STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

PATRICIA THOMAS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 93-5740A

)

BOYER PRODUCE, INC. and )

SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU ) CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, )

)

Respondents. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, the above matter was heard before the Division of Administrative Hearings by its duly designated Hearing Officer, Donald R. Alexander, on November 16, 1993, in Gainesville, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Patricia Thomas, pro se

Post Office Box 522 Archer, Florida 32618

For Respondent: Kennedy Boyer (president) (Boyer Produce, 15A South West 2nd Avenue Inc.) Williston, Florida 32696

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue is whether Boyer Produce, Inc. and its surety, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, owe petitioner $1,751.80 as alleged in the complaint.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This matter began on August 17, 1993, when Charles Strange, Sr. filed a complaint with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department) alleging that respondent, Boyer Produce, Inc., licensed as a dealer in agricultural products, owed him $1,751.80 for a shipment of watermelons purchased by respondent from petitioner on July 17, 1993. More specifically, petitioner alleged that under an oral agreement by the parties, petitioner sold respondent a load of U. S. Grade No. 1 stripe watermelons at 4 cents per pound, and respondent failed to remit full payment for the debt. Respondent has filed an answer denying any indebtedness to petitioner. Its surety, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, has also been named as a respondent. The matter was referred by the Department to the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 8, 1993, with a request that a hearing officer be assigned to conduct a formal hearing.

By notice of hearing dated November 1, 1993, a final hearing was scheduled on November 16, 1993, in Gainesville, Florida. At final hearing, petitioner, Patricia Thomas, the wife of Charles Strange, Sr., requested that she be substituted as the petitioner in this case. The request was granted and the style of the case has been changed accordingly. Petitioner testified on her own behalf and presented the testimony of Charles Strange, Sr., Richard Strange, and Eddie Williams. Also, she offered petitioner's exhibit 1 which was received in evidence. Respondent, which was represented by its president and owner, Kennedy Boyer, presented the testimony of Kennedy Boyer, Randy Rowe, Linda Brooks, and Rupert Rowe. Finally, joint composite exhibit 1 was received in evidence.

There is no transcript of hearing. Proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were due on November 29, 1993. None were filed.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined:

1. In July 1993, petitioner, Patricia Thomas, was given authority by her brother to sell all remaining watermelons on his farm located in Citra, Florida. This amounted to approximately one truckload. She eventually sold them to respondent, Boyer Produce, Inc., a dealer (broker) in agricultural products located in Williston, Florida. Its owner and president is Kennedy Boyer (Boyer), who represented his firm in this proceeding. As an agricultural dealer, respondent is required to obtain a license from and post a surety bond with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department). In this case, the bond has been posted by respondent, Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, and is in the amount of $75,000.00.

   
   

2. Although the parties had never had business dealings before this transaction, through a mutual acquaintance, Randy Rowe, respondent learned that petitioner was interested in selling her watermelons. After Boyer visited the field and examined three watermelons which he described as "good," Boyer offered to purchase a truckload for 4 per pound if all melons were of the same quality. Thomas declined and counteroffered with a price of 5 per pound. The parties then agreed to split the difference and arrived at a sales price of 4 per pound. During the negotiations, Rowe acted as an intermediary between the parties and observed the formation of the contract as well as the loading of the goods onto the truck. Although the matter is in dispute, it is found that both parties agreed that Thomas would be paid 4 per pound for "good" watermelons delivered. This meant that petitioner would not be paid unless and until the watermelons were delivered to their final destination in "good" condition. In the trade, being in "good condition" meant that the watermelons would meet U. S. Grade No. 1 standards. Respondent also agreed to provide a truck and driver at petitioner's field and to transport the produce to Brooklyn, New York, the final destination. At the same time, petitioner was given the responsibility of loading the watermelons on the truck. To assist petitioner in meeting her up- front labor costs, respondent advanced $500.00 as partial payment for the shipment.

   
   

3. Winston Smith was hired by respondent to transport the melons to New York. He arrived at petitioner's field on Saturday, July 16, 1993, and remained there while approximately 46,000 pounds of melons were loaded on an open top flat bed trailer. One of the loaders said the melons were "packed real tight," and four bales of straw were used in packing. According to Rowe, who observed the loading, the watermelons packed that day were in "good" condition, and any

   nonconforming watermelons were "kicked" off the truck. Also, by way of admission, the driver, as agent for Boyer, acknowledged to Rowe that the melons loaded were in "good" condition.

   
   

4. Late that afternoon, a thunderstorm came through the area and, due to lightening, no further loading could be performed. Since around 46,000 pounds had already been loaded, petitioner desired for the truck to be sent on its way north. Smith, however, told petitioner he wanted 50,000 pounds in order to make his trip to New York worthwhile and he would not go with anything less.

   Acceding to his wishes, petitioner agreed to meet Smith the next morning and load an additional two hundred watermelons, or 4,000 pounds, on the truck.

   Smith then drove the loaded truck to a nearby motel where he spent the night. That evening it rained, and this resulted in the uncovered watermelons and straw getting wet.

   
   

5. The next morning, Smith telephoned petitioner and advised her to meet him at 9:00 a. m. at a local Starvin' Marvin store, which had a weight scale that could certify the weight of the shipment. Petitioner carried two hundred watermelons to the store at 9:00 a. m., but Smith did not arrive. Around noon, she received a call from Smith advising that his truck was broken down at the motel and would not start. The watermelons were then taken to the motel and loaded onto the trailer. In all, 50,040 pounds were loaded.

   
   

6. Smith's truck would still not start after the watermelons were loaded, and Smith refused to spend any money out of his own pocket to repair the truck. Not wanting to delay the shipment any longer, petitioner gave Smith $35.00 to have someone assist him in starting the vehicle. In order for the repairs to be made, the loaded trailer had to be jacked up and the truck unhooked from and later rehooked to the trailer. This was accomplished only with great difficulty, and Smith was forced to "jostle" the trailer with the power unit for some two hours altogether. According to Rowe, he warned Smith that such jostling could bruise the melons and "mess them up." Smith was also cautioned early on that he should make the necessary repairs as soon as possible so that the load of watermelons would not continue to sit uncovered in the sun. The truck eventually departed around 9:00 p. m., Sunday evening after the uncovered trailer had sat in the sun all day.

   
   

7. The shipment was delivered to Brooklyn on the following Tuesday afternoon or evening, and it was inspected by a government inspector on Wednesday morning. According to the inspection report, which has been received in evidence, the load was split evenly between crimson and jubilee melons, and

   23 percent and 21 percent, respectively, of the two types of melons failed to meet grade. No greater than a 12 percent "margin" is allowed on government inspections. Almost all of the defects cited in the report were attributable to the melons being "over-ripe."

   
   

8. The buyer in New York rejected the entire shipment as not meeting standards. Respondent then sold the shipment for only $1350.00 resulting in a loss of $350.00 on the transaction. In addition, respondent says the driver (Smith) accepted $1200.00 instead of the $2,000.00 he would have normally charged to transport a load to New York. When petitioner asked for her money a few weeks later, respondent declined, saying the goods had not met specification when delivered to their destination, and if she had any remedy at all, it was against Smith, the driver. If petitioner had been paid 4 per pound for the entire shipment, she would have been entitled to an additional $1,751.80, or a total of $2,251.80.

9. Petitioner contends that the melons failed to meet grade because of the negligence of the driver. More specifically, she says the loaded melons sat in the sun for almost two days, including all day Sunday after being soaked from the Saturday evening rain. If wet melons are exposed to the hot sun for any length of time, they run the risk of "wet burning," which causes decay. But even if this occurred, only 1 percent of the shipment was found to have "decay" by the government inspector. Petitioner also says that by being jostled for two hours on Sunday, the melons were bruised. Again, however, the melons were rejected primarily because they were over-ripe, not bruised. Therefore, and consistent with the findings in the inspection report, it is found that the jostling and wet burning did not have a material impact on the quality of the melons.

   
   

10. Respondent contended the melons were close to being fully ripened when they were picked and loaded. In this regard, Charles Strange, Sr. agreed that if the melons sat in the field for another four or five days, they would have started "going bad." By this, it may be reasonably inferred that, unless the melons were loaded and delivered in a timely manner, they would have become

    over-ripe and would not meet grade within a matter of days. Therefore, a timely delivery of the melons was extremely important, and to the extent respondent's agent, Smith, experienced at least a twenty-four hour delay in delivering the melons through no fault of petitioner, this contributed in part to their failure to meet grade. Petitioner is accordingly entitled to some additional compensation, a fair allocation of which is one-half of the value of the shipment, or $1125.90, less the $500.00 already paid.

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

11. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties hereto pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

    
    

12. In order to conduct business in the state as a dealer in agricultural products, respondent must deliver to the Department a bond "conditioned to secure the faithful accounting for and payment to producers (such as petitioner)

    . . . of the proceeds of all agricultural products handled or purchased by such dealer." Subsection 604.20(1), Florida Statutes. When any person claims to be damaged by any breach of conditions of a bond, he may file a complaint with the Department within six months after the date of sale of the products. Subsection 604.21(1), Florida Statutes. In this case, the complaint was timely filed. By agreeing to allow this forum to resolve their dispute, the parties have implicitly presumed the existence of a valid oral contract. J. R. Sales, Inc.

    v. Earl Dicks, 521 So.2d 366, 369 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

    
    

13. As the party claiming a breach of conditions of a bond, petitioner bears the burden of showing her entitlement to the requested money by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Pine Island Farms, Inc. v. Five Brothers Produce, Inc. and Fla. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., Case No. 90- 6460A (DACS, June 4, 1991); Fla. Department of Transportation v. J.W.C. Company, Inc., 397 So.2d 778, 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

    
    

14. Under the terms of the parties' agreement, petitioner would not be paid unless and until the melons were delivered to destination and met grade. Ordinarily, a failure to meet grade would relieve respondent of any obligation to pay the seller the agreed upon price. Here, however, respondent's agent was directly responsible for delaying the delivery of the melons for at least one full day, thereby contributing in part to their deterioration. Petitioner is

accordingly entitled to a fair apportionment of the value of the shipment. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, a fair apportionment is deemed to be 50 percent of the value of the shipment, or $1125.90. After being given credit for $500.00 already paid, petitioner should receive an additional

$625.90.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture

and Consumer Services requiring respondent to pay petitioner $625.90 within thirty days from date of the agency's final order. In the event such payment is not timely made, the surety should be liable for such payment.

DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida.

DONALD R. ALEXANDER

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1993.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810

Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond

508 Mayo Building

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800

Richard A. Tritschler, Esquire The Capitol, PL-10

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810

Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company

Post Office Box 1985

Jackson, Mississippi 39215-1985

Patricia Thomas Post Office Box 522

Archer, Florida 32618

Kennedy Boyer

15A South West 2nd Avenue Williston, Florida 32696

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit to the agency written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least ten days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.

=================================================================

AGENCY FINAL ORDER

=================================================================

STATE OF FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES

PATRICIA THOMAS,

Petitioner,

vs. DOAH # 93-5740A

DACS # 94-0028

BOYER PRODUCE, INC. and SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Respondents.

/

FINAL ORDER

THIS CAUSE came before the Commissioner of Agriculture for consideration and final agency action.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In August, 1993, Petitioner, a producer of watermelons, timely filed an administrative complaint pursuant to Section 604.21, Florida Statutes, against Respondent, a licensed dealer in agricultural products in the amount of

$1,751.80. The Respondent's license for the pertinent time period was supported by bond issued by Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, Co- respondent, as required by Section 604.20, Florida Statutes. The Respondent timely answered, denying the claim. Pursuant to Section 604.21(4), Florida Statutes, the Department referred this matter for formal administrative hearing in accordance with Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, before the Division of

Administrative Hearings. A formal hearing was held before Hearing Officer Donald R. Alexander of the State of Florida Division of Administrative Hearings on November 16, 1993.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This dispute between the parties is over who is to shoulder the financial burden caused by the rejection of the watermelons at their desitation due to their condition.

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Neither party submitted proposed findings of fact. On December 2, 1993, the Hearing Officer rendered his Recommended Order finding in favor of Petitioner in the amount of $625.90. An order to make payment within 30 days of the Final Order and collection of the amount due from the Co-respondent, if Respondent fails to make timely payment was recommended. The Recommended Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

Exceptions were filed by the Respondent on December 17, 1993.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 120.57(1)(B)10 establishes the standard for review of a Recommended Order. It reads:

The agency may adopt the recommended order as the final order of the agency. The agency in its final order may reject or modify the conclusions of law and interpretation of administrative rules in the recommended order, but may not reject or modify the findings of fact unless the agency first determines from a review of the complete record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply with essential requirements of law.

The agency may accept the recommended penalty in a recommended order, but may not reduce or increase it without a review of the complete record and without stating with particularity its reasons therefor in the order, by citing to the record in justifying the action. ...

It is well established that a Hearing Officer's findings of fact may not be discarded by the reviewing agency unless they are "not based on competent substantial evidence." Section 120.57(1)(b)102; Venetian Shores Home & Prop. Own. v. Ruzakawski, 336 So.2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). When an agency does substitute its own findings, a reviewing court

will naturally accord greater probative force to the hearing officer's contrary findings when the question is simply the weight or credibility of testimony by witnesses, or when the factual issues are otherwise susceptible

of ordinary methods of proof, or when concerning those facts the agency may not rightfully claim special insight. [but]

where the ultimate facts are increasingly matters of opinion and opinions are increasingly infused by policy considerations for which the agency has special responsibility, a reviewing court will give correspondingly less weight to the hearing officer's findings in determining the substantiality of evidence supporting the agency's substituted findings. McDonald v.

Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569, 579 (Fla., 1st DCA 1977)

It is the hearing officer's function to consider all the evidence presented, resolve conflicts, judge credibility of witnesses, draw permissible inferences from the evidence, and reach ultimate findings of fact based on competent substantial evidence. If, as is often the case, the evidence presented supports two inconsistent findings, it is the hearing officer's role to decide the issue one way or the other. The agency may not reject the hearing officer's finding unless there is no competent, substantial evidence from which the finding could reasonably be inferred.

Heifetz v. Dept. of Business Regulation, 475 So.2d 1277, 1282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

A Hearing Officer's recommended conclusions of law and interpretation of administrative rules, may be rejected or modified by an agency. 120.57(b)(10), Florida Statutes.

Competent substantial evidence on which to base finding of fact "need not be enough to support the finding but there must be some competent evidence supporting or corroborating the incompetent evidence upon which a finding is bottomed. It is the evidence, not the competent evidence, that must be substantial." Florida Administrative Practice, Section 2.44 (citing Schwartz, Administrative Law, 340 (1976) and De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So.2d 912 (Fla 1957))(emphasis added:). An agency cannot substitute its view for that of the hearing officer if the recommended order and the findings thereunder are supported by substantial competent evidence. School Bd. of Leon County v.

Hargis, 400 So.2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); AFL-CIO Local 1010 v. Anderson, 401

So.2d 824 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).

RULINGS ON RESPONDENT'S EXCEPTIONS TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER

Respondent's first exception appears to assert that the Hearing Officer erred when he substituted Patricia Thomas as Petitioner, in place of her husband. The substitution did not operate to the prejudice of Respondent; therefore, the exception will not be granted. Other exceptions taken, which are premised upon this substitution of parties, will not be addressed. For example, statements that negotiations took place between Respondent and the Petitioner, rather than between Respondent and Petitioner's husband, do not affect the

outcome of this matter in any material way. Whether Mr. Strange was acting in his own behalf, or on behalf of his wife, the facts of this case are unchanged.

Respondent takes issue with the use of the word "sell" in this matter.

Respondent maintains that it acted as a "broker", not a "buyer." On this issue there was conflicting testimony. The hearing officer found, that the agreement between the parties with regard to these watermelons was that advanced by the Respondent and characterized by Respondent as a "brokerage" agreement. See Recommended Order at page 4. If a form of the word "sell" is used in a technically improper way in the Recommended Order from time to time, it has no material bearing on the outcome, because on this issue the Hearing Officer found in Respondent's favor.

Similarly, Respondent states that it did not visit the field to examine the watermelons, but that they were brought to his office. Indeed that is what the record reflects. Tr. p. 9 lines 3-7. The exception is well taken but, once again, it is a distinction without a difference. As stated above this was a brokerage arrangement and "Boyer and Strange mutually agreed that Boyer would make arrangements for the melons to be delivered to a buyer and that Strange would receive a final price of 4.5 cents per pound when the melons were received in good ... condition." Exception 2. The second sentence in paragraph 2 of the Recommended Order's Findings of Fact Section will be amended to remove all references to a field visit by Boyer to examine the watermelons.

Respondent next takes exception to the finding of fact that the melons were in good condition, according to Rowe. Respondent states that Rowe "is not an expert and has no training in quality." Exception 3. Rowe did so testify, although he was not qualified as an expert. Everyone who was present on the field and involved in the packing of the truck testified that the packed watermelons were in good condition. Tr. p. 11, lines 17-19, p. 26, lines 18, 20, p. 29, lines 15-16, Charles Strange (his experience: pace 18, lines 6-25,

1. 41, lines 1-3); p. 66, lines 8-17, Richard Strange (his experience page 65, lines 15-17 and p. 66, lines 5-7); p. 80, lines 15-21, Eddie Williams, (experience, same). The exception may be well taken because Rowe lacked the expertise to testify as an expert, but there was ample evidence on the issue to support the finding. The reference to Mr. Rowe, will be removed from the finding. Respondent continues, in this exception, to argue that the melons were of poor quality when loaded. This argument is based on hearsay from a Charles Parrot, Director of the South East Region of the PACA. No finding of fact can be based on hearsay alone, and in this instance hearsay is the only evidence that the melons were of poor quality when loaded, all of the direct evidence is to the contrary. Further, even if it could be argued that there is circumstantial evidence which would support the hearsay, there is ample evidence in the record upon which the Hearing Officer's finding can be premised.

   
   

   In exception 4, Respondent takes issue with the finding of fact set forth in paragraph 4 of the Recommended Order, but apparently misread the finding.

   There is no difference between the finding and that which the Respondent suggests. The truck driver wanted a load of 50,000 pounds before he left for New York.

   
   

   The exception numbered 5&6, is not an exception but argument. It reiterates the position of Respondent that the melons were not in good condition when loaded. This, as stated before, has been contraverted by direct evidence, which was relied upon by the Hearing Officer, and properly so. The finding of the Hearing Officer is supported by the record. This exception is not well taken.

   The next exception is also argument. Respondent argues that the statement that the melons sat in the sun for two days is somehow incorrect, because the first day was the day they were loaded. It is not clear how the fact that they were being loaded negates the fact that they were sitting in the sun. This exception is not well taken.

   
   

   In the exception numbered 10, the Respondent takes issue with the finding that it contended that the melons were close to being fully ripened when they were picked and loaded. He asserts that he states "the melons were overripe at the time of loading as evidenced by the inspection report." The fact of the matter is that Mr. Boyer's testimony is recorded in the transcript beginning on page 115 and ending on page 128, and at no place did he testify that the melons were overripe at the time of loading. Neither does the record reveal a statement that the melons were close to being fully ripened by Mr. Boyer.

   Obviously, anything that Respondent now states is not and cannot be evidence in this case. However, Mr. Strange did testify that the melons were within four or five days of starting to go bad. Tr. p. 25 lines 8-25. An inference that the melons were close to being fully ripened can be drawn from the questions and answers beginning at Tr. p. 24, line 15 and ending at Tr. p. 29, line 23.

   Paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact will be amended to establish that the testimony gave rise to the inference, rather than attributing that statement to a contention of the Respondent.

   
   

   Respondent next argues with a finding of the Hearing Officer rather than taking exception to it. The record clearly establishes that the shipment of these melons was delayed by the trucker. Tr. p. 12, line 16 to Tr. p. 15, line 21; Tr. p. 49, line 15 to Tr. p. 52, line 5. Forty odd thousand pounds of watermelons were loaded on the truck by early evening on Saturday, the truck did not leave Florida until early in the evening of Sunday. That is a one day delay. The argument of Respondent in this regard is specious. The fact that arrival on Tuesday in New York of a truck shipment which left Florida on Sunday is timely, does not negate the obvious conclusion that the truck would have arrived on Monday, if it had left on Saturday. The delay was not between Florida and New York, the delay was the holdover from Saturday evening until Sunday evening.

   
   

   Respondent then attacks the Hearing Officer's Conclusions of Law, but, the attack is argument, nothing more. The attack does not present any legal basis for amending the conclusions of law. It merely assumes that the facts are contrary to those found, and supported by the record, and therefore assumes that the conclusions of law must be changed. However, having failed to establish the facts as Respondent wishes them to be, there is no basis for overturning the conclusions of law.

   
   

   The recommended Order of the Hearing Officer is to be amended to provide for payment within fifteen (15) days, rather than thirty (30) days, because of the requirements of section 604.21(7), Florida Statutes.

   
   

   Upon consideration of the record in this case, the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order, exceptions filed by the Respondent and having been otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

   
   

   1. The Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact are approved, adopted and incorporated herein in toto as this Agency's Findings of Fact, with the exceptions of paragraphs two, three and ten which are hereby amended to read as follows:

   2. The second sentence of the second paragraph is changed to read "After Boyer

      examined three watermelons which he described as `good, .

      
      

   3. The fourth sentence of the third

paragraph is changed to read "According to Charles Strange, Richard Strange and Eddie Williams, each of whom observed the loading, the watermelons packed were in `good' condition, . .

10. The first sentence of the tenth

paragraph is changed to read "From testimony, it is inferred that the melons were close to being fully ripened when they were picked and loaded."

1. The Hearing Officer's Conclusions of Law are approved, adopted and incorporated herein in toto as this Agency's Conclusions of Law.

   
   

2. The Respondent shall, within fifteen (15) days from rendition of this Order, pay the amount of $625.90 to Petitioner.

   
   

3. Should Respondent fail to timely pay such sum, demand for payment shall be made upon Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, the surety underwriting Respondent's bond for the 1993 season, with the proceeds therefrom to be held for distribution pursuant to the provisions of Florida law. Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Review proceedings must be instituted by filing two copies of a petition or notice of appeal with the Clerk at 515 Mayo Building, Tallahassee Florida 32399-0800 within thirty (30) days of rendition of this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of March, 1994.

BOB CRAWFORD

Commissioner of Agriculture

Ann H. Wainwright Assistant Commissioner

Filed with the Clerk, this 3rd day of March, 1994.

Barbara R. Edwards Agency Clerk

COPIES FURNISHED:

Brenda D. Hyatt Chief Patricia Thomas

Bureau of Licence & Bond P.O. Box 522

FDACS Archer, Florida 32618

Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Kennedy Boyer Insurance Company 15A. S.W. 2nd Avenue

P.O. Box 1985 Williston, Florida 32696 Jackson, MS 39215-1985

Docket for Case No: 93-005740

Orders for Case No: 93-005740