who drew the contract or chose the language used.

    In particular, ambiguous language will be construed against the party responsible for the drafting of the contract, where any other construction would produce an unjust result or defeat the purpose of the contract. See, 11 Fla.

    Jur. 2d Contracts, Section 106.

    
    

29. Herein, there was no original written contract, but an oral contract with ambiguous language utilized in Respondents' favor by Respondents. Petitioner's testimony was remarkably naive, but also credible, that he did not have enough knowledge of the industry to understand what was the legal or practical effect of the oral euphemisms employed by Respondent Jim Smith to stand for a partial indemnification. Considering the dearth of information provided and the sparsity of language employed by Smith, it is unlikely even a knowledgeable grower would have been completely sure the Respondents expected Petitioner to indemnify them without opportunity to challenge the receiver's rejection. Where an indemnification is sought, greater care must be taken.

    
    

30. Smith knew from the outset of his negotiations with the Petitioner that he was dealing with a novice--indeed, a rank amateur--in the sale of watermelons. While nothing herein should be construed to require dealers to become insurers of a grower's success, under the circumstances of these

    negotiations, it behooved Smith to make clear to Petitioner that any deal was a brokeraged deal and that Respondents would be relying on Petitioner to protect the dealers on quality. Otherwise, Petitioner could reasonably assume, as he did, that when Jim Smith and his employee, Dale Hire, accepted melons they already knew to be hollow-hearted, they were purchasing the melons "as is."

    
    

31. In reaching the foregoing conclusion, the undersigned accepts that Mr. Smith intended no fraud or sharp dealing. The speed with which the deal was consummated on June 7, 1992 and the Petitioner's naivete resulted in the initial confusion, but the written notation, "* protect shipper on quality (ripe)" was certainly added to the settlement documents by Respondents without further negotiation with Petitioner and contrary to Smith's promise he would tell Petitioner if the "potential problem" with the melons became a real one. Probably, it was added after the third party had challenged the quality of the melons in question. Thus, that notation can be considered a written modification of an oral contract.

    
    

32. Respondents' written notation, * "protect shipper on quality (ripe)," on the settlement sheets also is just as ambiguous as the oral euphemisms Mr. Smith employed at the time the "deal" was initially agreed upon in the field. The written notation gives no clue as to which entity is represented by the "*." Mr. Smith, in his initial oral negotiations with Petitioner, used the term "paying the shipper" to mean the amount Respondents had to pay to a trucker or "the freight" to cover the shipping costs, promising that shipping charges were not to be charged against Petitioner. Yet the after-the-fact written notation was interpreted by Smith in testimony at formal hearing as being used to mean that Petitioner had agreed to protect Respondents on melon loss. The after-the- fact written ambiguous language was selected by Respondents and is clearly only to Respondents' advantage.

    
    

33. If the terms of a written contract appear on their face to be inserted for the benefit of only one of the parties, he will be considered as having inserted such terms and as having chosen the language thereof. Any ambiguity as to such language is therefore to be construed more strongly against the party making use of such language, in this case, Respondents. See, 11 Fla. Jur 2d Contracts Section 106.

    
    

34. Also, a provision in a contract will be construed most strongly against the party who drafted it, and where an indemnification is not given by one in the insurance business but is given incident to a contract whose main purpose is not indemnification, the indemnity provision must be construed strictly in favor of the indemnitor. See, Home Savings of America, F.A. v. Roehmer 491 So.2d 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) Sol Walker & Co. v. Seaboard C.L.R. Co., 362 So.2d 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).

    
    

35. To be valid, contractual modifications must be assented to by both parties. Traditionally, at least, they must be supported by consideration. Also, he who asserts a modification, in this case Respondents, must affirmatively prove the other party's assent to the modification. See, 11 Fla. Jur. 2d Contracts, Section 159.

    
    

36. Herein, Respondents have not affirmatively proven Petitioner's assent to indemnify them.

    
    

37. Petitioner was certainly not notified of any problem the receiver had expressed concerning the melons before Respondents acquiesced in the third party's rejection of the melons. There is no evidence Petitioner agreed to rely

    on a federal inspection or to waive the opportunity to challenge the receiver's assessment of the melons in some way. This circumstance supports the conclusion that Petitioner never waived such options in agreeing to indemnify the Respondents for melon quality because he did not affirmatively agree to indemnify the Respondents for the melons, in the first place.

    
    

38. Also, Respondents unilaterally agreed to take what the ultimate receiver agreed to pay. Since nine subsequent loads of watermelons from the same field in approximately the same condition presented no problems, it is not credible that Load 2051 was worth less than 50 percent of the expected price. "Hollow- heart" is not a "ripeness" problem as expressed in the ambiguous written modification on the settlement sheets, either. "Hollow-heart" would have applied to all melons from the same field, regardless of when they were picked. The inspection sheet and the bill of lading do not support more than a

    17 percent loss. The inspection report suggests that 60-85 percent of Load 2051 were good melons. The bill of lading shows only approximately 17 percent of the melons were rejected by the receiver. Respondents handled all negotiations with the receiver. Respondents, and Respondents alone, chose to accept the amount the receiver finally chose to pay. Without a clear agreement from Petitioner that Petitioner would indemnify them, Respondents should bear the result of their own unilateral agreements with the receiver.

    
    

39. Petitioner was entitled, under the limited circumstances of this case, to view Respondents' purchase of Load 2051 to be an outright purchase by Respondents, without any guarantee or indemnification by Petitioner on the quality of the melons to Respondents against a third party's refusal. Due to the confusion occasioned by Respondents' bookkeeping system, $1820.96 is the reasonable amount to be awarded Petitioner.

RECOMMENDATION

Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture enter a Final Order awarding Petitioner $1,820.96 on Load 2051 only and binding Respondents to pay the full amount, but which in South Carolina Insurance Company's case shall be only to the extent of its bond.

RECOMMENDED this 5th day of August, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida.

ELLA JANE P. DAVIS

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 1993.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and

Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810

Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel

Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services

The Capitol, PL-10

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810

Brenda Hyatt, Chief

Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture and

Consumer Services

508 Mayo Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800

Greg Rushton

10940 N. Circle M Avenue Dunnellon, Florida 32630

James R. Smith

1. Randall Smith

   Midwest Marketing Company Post Office Box 193 Vincennes, IN 47591

   
   

   South Carolina Insurance Company 1501 Lady Street

   Columbia, SC 29201

   
   

   NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

   
   

   All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.

   =================================================================

   AGENCY FINAL ORDER

   =================================================================

   
   

   STATE OF FLORIDA

   DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES

   
   

   Greg Rushton,

   
   

   Petitioner,

   
   

   vs. DOAH CASE NO. 93-1223A

   LB CASE NO. 93-0006

   James R. Smith and D. Randall Smith, d/b/a Midwest Marketing Company and South Carolina Insurance Company,

   
   

   Respondents.

   /

   
   

   FINAL ORDER

   
   

   THIS CAUSE, arising under Florida's "Agricultural License and Bond Law" (Sections 604.15 - 604.34, Florida Statutes), came before the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Florida for consideration and final agency action. On December 1, 1992, the Petitioner, a producer of agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15 (3), Florida Statutes, timely filed an administrative complaint pursuant to Section 604.21, Florida Statutes, to collect $1,820.96 for watermelons it sold to Respondent, a licensed dealer in agricultural products.

   Respondent's license for the time in question was supported by a bond required by Section 604.20, Florida Statutes, written by South Carolina Insurance Company in the amount of $32,900. Subsequent to the Department's entry of its Order, the Respondent requested a hearing, so this matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for an administrative hearing in accordance with provisions of Section 120.57 (1), Florida Statutes. An administrative hearing was held in this matter on June 29, 1993. Neither party filed written exceptions to the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order.

   
   

   Upon the consideration of the foregoing and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is

   
   

   1. The Hearing Officer's findings of fact are adopted in toto as this agency's findings of fact.

      
      

   2. The Hearing Officer's conclusions of law are adopted in toto as this agency's conclusions of law.

      
      

   3. The Hearing Officer's Recommendation that the Respondent, James R. Smith and D. Randall Smith, d/b/a Midwest Marketing Company, be ordered to pay Petitioner $1,820.96 is approved and adopted but modified to reflect said payment to be paid within fifteen (15) days after this Order becomes final and in the event Respondent fails to pay Petitioner $1,820.96 within fifteen (15) days of the Final Order, South Carolina Insurance Company, as Surety for

Respondent is hereby ordered to provide payment to BOB CRAWFORD, COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE, under the conditions and provisions of the bond. This Order is final and effective on the date filed with the Clerk of the Department.

Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a petition or notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk, 5th Floor, Mayo Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800, and a copy of same with the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of rendition of this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of September 1993.

BOB CRAWFORD

COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE

ANN H. WAINWRIGHT

Assistant Commissioner of Agriculture Filed with Agency Clerk, this 30th day of September 1993.

Copies furnished:

Mr. Greg Rushton

10940 N. Circle M. Ave. Duunellon, Florida 32630

Messrs. James R. Smith and

D. Randall Smith, d/b/a Midwest Marketing Company

P.O. Box 193 Vincennes, IN 47591

South Carolina Insurance Company 1501 Lady Street

Columbia, SC 29201

Ms. Ella Jane P. Davis, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings

The DeSoto Building, 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

Mr. Jim Brooks, Field Representative

Docket for Case No: 93-001223

Orders for Case No: 93-001223